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SUMMARY 
 
This thesis adds to the historiography on British foreign policy towards the Soviet 
Union in the early Cold War by closely examining the work of the Russia Committee, a 
secret organisation within the Foreign Office, in order to assess its influence on the 
formation of foreign policy in the early Cold War.  The research undertaken was based 
on the scrutiny of the official Foreign Office Archives, of the meetings and papers of 
the Russia Committee from its inception in March 1946 to the early 1950s, as well as 
Cabinet papers, private papers of key individuals, diaries and memoirs and relevant 
secondary historical sources.    
It concludes that the Russia Committee was a vital piece in the jigsaw of intelligence 
provision to the British government on Soviet Communist expansionism, and for a time 
was the only body collecting and analysing all aspects of Soviet activities.  It helped to 
determine how to deal with the emerging circumstances and tensions. It recognises 
that policy formation was a joint enterprise on the part of the Foreign Secretary, 
Ernest Bevin for most of the years covered, and his Foreign Office advisers and helped 
Ministers to determine how to deal with the emerging threats.  It concludes that the 
Russia Committee inevitably influenced the decisions taken by Ministers. The inability 
to prove the extent of that influence does not, it concludes, negate the case for such 
influence to have occurred. It further concludes that the strong relationship of trust 
and respect between Bevin and his official advisers aided his strong leadership both as 
Foreign Secretary and a towering figure of the two Attlee administrations from 1945 
onwards.  
i 
 
Table of Contents 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS .......................................................................................... IV 
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................... 1 
Cold War Origins .............................................................................................................................. 7 
Three different governments in eight years ....................................................................................11 
Contrasting stability in the Foreign Office .......................................................................................23 
CHAPTER 2   COLD WAR ORIGINS – EMERGING CONCERNS ...................................... 30 
Yalta ...............................................................................................................................................30 
Emerging concerns of US about Soviet policy – enter George Kennan ............................................32 
Three Weeks in Summer 1945 – ‘Stock Taking after VE Day’ – enter Sir Orme Garton Sargent .......32 
Bevin as Foreign Secretary and Return to Potsdam ........................................................................48 
Potsdam – the turning point ...........................................................................................................50 
First Foreign Secretaries Conference – Bevin’s tussles with Molotov ..............................................53 
Continuity of foreign policy and personnel .....................................................................................56 
Conclusion ......................................................................................................................................58 
CHAPTER 3  1946 A PIVOTAL YEAR .......................................................................... 62 
Stalin’s Election Speech ..................................................................................................................63 
George Kennan’s Long Telegram .....................................................................................................65 
Churchill’s Iron Curtain Speech .......................................................................................................70 
Frank Roberts’ Long Telegram ........................................................................................................74 
Paris Council of Foreign Ministers and Peace Conference ...............................................................79 
ii 
 
Conclusion ......................................................................................................................................81 
CHAPTER 4   SETTING UP THE RUSSIA COMMITTEE .................................................. 84 
Why it was set up ...........................................................................................................................84 
Who set up the Russia Committee ..................................................................................................86 
CHAPTER 5  PHASE I OF RUSSIA COMMITTEE WORK 1946 TO 1948 .................... 97 
1946  A Strong Beginning ................................................................................................................97 
1947  The Russia Committee Getting into its Stride ...................................................................... 121 
1948 Highlights ............................................................................................................................. 130 
CHAPTER 6  PHASE II OF RUSSIA COMMITTEE WORK  1949  TO  1952 ..................... 142 
Changes to the Russia Committee ................................................................................................ 143 
The Russia Committee ‘Crystal Gazers’ ......................................................................................... 147 
Further Engagement of Ministers with the Russia Committee ...................................................... 149 
CHAPTER 7  FOREIGN POLICY HIGHLIGHTS FOR THE ATTLEE ADMINISTRATIONS .... 156 
Atomic Race .................................................................................................................................. 157 
Titoism.......................................................................................................................................... 161 
China ............................................................................................................................................ 167 
CHAPTER 8   THE END OF THE RUSSIA COMMITTEE AND THE GROWTH OF PARALLEL 
FOREIGN AFFAIRS ADVISORY BODIES WITHIN GOVERNMENT ................................ 176 
CHAPTER 9  CONCLUSION - THE RUSSIA COMMITTEE IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 185 
BIBLIOGRAPHY ..................................................................................................... 200 
APPENDIX 1  RUSSIA COMMITTEE MINUTES AND KEY PAPERS ............................... 229 
iii 
 
APPENDIX 2 RUSSIA COMMITTEE MEMBERS AND OTHER KEY OFFICIALS ............... 314 
APPENDIX  3  COLD WAR CHRONOLOGY ................................................................ 340 
 
iv 
 
List of Abbreviations 
AC(O)   - Official Committee on Communism Overseas 
AC(H)  - Official Committee on Communism Home  
BBC  - British Broadcasting Corporation 
CIA  - Central Intelligence Agency 
CID  - Committee of Imperial Defence 
CO  - Colonial Office 
CPG  - Chinese People’s Government 
CRO  - Commonwealth Relations Office 
DIS  - Defence Intelligence Service 
ECITO  - European Central Inland Transport Organisation 
ERP  - Economic Recovery Plan (ie the Marshall Plan) 
FOI(A)  - Freedom of Information Act 
FORD  - Foreign Office Research Department 
GCHQ  - Government Communications Head Quarters 
ID  - Information Department  
IRD  - Information Research Department 
IDC  - International Danube Commission 
JIC  - Joint Intelligence Committee 
LON  - League of Nations 
NATO  - North Atlantic Treaty Organisation  
NHS  - National Health Service 
OEEC  - Organisation for European Economic Cooperation 
OPC  - Overseas Planning Committee 
PID  - Political Intelligence Department of the Foreign Office 
PS  - Private Secretary 
PPS  -  Principal Private Secretary 
PRAs  - Public Records Acts 
PUS  - Permanent Under Secretary 
PUSC  - Permanent Under Secretary’s Committee 
PUSD  - Permanent Under Secretary’s Department 
PWE  - Political Warfare Executive 
v 
 
MI5  - Security Service 
MI6  - Secret Intelligence Service 
MoI  - Ministry of Information 
NSA  - National Security Archive 
SIS  - Secret Intelligence Service 
SOE  - Special Operations Executive 
TGWU  - Transport and General Workers Union 
TNA   -  The National Archives 
UNO  -  United Nations  
UNSC  - United Nations Security Council 
UNWCC - United Nations War Crimes Commission 
US  - United States 
VE Day - Victory in Europe Day 
WCC  - War Crimes Commission  
1 
 
The Russia Committee of the British Foreign Office:  its Influence on 
Foreign Policy Formation in the Early Cold War  
 
There is no period so remote as the recent past and one 
of the historian’s jobs is to anticipate what our perspective 
on the recent past will be.         Alan Bennett ‘The History Boys’.1 
 
Chapter 1 Introduction  
This thesis, through the examination of the impact of the information gathering body 
within the British Foreign Office known as the Russia Committee, attempts to 
understand the way in which that organisation influenced the formation of the British 
government’s foreign policy towards the Soviet Union in the early Cold War.  It looks at 
the relationship between government ministers and officials as seen through the lens 
of the Russia Committee, examining the contribution of the ‘big hitters’ in influencing 
policy, both the key officials and the Ministers. It takes a fresh look at the whole issue 
as to when Ernest Bevin changed his initial stance towards the Soviets.  It also aims to 
take a comprehensive look at the work of the Committee over its whole life span from 
early 1946 through to late 1957;  to chart the ebbs and flows in its reach and influence 
over that life span;  and attempts to draw conclusions about the contribution the work 
of the Committee made to our greater understanding of the Cold War.   
 
With the exception of one academic article which largely concerned the first two years 
of the Russia Committee’s work, there are relatively few references to this 
Committee’s existence in secondary academic works.   Because of the nature of the 
beast - that is a Whitehall Committee whose membership was drawn, at least initially, 
purely from high level Whitehall based diplomats - the assessment of the impact of the 
Committee’s work presents certain challenges, not least because the membership of 
such committees comprises  largely anonymous (outside of Whitehall) public servants 
and insight to the nature and influence of their work, mostly of a secret nature, has to 
be gained primarily from their papers and minutes of discussions.  The papers of the 
                                                     
1 Permission to use quotation sought from United Agents, 12-26 Lexington Street, London, W1F OLE. 
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Committee were for many years not made available to the public at The National 
Archives (TNA)2 so that until comparatively recently the organisation was shrouded in 
secrecy.  These are now largely in the public domain but some have yet to be released.  
The most recent releases were in 2013,3 and doubtless more will eventually come to 
light.    The official archives provide a sound basis for study of the work of the 
Committee but not generally an indication of what was being achieved through that 
work and the sparse secondary sources, such as do exist, tend not to extend to 
attempts to assess the value of the Committee’s contribution to policy formation.   
 
The most comprehensive outline and analysis of the work of the Russia Committee to 
date has been the article, published by Ray Merrick in 19854 which looked at the years 
1946 and 1947.  Although the Committee was established in March 1946 and existed 
thereafter for just over 12 years, Merrick concentrated on 1946 and 1947, not because 
they were significant years in the life of the Russia Committee, though they 
undoubtedly were, but because at the time of his research the only papers available to 
researchers, were those which were first released into the public domain in the early 
1980s under the 30 year rule5 and it was these early releases that were plumbed by 
Merrick for his article. He takes a broad view of the work of the Russia Committee 
from April 1946 to the end of 1947 and paints a clear picture of the Foreign Office 
officials being persuaded,  from at least as early as 1945 onwards, that action needed 
to be taken to counteract Soviet policy, whereas Ernest Bevin, he argues, was not 
ready until the end of 1947 -  and, in particular, not until after the November 1947 
Moscow Council of Foreign Ministers - to actually accept and put to Cabinet, and then 
                                                     
2 The National Archives (TNA) based in Kew, Richmond, holds all the released Public Records available to 
the public plus some which are held there but remain closed and held in secure accommodation. 
3 TNA releases on 21 May 2013, including FO 1093/576-582 dealing with the setting up of the 
Permanent Under Secretary’s Committee (PUSC) and including the minutes of PUSC meetings from 
1949-50 and references to the Russia Committee. 
4 Merrick, Ray. The Russia Committee of the British Foreign Office and the Cold War, 1946-47.  Journal of 
Contemporary History Volume 20 (1985), 453-468. 
5 The Public Records Acts (PRAs) of 1958 and 1967 initially imposed a 50 year rule on the release of 
government official documents and this was reduced in 1968, during Harold Wilson’s Labour 
government of 1964 to 1970, to a 30 year rule.  The PRAs established the criteria under which official 
records generated by government departments would be eligible for release to the public at TNA or for 
further retention if they were deemed by expert reviewers, after applying the criteria, to be too 
sensitive to release for a further period, in which case they would be retained for a further period and 
would be re-reviewed under sensitivity criteria normally after ten more years.  
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to the House of Commons, that the policies recommended by the Russia Committee 
should be adopted.  As will be contended in later chapters of this thesis, while it was, 
indeed, clear in 1945 that some of the most senior and influential diplomats were 
becoming concerned about Soviet intentions, it is not necessarily true to say that Bevin 
did not ‘accept’ that there was cause for concern.  The fact that he did not publicly 
voice his concerns was not necessarily an indication of Bevin's private views on the 
acceptability of the Russia Committee’s recommendations or, indeed, of his persuasion 
that the foreign policy of the Soviets needed to be countered.   
 
Another of the challenges in researching this thesis has been the anonymity of many of 
the key characters simply because most of them were civil servants or diplomats who 
were bound by the conventions of secrecy surrounding their work.  From an outsider’s 
point of view the world of the senior echelons of Whitehall are often shrouded in 
mystery and appreciation of the influence that individuals can have on policy 
formation may be difficult to comprehend.6  A clearer understanding of individual 
contributions is possible in relation to elected politicians, of course, from the media, 
from biographies, diaries, memoirs, parliamentary proceedings and archives.  For most 
of the largely ‘invisible’ men behind the politicians, however, the data is restricted.  
But from an historiographical viewpoint it is important to try to put some flesh on the 
bones so as better to understand the inner workings of Whitehall and the extent of 
influence that key individuals can have.  Fortunately, there are a few, albeit 
comparatively rare, examples of former senior public servants’ diaries, memoirs, and 
personal papers having been donated to archive centres and this thesis draws on some 
of these.  As was written about one such set of diaries: “...there remains something 
baffling about British statecraft ..the key to the mystery is to be found not only in 
official documents but in memoirs by men on the inner circle at the time.  These bring 
out the personal attitudes, prejudices and subjective reasoning of the men in power”.7  
 
                                                     
6 The author of this thesis was, until 2016, a senior civil servant in the Cabinet Office, Whitehall. 
7 Review by Iverach McDonald of The Times on The War Diaries of Oliver Harvey 1941-1945. Published 
Collins, 1978. 
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This thesis, therefore, attempts to shed light on the role and influence of the diplomats 
of the British Foreign Office during the early part of the Cold War, focussing in 
particular on the work of the Russia Committee which was set up to monitor Soviet 
expansionism and to: “..review the development of all aspects of Soviet policy and 
propaganda and Soviet activities throughout the world...... with reference to the Soviet 
campaign against this country.... to consider what action is required ....” 8  
 
The Foreign Office is the largest and is, arguably, second only to the loosely combined 
departments of No 10 Downing Street and the Cabinet Office9 as being the most 
powerful of the British ‘civil service’ departments.  Certainly, it is, by its nature, the 
most influential advisory body to the British government on foreign policy.10  With its 
embassies and consulates throughout the world it is now, and it was in the 1940s and 
1950s, well placed to gather information and feed it back to the policy makers in 
Whitehall.  However, while the Foreign Office may have had a wealth of expertise, and 
the stream of information available to them from their outposts all over the world 
amounted to a formidable feedstock, at times it had to work hard to make its voice 
heard and to exert its influence. Indeed, it is claimed that in the early 1950s, the 
Foreign Office had a worrying “relative lack of influence within Whitehall.”11  
 
Towards the end of the Second World War the Foreign Office saw it as being vital to 
engender good and co-operative working relationships with the Soviet Union as well as 
seeing the need to “make use of American power for purposes which we regard as 
good”.12  At this time their colleagues in the British military senior ranks were taking a 
different and a more hard-lined, even suspicious, attitude towards the Soviets and as 
early as the summer of 1944 the British military were expressing fears about future 
                                                     
8TNA:  FO 371/N56885/N5170/38.  Extract from the Russia Committee Terms of Reference – see 
Chapter 5, Page 103 for full Terms of Reference. 
9 While technically there is no Prime Minister’s Department in the UK, the Cabinet Office and No 10 are 
so closely aligned and work together on so many issues that together they could be said to form a de-
facto Prime Minister’s Department.  
10 In recent times the Prime Minister has had his or her own Principal Foreign Policy Adviser in 10 
Downing Street but such a position, while potentially highly influential, cannot compete with the 
coverage, influence, and sheer manpower of the Foreign Office. 
11 Beck, Peter J.  Using History, Making British Policy:  The Treasury and the Foreign Office 1950-76.  
Published Palgrave, 2006. Page 210. 
12 TNA:  FO 371/38523. AN1538. 
5 
 
Soviet intentions.  In his war diary entry for 27 July 1944, for example, Alan Brooke13 
demonstrated impressive prescience when he said:  “Germany is no longer the 
dominating power of Europe, Russia is.  Unfortunately Russia is not entirely European.  
She has however vast resources and cannot fail to become the main threat in 15 years 
from now.  Therefore foster Germany, gradually build her up, bring her into a 
federation of Western Europe.  Unfortunately this must all be done under the cloak of 
a holy alliance between England, Russia and America”.14 
 
Attitudes within the Foreign Office were, however, changing and by as early as April 
1945, Sir Orme Sargent,15   then Deputy Under-Secretary, and therefore one of the 
most senior officials within the Foreign Office and who was to be a central character in 
the life of the Russia Committee, was identifying the need for the Foreign Office to re-
think policy towards the Soviet Union: “I wonder whether the changes in the war 
situation has not come to change the technique of our diplomacy towards the Soviet 
Union.......(hitherto) it was only prudent that we should in our diplomatic dealings with 
the Soviet Government set ourselves to propitiate our Russian Ally.....the situation has 
radically changed.....”. 16  
 
The minute from which the above extract is taken is cited by Graham Ross as being a 
key Foreign Office document from the time.  Orme Sargent, author of the minute 
which went both to his boss, Alexander Cadogan, and his Secretary of State, Anthony 
Eden,  spelt out his views on the changes that were taking place in the relationships 
between the Soviet Union and the West and argued that while it had been prudent to 
try to maintain good relations with the Soviets while they were in such a strong 
position militarily within Europe, the time had come to challenge them.  He described 
how the situation had changed markedly following the “opening of the heart of 
                                                     
13 Field Marshal Alan Francis Brooke (later Viscount Alanbrooke) was Chief of the Imperial General Staff 
and Chairman of the influential Chiefs of Staff Committee during the war and until 1946. 
14 Field-Marshal Lord Alanbrooke, War Diaries 1939 to 1945.  Edited by Danchev, Alex and Todman, 
Daniel. Published, 2001.  Page 575. 
15 Sir Orme Garton Sargent was Permanent Under-Secretary of the Foreign Office and Head of the 
Diplomatic Service from February 1946 to February 1949. 
16 Ross, Graham – Editor.  The Foreign Office and the Kremlin:  British Documents on Anglo-Soviet 
Relations 1941-45.  Published Cambridge University Press, 1984.  Document 35, Pages 199 to 204.  Orme 
Sargent’s minute of 2 April 1945 on the need to reconsider policy towards Russia.    
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Germany to invasion by British and American armies”17 and saw this as being at the 
root of the changing attitudes and growing truculence of the Soviets.  Indeed, he 
argued that the first sign of the Soviets having understood the magnitude of the 
change in what might be called the balance of power was their sudden change in the 
diplomatic field where they had started rescinding agreements entered into willingly at 
Yalta.  Sargent urged that the time had come to speak plainly to the Soviets and to 
stand up to them on, for example, the Polish settlement that had been reached at 
Yalta but on which the Soviets were strongly back-tracking.  Eden and Cadogan largely 
shared Sargent’s “apprehensions and suspicions”18 and the maturity of his analysis and 
his evident understanding of the shifts in the East-West diplomatic field may have 
done something to place him in the pole position as the soon-to-be-successor to 
Cadogan, who himself was appointed by Attlee in February 1946 as the first British 
permanent representative to the United Nations.   But whether it did or not, Orme 
Sargent was to be the driving force behind the setting up of the Russia Committee. He 
designed the Committee, from its inception, to be a secret body which would make 
use of covert means to keep track of the intentions of the Soviets and to consider how 
they might be counteracted.  
 
Over its life-span the Russia Committee, as this thesis will show, was one of several 
inter-departmental bodies, both Official and Ministerial,19 which were set up to 
monitor Soviet propaganda and subversive activities and to put forward proposals to 
take defensive action.  The other Committees and intelligence agencies which already 
existed included the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS), the Joint Intelligence Committee 
– which was closely associated with the Military intelligence agency of the Chiefs of 
Staff (COS) – the Government Communications Head Quarters (GCHQ) and the Security 
Service (MI5).  Each of them would have had interest in, and involvement with, the 
collection of intelligence on the Soviets in the early Cold War.  Perhaps the most 
important of these as far as the Russia Committee was concerned was the JIC because 
                                                     
17 Ibid. Page 200.  
18 Ibid. Page 204. 
19 High level government Committees, and in particular Cabinet Committees are generally of two types 
that often mirror each other, namely Cabinet itself and other Ministerial Committees on the one hand, 
and on the other, Official Cabinet Committees, whose memberships generally comprise high level civil 
servants.  
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it was directly involved with the Committee from the outset20 and was the link 
between it and the intelligence agencies. There are many academic works which have 
examined intelligence gathering from the perspective of these other committees and 
agencies21 but this thesis focuses interest on the Foreign Office and the relationship 
between political action and the professional advice on which it was based.   
 
The output of the Russia Committee, and to a much lesser extent other committees, 
will be examined but to understand why the Foreign Office, along with colleagues in 
the military, the intelligence agencies and the Cabinet Office felt the need to set up 
such committees, there needs to be some appreciation of how the early Cold War was 
being perceived within the British government and public service22 at the time.   
Cold War Origins 
To consider the beginnings of the Cold War raises the question as to when the Cold 
War is deemed to have begun.  This, of itself, remains a matter of historical debate and 
controversy.  It has been argued that it had its origins in the early twentieth century 
with the Bolshevik revolution in Russia establishing a different kind of government 
from that of the West or, more particularly, the way of life epitomised by laissez faire, 
capitalist, American society.23 That Bolshevism and Capitalism were diametrically 
opposite ways of organising society may be self-evident but whether the origins of the 
Cold War can justifiably be traced to these changes is disputable and indeed this may 
be to take the origins too far back.   At the other end of the spectrum some would take 
the beginnings of the Cold War from the Potsdam conference in July 1945 which has 
been described as “the turning point” once the raison d’etre no longer persisted for 
                                                     
20 A member of JIC attended Russia Committee meetings. 
21 For the SIS, for example, see Jeffery, Keith’s MI6 The History of the Secret Intelligence Service;  For the 
JIC see Goodman, Michael ‘s The Official History of the Joint Intelligence Committee; for GCHQ see 
Aldrich, Richard’s GCHQ The Uncensored Story of Britain’s Most Secret Intelligence Agency;  for MI5, see 
Andrew, Christopher’s The Defence of the Realm Authorised History of MI5. Each is referenced 
elsewhere in the thesis. 
22 The term ‘Public service’  is here defined to include the Home Civil Service, the Diplomatic Service, the 
Military, including the Chiefs of Staff  and the security and intelligence agencies, including  MI5, SIS and 
GCHQ.  
23 McCauley, Martin.  The Origins of the Cold War.  Published, Longmans, 1983.  See in particular Parts 1  
and 3. 
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the ‘grand Alliance’ to continue.24  Or from the date of Winston Churchill’s ‘iron 
curtain’ speech,25 made in America in March 1946 when he was no longer Prime 
Minister but was Leader of His Majesty’s Opposition - though he first used the term 
‘Iron Curtain’ in a telegram to Truman in May 1945.  Such claims are arguably too 
precise.  After all, the seeds for the growth of the Cold War were many facetted and 
unlikely to be attributable to one particular event given that the transformation from 
the relative peaceful co-existence of the wartime allies to one of open hostility did not 
take place overnight.    Whenever it started, the Cold War was underway by the mid to 
late 1940s and gained strength in the decades that followed.   
 
The origins and the causes of the Cold War are also open to historical debate.  
McCauley identifies three interpretations for explaining how the Cold War came about: 
the orthodox or traditional; the revisionist; and the post-revisionist.  The orthodox 
view as exemplified by Arthur Schlesinger,26 identifies the class struggle of 
Marxism/Leninism as a seed bed for revolution throughout the world, a revolution that 
would inevitably put Communist states in confrontation with the non-Communist 
powers, except at those times when it would be expedient for the opposites to work 
together for a common end, for example during World War II.  Perhaps more 
reasonably, David Reynolds says that after the preoccupations of fighting the actual 
war there were broadly: “….two contrasting perceptions of the post-war Russian 
question:  that the Soviet Union would be an expansionist threat driven by a mixture of 
ideology and imperialism, or that it would be an obstreperous but essentially co-
operative partner, concerned for some years primarily with security and 
reconstruction.” 27 
 
The revisionists 28 would be more likely to see the roots of the Cold War as lying with 
the Americans who were determined to increase their share of the world markets to 
boost their internal economy and extend their influence while at the same time 
                                                     
24 Ibid. Page 41. 
25 See Chapter 3, Pages 70 to 74. 
26 McCauley. Document 1, page 118. 
27 Reynolds, David.  From World War to Cold War: Churchill, Roosevelt, and the International History 
of the 1940s.  Published, Oxford University Press, 2007.   Chapter 13, page 236.   
28 McCauley.  Document 2, pages 119 to 121. 
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instilling American values and the capitalist ethos.  The post revisionist view in contrast 
would argue that the Russians who, having been brought to their knees economically 
through their massive human and material losses during the war, in which they could 
so easily have been defeated, were interested in forging closer links with “contiguous 
states which were not anti-Soviet” for safety and security.29  Vladimir Pechatnov takes 
the view that the Cold War was down to a “messy mixture of ideology, realpolitik, 
geopolitics and culture”.30  His Soviet perspective asserts that for the Soviet Union, the 
American led Western bloc was aimed at depriving the Soviet Union from gaining its:  
“well-deserved fruits of victory, and ultimately at its destruction”. 31  While not 
denying the ideological struggles between the Soviets and the West, Pechatnov 
highlights that in recent years, as hitherto closed Soviet archives have been released 
they have provided  evidence that the Soviet geopolitical aims after the end of the 
Second World War were about building a buffer zone of pro-Soviet states on their 
western borders and that he did not believe that Stalin had a clear plan to “Sovietize” 
all of the Eastern European countries.    
 
Recognition of the complexity of the causality around the Cold War has been 
underscored by the increasing availability over the years of evidential historical source 
documents.     Historians have written extensively on various aspects of the Cold War 
and the appetite for academic research into this already well plumbed field is 
underlined by the fact that in the year 2000 a major new journal – Cold War History – 
began to be published by the Routledge arm of the UK Publishing Group Taylor Francis.  
A year earlier an American academic journal was launched which was also devoted to 
the field of Cold War studies – the American Journal of Cold War Studies.  Articles from 
these and other journals, have been explored for this thesis to shed light on the 
subject. 
                                                     
29Ibid.  Document 3, Pages 121 to 122.   
30 Pechatnov, Vladimir.  A Soviet Perspective on Cold War Origins.  Section 2, Origins and Preliminaries, 
Pages 19 to 23.  From Fitzgerald, Michael and Packwood, Allen Editors.  Out of the Cold:  The Cold War 
and Its Legacy.  Published Bloomsbury, 2013. 
31 Ibid Pages 19 to 23. 
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Michael Hopkins identifies three distinct periods of Cold War scholarship:32 the 
emergence of the Cold War in the 1940s through to the 1970s when little serious 
historical work was undertaken in Britain”; the period from the 1970s through to the 
end of the Cold War between 1988 and 1991; and the post-Cold War period which has 
seen the burgeoning of archival material, publication of diaries and auto-biographies of 
key players, and many scholarly works.  The historical perspectives on the Cold War 
have been shaped and re-shaped and altered continually as more information has 
become available.  Moreover, the differing perspectives are likely to have been 
affected by the sources of the research material.  The first material of an archival 
nature to come on stream was from American archives; the British archives were 
subsequently to be opened; and much later, some of the Soviet archives.  If It could be 
argued that information from a particular source, for example exclusively from 
American archives, is likely to be coloured to some extent by having been generated by 
American practitioners, then it can similarly be argued that the same would hold true 
for information from other such sources.   Indeed, Greenwood argues that by the end 
of the 1970s: “attention was being drawn to the narrow focus of early histories of the 
period, assembled almost entirely by American historians researching mainly American 
archives” 33  
 British official archives from the early cold war years, which began to be released into 
the public domain from the early 1980s, ensured that academic works began to 
provide more of a British perspective, although many of the British official documents 
remained closed beyond the normal 30 year period because of continuing sensitivity 
and are only now being opened to the public (See footnote 5 on page 2 above).    
                                                     
32 Hopkins, Michael F.  Teaching and Research on the Cold War in the United Kingdom.  Article in Cold 
War History Journal, Volume 8:2, Pages 241-258.   
33 Greenwood, Sean.  Britain and the Cold War 1945-91.  Published Macmillan Press , 2000.  Pages 2-3. 
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Three different governments in eight years 
Consideration of the output of the Russia Committee and its subsequent offshoots also 
throws light on the importance of the contributions of the key politicians, for the most 
part the British politicians, who played influential roles in foreign policy formation 
during this period.  So, too, does the publication of well researched biographies on key 
British politicians such as the seminal work on Ernest Bevin by Alan Bulloch.34 
Autobiographies and diaries of key British politicians and other public figures of the 
early Cold War period have also added greatly to the useful data available to 
historians,  while recognising that such works may be thought to share a similar 
question mark over their veracity as is sometimes attributed to oral history.  Historian 
Michael Frisch, for example, writes extensively on oral history35 which he has 
described as ‘Anti-History’.  But this is to deny the value and complexity of oral history.  
As Lummis36 says: “Oral accounts from those who experienced the specific situation 
provide unsurpassed and irreplaceable evidence for actual behaviour”.37    
Lummis recognises that the main concern about oral history: “is the degree to which 
accurate recall of the past is possible”38 not least because: “The difficulty lies in the 
fact that memory does not constitute pure recall; the memory of any particular event 
is refracted through layer upon layer of subsequent experience and through the 
influence of the dominant and/or local and specific ideology.39 However, Lummis’ 
experience as an oral history interviewer has shown him that this is to undervalue the 
material gained through oral history.  He makes a distinction between ‘memory’ and 
‘recall’.    Memory, he says, is about: “the fund of information about the past that an 
informant will readily relate, often as polished stories or anecdotes, which suggest that 
they have been frequently retold or thought about.  By recall I mean responses to 
detailed interviewing which prompts ‘dormant’ memories that are less likely to be 
                                                     
34 Bulloch, Alan.    Ernest Bevin Foreign Secretary.  Published W W Norton and Company, New York, 
1983. 
35 Frisch, Michael H.  A Shared Authority:  Essays on the Craft and Meaning of Oral and Public History.  
Published State University of New York Press, Albany, 1990. 
36 Trevor Lummis, formerly Senior Research Officer, Department of Sociology, University of Essex. 
37 Perks, Robert and Thompson, Alistair (Editors) The Oral History Reader.  Published Routledge, 1998.  
Chapter 23, Structure and Validity in Oral Evidence, Pages 273 to 283. 
38 Ibid.  Chapter 23, Page 273. 
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integrated into the individual’s present value structure......Clearly a great deal depends 
upon exactly what it is that the interview is trying to achieve”.40   Even if one accepts 
that caution has to be exercised in the use of biographies, diaries, interviews, and 
other forms of conveying events that the ‘authors’ of them have experienced, they 
have a value in enriching the understanding of those events.  To quote Peter Hennessy, 
who sees value in the richness that personal recollections can add to the work of 
historians:  “We historians. have to go back and immerse ourselves ...to reconstruct 
what people – leaders and led alike – knew... the memories and experiences that 
shaped their fears, expectations and mentalities”. 41 
The issue of the value added by personal recollections and whether the veracity of 
such material can be relied upon goes to the heart of what is essentially an historical 
epistemological problem.  Where the perceptions and judgements of individuals are 
brought to bear in reaching their conclusions, which inevitably they must be, then their 
conclusions are likely to differ in some regard from those of other individuals in similar 
circumstances.   Nothing can be said to be ‘true’ or ‘accurate’.  Such considerations do 
not apply only to diaries, auto-biographies and interviews.  They must also apply, for 
example, to archives which might otherwise be seen as a ‘purer’ source of information.   
Thus, even the Minutes of the Russia Committee, meetings which have been a basic 
resource underpinning this thesis, were written by individuals who will have brought 
their own perceptions to bear in recording the events they were minuting.42  Despite 
such philosophical conundrums, however, it can be argued convincingly that history 
benefits from the richer contextualising of events through personal recollections of 
those involved.  
 
The years from 1945 through to October 1951 saw three different government 
administrations in the UK.  These years saw the recognition of the need to gather 
information on Soviet intensions as the wartime coalition government neared its end.  
This was followed by the formal setting up of the Russia Committee just after Attlee 
                                                     
40 Ibid.  Page 274. 
41 Hennessy, Peter.  Distilling The Frenzy:  Writing the History of One’s Own Times.  Published Biteback 
Publishing, 2012. Page 19. 
42 Cabinet Minutes, by contrast, are written by one senior official and checked by another before being 
submitted for approval. 
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became Prime Minister and Bevin Foreign Secretary.   And the work of the Committee 
continued after Churchill was returned to power in 1951.  The fact that the Committee 
continued throughout this period to gather and analyse information on the Soviets 
points to a continuation regardless of political differences.  That the Russia Committee 
was at its most potentially influential in the Bevin years may have had less to do with 
the political flavour of the government, or indeed the individual politicians involved, 
and more to do with timing.  The Committee from its inception under Bevin, and for its 
first few years, was fresh and concerned with keeping abreast of a newly emerging 
situation.   
 
So there were, from 1945 to 1951, three very different administrations of different 
political make-up but each served by the permanent and powerful cadre of home civil 
servants, members of the British Diplomatic Service, Chiefs of Staff of the military and 
members of the security and intelligence agencies who were involved in the various 
Committees co-ordinated by the Foreign Office and the Cabinet Office.  The different 
backgrounds and expertise of the public servants who comprised the membership of 
the Russia Committee and other Whitehall Committees (eg Official Cabinet 
Committees, the JIC etc) can be seen as lending breadth to their work.  The influential 
men who formed the membership – and they were all men as this was long before 
senior female diplomats and civil servants started to reach senior positions – would 
have been largely drawn from public school and Oxbridge backgrounds and very much 
products of their time.  That is to say that, with a few notable exceptions, they had 
been born into, and educated within, a Great Britain that ruled a vast Empire and 
enjoyed a pivotal position in world politics.   
 
The relationship between the key politicians and the civil servants and diplomats who 
potentially played significant roles in policy formation in respect of foreign relations 
with the Soviets, is worthy of closer investigation and this is a theme that will run 
throughout this thesis.  As background to an examination of the contributions of key 
individuals it is important to take stock of the international position of Britain and the 
West as the Second World War drew to a close, Britain was very much a weakened and 
junior party to her former great war-time allies, the United States and the Soviet 
14 
 
Union. Britain was financially seriously dependent on the United States and the British 
Empire was sliding away.  For all that, it would be wrong not to see Britain, despite all 
the deprivations and constraints with which she was faced, still as a significant power. 
One such reason for Britain’s continued, albeit weakened, importance internationally 
was Winston Churchill, the great war leader, respected as such by Roosevelt and, 
probably, Stalin, and not easily removed from the equation when internationally far 
reaching decisions were to be taken about such things as reparations and the re-
drawing of international boundaries. 
 
Even as early as 1943 Churchill was concerned that Britain was crushed between two 
much more powerful allies.  In November that year he said:   “Our man-power is now 
fully mobilised for the war effort… it is already dwindling (so that) if the war against 
Germany continues after the end of 1944 we shall have to rely increasingly on United 
States resources to make up for the declining scale of our own effort”.43 
 
As the War drew towards a close and Churchill remained for the moment as British 
Prime Minister, his views on the likely post-war international scene appear to have 
varied according to his latest experiences and dealings with Stalin and with Roosevelt 
and later with Truman.  Indeed, Churchill’s position on the emerging threat of Soviet 
expansionism is confused.  On the one hand he appeared, at least some of the time, to 
be disinclined to recognise Stalin as a threat to the West because Churchill had a 
regard for Stalin, with whom he had enjoyed convivial meetings.  On the other hand, 
Churchill was aware of the realities of what was going on in Europe.  Reynolds talks of 
accusations circulating in London, especially in 1944-45, that there was: “a widespread 
feeling in the Foreign Office in December 1944 that Churchill was erroneously pursuing 
a ‘policy of appeasement’ towards Moscow and Washington”.44  
 
Churchill told the House of Commons on return from the Yalta conference, which took 
place in February 1945, with Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin - the ‘Big Three’ - all in 
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attendance, that he had the impression that Stalin wished: “to live in honorable 
friendship and equality with the Western democracies…. I know of no Government 
which stands to its obligations…. More solidly than the Russian Soviet Government”.45   
And yet Reynolds says: 
 
In retrospect one can find many occasions during the war when Churchill 
bemoaned the dangers of Soviet expansion…There can be little doubt, I think, 
that in the very last months of the war, Churchill was more prescient than 
Roosevelt about future relations with the Soviets….Churchill had come round to 
the Foreign Office’s strategy of trying to pin Stalin down to a clear sphere of 
influence in Eastern Europe….Churchill’s Russian policy, then, was  
not of confrontation but negotiation from strength.  Until at least August 1944, 
when the Allied offensive in the west developed a momentum of its own, 
Russian military help was essential.46 
 
It seems, therefore, that Churchill did, indeed, take a different view in regard to the 
future threat posed by Russia at different times but to do so was, arguably, neither 
surprising nor unreasonable. Stalin was not known for his consistency and indeed the 
situation was a fluid one for all parties.  British and American hopes of building a 
sustainable working relationship with the Soviets reflected, according to Reynolds, 
three important assumptions: “…expectations of a limited American role in post-war 
Europe, confidence in Stalin himself as a man with whom one could do business, and 
hopes that ‘Stalinism’ betokened a shift from revolutionary ideology at home and 
abroad towards a more ‘normal’ state”.47 
 
One of Churchill’s biographers, Charmley, suggested that Churchill over-estimated 
both the altruism of the US and the fidelity of Russia and in so doing he sacrificed the 
remnants of British power and independence.48  This could be seen to be an overly 
harsh and damning assessment.  Perhaps Reynolds gives a more balanced appraisal 
when he sees Churchill as more of a realist and asserts that: “In the long run, Churchill 
knew, Britain would lose the numbers game in France.  But he also hoped that British 
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brains could guide American brawn.  This was basic British policy (or conceit) in the last 
part of the war:  the aim, in the words of one Foreign Office memorandum,49 was to 
make use of American power for purposes which we regard as good.50  
 
By the end of the Second World War, Churchill was tired and his health was poor and 
there was very little time after VE Day51 for him to enjoy the celebrations.   Within less 
than a week, as his Principal Private Secretary, John (Jock) Colville, recorded: “The P.M. 
looks tired and has to fight for the energy to deal with the problems confronting him.  
These include the settlement of Europe, the last round of war in the East, an election 
on the way, and the dark cloud of Russian imponderability …..Russia shows no 
willingness to compromise and storm clouds threaten…..At 2.30 the P.M. went to bed, 
leaving almost untouched the voluminous weight of paper which awaits his decision.  
He told me he doubted if he had the strength to carry on”.52  
 
Although Churchill’s energy and determination to continue as Prime Minister ebbed 
and flowed after the end of the war in Europe, he was reluctant to end the coalition 
immediately.  Indeed, on 18 May, just ten days after VE Day, he wrote to Clement 
Attlee - with whom, as his war time coalition Deputy Prime Minister, Churchill had 
enjoyed an excellent relationship based on mutual respect - asking him to agree to 
preserve the coalition until the end of the war in Japan.  One of Churchill’s motives was 
that he wanted to see through the Potsdam conference with the same team on the 
British side, notably his colleagues Clement Attlee and Anthony Eden.  With the same 
team, and given his own perceived good relationship with Stalin, Churchill believed it 
was better for Britain to retain the best negotiating position through continuity.   
Attlee visited Churchill in Chartwell on the same day and indicated that both he and 
Bevin were predisposed to agree to Churchill’s suggestion.  However, after having 
consulted other colleagues attending a Labour party conference at the time, Attlee 
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telephoned Churchill to say that he was unable to agree to postpone a General 
Election.53   
 
The Potsdam conference, with Churchill heading the British team, began in the 
outskirts of Berlin on July 15th 1945.  The conference was adjourned ten days later to 
allow Churchill, Attlee and Eden to return home on 26 July for the British General 
Election.  The results of the election were dramatic and surprising. Churchill’s War time 
coalition government was replaced, following the land-slide victory by the Labour 
Party and Clement Attlee became Prime Minister.  Colville notes that nobody was 
more surprised by the landslide victory than Attlee who told Colville, some three 
weeks later, that: “..in his most optimistic dreams he had reckoned that there might, 
with luck, be a Conservative majority of only some forty seats”. 54 
 
The new Labour government had a lot more to deal with than just the emerging threat 
of Soviet expansionism, important though this was.  It was vital, given the major 
domestic issues to be confronted, that Attlee should have a strong Foreign Secretary 
who fully enjoyed his confidence.  Attlee already saw the Soviets as a major threat and 
it was essential that sufficient priority be attached to being fully in the picture of 
developments on that front.  Attlee’s was a reforming and a socialist government; he 
was elected to make profound changes domestically (for example introducing 
Beveridge’s Welfare State proposals) but the problems to be confronted were also 
profound.  After bearing the costs of taking a central role in a lengthy world war, the 
economy was in a parlous state; a major fuel crisis loomed; there were food shortages 
and rationing at home and food shortages for our nearest European allies which could 
not be ignored; the social issues to be confronted were legion.  Moreover, 
internationally he had other major concerns with which to grapple.   The British 
Empire, which had long accorded Great Britain the influence and importance of a 
super state, was beginning to disintegrate which left the depleted British military 
forces having to: “respond to the problems of policing an empire which, when not 
already on the road to self-government and independence, was increasingly beset with 
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nationalist unrest in the Middle East, Asia and Africa, unrest which it was anticipated 
with some foreboding, the forces of international Communism would soon be in a 
position to exploit”. 55 
 
The establishment of the State of Israel also consumed much of the time and energy of 
the British establishment, as is evident from the number of times this was discussed in 
full Cabinet.56    Moreover the relationships between Britain and the other two major 
Second World War ‘super powers’ was of great importance.  As Francis Williams, in the 
post-war memoirs of Clement Attlee, observes: “Attlee and Bevin were compelled 
throughout the whole of the post-war period to play for time.  They had to fight a 
holding operation.  It was one which Britain’s limited resources and pressing economic 
and defence problems made it virtually impossible for her to win without American 
help, only obtainable if the United States could be brought to realise that her own 
interests, no less than those of Britain and Europe, required her to oppose the 
expansion of Soviet power in Europe and the Middle East”. 57         
 
Matthew Jones has described the situation in which Britain found itself, eloquently, as 
follows:  “far from enjoying any peace dividend with victory in the recent war, defence 
planners had to readjust to the menacing presence of Soviet military power in the 
heart of Europe, behind which lay a totalitarian system of government equipped with 
an ideology that predicted the demise of the capitalist states of the West, and which 
was busy consolidating, with the assistance of local Communist parties and using 
brutal methods, its firm hold over the peoples of Eastern Europe”. 58   
 
 It has also to be remembered that it was not just the growing territorial expansionism 
of the Soviets, on the one hand, and the cooling of the ‘special relationship’ with the 
United States, on the other, that Britain was having to contend against at this time. It 
was also the period of the emergence of the nuclear race. Roosevelt had informed 
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Churchill before the end of the Potsdam Conference in August 1945 - but had not 
informed Stalin - that the US was about to drop an atomic bomb on Nagasaki to bring 
the war in Japan to an end.   The Americans were clearly, at that point, in the lead in 
terms of developing nuclear weapons but the Soviets were playing catch up rapidly 
and the view of the British government was that the British would be in danger of 
losing status unless they, too, entered the race.  
 
On the foreign affairs front, Attlee generally left things to Ernest Bevin.  As the new 
Prime Minister, Attlee initially intended – and was expected – to appoint Bevin to the 
post of Chancellor of the Exchequer.  But at the last minute59   he appointed him 
Foreign Secretary instead.   This, arguably fortuitous change of plan, and this tendency 
to leave foreign policy to Bevin, did not denote a lack of interest on Attlee’s part, nor a 
reluctance to stand up to the strong personality of Bevin but, rather, was more due to 
their shared views on foreign policy.  The two men, though very different from each 
other, were close allies who shared great mutual respect.  Bevin had been one of the 
most influential, if not the most influential, of the Labour Cabinet Ministers in the 
Wartime Coalition Government.  Although, in contrast to Attlee, his background was 
humble and his formal education limited, his abilities enabled him to work his way up 
to become the foremost trade union leader of his time, as General Secretary of the 
Transport and General Workers Union (TGWU).  He had gained experience of high 
political office when serving in Churchill’s wartime coalition government, the latter 
recognizing Bevin’s qualities as a shrewd man with the common touch who would 
provide an important bridge between Churchill’s patrician Conservative colleagues and 
the working man and trade unionists.  Churchill was astute enough to realize that he 
needed everyone on his side if he were to fully optimize the use of the country’s 
resources.  Bullock asserts that Bevin became the most popular politician in the 
coalition government after Churchill himself.60 
Bevin, while clearly in the lead on foreign policy, was never out of step with his friend 
Attlee. Moreover, as Elsby has noted there is a consensus amongst historians that it 
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was not just Attlee and Bevin who held similar views about foreign policy but rather 
there “was a commonality of view between Attlee, Bevin, the Cabinet and the Foreign 
Office”.61  Blackwell puts this down at least in part to the Labour government’s socialist 
ideology being confined to domestic policy issues, saying: “...on the domestic front, at 
least, they came to office determined to change the existing order of society”. 62  His 
argument, basically, being that on matters of foreign policy the Labour government 
was freer to form policies unhampered by idealistic attitudes and could follow a more 
pragmatic path.63 
Bevin’s handling of Britain’s relationship with the Soviets in the turbulent years from 
1946 through to the end of the two Labour governments was measured and 
pragmatic. He was kept well informed of the Communist expansionism of the Soviets, 
by the Russia Committee and others, but for a long time did not react confrontationally 
in the face of provocation. It was not until later that Bevin was prepared to go on 
record as being convinced that there was: “no longer cause for optimism that friendly 
relations could be maintained in the face of their anti-Western and expansionist 
campaigns”.64    
During the six years of Labour governments the Cold War intensified and first Bevin, as 
Foreign Secretary and in the light of advice from the Foreign Office’s Russia 
Committee, and then Attlee and his Cabinet, decided that a change in foreign policy 
was necessary.  It seems reasonable to assume that their views were formed in part 
from personal experience of the difficulties they encountered with Soviet colleagues 
and partly from the advice they were receiving from their experts.  But Francis paints a 
picture of Bevin as someone who was very much his own man, who formed his own 
views:  “He sought and was ready to receive advice from his permanent officials but he 
made his own decisions and if they were decisions which often drew upon a range of 
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experience uncommon to the Foreign Office they were soon recognized by his staff to 
gain a richness and sureness from that fact”.65 
 
By 1951 the end of the reforming Labour Attlee government was in sight and the Cold 
War was intensifying.  At the end of November, just a month after the General Election 
that returned Churchill to Downing Street, Colville, who himself had been posted back 
from the Foreign Office to No 10 as the Prime Minister’s Principle Private Secretary, 
recorded a conversation with Churchill as follows: “The Prime Minister said that he did 
not believe total war was likely.  If it came it would be on one of two accounts.  Either 
the Americans….would say to the Russians you must by certain dates withdraw from 
certain points and meet us on certain requirements: otherwise we shall attack you.  
Or, the Russians realizing that safety did not come from being strong, but only from 
being the strongest, might for carefully calculated and not for emotional reasons, 
decide that they must attack before it was too late.  If they did so their first target 
would be the British Isles”. 66   
 
Churchill’s belief that there remained mileage in trying to broker a meeting of minds 
between the Americans and the Soviets was a theme that ran through the remainder 
of Churchill’s checkered final period as Prime Minister, dogged as he was by 
intermittent periods of illness and, arguably, impaired judgement.  He saw his role as 
the elder statesman who might just be able to bring about the rapprochement 
between the former three war time allies and thereby leave a fitting legacy at the end 
of his period of office.  But his remaining days as Prime Minister were to be marred by 
health issues that undermined his ability to put his attempts at bridge-building to the 
test.  On 23 June 1953 Churchill presided over a dinner in honour of the Italian Prime 
Minister, de Gasperi.  At the end of dinner Churchill delivered a speech “in his best and 
most sparkling form” 67 after which, in the presence of many of the guests, Churchill 
had a stroke which affected his mobility and his speech: “He sat down and was almost 
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unable to move.  After the guests had left, he lent heavily on my arm but managed to 
walk to his bedroom”.68  He chaired Cabinet the following day, his speech slurred and 
his mouth drooping, but as Rab Butler subsequently told Colville, no one attending the 
June 24 Cabinet noticed anything strange except that the Prime Minister was more 
silent than usual.69  The next day Winston and Clementine, together with Jock Colville, 
repaired to Chartwell to enable Winston to have a fortnight’s complete rest.  At first 
Colville feared that Churchill would not live beyond a few days not least because he 
had by then lost the use of his left arm and left leg: “But W’s recuperative powers, 
both physical and mental, invariably outstrip all expectation and after a week he began 
rapidly to improve”.70  
Arguably Churchill stayed on as Prime Minister, even after his stroke, at least in part 
because he hoped to bring about another conference between the three powers that 
would achieve some meeting of minds and help to reduce the potential hostilities born 
of the Soviet expansionism.  That said, his reluctance to cede power and his lack of 
confidence in Eden, his long-expected successor, would doubtless also have played a 
part.  Despite Eden’s increasing frustration with Churchill’s prevarication over when he 
would hand over the reins,71  it was clear that even at the last knockings of his 
premiership he harboured a continuing desire to try to bring the Soviets and the 
Americans together.72   On Friday July 24th 1954 Colville records: “Lunched alone with 
W at Chartwell.  He is now amazingly restored, but complains that his memory has 
suffered and says he thinks he probably will give up in October or at any rate before 
the Queen leaves for Australia in November.  Still very wrapped up with the possibility 
of bringing something off with the Russians and with the idea of meeting Malenkov73 
face to face.” 74  
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In the event Churchill’s reluctance and prevarication about handing over to Eden 
continued for a further 20 months, until 4 April 1955, when he at last came to the view 
“that he did not really think there was much chance of a top-level conference, and that 
alone would be a valid reason for staying”.75   
 
Contrasting stability in the Foreign Office  
While the government administrations came and went – with three different 
administrations from 1945 to 1955 - the permanent cadre of officials in the Foreign 
Office, and, indeed, throughout Whitehall, were working away with colleagues from 
other departments and agencies, gathering information and forming policy ideas and 
trying to make their voices heard by the politicians in charge.  The Foreign Office then, 
as now, attracted the highest calibre of people into its ranks.  This begs the question as 
to why such talented and often well-connected people should be so attracted to a 
career that does not generally provide large monetary rewards.  The answer is 
doubtless multi-layered but must include some of the following factors:  those from 
privileged backgrounds who have benefitted from private education at a very high 
level may put a high premium on the intellectual stimulation, potential for influence, 
collegiate working environment and career paths available to them in the diplomatic 
service.  Added to this would be the attraction for many of overseas work and even the 
prospect of receiving honours or of not having to take responsibility for the outcomes 
of policy decisions.  Whatever the reasons it can be demonstrated that at the end of 
the War many senior diplomats, though not all, were indeed from the stereotype 
privileged background in terms of their educational background and their lineage.  
Their political masters, while many of them were similar in terms of their backgrounds 
and education were very different in one major respect.  They were necessarily 
impermanent in their positions.  By contrast, their officials spent their whole careers in 
the diplomatic service learning the ropes, gaining expertise in their specialist areas and 
climbing the career ladder so that they were well equipped to supply the kind of 
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stability that politicians would not be able to emulate, even assuming that they might 
wish so to do. While this is always likely to be true, it is arguably more important to 
have experience and continuity during a period of heightened international tensions 
where the collection and analysis of information in a fast-changing situation by experts 
in the field, must be beneficial to policy makers.   
 
In 1945 those at the top of the Foreign Office tree included the most senior diplomats:  
Sir Alexander Cadogan, Sir Orme Sargent and the Ambassadors in the most senior 
posts throughout the world – HM Ambassadors in Washington76 and in Moscow77 
among them.  Others of considerable influence would have been those in the earlier 
stages of their careers who occupied influential positions, for example as Principal 
Private Secretary to Foreign Office Ministers, and these would include the likes of 
Pierson Dixon and Frank Roberts. Others would be the Heads of Departments within 
the Foreign Office who would be on the second or third rank down from the top and 
would include such people as Sir Oliver Harvey (the first Chairman of the Russia 
Committee and Head of the Northern Department of the Foreign Office).  Biographical 
details about these and other key individuals and others will be picked up later78 
because the notion that individual diplomats played an important part in the 
formulation of foreign policy in the early Cold War is a theme of this thesis.  
 
Conclusion 
Having explored in this introductory chapter the broad political landscape of Great 
Britain at the end of the Second World War and the beginning of the Cold War, there 
remain three main themes to pick up:  first, why the topic was chosen;  secondly, to 
recap on the broad aims of the research; and thirdly, to outline how the rest of the 
thesis is organized. 
There were five reasons that prompted the decision to research the Russia Committee.  
The first was the desire to understand what prompted the setting up of such a body.   
This led to the need to look at the wider context of what was going on at the time, as 
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78 Thesis Chapters 2, 3, and 4 and Appendix 2. 
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well as the views and concerns that were beginning to emerge on the part of officials 
and politicians towards the changes in the relationships between the former big three 
wartime allies: the US, Russia and Britain.  
The second reason related to the increased availability of data on the subject.  As the 
Russia Committee was an official body within the Foreign Office, and a secret one at 
the time, it could not be studied in depth before its papers were released into the 
public domain.  The Papers of the Committee began to be released79 comparatively 
recently under the 30 Year Rule, and even now some papers remain closed.  This 
provided, therefore, the opportunity to reveal something extra about the way in which 
the Foreign Office officials were able to influence the formation of foreign policy. Over 
the twelve-year period of the Committee’s existence it met over 150 times and 
generated a vast number of papers.  The minutes of the Russia Committee meetings 
for the years from 1946 through to 1952 have been read and catalogued in researching 
for this thesis and are listed and summarised, together with some of their key papers, 
in Appendix 1.80  
The third reason was because relatively little has been written on the subject so that 
secondary sources are comparatively thin on the ground.   Mention of the Committee 
is often confined to a passing reference, though a few recent PhD and MPhil theses 
have gone into greater detail and are cited in later chapters.  The only detailed study 
specific to the Russia Committee remains the article by Ray Merrick in the Journal of 
Contemporary History in 1985.81 That article, the details of which are picked up later,82 
dealt exclusively with 1946 and 1947.  Although these were undoubtedly active and 
important years in the life of the Russia Committer, the papers on which would have 
been the only ones available to Merrick at the time of writing his article, it remains the 
case that it covered less than 20 percent of the time that the Committee existed.  
Being able to cover the whole period, therefore, offered the potential for breaking 
new ground.   
                                                     
79 The Russia Committee papers began to be released at TNA from the late 1980s, mostly under Foreign 
Office class FO 371.  
80Pages 230 to 313. 
81 Merrick.  
82 See Chapter 5, Page 108 and 140. 
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The fourth reason was because advice was received from respected contemporary 
historians83 that this was a subject that was worth examining, both because it had not 
yet been done comprehensively, and in order to add to the knowledge of the 
understanding of British foreign policy formation in the early Cold War.  
Finally, and of some importance personally, it provided the opportunity, from a former 
Whitehall insider’s perspective, to cast light on the relationships between Ministers 
and their officials in the early Cold War, and in particular between Ernest Bevin, 
perhaps the most unlikely of great Foreign Secretary’s, and his very different body of 
advisers.  The workings of Whitehall and, in particular, the ways in which Ministers and 
their officials interact is likely to be somewhat opaque to those who have not 
experienced it.  And while there are no shortages of secondary sources on the 
workings of Whitehall written by former insiders that deal with specific issues (an 
example being Percy Craddock’s work on the JIC)84 these tend to be specific to the 
subject under scrutiny rather than giving an insight into the way ministers and officials 
work together.  
As to the broad aims of the thesis, to re-cap, there are basically three main inter-
related aims:  to look at the Russia Committee in its entirety as had never been done 
before;  and, on the basis of that research,  to assess the way in which the Russia 
Committee influenced the British government’s foreign policy towards the Soviet 
Union;  and to take a fresh look at the way in which key Foreign Office officials, 
associated with the Russia Committee, may or may not have influenced the views of  
Ministers - particularly  Ernest Bevin’s -   and consequent foreign policy decisions on,  
how to deal with the Soviet Union’s Communist expansionism. 
The remaining eight Chapters of this thesis will explore these issues.  Chapter Two 
looks at the concerns about Soviet foreign policy that wereemerging as the war was 
coming to an end and in the immediate aftermath.  It concentrates on what was 
happening in 1945 and looks at the Yalta conference;  at the warnings issued by the US 
diplomat and Soviet expert, George Kennan;  at the advice produced for Eden and then 
                                                     
83 Most notably Professors David Reynolds and Matthew Jones.  
84 Cradock, Percy.  Know Your Enemy:  How the Joint Intelligence Committee Saw the World.  Published 
John Murray, 2002. 
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passed to Bevin by the British diplomat who was to be the instigator of the Russia 
Committee, Sir Orme Garton Sargent;  to look at Ernest Bevin’s arrival in the Foreign 
Office as the new Foreign Secretary whose immediate task was to attend the Potsdam 
conference, which had been interrupted by the British General Election and change of 
government, and then his attendance at the first of the Foreign Secretaries 
Conferences;  and to contrast the change in the political leadership with the continuity 
provided by the permanent cadre of diplomats. 
Chapter three looks at how the early Cold War was developing in 1946.  It examines 
Stalin’s Election speech and Churchill’s Iron Curtain speech and looks in depth at two 
policy papers by diplomats, in the form of Telegrams, that have since been regarded by 
historians as key to identifying and publicising in the West the concerns that US and 
British Soviet experts were experiencing. These policy papers, which have become 
known as the ‘Long Telegrams’, are examined in detail.  The Chapter also looks at the 
Paris Council of Foreign Ministers, noting the difficult relationships developing 
between Bevin and his Soviet counterpart, Molotov.  
Chapter four looks at the setting up of the Russia Committee within the Foreign Office 
in March 1946 and examines both why it was felt necessary at that time and within the 
Foreign Office purview to set up such a Committee.  It also focuses on who set up the 
Committee and it does this for two reasons.  The first being that there is some 
confusion as to who was responsible for setting up the Committee ie whether it was 
Alexander Cadogan, the Head of the Foreign Office until very early in 1946, or the  
Head of the Northern Department of the Foreign Office, within which the ‘Russian 
Desk’ was situated,  or the person who was to succeed Cadogan, namely Orme 
Sargent.  The second reason is to focus on some of the diplomats who played key roles 
in the Russia Committee.  There were many such individuals and information about 
some of them is in Appendix 2 but information on the main characters is included 
mainly in Chapter four. 
Chapter 5 concentrates on the first three years of the Russia Committee, looking 
sequentially at 1946, 1947 and 1948 when the Committee was new to the task of 
gathering, analysing and promulgating information on Soviet expansionism, and was 
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working strongly to that end.   1946 saw a strong beginning and their work is examined 
in some detail;  1947 saw the Committee really getting into its stride;  and 1948, which 
among other things was the year of the Berlin Blockade, and another busy year for the 
Russia Committee, saw the public recognition by Bevin of the need to take action to 
counter Soviet propaganda.  It also saw the first of the re-organisations of the Russia 
Committee.  
Chapter six concerns the work of the Russia Committee over the years 1949 to 1952, a 
period which the thesis describes as the second phase of the Committee’s work.  This 
period included a further overhaul of the Committee to make it more effective. 
Although this could imply that the Committee was starting to be regarded as less than 
fully fit for purpose, which to an extent will be shown to be true, it also coincided with 
a period where the Committee’s main and regular output was reaching the most 
powerful people in the country and when its engagement with Ministers was at its 
height. 
Chapter 7 moves away from the sequential detail of the Russia Committee’s work and 
takes a broader look at a few of the many statecraft issues in the early Cold War which 
dominated the agenda of the British government, and in particular, the Foreign Office, 
in the years from 1946 to 1952.  This was a period during which the Russia Committee 
was most active and also coincided with the time when Ernest Bevin, as Foreign 
Secretary, and a towering figure of Attlee’s government, was driving forward the 
government’s foreign policy.  The three issues selected for examination are:  the 
development of the atomic warfare capability; Titoism, and the threat that it posed for 
Soviet expansionism; and the impact of Chinese communism and, in particular, the 
Korean ‘War’ on international relations.  The Foreign Office had a close interest in 
these matters and the Russia Committee was gathering information, writing and 
promulgating papers on these and other issues.   
Chapter 8 takes a fairly brief look at the final phase of the Russia Committee’s 
existence and the parallel policy and/or intelligence advisory bodies within both the 
Foreign Office and the government more widely, whose existence obviated the need 
for the Russia Committee to continue to exist.  It had fulfilled its aim as a means of 
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collecting and disseminating information to Ministers so that they could make 
decisions on foreign policy based on sound advice, but it had run its course. 
Chapter 9 examines the Russia Committee in historical perspective and looks at 
secondary sources to identify what has been claimed of, or written about, the 
Committee.  It attempts to answer the question as to what, new, can be said about the  
Committee’s achievements  as a result of the research for this thesis;  what new can be 
said about how it influenced Bevin in reaching his views on the need to counter Soviet 
Communist expansionism, and consequently his  foreign policy decisions.  In short, 
whether the existence of the Committee made a difference.   
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Chapter 2   Cold War Origins – Emerging Concerns  
 
Historians will doubtless long continue to debate the timing of the origins of the Cold 
War85 but, from the perspective of this thesis, concerned as it is with the post-war 
machinations within the British Foreign Office, the focus turns to tracing the events 
that may have led the senior diplomats to reach the conclusion that it was necessary to 
set up apparatus within the Foreign Office for monitoring the behaviour of the Soviets 
as it impacted on her former war time allies. 
 
1945 was clearly pivotal in terms of shifting attitudes and foreign policy towards the 
Soviet Union on the part of the United States and Britain.  From as early as 
February/March 1945, as the end of the Second World War was in sight, some highly 
significant events, and changes in administration were taking place.  These threw light 
on the beginnings of the cracks in the alliances between the big three powers and 
arguably can lay claim to providing, if not the start, then the seeds of the start of the 
Cold War.  This chapter examines these events and issues which included:  the Yalta 
Conference, which took place from the 6th to the 11th February 1945; the writings by 
the US diplomat, George Kennan;   in Britain, the Stock Taking After VE Day 
Memorandum which was commissioned by Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden in July; 
the Potsdam Conference which spanned two different British Government 
Administrations; the British General Election result; and the first in a series of what 
were to become highly important  Conferences, or Councils, of Foreign Ministers. 
Yalta 
In February 1945 the big three war leaders – the British Prime Minister Winston 
Churchill; the Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin; and the US President Franklin D Roosevelt – 
met in Russia, in the city of Yalta on the Crimean peninsula, to discuss and make major 
decisions about the post-war world.  Of Yalta, Deutscher writes: “In their thoughts the 
‘Big Three’ still tended to project their present unity into the peace and to see the 
future in terms of their condominium and of spheres of influence.  But the nearer the 
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war drew to an end the stronger grew their mental reservations, doubts and fears.  
Each side made concessions to the other, but sought guarantees for itself.  To every 
act of agreement, each was anxious to add an escape clause.....As if by some frailty, 
the ‘Big Three’ were driven to adopt one military expedient after another; and every 
expedient contained seeds of future discord and rivalry”. 86 
The British agenda for the Yalta Conference discussions, as conceived and drawn up by 
the Foreign Office, was a “detailed and extensive list of priorities”.87  The major 
priorities were:  the future of Germany; the Polish question; and possible French 
participation in later meetings of Foreign Ministers and Heads of Government.    Sir 
Alexander Cadogan,88  persuaded Foreign Secretary, Eden, to lobby colleagues and 
counterparts at Yalta to agree to the introduction of regular meetings of Foreign 
Secretaries. 89 Cadogan,90 and Eden both remembered the “disorganisation of 
Tehran”,91 and thought that meetings of Foreign Ministers every three or four months 
in London, in advance of meetings of the ‘Big Three’, could usefully prepare the ground 
for the latter’s discussions of complicated and technical issues.  These conferences 
were subsequently to become a feature, though at differing locations and at different 
intervals, but were noteworthy more for the differences, disagreements, even 
hostilities, between the parties that they sometimes revealed.   As to the future of 
Germany, the Big Three were in agreement in principle about the need to partition 
Germany but had little in the way of concrete plans on how this should be done.  
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Emerging concerns of US about Soviet policy – enter George Kennan 
It was not until the Second World War was drawing to a close that George Kennan, a 
recognised US expert on Russia, returned to the US Embassy in Moscow.  In his 
Memoirs92 he explains that on return to the country he had known so well in the past, 
he felt that he needed not to prejudge Soviet intentions as he recognised that they 
might well have changed following years of wartime co-operation with Western Allies.  
However, it was only a matter of a few weeks after his return that he concluded: 
“What I saw … was enough to convince me that not only our policy toward Russia but 
our plans and commitments generally for the shaping of the post-war world, were 
based on a dangerous misreading of the personality, the intentions, and the political 
situation of the Soviet leadership”.93 
During February and March 1945, following the Yalta Conference,94 Kennan witnessed 
endless, frustrating, discussions with Molotov over, for example, who was - and who 
was not - to be allowed to participate in discussions about the formation of a new 
Polish government.  Kennan notes that, by April, President Roosevelt started to show a  
“strong and growing anxiety...over Soviet reactions and practices”.95   
Then, on 12 April 1945, President Roosevelt died and was succeeded by President 
Truman, a very different and in some ways less tolerant individual.  Reynolds describes 
him as:  “inexperienced and insecure but with a penchant for toughness, inclined 
towards the ‘firm but friendly’ line...”.96   
Three Weeks in Summer 1945 – ‘Stock Taking after VE Day’ – enter Sir Orme 
Garton Sargent 
In, or around, the 10th July 1945, Eden, then Foreign Secretary to Churchill’s war time 
coalition government, asked Sir Orme Sargent to produce a paper on the ‘general 
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political situation’.  The background to this is explained in a manuscript note97 from 
Sargent to Alexander Cadogan, his then boss, as follows: “Sir A Cadogan. The S/S when 
he was still down in the country, said he would like to have a ‘Stock Taking‘ Memo on 
the general political situation at the end of the European War. The attached is a rather 
hurried attempt to get something down on paper before the S/S leaves.  I have sent a 
copy to the Private Secretary. OG Sargent July 11.“ 98 
 
The paper produced by Sargent, dated 12 July 1945, entitled ‘Stock taking after VE 
Day’99 is one of the earliest British Foreign Office documents which offers evidence of 
alertness to the potential threats posed by the Soviet Union.  
 
Orme Garton Sargent, who was to be the central character in the setting up of the 
Russia Committee, was known to his friends as ‘Moley’ and, to many others, just as 
OGS.  He was exceptional as a senior diplomat for not serving abroad.  Indeed, aside 
from spells in Paris early on in his career, from 1925 to his retirement in February 
1949, he refused to attend overseas conferences or to go abroad for any purpose.  It 
was thought that he suffered from claustrophobia in ships and aircraft. Some 
contemporaries believed that this was perhaps for the best as he had few of the inter-
personal skills necessary for a great Ambassador. Although he was highly intelligent, 
informed, and passionate about defending British interests, he was nevertheless said 
to be reserved and somewhat aloof, with little time for the social life which was, and 
remains, an important element of an Ambassador's job.  As Sir Robert Vansittart, a 
former Foreign Office Permanent Under-Secretary is said to have observed: “Orme 
Sargent was a philosopher who strayed into Whitehall. He knew all the answers; when 
politicians did not want them he went out to lunch”.100  This description implies a 
certain detachment or even perhaps a lack of commitment to his role though this 
could be regarded as being at odds with his colleague, Lord Brimelow’s, description of 
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Orme Sargent as: “..an absolute model of a civil servant; quiet; orderly; calm; 
meticulous; thoughtful; fair minded and expeditious.  He could get through 
extraordinary amounts of work, but never appeared ruffled”.101  Two other pen 
pictures of Orme Sargent add further flesh to the bones, the first  given by Jock Colville 
in 1941, who as Winston Churchill’s Principal Private Secretary (PPS), knew Orme 
Sargent well, when he described him as a: “witty and cynical Under Secretary at the 
Foreign Office who was loved and respected by all his colleagues..... Churchill set great 
store by his judgement”.102  The second from, Sir John Wheeler-Bennet, a prominent 
member of the Foreign Office’s Political Intelligence Department (PID) during the 
Second World War, described Orme Sargent as: “a survival (sic) of a past age, almost 
an anachronism.  In appearance, tradition, conventions, standards and values, he was 
essentially Edwardian with all the elegance and elan of that period”. 103 
Clearly, then, Orme Sargent was a man of some force and influence and, given the 
largely anonymous nature of most senior public servants, the recorded views of his 
contemporaries provide the closest insight into this influential man and his strong 
views on what kind of foreign policy Britain needed to construct in the post war 
environment.   Unfortunately, though perhaps not surprisingly, he did not leave his 
papers to any of the major archive centres.  Indeed, his only papers relating to his 
official work are those held in the TNA under the Class FO 800/272-9 which are 
basically his Private Office papers.  After his death, Orme Sargent’s personal papers 
were left to a friend but they are confined to papers about his family life and included 
no official papers.104    
At the time of Eden’s request for the ‘Stock Taking’ Memo, Orme Sargent was Deputy 
Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office which is, as it was then, the second highest rank 
within the Diplomatic Service.  In February 1946 (i.e. two months before the first 
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meeting of the Russia Committee) he was promoted to succeed Cadogan as 
Permanent Under-Secretary i.e. the most senior of all British diplomats, and, in civil 
service terms, out-ranked only by the Cabinet Secretary.  
As one of his most senior officials at the time, Eden clearly knew Orme Sargent well.  
Their backgrounds, socially and educationally, were similar.  Both were the products of 
a public-school education and from solid upper-class families and Eden would have 
been familiar with Orme Sargent’s talents and, doubtless, his mind-set as regards 
Britain’s position in the world and the challenges facing the country in the aftermath of 
the war. Eden was fully aware of, and in agreement with, Orme Sargent’s views on the 
need to start standing up to the Soviets whose post-war settlement demands were 
starting to be regarded as becoming unacceptable and had seen, and commented on, 
his  paper of 2 April 1945 which spelt out the need to reconsider British foreign policy 
towards the Soviet Union.105  Moreover, the same was true for Orme Sargent in 
respect of Eden’s views, the latter having written to Churchill: ”the truth is that on any 
and every point, Russia tries to seize all that she can and... to grab as much as she 
can”.106   
In commissioning the ‘Stock Taking’ Memo from Orme Sargent, therefore, Eden would 
have had some perception of the likely end result. The paper has been described as 
being “seminal to British post-war foreign policy” 107 and to have given rise to “an 
intense debate within Whitehall that apparently continued for some weeks”.108   It is 
interesting on a number of levels, including:   the speed of its production and its 
authorship; the views of the Secretary of State, Eden, on the Memo; the timing of the 
commissioning in relation to the forthcoming General Election; and the use, if any, to  
which the paper was put.   
The ‘Stock Taking’ Memo was produced at great speed and by Orme Sargent himself.  
While he may have been so deeply immersed in the subject matter that writing such 
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advice would not have required detailed research, nevertheless it would have been 
fairly unusual for an individual of his seniority, with many calls upon his time, to have 
immediately penned the paper himself.  An individual as senior as Orme Sargent might 
reasonably be expected to commission a first draft of such a paper from one of his 
subordinates.  While it is possible that he did so in this instance, the fact that the paper 
was produced at such speed, the fact that it has a flowing style rather than having the 
feel of being put together from disparate contributions and the fact that no evidence 
appears on the relevant Foreign Office files that his subordinates contributed to 
drafting the original version of the paper, all suggests that Orme Sargent penned the 
Memo himself.  And while it is normal in Whitehall for civil servants to act quickly to 
meet requests for advice from their political masters, it is nevertheless impressive that 
a paper of such length, complexity and breadth of thinking was provided at such speed 
by such a busy individual. 
 
The original ‘Stock Taking’ Memo, which was classified ‘Secret’, and dated 11 July 
1945, is four single spaced typed pages long, excluding the Annexes, and has 16 
paragraphs.109  The first three paragraphs, extracts from which are reproduced here,   
elegantly set out the position in which Britain found itself as the war in Europe had 
drawn to a close and it is difficult, in hindsight, to take issue with Orme Sargent’s scene 
setting: 
STOCKTAKING AFTER VE DAY 
 
The end of the war in Europe leaves us facing two main problems, neither of 
which has any resemblance to the problems with which we were faced at the 
end of the last war.   They are (a) the military occupation by Soviet troops of a 
large part of Eastern Europe, and the Soviet Government’s future policy 
generally; and (b) the economic rehabilitation of Europe so as to prevent a 
general economic collapse. 
 
2. Our own position, too, in dealing with these problems is very different 
from what it was at the end of the last war This time the control is in a large 
degree in the hands of the Soviet Union and the United States, and neither of 
them is likely to consider British interests ...unless we assert ourselves....... 
 
                                                     
109 TNA:  FO 371/50912/5471. Memorandum, signed O G SARGENT, dated 11th July 1945.   
37 
 
3.......the principle of co-operation between the three Great Powers should be 
specifically accepted .....and would give us a position in the world which we 
might otherwise find it increasingly difficult to assert..... there is a feeling that 
Great Britain is now a Secondary Power...”. 
 
Orme Sargent then goes on to say that the notion of Great Britain having become a 
Secondary Power is a misconception which it must be the policy of the British 
Government to combat and that in order to do that, given the fact that Britain was the 
weakest of the three both numerically and geographically:  “.. it is essential that we 
should increase our strength in not only the diplomatic but  also the economic and 
military spheres”.110   This might, at first sight, seem contradictory but what he may 
well have meant by this is that, although Britain may have ended the War as the 
weakest of the three big powers, and although there may have been “a feeling” that 
Great Britain was now a ‘Secondary Power’, this soubriquet was not necessarily 
justified and could, through appropriate actions/policies, be combated.111  
 
The meat of the lengthy Memo thereafter examined in detail the wide divergences 
between the outlooks, traditions and methods of the two other Great Powers and 
suggested what actions and policy Great Britain needed to adopt to maximise its 
influence over future developments dictated by either of the two other ‘Great 
Powers’. 
 
In paragraphs 5 to 13 of the Memo, Orme Sargent concentrated on making some 
notable generalised comments on the Soviet Union and the United States, the flavour 
of which is illustrated by the following three extracts: “It is particularly dangerous to 
assume that the foreign policies of totalitarian governments are opportunist and 
fluctuating, like those of liberal governments (using the term “liberal” in its widest 
sense as representing all that is opposed to totalitarianism, whether to the Right or the 
Left).  All totalitarian governments – and Russia is certainly no exception – are able to 
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conduct a consistent and persistent foreign policy over long periods because the 
government is not dependent on public opinion and changes of government...” 112 
This observation of the difference between, on the one hand, governments which have 
to have regard to the views of their electorates, and therefore need to tailor their 
policies and actions accordingly, and, on the other, the ‘freedom’ of totalitarian 
governments to make long term plans and stick to them, may seem a little simplistic 
but nonetheless has more than a kernel of truth.   That said, Orme Sargent recognised 
that even such ‘political freedom’ as enjoyed by Stalin’s Government would inevitably 
be constrained by the position it found itself in after a long and costly war, as he 
observed in his next paragraph: “At the present moment the Soviet Union has been so 
weakened by the war that Stalin is hardly in a position to force through ruthlessly his 
policy of ideological penetration against definite opposition.......”. 113 
 
The Soviet Union had, of course, suffered enormous losses in manpower, in territory 
and in economic assets as a result of the Second World War and was pressing hard for 
reparations, in the post war negotiations at Yalta and Potsdam and other conferences. 
Orme Sargent then returned to the theme of constraints on Western governments: 
“Unfortunately, the foreign policy of the United States is, like that of the Soviet Union, 
difficult to forecast, but not because, as in Russia, it is secret, but because the 
“liberalism” of the United States constitution makes it fluctuating, uncertain, and 
emotional.” 114 
The final paragraph of the Stock-taking Memo summarises Orme Sargent’s suggestions 
for the future foreign policy towards the other two ‘Great Powers’.115  It underlines 
Sargent’s belief that Britain ‘s foreign policy needed to be in keeping with traditional 
values and needed to work to establish a European voice even if that meant acting 
independently of the United States.  Indeed, he was quite suspicious of the United 
States, fearing that they may “... adopt a policy of appeasement towards Russian 
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113 Ibid. Paragraph 7.   
114 Ibid.  Paragraph 13.   
115 See footnote 114. 
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domination”116 while recognising, however, that there remained a need to maintain 
Britain’s position with the latter.   Having concluded his Memo, Orme Sargent signed it 
as “O. G. SARGENT”, dated it “11th July 1945” and, in accordance with normal 
procedure, submitted it to Anthony Eden via Alexander Cadogan who, before passing it 
on to Eden, added his own detailed comments covering two pages in manuscript and 
starting with his overall impression that:   “This seems to me a most useful paper”.117  
He then went on to comment on the conclusions, noting first, and before making 
comments on other aspects of the paper, that:  “I entirely endorse conclusion (a) in 
para.16 – all of it”. 118 
 
Eden was also impressed with the Memo, enthusiastically endorsing it as an “excellent 
paper”.119   The Files show that Eden had clearly read the lengthy Memo immediately 
upon receipt, as the date of his manuscript note shows, and he commented: “I think 
this is an excellent paper and the Annexes are all valuable.  I should like PM to see 
them & I am tempted to let Cabinet have a look also.  I am most grateful for the 
guidance they give & agree whole heartedly.  AE July 12”.120 
 
As to the Annexes to the Memo, as also endorsed by Eden, the main one of interest is 
the first, which comprises a note by Bruce Lockhart, dated 11 April 1945, which begins:   
“During my enforced immobilisation I have been turning my mind to the problem of 
Russia’s future intentions”.121   Sir Robert Hamilton Bruce Lockhart122 was a very 
colourful character with a long pedigree as an expert on Russia, having been posted to 
Moscow on joining the Diplomatic Service and was in the post of Acting British Consul-
General in Moscow when the first Russian Revolution broke out in early 1917. 
Thereafter he had had continual contacts with the country in varying capacities, 
working for a time for the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) and, during the Second 
World War he became Director-General of the Political Warfare Executive (PWE), co-
                                                     
116 TNA: FO 371/50912/5471.  Note dated 11 July 1945.  Paragraph 16(d). 
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119 Dutton, David.  Anthony Eden:  A Life and Reputation.  Published Arnold, 1997.  Page 316. 
120 TNA: FO 371/50912/5471. Manuscript Note dated 12 July 1945.  
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ordinating all British propaganda against the Axis powers. He was also, for a time, the 
British liaison officer to the Czechoslovak government-in-exile and a close personal 
friend of Eden, as is evident from their spending leisure time together when Eden 
ceased to be in government.123  For all these reasons Lockhart’s views on the Soviet 
Union at the end of the Second World War were not likely to be dismissed out of hand 
by Eden and others who knew of his expertise.  His Annex I to the ’Stock Taking’ Memo 
provides what might be described as Lockhart’s take on a potted history of the Russian 
psyche.  It makes for interesting, if not altogether convincing, reading.  For example, he 
says: “We must remember that your true Bolshevik is a convinced Marxist and that 
Stalin regards himself, and is regarded by his supporters, as the infallible interpreter of 
Marxism....... [Marx’s] whole belief in the social revolution was based on the theory 
that the smaller must be merged in the greater”.124 
Lockhart concluded his Note by saying that there appeared to be only one way of 
checking the Soviet Union’s ‘political malfeasance’ and that was by ‘bolder, but still 
friendly diplomatic action’ by Britain and the United States.   
Having read the ‘Stock Taking’ Memo, including its Annexes, and given it his 
endorsement, Eden wrote, in manuscript, at the end of the Memo, a brief note to 
Pierson Dixon, his PPS, as follows: “PD Please speak to me tomorrow about circulation 
of these papers. AE”. 125  The job title of PPS to a Minister (or, indeed, to a Permanent 
Secretary126 or even to the Sovereign) in the British Civil and Diplomatic Services, is a 
slight misnomer which belies the importance of the post.  It is a key position of 
influence as, arguably, the individual works more closely than any other with his or her 
Minister and is usually a position occupied by young and upcoming officials who are 
destined to reach the highest levels, as indeed was to be the case with Pierson Dixon.   
 
                                                     
123 Dutton.  Page 317.  
124 TNA: FO 371/50912/5471.  Annex 1 to Memorandum, signed O G SARGENT, and dated 11th July 1945. 
Paragraph 1. 
125TNA: FO 371/50912/5471. Manuscript Note dated 12 July 1945.  
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Pierson John Dixon,127 whose forenames reflected a long-standing family tradition 
whereby he was the fifth generation, from father to eldest son, to be so named, and 
who was from birth always known by family, friends and colleagues as ‘Bob’, proved to 
be a highly influential individual. But whether or not he ever did discuss circulation of 
the ‘Stock Taking’ Memo with Eden the next day, or sometime later, cannot be verified 
as the trail goes cold at this point.  There is no reference to such discussions in Pierson 
Dixon’s diaries128 and there are no further notes in the relevant archives to indicate 
whether such discussions took place.   So, as Poole has rightly observed,129 despite 
Eden’s apparent intentions to give the Memo a wider circulation among his political 
peers, there does not seem to be any evidence that the paper was seen by Cabinet.130   
This is not altogether surprising.  The timing of the commissioning of the Memo 
coincided with a very hectic period for Eden as the Secretary of State.  The Potsdam 
Conference, to which Eden was to accompany Churchill, was set to begin just three 
days later on 15 July, and was expected to be a fairly lengthy affair.131  And the results 
of the British General Election were to be announced on 25 July so that some, at least, 
of Eden’s energies, in common with the rest of his political colleagues, would have 
been invested in trying to ensure re-election of himself in his constituency but also 
election of the Conservative Party as the party of government (as opposed to being a 
partner in a coalition government).  He was, moreover, heir apparent to succeed 
Churchill on the latter’s anticipated future retirement.  In the circumstances, then, 
even though Eden had warmly endorsed Orme Sargent’s Memo, as had Cadogan, it is 
not surprising that nothing appears to have been done with the Memo immediately.   
However, that was by no means the end of it.   Orme Sargent had clearly circulated the 
Memo to senior colleagues in the Foreign Office around the time of submitting it to 
Eden, and had asked for their comments.  The responses arrived with him over the 
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course of the next week or two.   The Foreign Office file at TNA132 show responses and 
comments being sent to him from:  Gladwyn Jebb;133  Sir John Troutbeck; 134 Sir Con 
O’Neill;135  Douglas Howard;136  Sir Christopher Warner;137   Sir Philip Broadmead;138  
Sir Oliver Harvey; 139 Sir John Sterndale Bennett; 140 Ernest Passant; 141 Sir Neville 
Butler;142  and Sir Ronald Campbell.143 Several of these men – all men – went on to 
become active participants in the Russia Committee, several even Chairing the 
Committee on occasion.  They were all either Heads of a particular Foreign Office 
Department or Deputy Heads.  As such they were very senior and were drawn from a 
wide cross section of the Foreign Office which serves to illustrate that the Russia 
Committee was a broad-based entity – not confined to the Northern Department of 
the Foreign Office, for example, which housed the Russia Desk.   
 
Of the responses received on the Memorandum the two which justify close attention, 
as opposed to the many others which Orme Sargent mostly just acknowledged and 
either agreed with, or dismissed summarily, came from Gladwyn Jebb and John 
Troutbeck.   
 
Gladwyn Jebb, who at the time was PPS to Alexander Cadogan wrote a lengthy 
response to Orme Sargent and took issue with a fundamental point made by the latter 
in paragraph 14 of the ‘Stock Taking’ Memo, the relevant part of which reads: “....After 
the last war Germany was hamstrung until 1933 by having a liberal form of 
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government alien to her temperament.  This will not happen this time, unless we make 
very great efforts to impose such a regime in Germany, for her natural tendency will be 
to strive to return to some form of authoritarianism.”144   
 
Gladwyn Jebb’s response to this point was:  “..On the other hand it is elsewhere [in the  
memo] suggested that Russia fears the revival of Germany as a “liberal” power and 
that we for our part should try to build up Germany as a bastion of liberalism, even if 
necessary “imposing” any such regime on a country whose tendency lies as previously 
stated in the opposite direction”. 145  Orme Sargent dismissed Gladwyn Jebb’s point 
saying that his argument:  “...lands us, I fear, with the conclusion that the only thing to 
do is to reach an agreement with Russia for dividing Europe into spheres of influence.  
This is a policy of despair which runs counter to the principles underlying the whole of 
my memorandum”. 146   A crushing dismissal.  Needless to say, Gladwyn Jebb’s 
comments were not taken on board in the revised version of the Memo.  The 
comments submitted by Jack Troutbeck were perhaps not given quite so short shrift as 
those of Jebb.  Troutbeck was a respected Foreign Office expert on Germany.  Indeed, 
at this point he was the Head of the Foreign Office German Department, having earlier 
been involved in co-ordinating planning for the occupation of Germany and the peace 
settlement and, as such, had been much involved in the complex evolution of British 
thinking on the German question.   His central point, in a well-argued minute dated 30 
July 1945,147 was also to take issue with the points made in paragraph 14 of the ‘Stock 
Taking’ Memo about the imposing of a liberal regime.  He saw this policy as having 
three objectives:  to prevent Germany from sliding into totalitarianism; to keep 
Germany weak so that it would be unable to play the Great Powers off against each 
other; and to prevent the Soviets from gaining political control.  He wrote: “I must 
confess with all humility to certain doubts about all this….if the result, and the 
purpose, of establishing a liberal regime in Germany is to “hamstring” her, surely it is 
unlikely either to be a good advertisement for liberalism elsewhere or to last very long.  
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145 TNA: FO 371/50912/5471. Minute dated July 20 1945, from Gladwyn Jebb to Orme Sargent.    
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I have always thought it a short-sighted policy deliberately to create a feeble regime in 
Germany...I would say that to “impose” a liberal regime is a contradiction in terms.”148 
 
Orme Sargent’s concession to Jack Troutbeck’s comments was to agree to amend the 
wording of his paragraph 14 from “..impose a liberal regime in Germany”  to “..support 
the cause of liberalism in Germany”  and this form of words was contained in the 
revised version of the ‘Stock Taking’ Memo.  This is a not insignificant concession 
which perhaps Orme Sargent made because he recognised that Troutbeck was such a 
respected expert on Germany.   
On 31 July 1945, having received all the comments from his Foreign Office colleagues, 
Orme Sargent produced a minute summarising his responses to their comments and 
then produced a revised version of the Memo which, in truth,  and despite the 
numerous comments he had received, was largely unchanged from the original that he 
had penned three weeks earlier.   His 31 July minute included a manuscript note by 
him, in the margin, to the effect that the revised ‘Stock Taking’ Memo would:  “still 
bear the date of the original Memo”. 149    
This raises the puzzling question as to why Orme Sargent sought to produce a second 
version of the Memo and, even more puzzling, why he decided to retain the original 
date.   On the first point, of why produce a second version, this would seem to be 
consistent with a normal Whitehall approach.  If, as argued earlier, Orme Sargent 
penned the original – or what might be called the first draft – of the ‘Stock Taking’ 
Memo, he would have wanted it, for future usefulness and acceptance, to be 
considered by, and endorsed by, his senior diplomatic colleagues.  To do so could only 
add weight to the importance accorded to the document if he could point to the fact 
that it had been seen as the product of the senior cadre of diplomats.  Moreover, given 
that at this time he was Deputy Under Secretary - not yet the ‘boss’ - it would hardly 
be politic to seek the views of his colleagues, many of whom were his equals in terms 
of rank, only to dismiss them summarily without acknowledging that he had seen and 
considered them even if he chose then not to take them on board. 
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On the second, arguably more weighty point, as to why he specifically required the 
amended Memo to retain the original date, it seems that the reason, though this 
cannot be verified from evidence, is likely to have to do with the fact that between 
Eden’s commissioning of it on, or around, 10 July and the revised version still dated 11 
July but circulated within the Foreign Office on 31 July, there had been a change of 
Government and a change of Foreign Secretary.  This begs the further question as to 
why this should have led him to insist on retaining the original date.  Poole150 raises 
two interesting points about the Memo in relation to the change of Government.  First, 
he cites Robin Edmonds,151 a former diplomat, as pointing out that there is a Whitehall 
convention forbidding incoming governments from seeing papers prepared for a 
previous administration.  While there is, indeed, such a convention152 and it is 
inconceivable that Orme Sargent would not have been aware of its existence, it would 
seem only to be relevant here if Sargent wished to accord it the status of a completed 
document that was not to be shown to an incoming Government.  But clearly that was 
not his wish.  If it had been, he would simply have had his clerks file the Memo using its 
pre change of government date destined for a ‘previous administration’ file and left it 
at that.  But he must have felt strongly about the content of his Memo and felt that his 
new Foreign Secretary needed to see it when formulating his foreign policy decisions.  
Orme Sargent was doubtless aware of the respect which Eden held for Bevin (and vice 
versa)153 and with Eden’s belief that Bevin would continue with the Coalition’s foreign 
policy.  He could have avoided the danger of flouting the Whitehall convention by 
simply changing the date to after the arrival of Bevin.  But to do so would break the 
link of its having been commissioned, and approved, by Bevin’s predecessor, a link that 
would have been a useful selling point to Sargent given the shared views of the two 
Foreign Secretaries.  Also, while technically retaining the original date was a breach of 
the convention, it could be argued that it would be appropriate to interpret the 
convention more liberally in the circumstances whereby a Labour Administration 
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followed on from a coalition government in which both Labour and Conservative 
Ministers had both served.  Moreover, it would be in Orme Sargent’s interests, 
assuming he did not want his ‘Stock Taking’ Memo to be swept under the carpet, to 
adopt an interpretation such that the advent of the new Labour Government would 
not be precluded from further discussion of his Memo;   and that the new Foreign 
Secretary would have been at least aware of the discussion process.  While it is 
verifiably true that the ‘discussion’, in writing at least, continued after the change of 
Government, as we know from the many written exchanges between 11 and 31 July 
that led to the production of the revised version of the Stock-taking Memo, those 
written exchanges were, during that period at least, from the evidence on the files, 
confined to exchanges between serving diplomats, although by the end of August 
Bevin had seen and read the Memo.154   
The 1945 General Election campaign was fought largely on domestic issues but, 
inevitably perhaps, given the recent end of the Second World War, both main political 
parties gave prominence in their Manifestos to foreign policy and, perhaps more 
surprisingly, they broadly followed similar lines. That said, it has to be remembered 
that the General Election was to be fought between, in essence, the two main political 
parties whose leaders had together held prominent positions as colleagues in a 
successful war-time coalition government.  Both manifestos made strong references to 
the need for the United Nations Organisation which was then in its infancy.155 The 
Labour Party Manifesto included the passage: 
We must prevent another war, and that means we must have such an 
international organisation as will give all nations real security against future 
aggression...... 
 No domestic policy, however widely framed and courageously applied, can 
succeed in a world still threatened by war.  Economic strife and political and 
military insecurity are enemies of peace.  We cannot cut ourselves off from the 
rest of the world- and we ought not to try........ 
Now the victory has been won, at so great a cost of life and material 
destruction, we must make sure that Germany and Japan are deprived of all 
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power to make war again......We must consolidate in peace the great war-time 
association of the British Commonwealth with the USA and the USSR.... 156 
The Conservative Manifesto expressed similar views but emphasised the need for 
experienced men to take the policy forward: 
Our alliance with Soviet Russia and our intimate friendship with the USA can be 
maintained only if we show that our candour is matched by our strength. 
The main hope of the world is now founded upon the setting up of a World 
Organisation strong enough to prevent future wars of aggression whether by the 
weak or the strong.  The United Nations have lately been assembled at San 
Francisco with the object of devising the necessary machinery”.157 
The General Election that followed was expected to result in a return to power of the 
great wartime leader Winston Churchill.  Anything else might seem like base 
ingratitude.  The odds on a Conservative victory had shortened over the period of the 
campaign but it was still widely expected that Churchill would be returned as Prime 
Minister.  On the morning when the results were due, but before the outcome was 
known, the Daily Mail warned that Labour would need to: “accept an adverse verdict 
like men and not like spoilt children”.158 
The Manchester Guardian, perhaps more presciently, speculated that another coalition 
government might need to be formed if there were to be a stalemate.159  In the event 
it proved to be a landslide victory for Labour as they won 47.8% of the votes which 
translated into 390 seats in the House of Commons and an overall majority of 146 
seats.160 
So, the result of the 1945 UK General Election was largely unexpected, even on the 
part of the most optimistic of Labour supporters and Attlee, himself, was said to be 
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shaken by the result. Sir Alan Lascelles161 recorded in his diary for 26 July 1945: “Attlee 
came 7.30, obviously in a state of some bewilderment – the poor little man had only 
heard a couple of hours before that he was to be called upon immediately to fill 
Winston’s place; it struck me that he may not be sure whether his followers are 
prepared to follow him, or may prefer another leader – he has had no chance of 
consulting them. Anyway, he kissed hands alright, so is now committed to forming a 
Government – or trying to.”162 That night “bonfires burned in the streets of east 
London, in a scene that was compared to the jubilations of VE Day”163 and the Daily 
Herald reported that a dockworker had walked along Commercial Road in Mile End, 
with a placard around his neck which read: “THIS IS THE HOUR OF TRIUMPH OF THE 
COMMON MAN.”164   
After Attlee’s Audience of the King, he addressed a meeting in Westminster Central 
Hall of the newly elected Labour MPs where, with Bevin’s assistance, he warded off a 
leadership bid by Herbert Morrison165 when Bevin moved a vote of confidence in 
Attlee as leader which was overwhelmingly passed. Attlee then turned his mind both 
to the need to return to Potsdam and to appoint a Foreign Secretary to accompany 
him. Other key posts would have to await his return. 
Bevin as Foreign Secretary and Return to Potsdam 
Bevin’s appointment as Foreign Secretary came as a surprise, not just to others, but 
also to himself as he had expected to be offered the post of Chancellor of the 
Exchequer.  It seems that Attlee had been inclined to make the latter appointment but 
changed his mind.  Indeed, Lascelles reported that, in the Audience of the King on 
Thursday 26 July, which was held immediately after the results of the General Election 
were known, Attlee: “.. told the King he was thinking of making Dalton the Foreign 
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Secretary;  HM begged him to substitute Bevin.” 166 Others, too, were keen to see 
Bevin at the Foreign Office, most notably the Cabinet Secretary of the day, Sir Edward 
Bridges, and also Bevin’s predecessor, Anthony Eden, whose diary entry for 26 July 
1945 includes the passage: “Returned to W, and reported this.167  Then Bob168 came 
with me across to F.O.  He tells me my successor may be Dalton.  This would be very 
bad; it should be Bevin.” 169  
Bevin, therefore, became Foreign Secretary, and was immediately thrown in at the 
deep end. Pierson Dixon recorded in his diary170 that on the evening of Bevin’s 
appointment, when he was to fly with Attlee171 to Berlin the next day 172 to resume the 
Potsdam Conference that had been interrupted by the General Election result, he and 
Oliver Harvey (in the absence of Orme Sargent who was at the theatre) spent an hour 
briefing Bevin on the Conference, bringing him fully up to speed on the topics under 
discussion and so on. Dixon said that Bevin: ”absorbed it all and said very little, except, 
on parting, that he liked regular hours and found work better done and better 
decisions taken by work at day and not, like Winston, at night”.173 
 
Attlee and Bevin therefore arrived in Potsdam to resume the Conference on Saturday 
28 July and Bevin had the first of a number of meetings with his two opposite numbers 
namely James Byrnes, the newly appointed US Secretary of State, and Vyacheslav 
Molotov, the Soviet Foreign Minister.  That evening also saw the first plenary session 
of the Conference attended by both Attlee and Bevin which lasted until the early hours 
of the following morning.  Clearly there would have been interest, even perhaps 
concern, on the part of both the US and Soviet politicians and officials – as well, 
perhaps, as the British officials - over the change from Churchill’s Team to that of 
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Attlee’s.  The British interpreter at Potsdam, Hugh Lunghi,174 commented that he: “was 
impressed by the ‘sound, well-informed and realistic way in which Attlee, particularly, 
and also Bevin tackled the matter’.  They got to the ‘root of every question’ and would 
not permit themselves to be distracted by ‘red-herring digression – a trap into which 
Churchill could sometimes fall.  At one point, Bevin leaned his large frame across Attlee 
to Lunghi and said, “Tell them, that in the Labour Party we call a spade a spade”. 175 
Potsdam – the turning point 
Potsdam was not a resounding success for any of the central participants, though the 
Soviets did score a significant victory over the composition of the government of 
Poland and its frontier. Lawrence Freedman has summarised the essence of Potsdam 
as follows: “Tensions were evident…Germany was to be divided among the victorious 
powers and kept under an occupation regime, thereby delaying, though not for long, 
the struggle to shape its future political identity.  Poland inevitably presented itself as a 
particularly difficult case.  It had been the invasion of Poland by Hitler in September 
1939, in cynical collusion with Stalin, that had drawn Britain into war.  The Polish 
government-in-exile had moved to London and expected to return.  With his forces 
now in full occupation, Stalin wanted his own regime put in place”176 
Bevin and Attlee stood their ground well during the discussions of these issues and 
made their respective marks.  During the conference, and particularly during the days 
when plenary sessions were impossible due to the illness of Stalin on 29th and 30th of 
July (which according to Pierson Dixon had been due to Stalin having been shaken over 
his failure the day before to gain US and British agreement to his reparations 
requirements so that he “found it convenient to affect a diplomatic illness”),177  Bevin 
had separate sessions with his fellow Foreign Ministers and had his first serious 
confrontations with Molotov. 
Ernest Bevin clearly entered the scene as Foreign Secretary at a particularly sensitive 
time in relations between the ‘Three Big Powers’.    He took up the reigns with a strong 
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cadre of senior official advisers behind him, some at least of whom had strong views 
on the need for the West to take actions to restrain the expansionism of the Soviet 
Union.  Moreover, they would have been well aware of Bevin’s earlier ‘on the record’ 
criticisms of the Foreign Office and would have been forgiven for expecting that, he 
might, in contrast to senior diplomats and given his Labour Party pedigree, be pro-
Soviet.  In short, it could have been viewed as a fairly unpropitious beginning for the 
Foreign Office.  But this was soon shown not to be the case and, indeed, Bevin was to 
go down in Foreign Office history as one of the most esteemed Foreign Secretaries in 
the history of the post.178   Although his background, socially and educationally, was 
very different from that of the overwhelming majority of his staff in the Foreign Office, 
they quickly developed a mutual respect.  Bevin himself, on his unexpected move to 
the Foreign Office, had had experience during the Second World War years of working 
with the top civil servants of the time and he appreciated their considerable abilities in 
being fully on top of their subjects and he valued their ability to help in the solving of 
problems.  According to Bulloch, Bevin would affect sorrow towards those of his staff 
in the Foreign Office who: “had never had a chance because of their sheltered 
upbringing and education” but this was “more than half banter”. 179  For their part, his 
staff recognised his impressive qualities which swiftly earned their respect.  He was, it 
seems, very quick to take a point and absorb the information given to him but he 
resolutely refused to be hurried into reaching a considered conclusion, although once 
he had made up his mind he tended to stick to his guns. 
Bevin came under a lot of criticism for not getting rid of the old FCO establishment, 
populated as it was almost exclusively by upper class, privately educated elite 
characters.  Indeed, he faced, at the Labour Party conference in 1946, a formal 
resolution calling on him: “..to replace officials who were unsympathetic  with socialist 
principles by others with more progressive views”. 180  However, even if Bevin had 
been so minded it would not have been possible for him to summarily ‘get rid’ of 
officials.  The fact that the recruitment and the subsequent management of members 
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of the civil service and the diplomatic service were then, as now, independent of 
political interference is one of the cornerstones of the independence of the civil 
service in Britain.  While Bevin might legitimately have had his say to the Cabinet 
Secretary about, for example: the choice of person to become  his Principal Private 
Secretary (PPS);  the staff in his Ministerial Office staff; or about the choice of the PUS, 
it would have been a matter for the Cabinet Secretary to decide.  The concept of a 
Foreign Secretary being able to remove the ‘FCO establishment’ would simply run 
wholly counter to civil/diplomatic service independence. 
On his arrival at the Foreign Office, Bulloch says that Bevin held “some residual radical 
suspicions of the Foreign Office”181 but his suspicions were short lived and although 
initially, while he sized up his key staff, he tended to rely on his (and formerly Eden’s) 
Principal Private Secretary, Piers Dixon, as a go-between, he quickly came to respect 
his staff and they him.  Indeed, in response to the calls at the Labour Party conference, 
Bevin was unrepentant saying that: “I am not one of those who decry Eton and 
Harrow.  I was very glad of them in the Battle of Britain – by God! I was – those fellows 
paid the price in the RAF in those fatal days.” 182 
One of the question marks over the views and disposition of Bevin towards Russia 
relates to the fact that he was perceived to be well disposed to his Soviet allies as the 
Second World War drew to a close and might be assumed to continue to have been so 
well disposed as he assumed responsibility as Foreign Secretary.  But such perceptions 
may not have been valid.  He may not have been out of sympathy with the concerns 
expressed by Orme Sargent (or been opposed to the latter’s setting up of the Russia 
Committee).  Any shift in Bevin’s pro-Soviet mindset, if indeed he had such a mindset, 
may have resulted both from his own first hand rather difficult experiences of dealing 
with the Soviets as well as his advice from his key officials. It is clear that his approach 
was one whereby he would listen carefully to the advice of experts and to take time to  
absorb what he was being told before finally coming to his own conclusions, as noted 
by Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick who said of Bevin that: “He never allowed himself to be 
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bounced into anything against his better judgement….He required time to read the 
files and subject his experts to a penetrating cross examination…Above all he required 
time to let a considered judgement precipitate from a mixture of reasoning, intuition 
and experience”.183 
Bevin’s so called pro-Soviet views may, therefore, have been exaggerated.  Bill Jones, 
for example, tells of a misunderstanding on the part of the Labour Party of a 
pronouncement of Bevin’s at the 1945 Blackpool Conference that:“…’left understands 
left’, was widely interpreted as applying to the Soviet Union whereas in reality he was 
talking about the French socialists..”.184 
First Foreign Secretaries Conference – Bevin’s tussles with Molotov 
One of the outcomes of the Potsdam conference was the decision to have a protocol 
that: “established a Council composed of Foreign Ministers of the United Kingdom, the 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, China, France and the United States”.185 
11 September 1945 saw the opening of the first meeting of the Council of Foreign 
Ministers which was held in London186 with Bevin for the first time acting as host to 
the other Foreign Ministers, Byrnes, Molotov, Bidault187 and Wang .188  The purpose of 
the Conference was for the Foreign Ministers to resolve the issues that lay unresolved 
from the Yalta and Potsdam conferences.  But at the first meeting the “Russians 
became aggressive”189 claiming that both France and China should not be involved; 
that it should just be the Big Three Powers as it had been at Yalta and Potsdam.  This 
issue of the participation of France and China dominated the discussions in one form 
or another for the duration of the lengthy conference, which continued until 3rd 
October.  Bevin stood firm against Molotov’s claims and Byrnes supported him.  The 
fact was that it had been agreed by all parties that the Council should comprise the 
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Foreign Ministers of all five countries and it was in contravention of that protocol to 
then suggest that only the original ‘Big Three’ countries could discuss certain of the 
issues before the Conference.  Initially, Molotov grudgingly accepted that France and 
China could be full participants but rejected any hint of compromise over the Balkans 
and engaged in a series of tussles aimed at securing the major part of Libya 
(Tripolitania) for the Soviets, something that had been firmly resisted at Potsdam.   
Then, having reluctantly agreed on 11 September that all five countries could 
participate in the Council’s discussions, on 22 September the Soviet Delegation 
changed their stance, claiming that the Council’s 11 September decision violated the 
Berlin agreement reached at Yalta.   
 
Molotov’s aggression continued and hostilities permeated the remainder of the 
lengthy Council and did not bode well for future such conferences.  In his diaries, 
Cadogan, who had accompanied Bevin to the Conference, recorded: “Bevin’s hopes of 
a new style of diplomacy, ‘cards on the table, face upwards’, waned.....At the meeting 
of Foreign Secretaries held in London, Molotov behaved in his most mulish and 
obstructive manner.  By 23 September Bevin had had enough. He told Cadogan that he 
proposed to ‘’ave it out’ with Molotov”.190   
 
Bevin was essentially a shrewd and pragmatic man and his immediate experiences of 
negotiation at the Potsdam Conference would have provided a sharp reality check and 
shone a light on the trickiness of the Russian contingent.  And his experience of hosting 
the first Foreign Ministers Council could only have reinforced the view that the Soviets 
were becoming more and more unreasonable.  Nor were his concerns that new.  Both 
he and Attlee were, as Elsley puts it, anti-communism and had an “aversion for Soviet 
diplomatic tactics (which) were long-standing”.191  He traces their ‘long standing’ views 
to Potsdam or earlier192 where Attlee formed the view that Stalin was a tyrant who 
had no principles and who would stop at nothing.  Given the debate as to when Bevin 
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was ‘persuaded’ by his Foreign Office officials of the need to counter the Soviets 
aggression, this is an interesting observation. 
From the minutes of the various meetings at the First Foreign Secretaries Conference   
it is evident that there was little meeting of minds either about the format of 
proceedings or, more importantly, of what was to be discussed.  As a result, Bevin was 
clearly hard-pressed not to lose patience with the obstructive tactics of Molotov193 and 
in the end the Conference/Council broke up in disarray, when the Russians declined to 
accept the French proposals that they should be involved in all discussions.  As Pierson 
Dixon recorded: “There has been a singular bitterness in Molotov’s attitude at this 
conference…no doubt partly due to frustration at failure to make any progress towards 
his hidden objectives and at the failure of the procedural manoeuvres.  Another thing 
which may account for Molotov’s attitude is that….the Russians may well have 
expected that a Socialist Government in this country would be more accommodating 
towards them than its predecessors.  This has not proved to be so.” 194  
Following the breakup of the conference, which had in effect achieved little of any 
substance, Pierson Dixon had to dissuade Bevin – when he was preparing to make a 
post-conference statement to the House of Commons - from baldly stating that the 
breakdown of the conference was due to his refusal to meet Soviet ambitions.195 This, 
too, shines an interesting light on Bevin’s so-called initial reluctance to see difficulties 
with the Soviets. According to Dixon’s account he acted as a restraining hand on Bevin. 
Pierson Dixon’s Diary entry for 3 October states: “Byrnes and Molotov had both given 
press conferences on the breakdown on the Council but E.B. decided to hold his hand.  
Still, tonight he dictated a fierce statement to the press to explain that when he did 
make a statement he would spill the beans.  I prevailed on him not to issue anything 
but merely to let it be known that he would be making a full statement in the House 
next week”.196  
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Byrnes’s contemporary account of the conference197 gives a measured description of 
the events which led to the break-up of the Conference.  Although his language is 
more conciliatory than that of the blunt Bevin, Byrnes too decries the unwillingness of 
the Soviets to embrace what Byrnes saw as an opportunity to work for peaceful 
settlement of the issues under consideration.  A sticking point for the Soviets, which on 
the face of it does not seem unreasonable, was the unwillingness of the USA and Great 
Britain to recognize the Bulgarian and Rumanian governments which the Soviets saw 
as “a manifestation of unfriendliness to the Soviet Union”.198  However, Byrnes 
explains why it was not appropriate in the context of the London Conference to give 
such recognition, saying:  “We do not seek to dictate the internal affairs of any people.  
We only reserve for ourselves the right to refuse to recognize governments if after 
investigation we conclude they have not given to the people the rights pledged to 
them in the Yalta agreement”.199 
The difficulties illustrated in relations between the Soviets and the Western allies at 
Potsdam and at the first of the Foreign Ministers conferences, were significant because 
they constituted the first points at which the Foreign Office and the new Foreign 
Secretary really saw at first-hand the way in which the Soviets were demonstrating 
their obstructiveness – rolling back on decisions made at Yalta on reparations etc.  
These issues were to fall to the Foreign Office to negotiate over – at Foreign Secretary 
Conferences - as time went on.  While this preceded the setting up of the Russia 
Committee it clearly illustrated the need for such a body to be set up. 
Continuity of foreign policy and personnel 
The foreign policy of the new Labour government was largely a continuation of that of 
the war time coalition.  Given that the senior Labour Government Ministers had served 
with their Conservative counterparts for the years of the Second World War, and given 
that they had a joint commitment in foreign policy terms, it is hardly surprising that the 
policy continued.  It has already been stated that Eden was keen to see Bevin succeed 
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him but even more telling is Bevin’s continued liaison with Eden over the ensuing 
months, often with Pierson Dixon200 acting as the conduit.   
 
Before entering the Diplomatic Service Pierson Dixon was a Fellow of Pembroke 
College, Cambridge.  In his early days in the Foreign Office he became acquainted with 
Robin Butler201 who wrote the Foreword to Pierson Dixon’s published diaries202 and 
chose to refer to Dixon’s time as Foreign Secretary Bevin’s PPS and his friendship with 
Eden as being the foundation for the bi-partisan foreign policy adopted by both of 
them.  Lord Butler says of him: “One of Dixon’s greatest services was as Private 
Secretary to Ernest Bevin.  It was remarkable that a man like Bevin, who read papers 
and wrote with such difficulty, should have been able to handle the immense amounts 
of Foreign Office material, and be able to be absolutely at peace and ease with his 
official advisers.  It was largely Dixon’s work to bring out the greatness in the man.  At 
the same time Dixon was able to conduct a bipartisan foreign policy through his 
friendship with Eden”. 203 
Pierson Dixon’s diaries give many examples of Bevin and Eden keeping in very close 
contact over foreign affairs.  For example, after the break-up of the first Foreign 
Ministers conference, and when Bevin was preparing to make his statement in the 
House of Commons, scheduled for 9 October, there was a concern on Bevin and 
Dixon’s part that if the Opposition were to press for a Debate following Bevin’s 
statement, the real reason for the break-up of the conference and all the hostilities it 
involved could come to light.     Dixon’s diary entry for 7th and 8th October show both 
how closely Bevin and Eden were working together and how important Dixon was as  
the go-between friend and ally of both: “Long talk with A.E. about the Conference.  I 
told him that EB, who wanted him to know everything he wished, held that these were 
national interests and above party.  He hoped therefore that the Opposition would not 
press for a Debate when he made his statement on Tuesday.  A.E. said that W.S.C., he 
                                                     
200 Pierson Dixon had been Principal Private Secretary to Eden and then stayed in that role supporting 
Bevin. 
201 Lord Butler of Brockwell, formerly Sir Robin Butler,  who served as PPS to Prime Minister Margaret 
Thatcher and, subsequently as Cabinet Secretary  to three Prime Ministers:  Margaret Thatcher; John 
Major;  and Tony Blair.   
202 Dixon.  Foreword Page xi to xiii   
203Ibid.  Foreword, page xiii. 
58 
 
thought, did intend to press for a Debate, but he then and there spoke to W.S.C. at 
Claridges and persuaded him that the country’s interests required that there should be 
a cooling-off period of a fortnight of so.204    
 
The continuity between the politicians of different political persuasion – in this case 
Eden, as a Conservative Foreign Secretary and Bevin, as a Labour Foreign Secretary - 
could at first sight seem surprising except for the peculiar circumstances that 
prevailed.  The two had worked closely together in the wartime coalition government 
and were both highly senior members of that Cabinet who as this Chapter of the thesis 
shows both respected each other and shared views on foreign policy issues.  The same 
was true of the most senior Diplomats who worked to these Foreign Secretaries.  
Cadogan and Sargent had both been in post for a long time and worked closely with 
both Eden ad Bevin.  In the ever-shifting circumstances of the emerging Cold War, and 
the need to watch carefully what the Soviets were doing, such continuity both with 
politicians and officials was likely to have been beneficial.   
Conclusion 
In his thesis on British Foreign Policy, the United States and Europe 1945 to 50, 
Poole205 argues that British diplomacy “had achieved unimaginable objectives since the 
summer of 1940 when the country and its Empire stood alone against Germany” and 
that as the War neared its conclusion optimism prevailed that there would be a new 
world order of mutual co-operation and concord between the three war-time allies.  
But as the cracks started to appear in this unrealistically optimistic viewpoint, the 
British Foreign office, along with many others in Britain and abroad, was quick to see 
the dangers. 
This Chapter opened with George Kennan’s paper ‘Russia Seven Years Later’ and was 
swiftly followed by the ‘Stock Taking’ Memo commissioned by Eden and written by 
Orme Sargent, which arguably could be seen as the first considered paper on the likely 
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future of foreign relations with Britain’s war-time allies and, in particular, the emerging 
concerns about the Soviet foreign policy.  It was established that Eden thought the 
Memo worth circulating to the Cabinet but that there is no evidence that this 
happened, not least because of the change of Government which took place within 
weeks of the production of the Memo.  What can be established, however, is that 
Bevin at some point in his first few weeks at the Foreign Office - between 31 July and 
21 August 1945 – had been shown, and had read, the ‘Stock Taking’ Memo.  On 21 
August in a manuscript note from Pierson Dixon to his Secretary of State about a 
completely different paper, Pierson added: “....The paper, at the beginning, alludes to a 
memo by Sir O Sargent on “Stocktaking after V.E.Day”, which you have read (flag B).  
Do you approve circulation of Sir Orme Sargent’s paper to Cabinet?    PD  21/8”206 
And Bevin’s response is shown by his having written, in his famously almost illegible 
hand writing and in clumsy grammar: “Do this.  Connect by the discussions next 
Thursday.  EB.”207 
Orme Sargent, given his background and his staunch views, might have been expected 
to be wary of, and not well disposed, towards his new Foreign Secretary, not least 
because he had been so close to Eden, though initially his relationship with Eden was 
said to have been cool and grew as the war brought them together.208  From Orme 
Sargent’s viewpoint, and indeed from many of his fellow senior Foreign Office officials, 
there was bound to be some apprehension about Bevin’s appointment given the 
latter’s campaigning during the war for reform of the Foreign Office.  In the political 
diaries of Hugh Dalton, he notes that Bruce Lockhart told him that “Cadogan and 
Sargent both thought that they were out upon Bevin’s appointment”.209  As noted 
earlier the removal of Cadogan or Orme Sargent or, indeed, any other senior Foreign 
Office official would not have been in the gift of Bevan as their Minister but Dalton 
may have been expressing the foreboding that these individuals felt at the imminent 
arrival of a new Foreign Secretary who was known to have misgivings about the 
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Foreign Office. And, according to Pierson Dixon, on the morning of 26 July 1945 as the 
previous day’s General Election results were coming in and it was becoming clear that  
it was a landslide in favour of Labour, the FCO officials were in the office, and Dixon 
recorded in his diary: “.. Lunched with OGS,210who was in the depths of gloom, 
prophesying a Communist avalanche over Europe, a weak foreign policy, a private 
revolution at home and reduction of England (sic) to a 2nd class power”.211 
Despite confirmation that the General Election on 27 July had resulted in a resounding 
defeat for Churchill and the landslide election of Labour, Orme Sargent’s gloom and 
despondency did not persist, or, if at all, certainly not for long.  As he and his new 
Foreign Secretary quickly became known to each other, their respect for one another 
grew,   as the following months and years were to show, such that Bulloch noted: “Sir 
Orme Sargent who served under every British foreign minister in the 20th century from 
Salisbury onwards and ended up as Bevin’s Permanent Under-Secretary, went out of 
his way to tell the author that by comparison with any of his predecessors he 
considered Bevin a great foreign secretary”. 212 
In the space, therefore, of just under three weeks during July 1945 great changes had 
befallen Orme Sargent in particular and the Foreign Office generally, not to say the rest 
of Whitehall and the country at large.  But Orme Sargent, expert as he was on all 
matters pertaining to  the foreign policy relating to the Soviet Union, had been invited 
by Foreign Secretary Eden to produce a policy paper that was to become regarded as 
“seminal to British post-war foreign policy”,213 had been aware that it was thought 
important enough to be circulated to the Prime Minister and Cabinet colleagues, but 
had then seen it, as it were, set to one side as events of national and international 
importance intervened in the form of, first, the Potsdam Conference and then the 
British General Election.  Clearly Orme Sargent would have wanted his Memo to be 
seen and, more importantly, action taken as a result of the proposals it contained, but 
he would have had to tread fairly carefully, at least initially, as he became familiar with 
Bevin.  As the author of the paper and in his senior position as Deputy Under Secretary 
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in the Foreign Office there would have been different avenues open to him to pursue 
the suggestions in his Memo and one of them would be to set up a high level official 
Foreign Office Committee to look further into the issues.  It can hardly be a 
coincidence that he of all people was the one to set up the Russia Committee just a 
few months later.  However, between July/August 1945 and March 1946 when the first 
meeting of the Russia Committee was to be convened, other significant policy papers 
and Telegrams were to be produced,  important speeches were to be made, and 
foreign ministers conferences were to be attended, all of which would, to a lesser or 
greater extent, exacerbate  growing concerns.  
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Chapter 3  1946 A Pivotal Year 
 
1946 was a pivotal year at the start of the Cold War in terms of the United States’ and 
Britain’s shifts in attitudes and foreign policy towards the Soviet Union.  This resulted  
in part as a reaction to the change in Soviet policy towards the West as evidenced by 
their rowing back from agreements reached earlier at, for example, Potsdam, and the 
hostility demonstrated towards their Western allies at the first of the Council of 
Foreign Ministers conferences.  1946 saw the emergence of several significant policy 
documents, speeches and think pieces, which had far-reaching consequences for 
foreign relations between the Soviets and the West.  Domestically, too, within the 
Foreign Office, there were significant changes.   On 1 February 1945 Orme Sargent 
succeeded Cadogan as Permanent Under-Secretary, an appointment about which 
Bevin, as the political Head of the Foreign Office, would need to have been consulted, 
not least because the two would be working closely together, even though he would 
not have had the final say.   Sargent was undeniably a central figure in driving forward 
the close watch on Soviet actions and intentions, as is evident from his Stock Taking 
after VE Day Memorandum.  For Sargent to have been given the highest post in 
succession to Cadogan, and in the full knowledge of his views of foreign policy vis a vis 
the Soviets, his appointment has to have been significant to some degree in the shift of 
emphasis in Soviet watching.   In addition, the Summer of 1946 saw the Paris Peace 
Conference and the July Council of Foreign Ministers conferences and these were of 
great significance in terms of continuing to alert the Western powers to changes in the 
attitude of the Soviets.  So, as 1946 began, the concerns felt within the United States 
and Britain about the behaviour and attitudes of the Soviets, their former wartime ally, 
grew.  As John Lewis Gaddis puts it: “There were no surprise attacks, no declarations of 
war, no severing even of diplomatic ties.  There was, however, a growing sense of 
insecurity at the highest levels in Washington, London and Moscow, generated by the 
efforts the wartime allies were making to ensure their own post-war security.  With 
their enemies defeated, there was less of an incentive for these former allies, as they 
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were coming to think of themselves, to keep their anxieties under control.  Each crisis 
that arose fed the next one, with the result that a divided Europe became a reality”. 214 
Concerns grew apace about the foreign policy of Russia and, in particular, about the 
threat of Russian expansionism.  As Bulloch notes: “There was no doubt that since the 
beginning of the year tensions between Russia and the West had increased sharply”.215 
A controversial election speech by Stalin at the beginning of February was smartly 
followed by George Kennan’s Long Telegram later the same month, and, in March, by 
Churchill’s Iron Curtain speech; and by Frank Robert’s Long Telegram response to 
Kennan’s Telegrams. Later in the year there was a retaliatory Long Telegram from the 
Soviets but as this, unlike the Kennan and Robert’s Telegrams, was not widely 
publicised outside of Russia, its impact is hard to assess.  Together these events 
combined to ramp up the distrust and hostility between the former wartime allies and 
thereby to threaten the chances of their peaceful co-existence. 
Stalin’s Election Speech 
On 9 February 1946, Stalin delivered a controversial speech on the evening before 
elections to the Supreme Soviet.  Such elections had been in abeyance for eight years 
partly, according to Stalin, because of the delivery of the third Soviet Five-Year Plan 
and then the intervention of the War.  By then it was clear to Stalin that he was not 
going to get the help that his economy so badly needed. President Harry Truman, 
having been elevated to the Presidency following the death of Roosevelt, was more 
hard line than his predecessor.  He had, on 5 January, read to Byrnes216 - with whom 
he was annoyed because Byrnes had exceeded his brief - the text of a letter he had 
drafted which included the following extract: “At Potsdam we were faced with an 
accomplished fact and by circumstances were almost forced to agree to Russian 
occupation of eastern Poland, and that part of Germany east of the Oder River by 
Poland.  It was a high-handed outrage.  There isn’t a doubt in my mind that Russia 
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intends an invasion of Turkey and the seizure of the Black Sea Straits to the 
Mediterranean.  Unless Russia is faced with an iron fist and strong language, another 
war is in the making.  Only one language do they understand – ‘How many divisions 
have you?’  I do not think we should play compromise any longer...I’m tired of babying 
the Soviets”. 217      
Stalin was well aware, from Truman’s decision to cut off Lend-Lease that there was no 
further “prospect of an American financial loan......and that his other hopes of 
economic recovery were blocked by the British and American opposition to his 
requirements for reparations from Germany”.218   Seen from Stalin’s perspective it 
would be entirely understandable if he were to have been bitter at his former allies’ 
reluctance to accommodate his wishes, especially in relation to reparations from 
Germany.  Russia had suffered huge losses as a result of Germany’s aggression in two 
major wars in just thirty years and Stalin wanted both recompense on the one hand, 
and on the other, the security of knowing that Germany was so broken that it was 
unlikely to be in a position to pose a similar threat for the foreseeable future.    
Stalin began his speech by roundly blaming the West for the War which he said had 
been no accident, or the fault of individual statesmen, but had arisen “in reality as the 
inevitable result of the development of the world economic and political forces on the 
basis of monopoly capitalism”.219   He said: “the development of world capitalism does 
not follow a steady and even course forward, but proceeds through crises and 
catastrophes.  The uneven development of the capitalist countries leads in time to 
sharp disturbances in their relations, and the group of countries which consider 
themselves inadequately provided with raw materials and export markets try usually 
to change this situation and to change the position in their favour by means of armed 
force.  As a result of these factors, the capitalist world is sent into two hostile camps 
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and war follows”.220  He went on to claim that these world crises, catastrophes and 
wars, were the direct result of the evils of capitalism and that these could have been: 
“avoided if the possibility of periodic redistribution or raw materials and markets 
between countries existed in accordance with their economic needs”. 221     
This hard-hitting message was, understandably, not well received by his Western allies. 
But, in fact, the harsh criticisms of the West and capitalism were only a relatively small 
part of Stalin’s speech.  It was predominantly aimed at encouraging his fellow Soviets 
to recognise their war time victory; to applaud the success of their system; and to look 
to the future.  Nevertheless, although it is perhaps difficult to see why, the speech was 
said to be viewed by many in the West as a declaration of Cold War between the 
capitalist West and the communism of the Soviets.222 
George Kennan’s Long Telegram 
In February 1946 George Kennan, the eminent United States diplomat, by this time 
firmly ensconced in the US Embassy in Moscow as Deputy Head of Mission, responded 
to an invitation from the US State Department to receive from him an interpretive 
analysis of what could be expected in the way of future Soviet policy.  The US Treasury 
Department was behind this request as they were puzzled by the disinclination of the 
Soviets to co-operate in international forums: “including economic systems of the 
World Bank and International Monetary Fund..[and the US Treasury Department] 
cabled the US Embassy in Moscow, asking it to shed some light on the background to 
Stalin’s speech and the real motives of Stalin’s foreign policy”. 223 
The upshot was the Kennan ‘Long Telegram’, which analysed Soviet policy and made 
recommendations for a strategy to contain Soviet expansionism, and is considered by 
some historians of the Cold War to be highly significant in turning the tide of attitudes, 
not just in Kennan’s native United States but also in Britain, against the Soviets. 
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On 22 February 1946 George Kennan, sent his 8,000 word, 17 page long, telegram224 to 
George Marshall, Secretary of State in the US State Department.  Kennan was 
described by Lord Strang, as:  “.... the best type of American, than which there is 
nothing better to be found anywhere in the world”.225   Kennan was both “highly 
regarded.....and a very influential man”226  who was later to be instrumental in 
producing the Marshall Plan.   As an acknowledged expert on Soviet affairs, therefore, 
he penned the Telegram which turned out to be unapologetically lengthy because, as 
he said in his opening paragraph, the issues he was to address were: “so intricate, so 
delicate, so strange to our form of thought, and so important to analysis of our 
international environment that I cannot compress answers into single brief message 
without yielding to what I feel would be dangerous degree of over simplification”. 227 
The National Security Archive (NSA)228 television documentary Cold War, which was 
broadcast in 1998, included an interview with George Kennan about his Long 
Telegram.   He explained that by 1946 he was frustrated by the way he had repeatedly 
watched his government – particularly the military – making concession after 
concession to the Soviet government and behaving in what he regarded as “an 
undignified ingratiating way toward Stalin and toward the whole Soviet 
bureaucracy”.229  He went on to say: “...we sent lend lease to them in great quantities, 
they were the only people who were not asked to justify their requests.  And as the 
war approached its end, I once tried to question the general who was handling the 
lend lease and said:  ‘Look, here, is this really necessary for their wartime needs?’  He 
was furious about it, and said, you had no right to question this:  That is a matter for... 
the War Department, not for you in the State Department”.230 
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This, then, was Kennan’s frame of mind when he received the request from the US 
Treasury Department for an interpretive analysis of what could be expected in the way 
of future Soviet policy. The Treasury Department expressed their astonishment and 
concern at the way the Soviets were dragging their feet about joining the International 
Bank despite all the financial help they had received from the United States.  Kennan, 
for whom the behaviour of the Russians came as no surprise at all, set about the task 
of drafting the interpretive analysis straight away, despite being confined to bed with 
influenza at the time.  He wrote his Long Telegram, dividing it into five lengthy 
sections.   Part one231 set out what Kennan believed to be the basic tenets of the 
Soviet post-war outlook.  He began by quoting from a speech given by Stalin232 in 
which the latter spelt out his belief that there could never be a peaceful long-term co-
existence between Socialism and Capitalism and that the battle between the two for 
command of the world economy would decide the fate of Communism and Capitalism 
in the entire world.  In Kennan’s judgement, the Soviets believed that the capitalist 
world was beset with internal conflicts, and saw England and the United States as 
examples of capitalist states that were in conflict with each other, and that such 
internal conflicts would, they thought: “...hold out great possibilities for advancement 
of socialist cause, particularly if USSR remains militarily powerful, ideologically 
monolithic and faithful to its present brilliant leadership”.233 
Part two of Kennan’s Telegram was an essay on his perception of the Soviet outlook on 
life and on Russian history and current-day policies of the Government.  He went on to 
argue that the Soviets had no grounds for believing in the inevitability of war between 
Communist and Capitalist states and also between Capitalist states themselves.  He 
believed that the Soviets held such views not as a result of any objective analysis on 
their part but rather because: “At bottom Kremlin’s neurotic view of world affairs is a 
traditional and instinctive Russian sense of insecurity”. 234  Returning to his theme that 
this was more reflective of the country’s leadership than of the Russian people he 
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 said:     “ ..this latter type of insecurity was one which afflicted Russian rulers rather 
than Russian people;  for Russian rulers have invariably sensed that their rule was…. 
unable to stand comparison or contact with political systems of Western countries.  
For this reason they have always feared foreign penetration, feared direct contact 
between Western world and their own, feared what would happen if Russians learned 
the truth about world without or if foreigners learned truth about world within...” 235 
In Part three, Kennan directed his thoughts to what actions he believed the Soviets 
were likely to take, both overtly and covertly.  The avowed, or overt, actions, he 
argued, were likely to be devoted to increasing Soviet strength and prestige through 
the development of military industrialisation and the armed forces which would be 
manifested by great public displays of military strength to impress the outside world.  
Further ‘official plane’ actions would include the Soviets participating officially in 
international organisations but only where they saw opportunity for extending Soviet 
power or of inhibiting or diluting the power of others.  
Given that these views are those of an American diplomat it is hardly surprising that he 
laments the anticipated lack of buy-in on the part of the Soviets to the ideals of the 
UNO.  But even though he was shown to be right that the Soviets would pull out of the 
UNO when it was not felt to be of use to them, from the Soviet viewpoint this could be 
seen as being simply pragmatic self-interest and, as a sovereign State, they were, 
arguably, entitled to pursue that which would be of most benefit to their State. 
 
Part 4 of the Long Telegram concerns what Kennan regarded as the kind of activities 
that the Soviet government were likely to pursue covertly by, as it were, pulling the 
strings of other organisations behind the scenes but being careful to take no 
responsibility for so doing.  Under this heading he included:  Communist parties in 
other countries; a wide variety of national associations which could be penetrated and 
dominated, for example youth leagues, women’s organisations, religious societies and 
other governments willing to bend to Soviet purposes, for example Yugoslavia, 
Bulgaria, Northern Persia and China. Kennan said: “Everything possible will be done to 
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set major Western powers against each other. Anti-British talk will be plugged among 
Americans, anti-American talk among British.  Continentals, including Germans, will be 
taught to abhor both Anglo-Saxon powers. Where suspicions exist, they will be fanned; 
where not, ignited”. 236   
 
The final part of Kennan’s Telegram sets out what he saw as being the practical 
deductions from the standpoint of US policy.  He admitted that the picture he had 
drawn of the Soviets as a political force committed to the belief that they could have 
no permanent modus vivendi with the United States, was not a pleasant picture and 
that the question of how to cope with that force was undoubtedly the: “greatest task 
our diplomacy has ever faced and probably greatest it will ever have to face”.237  He 
concluded with his overall concerns and vision: “World communism is like a malignant 
parasite which feeds only on diseased tissue...... We must formulate ... a much more 
positive and constructive picture of (sic) sort of world we would like to see….have 
courage and self-confidence to cling to our own methods and conceptions of human 
society”.238 
Kennan was surprised at the impact which The Long Telegram had in Washington and 
beyond.  He said that the “success of the long telegram from Moscow changed my 
life”239 in terms of the status he was accorded and the posts he was subsequently 
offered.   He was a little disturbed that his message, that the Soviet challenge could be 
dealt with through appropriate diplomatic rather than military means, seemed to be 
subsumed by the hawkish enthusiasm with which any criticism of the Soviets was 
greeted by his fellow countrymen.  Nevertheless, his views on the Soviets remained 
steadfast as his further writings at the end of the winter of 1946 demonstrate: “The 
Russians have no conception of permanent friendly relations between states.  For 
them all foreigners are potential enemies.  The technique of Russian diplomacy...is 
concentrated on impressing an adversary with the terrifying strength of Russian 
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power... its leaders are, by their own choice, the enemies of all that part of the world 
they do not control....”.  240 
Churchill’s Iron Curtain Speech 
A month after Kennan dispatched his Long Telegram, Churchill delivered his Iron 
Curtain speech. After the devastating blow of being ousted by Attlee at the General 
Election in July 1945, Churchill, according to Colville was, as Leader of the Opposition, 
initially a spent force.  He was 70 years old, his health was not good, and he was 
exhausted and dejected.  But he was also famous for bouncing back and he did just 
that by 5 March 1946 when, in Fulton, Missouri, he delivered one of the most famous 
of all his speeches.  Churchill had gone there, a place that David Reynold’s, argues:  
“..he would not otherwise  be caught dead in”,241  in the presence of President Truman 
- with whom he had shared the content of the speech beforehand - and whose 
presence was sure to guarantee maximum publicity.  The speech provided, according 
to Harbutt:242  “the first authoritative public utterance to many of the leading political 
and ideological themes of the coming Cold War.” 243    
Churchill’s speech was intended to underline the importance of the Anglo-American 
alliance and the ‘special relationship’ that was claimed to continue to exist between 
the English-speaking peoples and to give maximum publicity to the growing threat 
posed by Soviet intentions.  Although peppered with references to understanding the 
position of the Soviets and the belief that it was possible to reach a meeting of minds 
with them, and after acknowledging his:  “strong admiration and regard for the valiant 
Russian people and for my wartime comrade, Marshall Stalin”.244 Churchill went on to 
give his iconic warning: “It is my duty…..to place before you certain facts about the 
present position of Europe.   From Strettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic, an 
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iron curtain has descended across the continent.  Behind that line lie all the capitals of 
the ancient states of central and Eastern Europe.  Warsaw, Berlin, Prague, Vienna, 
Budapest, Belgrade, Bucharest, and Sofia, all these famous cities and populations 
around them lie in what I might call the Soviet sphere, and all are subject, in one form 
or another, not only to Soviet influence but to a very high and increasing measure of 
control from Moscow…..”.245 
 
In an interview published in Pravda on 11 March, Stalin assessed Churchill’s speech: 
“as a dangerous act calculated to sew the seed of discord among the Allied 
governments” and he said that Churchill: “now stands in the position of a firebrand of 
war”. 246  Reynold’s argues that Stalin’s denunciation of the speech – with headlines 
and a lengthy article in Pravda, and another in Izvestia on the 13th March, was in part 
responsible for the fact that it was the ‘iron curtain’ sentiments that hit the headlines 
at the expense of the ‘special relationship’ or ‘the sinews of peace’ elements of the 
message.247  There is an echo here of what happened with Stalin’s election speech and 
even of Kennan’s Long Telegram where the more conciliatory and positive elements of 
the communications were lost in the headline-grabbing elements of the messages, 
which serves to highlight the power of the media to, inadvertently or otherwise, 
distort messages. 
Despite the hostile reaction of the Soviets, Churchill retained some optimism that they 
could be prevailed upon to reach agreement with the US and Britain, an optimism he 
retained, in differing degrees of intensity, until the end of his Premiership.  Indeed, as 
is clear from Jock Colville’s diaries, barely a week before Churchill’s resignation on        
5 April 1955, the Soviet leader, Bulganin, finally expressed a wish to accede to the 
requests for Four-Power talks.  As a result, Churchill was, even at that late stage, sorely 
tempted to go back on his decision, even asking HM the Queen if she would mind if he 
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changed his mind and stayed on, because he firmly believed that he, not Eden, was the 
right person to try to broker agreements in such talks.248    
However, in the meantime, it was not Churchill, but Attlee, who held the reins in 
Britain and he and his Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin, were trying to keep the 
Americans onside and not to frighten them, as Francis Williams puts it:   “into a new 
isolationism by precipitate action”.249  At the same time they were both somewhat 
reluctant initially to give official recognition to rapprochement with the Soviets being a 
diminishing possibility, even though neither of them was deluded into thinking this 
would be straightforward.  Bevin had recognized from his first dealings with Molotov 
both at Potsdam and at the first of the Foreign Ministers conferences, how tricky it was 
to negotiate with the Soviets.  Indeed, as Cadogan observed:  “Bevin’s hopes of a new 
style of diplomacy, cards on the table, face upwards’, waned during the autumn of 
1945.  At the meeting of Foreign Ministers held in London, Molotov behaved in his 
most mulish and obstructive manner.  By 23 September Bevin had had enough”. 250   
Light is thrown on the reaction of Attlee’s Cabinet to Churchill’s Iron Curtain speech in 
the Cabinet Secretary Notebooks251 entry for the meeting on 11 March 1946.  The 
Cabinet discussed the speech in some depth.  It had been suggested in the US, the 
Soviet Union and elsewhere that the British Government had seen and approved the 
content of Churchill’s speech before it was made.  In present times it would be unlikely 
that the official Leader of the Opposition – as Churchill was at that time – would first 
clear his lines with the Cabinet before giving his personal views on the state of foreign 
policy.  This, however, was at a time when the Second World War had recently come 
to an end and great international machinations were going on and the views of the 
former charismatic British Prime Minister were likely to be greatly publicised and taken 
notice of.  What is clear is that the British Cabinet, and in particular neither the Prime 
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Minister nor the Foreign Secretary, had not been consulted in advance as the following 
extract from that Cabinet discussion confirms: 
“E.B.252 Suggd in US Press tht we were consulted in advance.  Hope all will 
make it clear that we didn’t see it in advance.  V. embarrassing tht it 
was circulated here by M of I253 some hours before speech was made. 
P.M.254 The US asked for M of I to handle it. 
E.B. ….Anyhow, it’s v embarrassing to me… And policy on this for the future 
shd be made clear. 
P.M.          ….I believe B Embassy started it, by agreeing to attach press offr to 
WSC 
E.B. I will enquire into B Emb part in this… 
R.S.C.255  Cd you add reply to PQ tht there was no consult with HMG.  It has bn         
 specifically alleged in US Press. 
P.M. “HMG had no knowledge of contents before delivered”.  I will add 
that…. 
E.B. I want party to stand on my last speech.  That is our policy.”256 
 
Bevin’s remark in Cabinet appears to suggest that the British Government in general, 
and the Cabinet in particular, wished to distance themselves from Churchill’s 
sentiments.  However, given the fact that Bevin had said, in his first speech as Foreign 
Secretary,  in the House of Commons on 23 August, that the government intended to 
maintain similar foreign policy lines to those of his predecessor, it is more likely that 
his annoyance with Churchill, if it can be so described, was because he was using his 
world statesman position to give a speech, the content of which was bound to be seen 
as the official British government viewpoint, but doing so without the courtesy of first 
clearing his lines with Attlee and/or Bevin.  Indeed, it seems more likely that it was 
merely the embarrassment caused to Bevin by Churchill’s discourtesy, rather than any 
disagreement with Churchill’s sentiments, that led to Bevin’s comments in Cabinet.    
Whatever view the British Cabinet took of the decision of Churchill to make his public 
pronouncements, it clearly angered Stalin, by painting, as Lord Brimelow put it, an: 
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“enduring image of a brutal, totalitarian Soviet policy, whose “expansionist 
tendencies” could be checked only by Anglo-American strength and will”.257 
Frank Roberts’ Long Telegram 
A month after George Kennan’s Long Telegram had been widely distributed, and 
shortly after Churchill’s Iron Curtain speech, Kennan’s British counterpart, Frank 
Roberts, entered the debate with his own Long Telegram258.  Roberts was British 
Minister in Moscow acting as Charge d’Affaire at the beginning of 1946.  Lord 
Brimelow said of him: “I have never seen anyone with such a capacity for getting 
through work; always cheerful; bright as a button; clear-minded. A smiling, quizzical 
realist content to make the best of the world as he found it.   A superlative 
operator”. 259   
Roberts’ background was fairly typical of diplomats at the time; public school (Rugby) 
followed by a scholarship to Trinity College, Cambridge, where he gained a first class 
honours in both parts of the History tripos.  He was a skilled diplomat and negotiator, 
who liked the challenge of sorting out difficult situations.  His three-year posting as 
chargé d'affaires in Moscow, from 1945–7, was perhaps the most important period of 
his career.   
Roberts and Kennan had both been stationed in Moscow at the same time.  As Roberts 
explained: “Our Ambassadors were away a great deal and he and I were in charge of 
our Embassies”.260   He said that few weeks passed without he and Kennan meeting 
two or three times, either formally or informally261 and the two men worked closely 
together but were said to be: “..completely different characters – Kennan a deeply 
serious philosopher and moralist, always probing the validity of his past and present 
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assumptions; a ‘loner’;  Roberts a cheerful, pragmatic, brisk extrovert, who thoroughly 
enjoyed the task of trying to make the rickety machinery of international relations 
work”.262 There were other pragmatic differences.  Kennan’s political master, 
President Truman, had inherited, and initially wished to pursue, his predecessor’s 
desire to foster amicable relations with the Soviets, although Kennan doubted that this 
would be easy or even, as time went on, possible.  Roberts was in a different position.  
He had a political master, in the shape of Bevin, who was already showing his colours 
as a realist who listened to, and valued, expert advice and who had already 
experienced the difficulties of dealing with Molotov and others of his Soviet 
colleagues. 
 So, three weeks after his US counterpart in Moscow had sent his Long Telegram to the 
State Department, Frank Roberts sent an “equally long and penetrating analysis”263  in 
the form of three telegrams dated 21 March 1946:  “analysing Soviet policy and 
recommending a strategy of containment to frustrate its aggressive expansionism”.264  
It is also relevant, that Roberts had been asked by Bevin on 12 March whether he 
thought that the West was in for a permanent gale or a short squall.  Bevin had asked 
this question of Roberts having read a JIC report which had concluded that “although 
Soviet intentions may be defensive, tactics will be offensive” 265   The Telegrams that 
Roberts penned were at least in part his attempt to answer Bevin’s question.   
The Kennan and Roberts Telegrams were similar in many ways but there were also 
some striking differences.  As Greenwood notes: “Roberts focused more on the 
constructive aspects than Kennan”.266    Greenwood saw the difference between 
Kennan’s and Robert’s Telegrams as being subtle but significant: “Both believed Stalin 
to be a paranoid with malevolent intentions towards the West but Roberts suggested 
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that it might just be bluster that could be better manipulated economically and 
politically than militarily“. 267 
Greenwood also suggests that as a result of his Telegrams Roberts was instrumental in 
the setting up of the Russia Committee as he recommended this to his Foreign Office 
colleagues in London.  Although this has not proved verifiable from the archives or 
from contemporary accounts, it would be reasonable to assume, given the timing and 
the content of the Roberts ‘Telegrams’, that this may have been a contributory factor 
in Orme Sargent’s decision to set up the Russia Committee.  Moreover, Gill Bennett, 
the former Chief Historian of the Foreign Office has expressed a similar view.268 
Greenwood also notes that both Kennan and Roberts: “received immediate and 
glowing commendations from Washington and London respectively…and both 
contributed signally to a hardening of American and British attitudes towards the 
Soviet Union”.269 
The Roberts’ Telegrams were submitted in three dispatches to Bevin but, as for 
Kennan’s Telegram, though in several parts they were meant to be read as a single 
document.  The first part of Robert’s ‘Telegrams’ was dated 14 March 1946 and set out 
the position in which Britain then found itself in terms of deteriorating relations with 
the Soviets.  It comprises a review of the then current position and refers back several 
times to the difficulties experienced in the first abortive meeting of the Council of 
Foreign Ministers in September 1945 and in the second Council meeting in December.  
Section 1 concluded, rather gloomily: “the present state of Soviet relations with the 
outside world, and more particularly with Britain, is very different from what we had 
hoped for on the morrow of our joint victory......Instead of the Soviet Union gradually 
settling down to a more normal and friendly relationship with its allies, we are faced 
with a Soviet policy designed to advance Soviet interests at every possible opportunity, 
regardless of those of its allies…and of treaty obligations…Soviet propaganda is actively 
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instilling suspicions and distrust of the outside world, of which the Soviet public is 
being kept in complete ignorance”.270  
 
In the second part of Roberts’ Telegram he sets out what he saw as being the long 
term aim of the Soviets, namely to make the Soviet Union the most powerful State in 
the world and, at a time when other countries were busy demobilizing and reducing 
their armed forces, to maintain a very large military establishment.  He thought that 
they would pursue this aim in a number of ways which would include doing whatever 
could be done to weaken capitalist or social democratic countries in every way and, in 
particular, to keep the Americans and British apart; and to support and make use of 
Communist parties in other countries to further Soviet interests and, ultimately, to 
take over their governments.  One issue to which Roberts attached great weight was 
the Soviets’ aim to undermine Western Capitalism through the full weight of 
propaganda.  He wrote: “….the full weight of Soviet propaganda…will be brought to 
bear in favour of the so-called oppressed colonial peoples and against imperialist 
domination….  and there is little doubt that the Soviet peoples, from Stalin 
downwards, are embarking upon such a campaign with the zeal of crusaders and with 
a sincere belief that they are thereby contributing to the progress of the world”.271  
Perhaps this was one of the reasons why the Russia Committee, when it shortly 
thereafter came into existence - and given that Orme Sargent who set the Committee 
up was fully aware of the contents of Kennan’s and Roberts’ Telegrams –  spent quite a 
lot of their time thinking about Soviet propaganda and what could be done to 
counteract it.    
The final Telegram in Roberts series of cables in March 1946 dwelt on what British 
policy towards the Soviet Union should be if his assessments were to prove to be right 
in essentials.  This can be seen as a refreshing acknowledgement that his assessments 
might not have been right.  After the assertions made throughout Kennan’s and 
Roberts Telegrams in language that appeared to brook no possibility that their 
opinions were other than accurate, this could be viewed as a welcome departure.   
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Roberts’ conclusions were not all pessimistic and in this he also differed from Kennan.  
As Bennett puts it, Kennan saw: “..Soviet policy as being fundamentally hostile to 
Western liberal, democratic capitalist and imperialist conceptions”.272  
However, Roberts thought it possible, albeit difficult, given the right mixture of 
understanding, patience, avoidance of unnecessary saber-rattling and of standing firm 
in the face of Soviet bullying - to reconcile the aims of the two powers.  And his 
relatively optimistic assessment remained, for him, valid in hindsight.  In 1990, asked 
whether he believed that his and Kennan’s assessments about the transformation of 
the wartime alliance into the Cold War, and the likely long-term outcomes, had been 
realistic, Roberts said that he thought that the messages he and Kennan had put 
forward in early 1946 remained appropriate.  His Telegrams, as the writer of his 
obituary in the Independent Newspaper put it after Roberts’ death in 1998, were: “in 
substance a tour de force. Constituting a comprehensive and illuminating analysis, they 
revealed a sound grasp of the history of Russian foreign policy and a unique knowledge 
of the Soviet press”.273 
There was another Long Telegram that at least deserves a mention although it was 
different in scope and impact from the other two, and was not written until several 
months after those of Kennan and Roberts. This was the Novikov Telegram dated 27 
September 1946, doubtless written in response to the Kennan and Roberts missives 
and it was commissioned by Molotov:   “.. in the wake of the rancorous foreign 
ministers’ conference in Paris that dragged on fruitlessly through the summer of 
1946”.274   
A copy of this Telegram is reproduced in full in pages 3 to 16 of Jensen’s Long 
Telegrams book275 as released by the Soviet archives in 1990 and as background to a 
seminar on the Origins of the Cold War held in Washington and in Moscow during the 
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summer of 1990.  The document was translated into English for the conference with 
the translator276 scrupulously replicating not just the wording but all the many under-
linings from the original document which were made by Molotov.   
The major differences between the two Western Long Telegrams and that of Novikov 
are in terms of impact and consequence.  The Western Telegrams have been assessed 
as contributing to the direction of the United States and British foreign policy towards 
the Soviets.  But such assessments by historians in relation to the Soviet Telegram have 
been hampered by the lack of data due to the Soviet archives having been less open to 
the public and therefore the raw data on which to form conclusions has been sparse.   
Paris Council of Foreign Ministers and Peace Conference 
The third Council of Foreign Ministers opened on 25 April 1946 in Paris.  It was a 
prolonged affair, going on until 13 July, with a break in mid-June and then followed up 
by a Peace Conference which began, also in Paris, on 14 October.   In his utobiography 
Pierson Dixon records the frustrations during the lengthy discussions in Paris from April 
through to July: “The world was longing for peace.  The war had been over for nearly a 
year.  But still no peace treaties had been signed.  An attempt was now made to 
implement the two stages agreed at Potsdam:  first, there should be a Council of 
Foreign Ministers …..; and, secondly, there should be a Peace Conference attended by 
all 21 countries which had fought against Germany”. 277  
The Conference started well with constructive and orderly meetings on 25, 26 and 27 
April and the Soviets took a conciliatory line with the French, accepting that they 
should, after all, be permitted to join in all future discussions – it had been the Soviet 
refusal to allow participation of the French (and the Chinese) that had led to the 
breakdown of the Second Foreign Ministers Conference in London the previous 
October – and all seemed to be going well until 29 April when: “suddenly the mood of 
conciliation evaporated and Molotov was back to his old tricks”.278  The sticking points 
were over Italy where the Soviets greatly increased their demands by insisting on the 
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cession of Trieste to Yugoslavia and the cession of Tripoli to Russia as well as the 
payments of reparations crippling to Italy.  Byrnes and Bevin refused to agree to any 
Italian Peace Treaty that contained such harsh increased demands.  Reading the diary 
entries of Pierson Dixon during this period the conference appeared to have seen a 
series of difficult clashes mostly engendered by Molotov and by 6 May it was clear that 
the conference had reached deadlock.  Things limped on until  10 May which saw what 
Dixon described as the “Grand crisis of the conference”279  with Byrnes having become 
so irritated with Molotov that he was prepared to engineer the collapse of the 
conference and eventually succeeded in securing an adjournment for a month, and 
Bevin being so thoroughly depressed by the deterioration in relations that he rushed 
back to London to consult Attlee and seek his views and advice.  The Soviet press saw 
things quite differently when Pravda reported: 
During the conference there were sharp clashes between the Soviet delegation, 
which defended the national independence of all peoples, and the delegations of 
the Western powers, especially the USA and Great Britain, which endeavoured to 
secure the right to interfere, at future peace negotiations, in the internal affairs 
of Germany’s former allies, particularly Bulgaria, Hungary, and Rumania, which 
had established people’s democratic systems. Owing to the firm position 
maintained by the Soviet delegation, the conference approved the overwhelming 
majority of provisions agreed upon earlier by the Council of Foreign Ministers. 
However, the Western powers imposed a procedure requiring the approval of 
recommendations by a simple majority, thus overriding the Council of Foreign 
Ministers’ decision calling for a two-thirds majority in such cases. Taking 
advantage of this procedure, the Western powers introduced several 
unacceptable recommendations.280 
 
 Seen from the Soviet perspective, and given their huge losses in the war, it is hard not 
to understand why they were making such harsh demands, for example over the 
cession of Trieste given its strategic importance and its geographical position 
ostensibly within the, then, Yugoslavian borders.  But whatever the merits or 
otherwise of the Soviets post-Potsdam enhanced demands, their bellicosity could only 
serve to widen the rift with their former allies.  The tail end of the Council of Foreign 
Ministers had an element of farce as the wrangles went on and on about when the 
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Peace Conference, which was to follow the Council, could begin and what had to be 
done and dusted before it took place. Byrnes wanted it to follow on speedily, and on 4 
July there was acceptance by all the parties that it should start on 29th July, which it 
eventually did, but not until after there were several other challenges by Molotov to 
delay proceedings.  Bevin was unable to attend the early days of the Peace Conference 
due to illness and Attlee had to go without him but Bevin resumed his attendance at a 
later stage.  Although this, and other such, conferences had important things to discuss 
which impacted lots of countries and inevitably took a good deal of time to consider, it 
is also true that these meetings were very costly in terms of the time and energy of the   
principal participants and must have disrupted not only their lifestyles but also their 
home-based work issues.  Fortunately for Bevin and Attlee they had a permanent 
cadre of professional and gifted officials to conduct business in their often prolonged 
absences. 
Conclusion 
It may be asked why, in the context of this thesis about the Russia Committee and its 
impact on British foreign policy in the emerging Cold War, were these conferences, 
speeches and telegrams of relevance and importance.   The evidence is circumstantial.  
Clearly Stalin’s speech had an impact on George Kennan sitting in Moscow as the 
acting US Ambassador.  He had amassed a wealth of expertise on all things Soviet so 
that he was ready, when the request arrived from the US Treasury Department for his 
advice on why the Soviets were reluctant to play any part in the international financial 
organisation, to pour out his views and advice.  Knowledge of the contents of the Long 
Telegram, together with knowledge of the response from Kennan’s counterpart in the 
British Embassy in Moscow, Frank Roberts, was not confined to the internal diplomatic 
worlds of the US State Department and the British Foreign Office.  Both Telegrams 
were widely publicised.  Indeed, Kennan was personally at pains to ensure that the 
content of his Long Telegram was copied to the serious American Press so as to ensure 
it received good publicity.  And from the sentiments of these influential Telegrams it is 
clear that, by the end of 1946, hostilities between the former Second World War allies 
were entrenched with the West being: “convinced that they had to contend with an 
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implacable and expansionist Communist state, well-armed, secretly policed, and 
utterly ruthless”. 281   
One interesting issue that, at this early stage of the Cold War, remained unclear, was 
whether the Foreign Office officials, many of whom were concerned that the UK 
needed to take action to combat the growing hostility of the Soviets, were already 
influencing their political masters’ views or whether the latter were coming to a similar 
view themselves independently.  And, if they were coming to similarly pessimistic 
views, whether other constraints upon them – the need to keep their Party colleagues 
on side;  the need to have regard to the views of the electorate who were largely 
unaware at the time of the deterioration in East-West relations;   and the need to try 
to keep international talks going – were holding them back from action.  It is not easy 
to determine the views held by the officials on these issues.  After all, as officials their 
job was to gather and analyse information rather than to express their own views.  
There are some notable exceptions, including: Sargent’s Stock-taking Memorandum; 
Roberts Long Telegrams; and Warner’s Memorandum.  Also, once the Russia 
Committee had begun work there were meetings at which Ambassadors visiting 
London HQ and attended meetings of the Committee gave their first-hand views from 
the front line.  Nor is it easy to determine how the views of the officials differed from 
those of the Foreign Secretary at this time.  Bevin’s initial reluctance to agree that the 
Soviets propaganda needed to be countered has already been alluded to, as has the 
point that this was perhaps more about his natural tendency not to rush into 
conclusions as well as his having many issues to deal with other than just countering 
Soviet propaganda.   
So, in terms of whether these failed conferences, speeches by Churchill and Stalin and 
Long Telegrams had any impact on the perceptions on the part of British and US 
foreign policy makers, and, indeed, on their views as to what actions might be take to 
counter the threat of Soviet Communism, it seems inconceivable that they did not 
have an impact.    This again raises questions relating to historical epistemology, as 
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discussed in Chapter 1.282  Although such matters cannot be measured like tangible 
commodities they can be assessed in context and applying informed judgement which 
in this case suggests that the expert diplomats, who would have prepared their 
Ministers for the conferences and advised on the impact of Churchill and Stalin’s 
speeches and who penned the policy advice in the Long Telegrams could hardly have 
failed to have had influence over the decision makers.  
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CHAPTER 4   Setting up the Russia Committee   
 
The Russia Committee, which was initially named the Soviet Policy Co-ordinating 
Committee, was set up in March 1946.  This Chapter looks at why it was set up, when, 
by whom and for what purpose. 
Why it was set up 
The Russia Committee was set up because there was a need to establish a body which 
would keep a close watch, and gather all available information, on the developments 
that were taking place in Soviet foreign policy.  There was at the time no other such 
body within the British government machine.   
 
Richard Aldrich points to this absence of an appropriate organization.  He argues that 
Britain’s Special Operations Executive (SOE) and the Political Warfare Executive (PWE), 
SOE’s sister propaganda service, “had been reduced to  nothing in 1945” 283 and that it 
was only in May 1946 that “senior British diplomats began to think about reviving 
shadow warfare.”284  MI5 and MI6 remained functional and the latter – the 
organisation which dealt with overseas intelligence – was under the Ministerial control 
of the Foreign Secretary. But their remits were global - much wider than just the 
Soviets.  What was needed was a high level organisation within government, with 
access to all available information, including intelligence, focused specifically on the 
Soviets.  There would have been two possible homes for such a body at the time: the 
Cabinet Office/N0 10, in the form of an official Cabinet Committee or a cross-Foreign 
Office and cross-government body housed in the Foreign Office.  It was, initially, the 
latter route that was adopted.  From virtually the outset of the work of the Russia 
Committee it had links with MI6 and MI5 through the JIC member of the Committee, 
as well as links with other departments of state.   
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In one of the few references to the Russia Committee in secondary historical sources, 
Aldrich, goes on to say: “Indeed, it was only in January that year that the JIC felt safe to 
return to the vexed issue of forecasting Soviet intentions.  Its mammoth report285 now 
landed on the desks of several individuals including Frank Roberts, an influential British 
diplomat serving in Moscow.  Roberts was a clear minded individual who punched 
above his weight and, like George Kennan in the US context, his dispatches from 
Moscow286 were important in forming British policy in the first year after the war”.287 
 
In his Long Telegram Roberts had emphasised the coordinated and expansionist nature 
of Soviet post-war foreign policy and argued that this required an equally coordinated 
response.  The result, Aldrich asserts: “was the creation of the Foreign Office Russia 
Committee, which then oversaw the gradual revival of a department of British covert 
political warfare”288 and he continued: “Creating the Russia Committee provided a key 
coordinating centre that was controlled by diplomats rather than the Cabinet Office or 
Chiefs of Staff.  (It) also marked a new style of British foreign policy.  Cadogan had 
nurtured an extreme aversion to planning, but the new Permanent Under Secretary, 
Orme Sargent, felt that in the current climate ‘it would be valuable to have a joint 
planning committee of this kind’….It was imperative to get organised since the military 
were now the Foreign Office’s rivals for control of Britain’s Cold War”.289 
 
In her thesis on the Northern Department of the Foreign Office, Ulricke Thieme claims 
that the setting up of the Russia Committee “…was essentially an admission that the 
Foreign Office had to become more proactive and better organised”290  because to 
anticipate Soviet actions would be invaluable for effective diplomacy.  This would 
appear to be a mostly valid assessment. That greater knowledge of Soviet actions and 
intentions would aid effective diplomacy may well be self-evident.  Moreover, it has to 
be true that the setting up of a co-ordinating body which would draw together 
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expertise from around the various Foreign Office Departments, and elsewhere, could 
not fail to result in better, and better organized, information gathering.  Whether this 
amounted to an admission by the Foreign Office that there were shortcomings that 
needed to be addressed is a little different.  They were dealing essentially with a fast- 
changing situation, the Soviets having until very recently, been wartime allies.  It could, 
indeed, be argued that the Foreign Office was fast out of the blocks to recognise the 
growing dangers and to put into place machinery that could provide the British 
government with the information needed to enable them to make informed foreign 
policy decisions. 
Who set up the Russia Committee 
There is clear circumstantial evidence to suggest that it was set up at the behest of Sir 
Orme Sargent.   Adam Richardson,291however, has asserted that it was set up by Sir 
Alexander Cadogan but this appears not to have been the case although it is an 
entirely understandable assertion given that Cadogan was Permanent Under Secretary 
of the Foreign Office at the beginning of 1946.  Despite Richardson’s claim, the 
evidence suggests that it was not Cadogan but Orme Sargent who set up the Russia 
Committee.  For one thing, Cadogan had retired from the Diplomatic Service in 
February 1946, that is before the Committee was set up, and was immediately 
succeeded by Orme Sargent.  For another, the timing of the first meeting followed on 
immediately from a meeting called by the new Permanent Under Secretary which led 
directly to the setting up of the Russia Committee.  That meeting, held on 18 March 
1946, and presided over by Orme Sargent in his room in the Foreign Office’s Main 
Building in Whitehall, brought together an illustrious group of fellow diplomats 
including Sir Maurice Peterson, who was at the time (and until 1949)  His Majesty’s 
Ambassador in Moscow.  Also present  at the meeting were:  Sir Christopher Warner, 
who was then Head of the Northern Department of the Foreign Office,292 a post he 
held from 1941 through to 1946, before then becoming  His Majesty’s  Ambassador in 
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Brussels;   Mr Kirkpatrick (later Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick) Head of the Information 
Department of the Foreign Office;   Mr Edmund Leo Hall-Patch (to become Sir Edmond 
in 1947),  Deputy Under Secretary and principal economic adviser to Ernest Bevin;   
and Mr Harold Anthony Caccia, lately returned from the Embassy in Athens.  All of 
these individuals would become regular attendees at Russia Committee meetings and 
several of them would, on occasion, Chair the proceedings. 
The purpose of Orme Sargent’s 8 March 1946 meeting was to discuss Soviet foreign 
policy and British attitude towards it.  It took a strategic overview of the UK’s relations 
with the Soviet Union, focussing on three major issues.  First, there was concern that 
the Chiefs of Staff were not as yet persuaded to take an interest in the Soviet attitude 
to the Middle East but, as Orme Sargent reported, the Foreign Secretary saw this as 
being of ‘high importance’ and needed to be looked into ‘most carefully’.  It was felt 
that the Soviets were not just interested in Middle East oil and that the probability was 
that their aim was not simply economic or defensive or ideological, but rather a 
combination of all three.  Secondly, the meeting considered whether the Soviets were 
playing from strength or from weakness and, if the latter, whether they might be likely 
to resort to armed force.  They also considered, in the light of the recent JIC paper293 
whether, if the Soviets were acting from strength, this would be more dangerous but 
noted that the JIC paper had concluded that that the Soviets would not be prepared to 
engage in a major war for the next five years.  Either way, however, the meeting 
concluded that the Soviet Union was dangerous.  Thirdly, and this is of particular 
significance in the context of setting up the Russia Committee, the meeting looked at 
what might be done to counter the spread of Communism and Communist 
propaganda.  It was felt that it would be easy to counter propaganda ‘if the 
Government decided to attack Communist doctrines, but not otherwise’.294  Orme 
Sargent suggested, and the meeting agreed that: “.......a general paper should be put 
up to the cabinet on policy towards the Soviet Union which it was clear had returned 
to pure Marx-Leninism, was becoming dynamic and aggressive and had opened an 
offensive against Great Britain as the leader of social democracy in the world.   
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Recommendations were to be made to cabinet for a co-ordinated defence against this 
long-term attack … and it was apparent that we should coordinate our policy towards 
the Soviet Union in different parts of the world, since many of the elements of Soviet 
policy were much the same everywhere”.295 
The meeting was, in effect, agreeing in that last sentence, that a body was needed to 
gather the information required to enable the coordination of policy towards the 
Soviet Union and who better to do so than the Foreign Office which had bases all over 
the world which could provide advice and information.  Given the timing and the 
seniority of the people involved attending the meeting, it seems evident that Orme 
Sargent, as the most senior official and the one who had engineered the 18 March 
meeting, was responsible for setting up the Russia Committee.  What is less clear, as 
there is no actual evidence, is whether the decision to do so was agreed beforehand 
with Ernest Bevin, his political master, although it is clear from the note of the 
meeting, that Bevin had expressed his wish for the gathering of as much information as 
possible about Soviet attitudes  
So, the ground work was completed for establishing the Russia Committee and it was 
suggested, too, that the Dominions Office and the Colonial Office should be involved in 
discussions about how to counter Communist propaganda in the British Empire.  As it 
transpired, both departments were subsequently to be represented on the Russia 
Committee. 
Some key Foreign Office individuals involved in the Russia Committee 
There were many influential Foreign Office individuals who played a key part in the 
work of the Russia Committee during its existence, either directly or indirectly.  
Appendix 3 records at least skeletal biographical details on many of those individuals.  
But at least eight of them deserve more than a nodding reference since it is a central 
contention of this thesis that the senior diplomats in the Foreign Office in the early 
Cold War were an important and influential resource for Great Britain.  The eight 
individuals were:  Sir Orme Sargent; Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick, Sir Frank Roberts, Lord 
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Brimelow; Sir Oliver Harvey, Sir Christopher Warner, Sir Gladwyn Jebb and Sir Edmund 
Hall-Patch.   While there were many others, these eight were probably the most 
important in the context of this thesis.  Two of the eight have already featured, namely  
Orme Sargent and Frank Roberts.  Orme Sargent’s character and his views on British 
Foreign policy are explored in Chapter 2 296 which describes his influential ‘Stock 
Taking After VE Day’ Memorandum provided to his then Secretary of State, Anthony 
Eden, at the latter’s request’ and subsequently to Eden’s successor, Ernest Bevin.   
Orme Sargent was fully aware of the contents of the Kennan and the Roberts Long 
Telegrams described in Chapter 3.   Frank Roberts, whose character and views are also 
outlined in that chapter, was in regular contact with Orme Sargent from the Embassy 
in Moscow where Roberts was stationed at the time and his views and his writings are 
likely to have influenced the views of his London-based colleagues, just as his US 
counterpart , George Kennan, had influenced his US based colleagues. 
 
The third key Foreign Office mandarin at the time was Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick, “a peppery 
Ulsterman”297 who in 1945 had been put in charge of the newly set up Information 
Department (ID) of the Foreign Office which had replaced the abolished Ministry of 
Information (MOI).  As Head of ID, Sir Ivone was an Assistant Under-Secretary and 
therefore two ranks below Orme Sargent.   The ID was set up in the Foreign Office for 
two reasons.  First, because there was a perceived need to focus more on the 
gathering of information from foreign countries and to tailor this to meet Britain’s 
post-war information requirements.  And, secondly, and related to the first issue, it 
was only the Foreign Office which was tailor made to be able to gather information as 
they were the only British organisation that had officials situated throughout the  
world.  Indeed, Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick is on record as saying: “The Foreign Office was the 
first department of State to go in for information in a big way”.298 
 
In its early days Sir Ivone would occasionally Chair the Russia Committee when the 
normal Chairman, Oliver Harvey, was absent for reasons that are not made clear.299  
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Sir Ivone was an expert on information work, having been employed during the Second 
World War in propaganda and intelligence activities and thereafter in the MOI.  He had 
had the task, in 1941, of verifying the identity of Rudolph Hess when he had flown 
secretly to the UK – having landed close to Glasgow – asking to see the Duke of 
Hamilton and wanting to instigate peace talks with the UK government.  Sir Ivone had 
known Hess before the War and was an obvious candidate to be sent up to Scotland to 
establish whether it actually was the German Deputy Fuhrer or whether it was a hoax.  
Sir Ivone was also a rare example of someone who had not come up through the 
normal diplomatic route and did not conform to the usual kind of privileged 
background for a senior civil servant.  A Roman Catholic, with a relative lack of formal 
education, he had an incisive mind and he established a reputation as a quick thinker 
and rapid worker. In appearance he was small, dapper, and decisive.  He was said to 
have had an authoritative manner and to be combative with a perfunctory style of 
decision making which was not in the normal mode of a diplomat.  He eventually rose  
to become the Permanent Under-Secretary from 1953 to 1957. 
 
The fourth individual was Lord Thomas Brimelow who was always ‘Tommy’ to his 
friends.  He was another character with an atypical background for a diplomat.   He 
was a product of a grammar-school education, who went on to win a scholarship to 
Oriel College, Oxford, where he gained a first in Modern Languages. He then joined the 
Diplomatic Service, gaining entry through the Consular Section.  In June 1942 he was 
posted to Moscow, as Vice-Consul, where he remained for the rest of the War.  The 
experience he gained of the workings of the Soviet State led him to become an 
acknowledged authority on the interpretation of Soviet policy.  That he was the best 
Russian speaker in the British Embassy in Moscow during the War placed him in an 
influential position. He was often despatched to cope face to face with Joseph Stalin, 
who, having imbibed his vodka, was in the habit of summoning someone from the 
British Embassy late at night or in the early hours of the morning to convey his views to 
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Churchill and the British Government.300  Many years later, from 1973 to 1975, Lord 
Brimelow rose to become Permanent Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office and, in 
1977, he donated his personal papers, including those relating to Soviet foreign policy, 
to the University of Essex.  Subsequently, in 1983, ‘Notes of Conversations with Lord 
Brimelow’, conducted by Michael Bird, and covering Foreign Office attitudes to the 
Soviet Bloc and Foreign Office personnel in the late 1940s, were deposited in the 
Churchill Archive Centre at Churchill College, Cambridge, where they were consulted 
for this thesis.301 
 
The fifth key player was Mr Oliver Charles Harvey – later to become Sir Oliver and, 
later still, to become Baron Harvey of Tasburgh.  The son of a Baronet landowner in 
Norfolk, he was educated at Malvern College and Trinity College, Cambridge, where he 
obtained a first in the History tripos.  He served in the Norfolk Regiment in France in 
the First World War and had a very distinguished military career,302  and on return 
joined the Diplomatic Service in 1920, serving in Rome, Athens and Paris before 
returning to London to become Principal Private Secretary to Anthony Eden in 1936 
and, later, to Lord Halifax whom he regarded as a disaster.303  In January 1941 Eden, 
who had taken over from Halifax as Foreign Secretary, was keen to have Harvey back 
as his Private Secretary.  Harvey records: “I said that I would be only too pleased to 
come back if he thought I could be helpful.  He asked whether I would be too senior to 
be P.S. again.  I said of course not...” 304 
 After the end of the Second World War, in 1946, Oliver Harvey held the rank of 
Deputy Under Secretary (political) and Head of the Northern Department of the 
Foreign Office and was to remain the Chairman of the Russia Committee for the first 
couple of years of its existence until, in June 1948, he was appointed His Majesty’s 
Ambassador in Paris – one of the most prestigious of Ambassadorial posts - in 
succession to Duff Cooper.   His time as Anthony Eden’s Private Secretary, and his 
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relationship with the latter, was a rich one for him.  He served Eden with devotion 
saying, in his posthumously published diaries: “Eden gave me his confidence most fully 
and I endeavoured to return it in the same spirit, loyally and to the best of my     
ability’. 305  Then, as Deputy Under-secretary from 1946 to 1948 he also worked closely 
with Ernest Bevin, to whom he took immediately upon meeting  him in July 1945, 
describing Bevin as “very genial and friendly”.306  He grew in admiration for Bevin, who 
clearly reciprocated the respect and had great faith in Harvey. 
The sixth major player was Sir Christopher Warner.  He attended Orme Sargent’s 18 
March 1946 meeting in his capacity of Head of the Northern Department of the 
Foreign Office,307 a post he held from 1941 through to 1946, before then becoming His 
Majesty’s Ambassador in Brussels.  Although Oliver Harvey was the Chairman for most 
of the Russia Committee meetings in the first few years of the Committee’s existence, 
Christopher Warner was a regular attendee.  Indeed, he attended the first meeting of 
the Committee and later, on several occasions, he chaired the meetings.  Lord 
Brimelow, described Warner, who was a Winchester man, as: “..a real intellectual;  
unmarried.  He used to spend his spare time reading detective novels to spot faults in 
construction.  He said it helped him spot errors in the drafting of minutes.  He was a 
perfectionist; but he didn’t get there the first time.  When you went to speak to him he 
would speak at great length and his thoughts would evolve as he spoke.  You had to do 
things for him three times.  The amount of redrafting was exasperating.  But he was 
the kindest of men”. 308 
 
Christopher Warner, during the war, was very pro-Soviet.  Aldrich tells how even as 
late as 1944 he was convinced that the Soviet Union were bent on co-operation in the 
future and that Warner was: “The leading light among the British co-operators.... He 
new nothing of the Soviet Union and had certainly never been there.... could not have  
formed a greater contrast to the cynical old Russia hands...was genuinely moved by 
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 the scale of the sacrifice by Russian forces”.309  This is corroborated by Victor Rothwell  
who was a contemporary of Warner’s and said: “during the war Christopher Warner  
felt ‘real cordiality toward Stalin’s State and thought that true Anglo-Soviet friendship  
was possible”.310  Rothwell also described Warner as “something of an apologist for  
Soviet actions before reverting to outraged anti-Communism after the war”.311  
 However, as time moved on, Christopher Warner had a complete change of heart so 
 that as the war neared its end the hitherto “remorseless optimist”312 as far as the  
Soviets were concerned, had to concede that things had taken a sinister turn so that: 
“by 1946 there were no more arguments about ‘co-operation’ with the Soviets. The 
arguments were now about how far to go in responding to Soviet hostility and a more 
militant tendency was emerging in the Foreign Office.  Ironically, these militants  
included Christopher Warner ….now, like a lover scorned, he was full of bitterness and  
had come to hate the Soviets”. 313 Greenwood, too, notes this complete change of  
heart saying that:  “before long a hard-liner on Russia, Warner had initially gone in ‘for  
rather cosy imagery being convinced that the Russians wanted to be reasonable”.  314   
 
Christopher Warner, then, was a man who had completely changed his view of the  
Soviets by the time the Russia Committee began work in March 1946 and was clearly a  
man of strong views who had the ear of his political, and his official, masters.  He was  
to become closely associated with the early days of the Russia Committee as is 
evidenced by his having been the one to draft the Committee’s terms of reference  
and, even more importantly, he wrote what was to become one of the most  
referenced of the early outputs of documents of the Committee, namely the Warner  
Memorandum.315  316 
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 On 2 April 1946, he attended the first meeting of the Russia Committee, which looked  
at the Soviet ‘offensive against Great Britain as leader of social democracy in the  
world’.  Clearly by this time he had completed his volte face and offered, what Aldrich 
describes as an:   “unabashed comparison with Hitler’s Germany, arguing, ‘We should  
be very Unwise not to take the Russians at their word just as we should have taken  
Mein Kampf at its face value’.  A week later Bevin wrote to Attlee employing exactly  
 
those words”.317 
 
The seventh key player was Sir Gladwyn Jebb.  Later, to become Lord Gladwyn, he was 
Head of Economic and Reconstruction Department of the Foreign Office, from 1942 to 
1945, and was then given, in his own words, “my new job of getting the UN going”. 318 
In that capacity he first came into contact with Bevin at Potsdam at the start of the 
latter’s Foreign Secretary-ship, although the two did not get to speak on that occasion. 
But shortly after that, Jebb received a message saying that Bevin wanted to see him, to 
find out how things were going on the UN front.  The following quotation is revealing 
about both characters:  “The initial reception was a little formidable.  In fact he said 
nothing for a few moments….  Finally, he observed, ‘Must be kinda queer for a chap 
like you to see a chap like me sitting in a chair like this?... ‘Ain’t never ‘appened before 
in ‘istory’ he remarked, scowling ferociously. … ‘Secretary of State’, I said .. ‘I am sorry 
that the first time I open my mouth in your presence is to contradict you.  But you’re 
wrong.  It has.  ‘What do you mean young man?’  ‘Well’, I said, ‘it was a long time ago – 
rather over four hundred years I think.  But there was then a butcher’s boy in Ipswich 
whose origins, I suspect, were just as humble as your own, and he became the Foreign 
Secretary of one of our greatest kings. And for that matter, a Cardinal too. His name 
was Tom Wolsey….What is certain is that, from that moment onward, I could do little 
wrong so far as Bevin was concerned….As for myself I thought he was splendid.319 
 
Roderick Barclay, one of Jebb’s contemporaries describes him as being:  “a  
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strong character with decided views”320  which he was always encouraged by Bevin to   
put forward.  Bevin, it seems, had a high regard for Jebb and he in turn was a warm  
admirer of Bevin who Jebb always used to refer to as “Uncle Ernie”321 although at least 
one historian has described this as “patronising language  often used in the writings of 
other Foreign Office officials”.322    Jebb was later to become Chairmen of the Russia 
Committee323 and oversaw the first of the two main reorganisations of the Committee 
having become critical of its workings and its outputs.  In 1954 he was to become His 
Majesty’s Ambassador in Paris, a post which he held until 1960. 
 
The eighth key player was Sir Edmund Leo Hall-Patch who was a slightly odd character.  
He gained much experience in financial diplomacy following his posting from the 
Treasury to the Foreign Office from 1936 onwards, when he was first appointed to the 
British Embassy in China, then Japan and, subsequently, as the government’s Financial 
Commissioner throughout the Far East.  From 1948 he became principal economic 
adviser to Bevin, in which capacity he played a central role in the British response to 
the US Marshall Plan.  A single man, a devout Roman catholic and a great Francophile, 
he was said to have had a brilliant, but rather tortuous and pessimistic, mind.  He was 
slightly eccentric in his dress and had a tendency, as he was completely bi-lingual, to 
suddenly break into French.  He was also said to have been a cheerful and charming 
companion, always kind and ready to help.   He was said to be a “great favourite”324 of 
Bevin’s who valued him highly and was amused by his Cassandra role. ‘Morning 'all-
Patch’, he would say as he saw Hall-Patch lowering ominously in the corridor ‘and 
what's the snags to-day?’ When he had heard, he felt forearmed against the worst.  
Bulloch tells the story that when Bevin heard that a member of his staff was optimistic 
about finding a solution for a particular problem he snorted: “Optimistic, is he?  Send 
for ‘all-Patch.  E’ll chill ‘is bones.” 325  
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This, then, was the background when in March 1946 Orme Sargent set up the Russia 
Committee with membership drawn from the Heads of various Foreign Office 
Departments – all of whom were subordinate to Orme Sargent.  As to why Orme 
Sargent saw the need for such a Committee, it is clear from the Minutes of his 16 
March 1946 meeting and from his recommendations in paragraph 16 of his Stock 
Taking Memorandum326 that actions would need to be based upon sound information 
being gathered  from sources drawn as widely as possible – including the intelligence 
agencies - on the views and the policies of Britain’s allies.  Moreover, since writing his 
Memorandum he had seen both Kennan’s and Roberts’ Long Telegrams.   Gill Bennett, 
in her capacity as Chief Historian of the Foreign Office was familiar with the workings 
of the Russia Committee to whose papers she had full access - both those in the public 
domain and those retained by the Foreign Office.  She has said that although she had 
never seen any papers that specifically recorded Orme Sargent’s decision to set up the 
Committee, she nevertheless takes the view (and it is a view shared by Greenwood) 
that the debate enshrined on the Long Telegrams could be seen as being at the very 
least in part the catalyst for his decision to do so.327   It would have been a small step 
from the setting up of the Information Department to the establishment, within the 
Foreign Office Headquarters in Whitehall, of the vehicle that would organize the 
collection of information about the actions, tactics, attitudes and plans of the Soviets, 
namely the Committee that subsequently became known as the Russia Committee,328 
the first meeting of which took place on 2 April 1946329 just a fortnight after the 16 
March meeting had been convened by Orme Sargent. 
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Chapter 5  Phase I of Russia Committee work 1946 to 1948   
1946  A Strong Beginning 
During 1946 there was, what Rothwell describes as “much serious pondering of Soviet 
policy  motives in the Foreign Office and in the British Embassy in Moscow”.330 In so 
pondering, the British, Rothwell argued, had the advantage over the US in terms of 
understanding  the Soviets because “British-Russian relations had been of great 
importance to both countries for at least a hundred and fifty years, whereas Soviet-
American relations had been of secondary, even trivial, importance before 1941”.331 
Whether this view has validity is at least questionable but what is indisputable is his 
assertion that the subject of British-Soviet relations was under close scrutiny at this 
time and one tangible result of this ‘pondering’ was the setting up of the Russia 
Committee.   April 1946332 saw the establishment of what was to be the first of the 
government committees to examine the emerging threat posed by the Soviets.  It was 
set up to: “collate information about communism from all sources, including the most 
secret, in order to bring home to Ministers and selected Government Departments the 
true nature of the [Soviet] menace”.333 
The membership of the Committee mostly comprised Heads of Foreign Office 
Departments all of whom were diplomats of senior rank, many of whom later went on 
to reach the highest levels of their profession.  By drawing the membership from 
across the Foreign Office the Committee gained a wide coverage of Foreign Office 
expertise.   The first Chairman of the Russia Committee was Oliver Charles Harvey,334 
Deputy Under-secretary (Political).335  He was one of the few members of the 
Committee who was not a Head of Department but he was someone who was highly 
regarded by Orme Sargent and by both Eden and Bevin.  It was in some ways surprising 
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that the Chairmanship was not vested in the Head of the Northern Department336 
which encompassed the ‘Russia Desk’.  Sir Christopher Warner was Head of the 
Northern Department until early 1946 and did attend Russia Committee meetings until 
his move to become HM Ambassador in Brussels but it was perhaps because of his 
imminent move from the Northern Department that he was not appointed Chairman.  
It may also have been deemed more appropriate to appoint a Chairman whose brief 
extended beyond specific areas and disciplines.  After all, the Russia Committee was 
not an exclusively Northern Department organisation. The reach and coverage was 
wider. And although several members of the Committee, including the Secretary, were 
from the Northern Department, others came from the Foreign Office Research 
Department (FORD), the Information Department (ID) and other Foreign Office 
Departments as well as visiting Ambassadors.  Nevertheless the fact that the Secretary 
came from the Northern Department put it in poll position.  The post of Secretary in 
civil/diplomatic service terms has an importance probably undermined by the 
nomenclature.  The Secretary of high level Committees is often a very senior person 
who is an expert in the particular field, perhaps the most obvious example being the 
Secretary to the Cabinet who is the highest ranking civil servant in Britain, a post which 
it has been claimed, is one of the four highest Offices of State, alongside the Prime 
Minister, the Foreign Secretary and the Chancellor of the Exchequer.337  
The first Secretary to the Russia Committee was Robin M A Hankey who was the son of 
the highly esteemed Secretary to the Cabinet, Sir Maurice Hankey, who had retired in 
1938.338  Robin Hankey had served in Cairo and then Teheran in his early Diplomatic 
career and was posted back to the Foreign Office in London in 1943 to become the 
Deputy Head of the Eastern Department and then, from 1946, became Head of 
Northern Department but was not to remain Secretary for long as he was soon 
appointed Counsellor in Warsaw. 
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The first meeting of the Russia Committee took place at 11am on 2 April 1946 in 
Whitehall where eight339 senior ranking members of the Diplomatic Service met with 
the far from low-key objective to “co-ordinate policy towards Russia”.340  The meeting 
was notable for a number of reasons, beyond its being the first to be held.  The sheer 
reach of the Foreign Office interests and the surety of the assessments is profound.  
The judgments are stated as facts.  There is an unnerving self-confidence about the 
statements and, not surprisingly as it was the British Foreign Office, a clear and 
unapologetic concentration on the British interests and, significantly, in its inaugural 
format and membership, this committee was made up purely of Foreign Office 
officials.   The Chairman, Oliver Harvey, set out the background to Orme Sargent’s 
decision to set up the Committee, explaining that the outcome of the latter’s recent 
meeting was the decision that a paper should be put to Cabinet as it was clear that the 
Soviets:  “..had returned to pure Marx-Leninism, was becoming dynamic and 
aggressive and had opened an offensive against Great Britain as the leader of social 
democracy in the world…Recommendations were to be made to the cabinet for a 
coordinated defence against this long term attack and possibly for the adoption of a 
defensive-offensive in reply…”. 341 
The Chairman explained that the aim was to hold a series of weekly meetings to 
coordinate policy towards the Soviet Union and in a tour de table he led his colleagues 
in an overview of Soviet policy towards the Far East, the Middle East and Central and 
South Eastern Europe.   It is worth dwelling on the overall assessments of each of these 
areas at this point because the Committee would return at their subsequent meetings 
to take stock of developments thereon. The report on the Far East342 concerned the 
states along the Soviet border with China which were described as being quiet noting 
that the Outer Mongolian People’s Republic was “virtually a satellite”343 of the Soviet 
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Union.  In Manchuria the Soviets were said to be trying to get a majority control of 
economic enterprises and had put great effort into the removal of factories and 
machinery which it was observed would be likely to have had a crippling effect on the 
economy of a country that had up to then been “relatively highly developed”.344  
Nevertheless, as an observation on the relationship between the two big  Communist 
blocks,   the Chinese were thought to be capable of looking after their own interests 
very effectively, as the minutes of the meeting record:   “..the Chinese Communists 
would probably take all they could get from the Russians in order to increase their own 
power.  Present indications, however, were that they had a strong nationalist tendency 
and it was quite possible that they would end by biting the hand that fed them”.345 
The discussion on the Middle East dwelt largely on Persia’s346 oil reserves, which were 
important not just to the British and the Soviets but also to the United States.  The 
formation of the Tuleh Party, which had been encouraged by the Soviets, was seen by 
the Foreign Office as a lever to be used to encourage the formation of a stooge 
government over which the Soviets could exert undue influence.  This sort of tactic 
was regarded by the Foreign Office as being a typical move on the part of the Soviets 
to foster Communist expansionism. With similar concerns in mind the meeting noted 
that Britain had advised the Iraqi Government: “not to be in a hurry to receive a Soviet 
diplomatic representative and were contemplating advising His Majesty’s Minister at 
Jedda in the same sense…”.347 
The discussion on Central and South East Europe348 drew attention to a report which, 
given subsequent events may well have been true, that the Soviets had started to 
establish a base at Varna, Bulgaria’s largest seaport, where they had fermented 
disagreement between the existing Bulgarian government and the opposition.  The 
Communist state of Bulgaria was subsequently established, lasting for 35 years, over 
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which period it was for a time under strong Stalinist/Soviet control but later held more 
to the Yugoslavian/Titoist type of Communism.    
The remaining countries, for which an overview was given at this initial meeting, were 
Scandinavia, Austria and Germany.  It was thought that the Soviets had reasonably 
little influence at the time in either Sweden or Norway but rather more in Denmark 
and that they were seeking to penetrate the Swedish trades unions.  A commonsense, 
though nonetheless interesting, observation was that the Scandinavians by their close 
proximity to Russia were impressed by power and the nearness of that country which 
could lead to the lessening of their tentative ties with Britain.  On Austria it was 
reported that Britain had now agreed to support the Austrian Social Democrats and 
was noted that the Soviets “…were being as difficult as possible in Austria”349 in 
relation to the allocation of farm land and the supply of food. 
As to Germany, the views expressed in the initial report are worth quoting more fully 
given what later transpired in the partitioning of Berlin: “the Eastern zone was being 
rapidly communised.  The battle over the future of the Social Democrat Party was now 
joined and it was apparent that the Russians aimed at turning Berlin into a Communist 
stronghold.  There were preliminary indications that the Russians were now actively 
building up industry in the Soviet zone and were even using industrial plants delivered 
as reparations from Western Germany and Austria for the purpose”.350   
This initial scene-setting meeting concluded with a summary of the situation in respect 
of the numerous international organisations which were then operable:  The United 
Nations Organisation (UN or UNO);351  the European Central Inland Transport 
Organisation (ECITO);352the International Danube Commission (IDC);353 League of 
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Nations (LoN);354 and the War Crimes Commission (WCC).355  On the UN, although 
Gromyko356 had reportedly walked out of the UN Security Council over the Persian 
dispute about oil rights, the general consensus was that the Soviets would not walk out 
of the UN altogether if they could avoid it;  Molotov, in his election speech, having said 
that the Soviet Government would support the UNO: “...in order to prevent capitalist 
aggression”.357  
It is clear from this record of the initial meeting that there existed considerable 
concern within the Foreign Office as to the direction in which the Soviets were moving 
and the need to get the Cabinet to address these issues and to act upon 
recommendations that the Russia Committee would draw up. The fact that the 
Committee planned to meet weekly was, of itself, an indication of the importance that 
was attached to the Committee’s work by the most senior people in the Foreign Office 
as it required a considerable resource commitment.   
There were several distinct elements to the Foreign Office’s concern over Soviet 
Foreign policy.   The first concerned Russia’s stance towards Great Britain, as 
evidenced by the earlier reference to “dynamic and aggressive offensive against Great 
Britain”.358   The Russia Committee rapidly came to the view that Britain needed to 
respond by adopting a ‘defensive-offensive’ stance, in other words to defend Britain’s 
position by going on the offensive.  The second element, which the Foreign Office was 
uniquely able to fulfill, was to examine and keep under regular review the Soviet policy 
in different parts of the world.  The third concern, which would become clear at later 
meetings, was the need to walk in step with colleagues in the United States.  
The Chairman concluded the first meeting of the Russia Committee with the warning: 
“By means of their economic, financial, banking and commercial policies, the Russians 
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were linking up the largest possible area in Eastern Europe with the Five Year Plan and 
were gearing it into the Soviet economic system.  The effect of their economic 
stranglehold was to tighten their political grip on Eastern Europe and the social 
changes which their economic measures produced (eg by closing the banks or 
manipulating the currency in Eastern Europe) had a similar result.  Western influences 
and economic interests were by the same means being progressively eliminated”. 359 
The second meeting, a week later and with largely - but not entirely - the same cast 
list, was perhaps a little sharper and more business-like in its approach, agreeing 
immediately that terms of reference for the Committee would be drafted by 
Christopher Warner 360 and these were subsequently circulated on 18 April as follows:    
To review weekly the development of all aspects of Soviet policy and 
propaganda and Soviet activities throughout the world, more particularly with 
reference to the Soviet campaign against this country; to ensure a unified 
interpretation thereof throughout the political and economic departments of 
the Foreign Office; to consider what action is required as a result of the 
Committee’s review with particular reference to the probable degrees of 
support to be looked for from the United States of America and to a lesser 
degree from France, and others; and to ensure that the necessary 
recommendations as to policy are made either by the departments of the office 
concerned or by the Committee to Sir Orme Sargent, as may be appropriate.  
The Committee will maintain close contact with the JIC with a view to 
coordinating intelligence and policy at every stage. 
A brief report of each meeting is to be submitted to Sir Orme Sargent.361  
These terms of reference are significant in several respects.  First, they are broadly 
based and high level.  The requirement to review “all aspects of Soviet policy and 
propaganda throughout the world” 362  appears an ambitious and formidable task.  
Only the Foreign Office was in the position within the UK to mount such a review. 
Secondly, they embrace the close intelligence relationship that existed between the 
United States and Britain during the Second World War and sought to ensure that this 
continued.  Thirdly, the reference to “maintaining close contact with the JIC”, which 
has been described as the most important British intelligence body at the centre of UK 
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politics,363  is highly significant not only in terms of establishing the security and 
intelligence credentials of the Russian Committee but of its importance in terms of 
status – the JIC being on all fours with an official Cabinet Committee. The status of the 
Russia Committee was further underscored by the involvement of the PUS, Orme 
Sargent, who was to be kept in close contact with all that they did.  
 
The discussions at the next meeting of the Committee, held on 16 April 1946,364  
covered a broad spectrum of issues and serves to underline the size of the task before 
them.  In addition to looking at the state of play in the Middle East and the Far East 
and looking ahead to the proposed next Council of Ministers meeting to be held in 
Paris, there was a lengthy discussion on the strategic position of the British 
Commonwealth and a paper on ‘Relations with the United States’.  On the 
Commonwealth, the discussion centered on what to do about the manpower needed 
to honour the country’s defence commitments when manpower resources were at a 
low ebb.  One proposal for dealing in part with this problem related to the large 
number of Polish Armed Forces who had fought with Britain in the War and had 
remained in the UK and to whom de-mobilisation had been promised.   The proposal 
was to offer the Poles the opportunity to remain in the UK and to join a new voluntary 
defence organisation.     This resulted in the proposal to set up another Whitehall inter-
departmental committee to consider the plans of the Ministry of Defence’s Chiefs of 
Staff to tackle the manpower shortage problems, with representatives from the Chiefs 
of Staff, HM Treasury, the Ministry of Labour and the Foreign Office.   This is an 
example of a subject that crossed the responsibilities of several Departments including 
the Foreign Office and the Ministry of Defence and which left the MOD in this instance 
in the pole position.  The Foreign Office representative was to be Mr Hall-Patch who, 
as he was also a member of the Russia Committee, could keep the latter informed of 
what was going on.  This Committee was charged, once they had researched the 
options, with advising Ministers who would then take it to the Defence Committee.  
On the face of it, therefore, this Whitehall Committee on Manpower had a much more 
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focused and narrow remit than the Russia Committee but on the other hand it also  
had cross-Whitehall representation and an expectation to advise their political 
masters, whereas the Russia Committee at this early stage had high level official 
participation but no obvious  Ministerial backing;  had a dauntingly wide remit;  and 
had a membership drawn exclusively from the Foreign Office, though attendees from 
elsewhere were permitted. 
 
The other paper of interest, which was circulated in advance to the Russia Committee 
members was significant in one important respect, namely that it picked up on the 
need to continue to work closely with, and to share information with, the Americans.  
The sharing of intelligence between the UK and the United States was well established 
but was to be undermined by the US decision to stop sharing intelligence after the War 
with all other countries, including the UK and, later – by 1952 – through the 
compromising of British intelligence output through Soviet spies working within the SIS 
and the Foreign Office.  The un-redacted365 section of the Addendum reads as follows:  
“Relations with the United States.  Mr Caccia informed the meeting that the Chiefs of 
staff had now agreed that we should exchange J.I.C. appreciations through the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff Organisation in Washington”. 
The April 23rd meeting of the Committee, in addition to what had already become the 
standard updating under the normal headings, was interesting in that it records 
several instances of Committee members wishing to engage Ministers and/or senior 
diplomats with their concerns. They were not, after all, deliberating on the Soviet 
threat in a vacuum merely for their own consumption.  Their raison d’etre was to bring 
their concerns to those senior people in government and by so doing encourage the 
adoption of policies to counter the threat.  So, for example, under the ‘Europe’ 
heading, concern was expressed about the willingness of France to accede to Soviet 
pressures.  The minutes record the view that the:  “….growth of Communist influence 
in France was having a marked effect on the Netherlands and Belgian Governments 
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which were becoming nervous of having close connections with France”.366 There were 
also thought to be a number of instances which indicated that Czechoslovakia was 
falling more and more into the Soviet sphere of influence  -  this was a somewhat 
prescient comment given the fact that the Communists seized power two years later.  
Similarly, under the heading of International Federations, concern was expressed 
about the tactics employed by the Communists of infiltrating their nominees into 
influential positions in organisations. 
The Committee continued to meet weekly.  At their 30 April meeting,367 in addition to 
the by now normal topics being discussed, there was a curious reference to the 
“decidedly anti British” American government representative in Berlin, General Clay, 
who was described as a “queer character” who felt that he needed to keep on the right 
side of the Soviets.  The Foreign Office was mindful of the need to keep abreast of 
possible changes in relations with United States with whom close relations remained 
very important partly because of the wish to try to retain a central place on the world 
stage and partly because of the practical need for tangible economic assistance. 
 
Concern was expressed about the Soviets making propaganda use of Great Britain not 
having supplied wheat to France when asked to do so, the French being susceptible to 
such propaganda with their elections in the offing.  It was claimed that: “..the Russians 
had speeded up their campaign of vilification against us by saying for instance that 
Russians had only given wheat because the Anglo-Saxons had failed to help France”.368 
Britain, of course, had major issues with feeding its own population.  As had been 
noted during the Russia Committee meeting a week earlier in that the British Secretary 
of State had decided that there was nothing that could be done to aid the French with 
cereals, as all available stocks were spoken for.  Britain also had to have regard to the 
needs of the wider Commonwealth, for example India, which was experiencing 
dangerous food shortages.  And on Persian oil – a recurring theme, and set to remain 
so – the view was that Britain needed to press her interests in South Eastern Persian oil 
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unilaterally rather than as being in a consortium with the Americans who would 
doubtless have no qualms about pursuing their own independent interests in this area. 
 
Members of the Committee, at this stage all from different parts of the Foreign Office, 
agreed that other government departments had a clear interest in the issues being 
kept under review by the Russia Committee, and they therefore decided to hold a 
meeting dedicated to considering whether the net of membership should be cast more 
widely.  The appetite for so doing seemed likely to be welcomed given the Chairman’s 
report that Sir Orme Sargent wished the committee: “to pay special attention to 
economic policy as well as political and to the co-ordination of the two”.369 
The Committee was therefore beginning to widen out its sphere of interest to involve 
other government departments, for example HM Treasury. So it was that even in these 
very early days of the Russia Committee’s existence, their remit was recognised as 
being so vast, and so potentially important, that its membership could not be confined 
to the Foreign Office. The membership was, therefore, expanded from May 1946 to 
include representatives from the Ministry of Defence Chiefs of Staff and the JIC. 
The Warner Memorandum 
May 1946 saw the Russia Committee really getting into its stride with a lot of things 
happening in short order.  The first really significant output of the Russia Committee 
was circulated in early draft form after Christopher Warner  had been commissioned 
by  Orme Sargent to produce a Top Secret Circular, which was to become known as 
‘The Warner Memorandum’, designed to be sent to all Heads of Political and 
Functional Departments of the Foreign Office and all Under Secretaries in posts abroad 
– therefore, in effect, to every senior diplomat in the Foreign Office - to be entitled 
‘The Soviet Campaign Against this Country and Our Response To It’.  On 3 May Warner 
sent his first draft to Edmund Hall-Patch, inviting him to make any changes he thought 
fit and then to pass the draft on to Orme Sargent.  On 4 May Hall-Patch did as 
requested, noting: “This circular covers the Russian aspect of the Committee’s work 
very well. It makes no mention of any more general activities. You may wish to add 
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something to cover this, or it may be better to leave things as they are and see how 
the work of the Committee develops.”  On 6 May Mr Troutbeck produced a note for 
discussion at the next meeting of the Russia Committee – which was to take place the 
following day - having been asked by Lord Brimelow for his views on Warner’s paper.  
The meeting on 7 May was a key event in the early life of the Russia Committee.  In 
addition to the normal updates, it was notable for including an in-depth discussion 
about the draft Warner Memorandum.  The Memorandum, which is made up of seven 
pages and 28 paragraphs, comprises arguably the blueprint for all the future work of 
the Russia Committee.  It begins by referring to the various sources that had influenced 
Warner in his thinking - for example election speeches by Stalin, Molotov and other 
Polit-bureau members – which Warner believed illustrated the Soviets’ return to the 
pure doctrine of Marx-Lenin-Stalin.  It notes the Soviets intense building up of military 
and industrial strength and what Warner described as their “revival of the bogey of 
external danger to the Soviet Union”.370  The Memorandum then unpacks Warner’s 
reasons for so contending and his belief that Britain needed to defend herself against 
these Soviet policy changes which were unlikely to be short-lived and posed a serious 
threat to Britain’s interests all over the world.371  He further argued that Britain 
needed not only to be fully aware of the Soviets’ aggressive policy in all its aspects but 
also to foresee future developments in her campaign against Britain and how they 
could be countered, or, in using Warner’s words whether Britain should adopt a 
“defensive-offensive policy”.   This phrase was picked up by Merrick 372 who singled 
out the 7 May meeting as being important, noting that the Committee: “recognised a 
need for a defensive-offensive policy, and drafted lines for a counter-offensive of 
propaganda”.  
Warner saw a clear necessity to carry out a constant study of the Soviets’ activities to 
stir up trouble for Britain and weaker her influence.  And to work out a coherent policy 
to keep counter measures under constant review.  He cites the Soviets as accusing 
Britain of being anti-democratic, reactionary, lax in routing out fascism, aggressive and 
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war-mongering.  He points to the Soviets infiltration of international bodies such as the 
World Youth Organisation and the World Federation of Trade Unions etc and the need 
to be alert to these moves.  The specific threats he identified as needing to be guarded 
against were:  “(a) the establishment of communist governments in countries where a 
hostile influence threatens our vital interests, (b) the weakening of the influence of 
elements friendly to us in such countries, (c) the creation of troubled conditions where 
we are responsible for peace ….and prosperity, (d) Soviet blocking of schemes for 
restoring settled conditions…, (e) Soviet attempts to divide us from those who share 
our basic political conceptions, (f) Soviet attempts to discredit us as weak and 
reactionary.”373 As to how Britain should go about conducting a ”defensive-offensive” 
policy, the Memorandum argues that Britain should develop her own propaganda but 
recognised that this would need endorsement by Bevin and Attlee and a lead would 
need to be given by politicians through their Ministerial speeches. 
 
Following the Russia Committee discussion of the draft Warner Memorandum, Orme 
Sargent signed a circular, dated 13 May,374 and entitled “Committee on Policy towards 
Russia”, which was, in effect, a covering note to the Memorandum.  It included the 
following:  
The Russians are engaged in a general and long-term political offensive against 
us...The pattern of Russian tactics in the political economic and propaganda 
fields is pretty clear:  we must constantly try to anticipate their application to 
new cases and consider how to counter them.  But we must try not to think 
purely defensively.  A defensive-offensive policy has been sanctioned.  We 
should therefore ourselves constantly consider how we can score points in the 
contest against the spread of international communism and against the 
extension of Russian influence.  We must, however, expose totalitarianism and 
communism in all their forms and wherever they may be found......375 
The Circular was preceded by a note from Christopher Warner, dated 10 May 1946, to 
Orme Sargent in which he says: “It was recommended at last week’s meeting of the 
Russia Committee that the attention of heads of department should be drawn to the 
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importance of trying to foresee and prepare to meet in advance if possible Russian 
developments of their campaign against us……”. 376  
 
The Circular377 set out for the Heads of all Foreign Office Political and International 
Departments, the reasons behind the setting up of the Russia Committee;  noted the 
fact that a shorter version of the circular had been approved by the Prime Minister and 
had been sent to all Ministers – thereby giving the Committee status and the highest 
stamp of approval for its work;  and informed the Heads of Department what role they 
were to play in the Committee’s work.  It re-iterated that the basic justification for the 
existence of the Committee was that, as the Soviet policy in the military, political, 
economic and propaganda fields was carefully planned and orchestrated, then the 
British should attempt equally to co-ordinate their responses in these fields.  The 
scope of the Soviet threat was seen as: “..so wide and so insidious that the policy of 
withstanding communism and fighting for “liberalism” of western democracy will to a 
large extent affect and focus this Office”.378 
The setting up of the Russia Committee was regarded as being essential not just to 
react/respond to Soviet aggression and propaganda against Britain  but to be in a 
position to anticipate what they were likely to do in the future and thereby be better 
placed to counter it;  the Committee was to become the central machinery for this 
work.  This task could best be achieved by ensuring that membership was not only 
drawn from senior experienced diplomats from across the  relevant Foreign Office 
departments but also by linking in to the Chiefs of Staff at the Ministry of Defence and 
to the JIC through the addition of Harold Caccia379 to their regular membership, and 
Caccia himself would provide a link with the Security Service (MI5).380  Each of the 
Committee members was charged with responsibility for bringing to the notice of the 
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Committee any matters bearing on Soviet policy of concern to their own departments 
and of seeing that any actions agreed by the Committee and affecting their areas of 
responsibility were implemented.  Cross-departmental issues would be the 
responsibility of the Committee to address as would the need to decide whether to 
engage or bring in people from other government departments as the Committee’s 
work proceeded. 
By mid-May 1946, therefore, the Russia Committee had been established and 
Ministers were aware of its existence.  The Chairmanship and membership had been 
agreed, individual responsibilities had been assigned; the frequency of meetings 
(weekly) had been decided; and the wider Foreign Office Departments and Overseas 
posts were informed of its existence and purpose. Indeed, the minutes of the 14 May 
1946 meeting confirmed that the circular to Heads of Department regarding the work 
of the Committee “has now been sent out”.381 The Russia Committee was now well 
placed to get on with its task.  Moreover, the meeting of the Committee on 14 May 
1946 saw an end to the period in which the Russia Committee only existed, as it were, 
as an internal and purely officially sanctioned entity and became a body of which 
Ministers were aware and of which they were supportive. Two other points worthy of 
note are recorded in the Minutes, namely that a working party had been set up to look 
into the preparing of a “counter-offensive” to Soviet propaganda;  and that Mr Caccia 
was able to inform his fellow members of the  Russia Committee  that the JIC intended 
to keep the output of the Russia Committee under review to ensure that they were 
kept up to date on the strategy being adopted to counter the Soviets propaganda 
activities.  This underlined that a close link had been formed between the JIC and the 
Russia Committee which, in turn, provided the Committee with a link with the security 
and intelligence agencies.  Subsequently, and out of committee, the Secretary 
circulated a memorandum in mid-May summarizing the subject of various studies that 
had been,  or would be, produced at the behest of the Committee.382  The list of topics 
it was intended to cover illustrates the proposed breadth of the work of the Russia 
Committee, which included: the spread of communism throughout the world and the 
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extent of its being directed from Moscow;  the Soviet use of Diplomatic Privileges and 
Missions for subversive purposes;  Soviet strategic interests and intentions in the 
Middle East;  fortnightly reports on Soviet troop movements in South East Europe and 
the Persian frontier;  Soviet activities in Western Europe, Austria, Hungary and in the  
Chinese Northern provinces .  
May 1946 was, therefore, a busy time in the early days of the Russia Committee.  They 
were clearly feeling their way forward and deciding on the areas on which they needed 
to concentrate their energies.  The above list is formidable of itself but to this was 
added another requirement, as set out in another circular drafted for Orme Sargent to 
send out at the end of May to go to all Heads of Foreign Office Political and Functional 
Department Heads.  The circular was entitled ‘Communist Activities in International 
Federations and Congresses’ and in what might appear a slightly paranoid opening to 
the  paper, Orme Sargent described why he believed it necessary, when proposals 
were in hand to set up new international organisations – and particularly where British 
participation was mooted -  to keep them under close scrutiny: “The Soviet 
Government’s clever trick of penetrating or securing the creation of International 
Federations of various kinds and arranging that the executive functions should be 
controlled by Communists….  By suitable manipulation of the procedure and drafting 
of resolutions the whole proceedings of such bodies or congresses are made to serve 
the ends of Soviet propaganda and in particular for unscrupulous attacks on this 
country……”383  The examples of organisations being penetrated by the Soviets were 
similar to those listed by George Kennan in his Long Telegram and lend weight to the 
assertion that the Telegram prompted Orme Sargent to set up the Russia Committee. 
 
There was a delay in sending out this circular, as became apparent from the note of a 
subsequent meeting of the Russia Committee which recorded “the Secretary of State’s 
refusal to approve the paper on propaganda”.384  This reference is highly significant for 
two reasons.  Firstly, the language could be said to be uncharacteristically forthright 
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for a set of formal minutes of a meeting of senior diplomats.  The use of the word 
“refusal” appears pejorative.  As has been alluded to elsewhere, the attitude of Ernest 
Bevin towards the Russia Committee’s proposed anti-Communist propaganda is open 
to question.  It has been argued that neither he, nor Attlee, were at this stage inclined 
to take a pessimistic view of where the Soviets were going and this could seem to be 
borne out by the following extract from the meeting minutes:  “(The memorandum on 
propaganda) had been submitted to the Secretary of State but it had not been 
approved. The Secretary of State had requested that in the meantime, instead of 
publicizing misdeeds of the Communists, we should concentrate on extolling our own 
achievements”. 385 
This sounds like a reining in of the Committee by their political master but, if so, it 
failed to achieve that end.  Indeed, the Committee was having none of it.  Their 
conclusion was that in circulating the paper the covering letter should make it clear 
that the recommendations therein should ‘not yet be acted on’.   It would be easy, 
perhaps, to see too much significance in Bevin’s apparent reigning in of the 
Committee.  While it is conceivable that he may have had a somewhat different view 
of the Soviets’ intentions from those of his officials,  it is also likely that too much can 
be made of this and that in fact his attitude was multi-layered as he had to have an eye 
to the need for retaining as good an official line with the Soviets as possible even 
though he had already had first-hand experience of how difficult, duplicitous and 
intransigent they had shown themselves to be over, for example, rescinding Yalta 
agreements.  One historian of the period takes the view that he was simply feeling his 
way386 and in the absence of concrete evidence of hostile action and given his relations 
as Foreign Secretary with the leaders of Britain’s former allies it would have been 
incumbent upon him to deal with his counterparts on issues as they arose and in an 
open minded way.  
In mid-May 1946 there was evidence that the MOD and JIC valued the work of the 
Russia Committee.  A paper387 by the Chief of Staff, circulated to Russia Committee 
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members, outlined three studies being prepared on Russian activities.  The first was a 
report on Russia’s strategic interests and intentions, prepared by the JIC388  which was 
to be updated six-monthly to see if the conclusions needed amending.  The second 
would comprise fortnightly reports on Russian troop movements in South East Europe 
and on the Persian frontier.  The third was a paper that was in preparation on Russia’s 
strategic interests and intentions in the Middle East, which was also to be reviewed 
and updated monthly.  The Memorandum recorded that the Russia Committee, in 
addition to ensuring that they had sight of the above three regular report updates, 
would also, “as sufficient material becomes available”  prepare studies on:  Soviet 
activities in Western Europe;  Soviet activities in Austria and Hungary;  Soviet activities 
in Chinese Northern Provinces and in the use of Chinese Communism to further Soviet 
aims; and the spread of Communism throughout the world and the extent of its 
direction from Moscow including Soviet use of Diplomatic Privileges and Missions for 
subversive purposes.  A formidable expanse of work for any organisation. 
 
In mid-May another key document389 was produced, by Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick, for the 
Russia Committee, entitled ‘Anti-Communist Propaganda’.  It set out the factors that 
needed to be kept in mind when setting up a scheme for anti-Communist propaganda.  
Although there was clearly a perceived need to take action it was nevertheless noted 
that, unlike the Soviets, Britain could not control domestic organs of publicity but was 
dependent on the goodwill of her publicists.  Therefore, it was argued, the success of 
propaganda would be dependent upon engaging Ministers and would need to be 
backed up with policy decisions and deeds which, in turn, needed Ministerial sanction.  
This was not necessarily going to be easy to deliver bearing in mind that Bevin had 
already shown that he was not yet ready to take action.  This was to be an education 
campaign and therefore long-term.  It required action at home and abroad.  Action 
that would be needed at home would comprise:  informing and obtaining co-operation 
of Ministers and other Home departments and particularly enlisting the cooperation of 
the Ministry of Defence’s Admiralty, War Office and Air Ministry; engaging the  BBC 
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Home Service via the BBC governors;  engaging Chatham House390 to include suitable 
material in all of their publications.  Action that would be needed abroad would 
require keeping Heads of Missions fully updated on the purpose and scope of the 
propaganda campaign and providing Missions with information on malpractices of the 
Soviet Government. 
 
With initiatives coming thick and fast the next few meetings of the Russia Committee 
were notable for reporting on the status of the two most substantive circulars yet 
produced by the Committee, namely the Warner Memorandum and the Kirkpatrick 
‘paper on propaganda’.  Rothwell describes the Warner Memorandum as being “very 
influential”391 and as evidence for this he cites Attlee as having referred to the ideas 
enshrined in the Memorandum in positive terms when in correspondence with the 
British Liaison Mission, Tokyo, in July 1946.392  But, before that, in June, the Committee 
were awaiting Bevin’s approval to circulate it widely and so Orme Sargent authorised a 
partial circulation ie he agreed to the despatch of the draft of under a suitable covering 
letter to “a restricted number of posts”.  It was also agreed that in view of the 
Secretary of State’s awaited approval to circulate the paper, the covering letter should 
make it clear that, while the analysis contained therein had been accepted, its 
recommendations were still under consideration and could not yet be acted upon.     
Finally, on 18 June the stand-in Chairman393 was able to report to the Russia 
Committee394 that Orme Sargent had approved the dispatch of the Warner 
Memorandum to those posts suggested by the Committee provided adequate security 
could be ensured.  Also, in reference to the Kirkpatrick Memorandum, the Committee 
discussed what economic, diplomatic and publicity action might be taken once 
Ministers had approved their recommendations.  There was also discussion as to the 
application of policy outside the Foreign Office’s purview and the need to draw in 
other Departments where the policy impacted their responsibilities.  
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The second half of 1946 saw no significant slowing down of the Russia Committee 
activities. However, it did see a ratcheting up of concerns about Soviet policy 
expressed to the Foreign Secretary and the latter’s further examples of being on the 
receiving end of Soviet hostilities.  For example, in early July Ernest Bevin received 
from His Majesty’s Ambassador in Washington395 a telegram setting out in detail the 
deterioration in relations  between the Soviet Union and the Western Powers and the 
growing conviction that it was:   “becoming impossible to bridge the ideological gap 
between them.”396  The Ambassador went on to report on two recently published 
articles by John Foster Dulles,  the central thought of which was that the Soviet rulers 
did not believe the security of their country could be guaranteed until the eradication 
of non-Soviet type of society which dangerously divided the one world into 
incompatible halves. Although there is no record of Bevin’s reaction to this missive, it 
is reasonable to assume that he would not have discounted the views of either His 
Majesty’s Ambassador or, indeed, of his American counterpart, Dulles.  Moreover, at 
Cabinet on 15 July, Bevin gave his colleagues an account of the Council of Foreign 
Ministers Meeting that had recently concluded in Paris.397 He outlined the very 
intransigent line taken by Molotov on reparations and the fact that he had made many 
charges that Britain was not playing its part.  Bevin had called his bluff by suggesting 
that there should be an enquiry to determine the veracity of Molotov’s claims.   
Molotov declined the proposal.   Bevin concluded, and this must surely be seen as a 
signal that he was alluding to the kind of actions being proposed by the Russia 
Committee, that it would be well to bring publicity to bear on Russian activities in this 
matter.  The following day there was a meeting of the Russia Committee at which Hall-
Patch gave an account398 of the same Foreign Ministers Conference, to which he had 
accompanied the Foreign Secretary, saying  that the UK had been forced to give way to 
the Russians which he ascribed to the weakness of Britain’s bargaining position which 
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he thought resulted from two causes.  First, the United States had been so anxious to 
get the Peace Conference off the ground that they had acceded to many of the 
demands of the Russians to include items.  Therefore, in the interests of keeping the 
Soviets on side the United States had been willing to bow to their pressure.   And 
secondly, Hall Patch believed that the weakness of Britain’s bargaining  position was 
attributable, somewhat prosaically, to the fact that she had taken to the conference 
only a small delegation of generalists whereas the Russians had arrived mob-handed 
with specialists in all of the fields under discussion.   Another interesting insight into 
the way statecraft issues were handled by the different parties, that such a relatively 
small issue should have such an impact.   
Hall-Patch also reported that the Council had been unable to reach agreement on 
Germany where the United States and Great Britain wished for German unity but it 
was concluded that such unity might be dearly bought at the expense of a nation-wide 
domination of Germany by the Soviet Union through the Communist party.  Bevin’s 
view was that the projected talks would fail, and German unity would be unachievable, 
unless the Western powers and the Soviets were able to agree on an exact 
interpretation of the Potsdam Agreement.  Such an outcome seemed unlikely, 
however, because the Soviets were construing certain ambiguous passages in the 
documents flowing from Potsdam in a way that differed from the interpretation of the 
United States and Great Britain 
This somewhat pessimistic report to Cabinet was smartly followed by a Secret Minute 
to Bevin from Sir Maurice Peterson, His Majesty’s Ambassador in Moscow, dated 16 
July 1946 which is important for its forthrightness to his political master about the 
trickiness of the Soviets. The seven-page minute records the Ambassador’s views on 
Soviet foreign policy and the Soviet mindset. He expresses surprise that the Soviets 
unexpectedly, at the Second Conference of Foreign Ministers in Paris, had shown 
themselves willing to try to unlock the deadlock that had transpired at the end of the 
previous Conference. He wrote: “There are no half-tones in Russia and the foreign 
commentator must steer a middle course between the scylla of flattery and the 
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charybdis of insult....399 and to see whether some agreement could be reached on the 
Russian obsession over increasing “bases”.400 
 
While Bevin was experiencing his own difficulties with the Soviets, Attlee, too, had his 
concerns as was apparent from a report given to the meeting of the Russia Committee 
on 30 July401 to the effect that the Prime Minster had drawn attention in a minute to a 
suggestion made by General Gairdner402 that as Russian tactics in Europe and Asia 
followed the same pattern, it would be useful if our representatives in the East could 
be given early notice of tactics followed in the West and vice versa, so that they would 
be forewarned.  In effect the Prime Minister was commissioning information from the 
Russia Committee and they set about discussing the best means of carrying out the 
Prime Minister’s wishes and agreed that: “it would be best to compile a monthly 
summary on Russian tactics as revealed in the “tour d’horizon” made each week by the 
Committee and to pass this summary by telegram to His Majesty’s Representatives in 
Tokyo and Nankin and to Lord Kilearn” 403 
 
The first summary, which was to be compiled monthly, would be embodied in a note 
for submission through Orme Sargent to the Prime Minister”.404  This was a major step 
forward for the Russia Committee.  Not only did it prove incontrovertibly that the 
Prime Minister, as well as the Foreign Secretary, were well aware of the work of the 
Committee, it also marked the beginning of the latter’s regular high-level reports to 
Ministers. 
 
It was becoming clear, then, by mid-1946 that Bevin and Attlee were well versed in the 
trickiness of their Soviet allies, as were their US counterparts and their advisers.   An 
example of concern on the part of the US was shown in a Confidential memorandum 
sent by Ernest Bevin to his Cabinet colleagues reporting a conversation he had had 
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with US Secretary of State Byrnes about UK policy towards Russia.  Byrnes had called 
attention to the conduct of the Russians at the Paris Peace Conference and in the 
Security Council where they had attacked the US and the UK without notice and 
without reason despite the US having tried hard to bring about peace and amity with 
them.405 So while Bevin and Attlee may not have broadcast their concerns as yet 
outside the relatively narrow and confidential confines of Cabinet, that does not mean 
that they were not alert to, and complicit with, the need to take counter action. 
 
The Summer months of 1946 saw the Russia Committee focussing on a new initiative, 
namely on the need for the problems being experienced with the Soviets to be better 
publicised within the British media. This was an initiative born out of questions being 
raised by the Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of State about the advantages of 
giving wider circulation to reports in the Soviet Press which were hostile to Britain, by 
making them available to the Libraries of the House of Commons.406  It was concluded 
that the best information source for this purpose were the weekly reviews compiled by 
the British Embassy in Moscow of Soviet daily press on international issues and 
monthly reviews of the main omissions and the peculiarities in the presentation of 
world news by the Soviet Press. They Committee was minded to recommend   that the 
Prime Minister should encourage the British Press to make use of the material but 
although this issue of publicity dominated the Committee’s deliberations throughout 
August and September, it posed a number of difficulties.  First, it was felt that 
“Ministers approving an all-out anti-Communist campaign”407 would be necessary in 
order to see that the publicity machine was working at full efficiency but unless there 
were to be a clear steer from the Prime Minister to this effect, it was feared that the 
British Press were likely to be reluctant to report anything critical of Russia in case the 
British Government were thought to be against such reports.408  Secondly, on a prosaic 
level, there was a shortage of newsprint in London which could hamper the efficiency 
of the publicity machine.  
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By the end of August, having dwelt on this subject for a couple of months, the Russia 
Committee concluded that there was: “increasing evidence to show that the 
Press…was still abstaining from the publication of items reflection (sic) unfavourably 
on Soviet policy.”409 Evidently the Committee proposed to draft a minute for the 
Foreign Secretary to send to the Prime Minister to deal with this but decided that the 
draft should await discussions at the forthcoming Paris conference on the Balkan 
Treaties which might generate publicity.  The Committee agreed, therefore, to put this 
on hold for discussion a fortnight hence when the Chairman, then noted that: “our 
publicity in general was not keeping the public fully informed on two important 
aspects of the present situation, viz the extent and virulence of the Russian 
propaganda campaign against us over the last six months, and the reign of terror and 
oppression which was mounting in countries behind the iron curtain”. 410 
 
One further development of interest occurred around this time when, at the 
suggestion of Orme Sargent, the Russia Committee agreed that General Jacob of the 
Ministry of Defence’s Chiefs of Staff, should in future be invited to attend meetings as 
he had a clear interest in all the subjects with which they were engaged.  This met with 
a slight reluctance on the part of Christopher Warner who noted that the Committee 
had decided “some time ago” to confine membership to the Foreign Office. He 
accepted, however, given that it was Orme Sargent’s suggestion, and who could 
gainsay ‘the boss’.  So General Jacob was invited to attend “in his personal capacity” 
even though it meant that the Russia Committee had to re-time their weekly meeting 
to accommodate him, but Warner felt that General Jacob should not receive Russia 
Committee papers routinely because of security - although this compromise, they 
accepted, would need to be cleared with Orme Sargent.411  This little restriction is 
amusing in the sense that General Jacob would have had security clearance at least as 
high as that of his Foreign Office colleagues so that the compromising of security could 
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hardly have been a real concern.  Anyhow, it was subsequently agreed that General 
Jacob could attend the Russia Committee meetings regularly from mid-October 
onwards, which, indeed, he did.412 
As has been demonstrated, the work of the Committee in its first year was 
impressively productive.  They had met at weekly intervals since April – a total of 30 
meetings.  They had produced several detailed Memoranda which conveyed to a wide 
audience, including Ministers, advice on the need to be alert to, and report on, 
examples of Soviet propaganda against Britain that needed to be countered. They had 
established their worth to the extent that the Prime Minister, as well as the Foreign 
Secretary and other Foreign Office Ministers, had commissioned work from them.  
They had produced and circulated monthly updates on developments in Soviet foreign 
policy affecting various areas of the world. They were examining what could be done 
to tackle the reluctance of the British media to report on the country’s tensions with 
the Soviets. They had broadened the membership of the Russia Committee to include 
liaison with the intelligence community and with the Ministry of Defence, and they had 
included representatives from the Colonial Office and the Dominions Office as 
members.  And they had encouraged attendance at their meetings of Ambassadors 
who were visiting London and could contribute valuable inside information to their 
discussions.   It was therefore a busy and successful inaugural year.  
 
1947  The Russia Committee Getting into its Stride  
The year started on a positive note in terms of a perceived improvement in relations 
with the Soviets.  On 2 January Ernest Bevin reported to his colleagues at their Cabinet 
Meeting on the position vis a vis PeaceTreaties discussions with the Soviets and the 
US413 where the Soviets were being more positive and co-operative.  On the official 
front, this was followed up the next day with the Russia Committee’s monthly report 
to overseas representatives, which, amongst other things, noted that Soviet policy had 
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been more restrained in December 1946 than for some time past. This was thought to 
be due in part to the Soviets being satisfied with the outcome of the General 
Assembly.414  This optimism was, however, short lived.  Frank Roberts (of Long 
Telegram fame) attended the mid-January meeting of the Russia Committee and was 
asked to give his opinion on the state of the Soviet’s foreign policy and their current 
domestic situation.   He described Soviet problems as both internal and external.415  
Their internal problems, he thought, were largely economic, as their 5-year plan was 
not going to schedule and the bad grain harvest in 1946 had led to food rationing 
bordering on starvation in the Ukraine.  The Russian people were becoming 
disillusioned.  Externally, the Soviets feared the closeness of the US and UK and, of 
course, the US atomic bomb.  A distinction was drawn between Molotov and his 
aggressiveness – which was perceived by many to be the ‘real’ stance of the Soviets - 
and the sometimes more conciliatory comments by Stalin.  The Committee felt that 
the appearance of a more accommodating Soviet mood might be designed to provide 
ammunition for the critics in the Labour Party who were pressing Ernest Bevin to make 
more conciliatory responses to the Soviets than he had previously been prepared to 
do.   But Bevin had become, at least in communications with Cabinet colleagues, 
brutally honest about the difficulties posed by the Soviets.  In a minute entitled ‘Main 
Short-term Problems Confronting us in Moscow’ he outlined what was likely to be the 
most crucial part of the discussions in the forthcoming March Moscow meeting, 
namely the short-term economic and political problems of Germany.  Bevin, who was 
speaking to Cabinet colleagues rather than to his wider Labour Party critics, made 
harsh assessments throughout the paper on the Soviet stance and their having 
reneged on Potsdam agreements.  He said that: “It is most important ...that the 
responsibility for failure at Potsdam should be placed fairly and squarely on the 
shoulders of the Russians who are entirely responsible for the present state of 
affairs”.416  
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As the year wore on, Bevin’s views on the difficulties with the Soviets seemed to 
converge ever closer with those of his senior Foreign Office officials on the Russia 
Committee.  As Warner reported to colleagues at the end of February, the Soviet 
propaganda machine had now been turned against the internal policy of the UK 
Government and was attacking the leadership of the Labour Party.  Bevin had 
therefore decided that he would mention this in his next Foreign affairs speech and 
had duly included a passage so doing.  Warner had also suggested to Bevin that he 
should confront Stalin and ask him whether such a policy of hostility could be 
reconciled with the Treaty of Alliance and Collaboration to which he had signed up.417  
And Jebb, who attended the meeting as he was in London, that he should prepare a 
dossier of Soviet attacks on the UK in the United Nations, which Bevin might also wish 
to point out to Stalin. 
 
At the end of April, Kirkpatrick told the Russia Committee about a meeting  that had 
taken place on 21 April between HM Ambassador in Moscow and Mr Vyshinsky418 on a 
revised version of the British/Soviet draft Peace Treaty which had been sent to the 
Soviet Government on 3 April.419 No progress had been made at the meeting and no 
date fixed for a further meeting. It was felt that the Soviets would put blame on the UK 
for failure to achieve progress.  This proved to be true.  Although Vyshinski did agree a 
month or so later to some further discussions on the draft Anglo-Soviet Peace Treaty 
with the British Ambassador, and this resulted in a measure of success in reaching 
some agreement on the terms of the revision, there followed an editorial in Izvestia 
amounting to ‘a slashing attack’420 on Bevin’s recent speech in the House of Commons, 
claiming that his version of the negotiations for a revised Peace Treaty did not 
correspond with the facts and that the UK version would worsen, not improve, the 
present Peace Treaty. 
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Elements of the UK Press had been hardly less critical, with the Daily Worker, in an 
article on 23 April, attacking the British Government and Bevin in particular.  Against 
that background the Committee, re-opening their push for counter propaganda 
through the British Press, concluded that two papers should be prepared for 
submission to the Secretary of State setting out the lines that should be taken in 
response to a Soviet Propaganda campaign. The first would comprise guidance to the 
British Press; the second would cover the more technical points arising out of the 
Peace Treaty. 
 
In early May, again, Bevin was giving negative messages to his Cabinet colleagues 
when he reported on the Moscow Council of Foreign Ministers meeting from which he 
had just returned, it having dragged on for six weeks.  His report was detailed and 
itemised all the areas of disagreement between the UK (and the US) and the Soviets.421 
An even more candid report on the same conference was given at the next Russia 
Committee meeting by the Secretary, who reported that the UK delegation had arrived 
in Moscow ‘full of apprehension’ and that the Secretary of State had refused to 
commit to partial solutions to the outstanding problems at the initial stages of the 
Conference. He had subsequently tabled a paper entitled ‘Revised Potsdam’ which, 
surprisingly, the Russians had seemed to accept in large measure.  German reparations 
were, as always, the main stumbling block with the Soviets seeking more than the US 
and UK were prepared to accept.  It was noted that the next Council of Foreign 
Ministers, which was to be held in November, would need to make decisions on 
reparations.  
 
The deliberations of the Russia Committee during the second half of 1947 were 
dominated by three subjects:  the Marshall Plan; the setting up by the Soviets of 
Cominform; and preparations for the November Conference of Foreign Ministers.  
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The US Economic Recovery Program (ERP), colloquially known as the Marshall Plan, 
had its genesis in June 1947 when the US Secretary of State, George C Marshall,422 
gave an address at Harvard University,  espousing the urgent need to provide 
European countries - including the UK, Germany, France, Italy etc - with economic aid 
to enable the rebuilding of the economies left devastated by the War.  Bevin, who had 
heard the speech on the radio, immediately perceived its importance and was keen to 
grasp the initiative and start discussing with the French and others how to respond.  
So, although the Marshall Plan itself was not implemented until mid-1948, the 
planning began with a meeting in June 1947, set up by Bevin, of the European 
countries affected, to discuss how they would develop a reconstruction plan to take 
advantage of the US aid proposals.  The US had included the Soviets - and Soviet 
satellites including Poland and Czechoslovakia - in their offer of aid, but the Soviets 
declined, and put pressure on their Satellites to do likewise. In part this was, doubtless, 
because they did not wish to be beholden to the US and have to comply with what 
they regarded as the political interference that went along with such an offer. Partly, 
too, and perhaps understandably, because Stalin was fundamentally opposed to 
restoring Germany to a position of economic strength, when it had been responsible 
for heaping such misery and devastating loss on the Soviets.   
The Russia Committee discussed the ‘Marshall Offer’ in July.  Initial discussions centred 
on the, by now familiar, subject of the disruptive behaviour of the Soviets at the recent 
Paris Conference where they had walked out at once and subsequently caused their 
Satellites to follow suit in leaving the conference, and their reasons for so behaving.423 
Despite this behaviour the Secretary of State was said to be of the view that European 
unity should not be despaired of until after the November conference of Foreign 
Ministers.  Later in July the Russia Committee, with Kirkpatrick in the Chair, considered 
a minute he had produced setting out arguments for and against a more actively 
critical line in UK publicity about Russia in the light of the failure of the Trade talks and 
their attitude to the Marshall offer.424  They agreed that it would not be politic, given 
Bevin’s view,  to recommend any drastic changes to the policy until after the 
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November Conference and that a campaign of propaganda against Russia by the BBC 
at that time could serve to undermine the latter’s reputation for objectivity.  It would 
also be at odds with the situation with Satellite countries which was impacted by the 
directive earlier in 1947 by Bevin to HM’s representatives abroad to maintain relations 
with the Satellites.  Moreover, obstructive Soviet tactics were already showing signs of 
damaging Communist influence in the UK and clumsy Soviet propaganda was serving 
the UK cause well in the US.  For all these reasons the Committee decided to hold back, 
for the time being, on making any recommendations to Ministers on pursuing a 
publicity propaganda campaign to counter that of the Soviets. 
The second of the three main pre-occupations of the Russia Committee in late 1947 
was to consider the implications of the setting up by the Soviets of Cominform.425 
Cominform was founded in late 1947 as the information bureau of the Communist 
parties in Russia and eight other countries426 to exchange information between them 
by means of, for example, the Cominform newspaper, which was produced in several 
languages. At their early October meeting427 they had a wide-ranging discussion on the 
significance of the Soviets having set up Cominform which had been the subject of a 
telegram from Frank Roberts.428   
With the November Council of Foreign Ministers around the corner the Russia 
Committee felt that it was important to provide Bevin with a full report on the 
implications of the setting up of Cominform and decided that when Frank Roberts’ 
fuller analysis had reached London it should be correlated with the Committee’s 
discussions and a note prepared for circulation, after which it would be submitted to 
Bevin together with a draft Intelligence note to posts abroad for his approval.   At their 
second October meeting 429 the Russia Committee continued their earlier discussion 
on ‘Cominform’ and were informed that Bevin had taken note of Mr Roberts’ 
preliminary analysis  but had ruled that no ‘Intelligence’ on the subject should be sent 
out, because he wished to wait for further evidence of the effect on which the setting 
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up of the ‘Cominform’ was going to have on Communist plans in Europe and  -  by now 
a familiar theme - would probably await the outcome of the November Conference.  A 
Memo was duly circulated to Foreign Office Heads of Department in early 
November430 entitled ‘Russia Committee – The Cominform’ – asking for comments on 
the text in order to have ready a final version of the submission to Bevin after the 
November conference.  The Memorandum began by noting that judgment on the real 
significance of the Cominform was being suspended until it could be seen whether it 
resulted in changes to Soviet policy and tactics.  By 21 November comments had been 
received back from Embassies in Austria; Hungary; Bulgaria; Czechoslovakia; 
Yugoslavia; Romania; France and Italy and a further version was produced 
incorporating their comments and providing what the Russia Committee regarded as 
the concrete evidence that Bevin had wished to see, to the effect that the setting up of 
Cominform marked a new phase in Communist and Soviet policy which was aimed at 
tightening the ties, and the controls, over the Communist satellite  countries.  This 
draft advice was discussed and agreed at their 4 December meeting431 and was ready 
to go forward not just to Bevin but also to his Minister of State and the Parliamentary 
Under-Secretary but not be circulated to posts abroad or given further distribution in 
London. It was for their political masters to see and any further distribution would 
need to be agreed first with them. 
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The third issue to dominate discussions of the Russia Committee in the second half of 
1948, indeed from as early as August that year, was what was likely to happen at the 
November Council of Foreign Ministers.  This was hardly surprising given that relations 
between the UK and the Soviets had been deteriorating.  At their 14 August meeting 
Sir Maurice Peterson (HM’s Ambassador in Moscow) described how the atmosphere in 
Moscow had changed for the worse recently and the breach between East and West 
now appeared to the Soviets to be an accomplished fact, and one that the US also 
acknowledged.  Bevin, with an eye on the continuing need not to exacerbate the risk of 
a split in the Labour Party, continued to maintain publicly that the UK government 
should not sanction any policy of despair at being able to reach some agreement with 
the Soviets until after the November Conference.  However, as the hope of a change of 
heart on the part of the Soviets was deemed to be so slight, the Russia Committee saw 
the need to make alternative plans.432 
As the much- heralded November 1947 Council of Foreign Ministers approached433 the 
Russia Committee were well aware that it was to be a kind of watershed in terms of 
cementing the Foreign Secretary’s foreign policy proposals in respect of his, and the 
government’s, formal views on, and proposals for countering, Soviet aggression. 
Meeting in mid-September, the Russia Committee focussed their discussions on 
Germany and Austria.434 On Germany, the focus was on what the Soviet attitude was 
likely to be at the Council.  It was feared that they would press for unreasonable 
concessions and, if and when unsuccessful, would blame the Western powers for non-
achievement of German unity.  On Austria, it was noted that there had been no 
progress on the Austrian Peace Treaty because the Soviets would only sign if they 
could acquire a large portion of German assets in Austria.  At their 8 November 
meeting the Russia Committee considered a memorandum from Sir Maurice Peterson,  
to Bevin (received 13 November)435  providing, in advance of the Council meeting, a 
lengthy and pessimistic analysis, from the man on the spot in Moscow, of the 
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deterioration in Anglo-Soviet relations since the previous Council meeting  held in 
Moscow in April 1947.   
More importantly, however, as an indication of Bevin’s thinking, was his report to his 
Cabinet colleagues on the morning when the Council meeting was due to begin later in 
the day.  The minutes record his speaking of a lack of optimism about the fifth Council 
of Foreign Ministers Conference:  “There were no indications that the Soviet 
Government would be more accommodating than they had been at the last meeting in 
Moscow.  Indeed, their action in establishing the Cominform, in strengthening their 
political control in the satellite countries of Eastern Europe and in fomenting industrial 
troubles in many parts of Western Europe seemed to suggest that they had no present 
desire to reach agreement with the Western powers for the peaceful settlement of 
Europe.  There was, therefore, little ground for hoping that the Council of Foreign 
Ministers would be able to make much progress towards agreement on the main issue 
still outstanding in connection with the Peace Treaties for Germany and Austria”.436  
This underlines that although Bevin was being cautious with the suggestions coming 
from his Foreign Office team, and was careful in the House of Commons not to 
antagonize his pro-Russia Labour colleagues, he clearly had reached a pessimistic view 
of Soviet tactics.   
 
On 4 December, while the Council of Foreign Ministers was still underway, the Russia 
Committee met and agreed that it was important to foresee what the UK publicity 
should be in the event of a breakdown of the Conference (which did subsequently 
occur). General Jacob drew attention to the fact that Ministerial speeches were an 
essential preliminary to any propaganda operation and that the Secretary of State 
should be advised to make a statement either at the Conference or immediately 
following it, to give maximum effect to the publicity.  It was agreed that this suggestion 
should be taken up with Orme Sargent.437 
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As 1947 drew to a close it had been another busy and productive year for the Russia 
Committee which was by now well established as a source of expert information on 
Soviet policy.  The Committee had met on a total of 18 occasions in 1947 - fewer than 
in 1946 when they had met 30 times - but this largely reflected the fact that their 
meetings were now fortnightly rather than weekly as hitherto. 
1948 Highlights 
The year started, momentously from the Russia Committee’s viewpoint, with a 
confirmation from the Foreign Secretary that he was persuaded of the need to do 
something to counter Soviet attitudes.  He duly sent three Memoranda to Cabinet 
colleagues on three consecutive days.  The first, dated 4 January 1948 but circulated to 
Cabinet on the 5 January,  for discussion at their meeting on 8 January, was entitled 
‘The First Aim of British Foreign Policy’.438  The Cabinet endorsed the policy outlined in 
his paper 439 but felt that too much emphasis should not be laid on its anti-Soviet 
aspect.  In reply Bevin was reported as saying: ‘it would be impossible for him to give 
an effective lead without being critical of Soviet policy, but it was his intention to 
concentrate mainly on the positive and constructive side of his proposals’. 
 
The second Memorandum to his Cabinet colleagues entitled ‘Policy in Germany’ (dated 
5 January but circulated to Cabinet on 6 January)440  set out the situation resulting 
from the breakdown of the Conference of Foreign Ministers.  Bevin explained that the 
breakdown had not been unexpected and that although he had, before the 
Conference, not abandoned hope that the issues around trying to reach agreement on 
German policy would be resolved, he now felt that the UK and Western powers had to 
consider urgently, but soberly, what their future policy in Germany should be in 
response to Russia’s intransigence. 
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The third memorandum, dated 5 January but also circulated on 6 January was entitled 
‘Review of Soviet Policy’.441 This paper was partly based upon Sir Maurice Peterson’s   
8 November Memorandum to Bevin.  The minutes of the Cabinet meeting on 8 January 
1948 are very important from the viewpoint of the Russia Committee.  Under Item 5, 
Bevin referred to the above Memoranda that Cabinet had before them.  They ‘took 
note’ and the Minutes record his saying: 
 
…although the recent Soviet attempts to stir up trouble in France and Italy had 
largely failed, some closer form of union should be created in Western Europe 
in order to resist the increasing penetration of Soviet influence.  It would have 
been premature to take action in this direction before the recent meeting of 
the Council of Foreign Minister, but the breakdown of that conference …had 
opened the way for an attempt to secure a greater measure of co-operation 
among the countries of Western Europe. 442  
 
Significantly, in Russia Committee terms, Bevin was also reported as saying: 
The most effective method of countering Soviet propaganda was to provide 
specific information refuting the misrepresentations made by the Soviet 
Government.  The Prime Minister’s recent broadcast illustrated how this could 
be combined with encouragement of Socialist principles’. ‘It might be desirable 
to establish some form of inter-departmental organisation, including the Board 
of Trade, the Colonial Office, and the Commonwealth Relations Office, to work 
out the basic principles of co-operations and advise on the line which 
propaganda should follow’.443 
 
So January 1948 saw a flurry of activity that was of direct relevance to the work of the 
Russia Committee and saw Bevin presenting to Cabinet the papers produced by the 
Committee and in so doing giving them his personal endorsement.  This provides clear 
evidence of the influence of the Russia committee over Bevin himself and over the 
Cabinet as a whole.  While they may have merely at that time ‘taken note’ of what was 
recommended it was an early indication of future changes in foreign policy towards 
the Soviets.   
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Shortly after this it was announced that Orme Sargent had asked Gladwyn Jebb to take 
over as Chairman of the Russia Committee in succession to Oliver Harvey.  No reason 
was given for this change but it was possible that Jebb, a high-profile and charismatic 
character, was thought more likely to drive forward Committee’s work following the 
approvals given by Cabinet on 8th January.  Jebb began his tenure with a minute to  
Orme Sargent,  in which Jebb said that ‘to his astonishment’  he had discovered, when 
chairing the Russia Committee for the first time that, with the exception of Kirkpatrick, 
none of the other Committee members,  despite their seniority, had seen the papers 
which had been circulated to the Cabinet  and therefore: “it was really not possible for 
[the Russia Committee] to function very intelligently”.444 He therefore proposed some 
special circulation rules to circumvent the problem of the stringent rules governing the 
circulation of Cabinet papers445 from preventing the efficient working of the Russia 
Committee.   
 
Later in January there was a debate in the House of Commons in which Bevin reported 
on the breakdown of the November Council of Foreign Ministers.446 The debate 
marked the public recognition (as opposed to official recognition to his Cabinet 
colleagues) on Bevin’s part that relations between Western Powers and the Soviet 
Union had seriously broken down and that actions, to counteract Soviet aggression 
were needed as had long been suggested by his Russia Committee Foreign Office 
officials.  His speech was a lengthy one where he painstakingly described the changes 
in relations since Potsdam onwards – after which, he said, ‘things had begun to go 
wrong’ -  and gave examples of what he described as the ‘war of nerves and pressure 
upon weaker neighbours’ exercised by the Soviets since the war.  He said that Mr 
Marshall’s proposals for a European Recovery Programme (ERP), which he saw as an 
opportunity for really trying to get Europe on its feet, had been the catalyst for further 
deterioration in relations between the West and the Soviets who could not accept the 
concept of the unity of Europe.  He re-iterated that Molotov had threatened both the 
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UK and France if they went on with the ERP and that it had been soon after that the 
Soviets had established the Cominform, the objective of which was to prevent the ERP 
from succeeding.  Bevin continued:   
The flood of abuse against ourselves and the world by M Vyshinski in New York 
was calculated to raise tempers…we still went on trying to get the conference on 
a proper basis as I reported to the House before the Recess.  Every day when 
there was a proposal discussed and an effort made to reach a practical 
conclusion we had to waste a whole day listening to abuse of the Western 
Powers.....I ask each one here to try to imagine what it is like to sit there hour 
after hour and to have thrown at one almost every invective of which one can 
think and not answer back…..Now we have to face a new situation…..the free 
nations of Western Europe must now draw closely together.447 
 
On Germany, Bevin stated: 
 
We stand for a united Germany, not a dismembered or divided Germany.  We 
have been in favour of a centralised German Government but not an over-
centralised German Government which in our view could be a danger to peace.... 
On the other hand, the Soviet Government are pressing for an over-centralised 
Government which we know could be used in the same way to develop a one-
party dictatorship as has been done in the Eastern European countries, and we 
cannot agree to it.448 
 
On how to meet the change in Soviet policy, Bevin said: 
Despite all the artificial barriers set up, and the propaganda blared out, which no 
doubt will increase after this Debate, we shall pursue a course which will seek to 
unite Europe.  If the present division of Europe continues, it will be by the act 
and the will of the Soviet Government…. However, we shall not be diverted, by 
threats, propaganda or fifth column methods….449 
 
The debate therefore finally put paid to any suggestion that Bevin remained 
unconvinced that action of some kind was needed to counter the Soviet offensive.  But 
more than that it was carefully planned as the best opportunity to set out for the 
Labour Party as a whole and, indeed, the British public, the full story of what had been 
happening in the deterioration of foreign relations with the Soviets since the end of 
the Second World War, despite every attempt on the part of the British, the US and 
France, to try to maintain good relations.  Repeatedly he had delayed taking decisions 
of a change in policy until ‘after the November Council’ which he clearly saw as the last 
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chance to effect reconciliation with the Soviets.  By waiting until after the Conference 
to report to the House of Commons and then by going into detail and using such 
unequivocal language, and importantly, by citing the fact that the United States and 
France had reached similar conclusions, Bevin was setting out the case for the change 
in foreign policy.   He may long have held the views expressed in the debate, and if so, 
it would have been a pragmatic policy decision on his part to hold back his public 
statements until he could demonstrate just how much he had tried to hold things 
together with the Soviets. 
In March, as an example of Bevin’s close interest in keeping abreast of Soviet activities, 
he asked Orme Sargent to get in touch with the Permanent Secretary of the Colonial 
Office450 to say that the Foreign Secretary was anxious to have periodical (fortnightly) 
surveys of Communist activities in countries outside the Soviet Union.451  The Colonial 
Office was asked to supply information about Communist activities in British overseas 
territories.  Later in March Bevin was being provided with a lengthy (17 page) paper by 
the Head of the Russian Secretariat at the British Embassy in Moscow,452 entitled “The 
Practice of Stalinism” 453 in which he says: 
2.  What emerges from the study with incontrovertible clarity is that Soviet policy 
is... directed towards the ultimate goal of bringing about world 
revolution…..During this desperate struggle for survival...the Soviet leaders were 
compelled to jettison, at least temporarily, many of the fundamental principles 
of Leninism both at home and in their relations with that part of the capitalistic 
world with which they were compelled to make common cause……………………… 
3.  The years 1946 and 1947 saw, in pursuance of this policy, the development of 
a ponderous propaganda campaign for the reconditioning of the Soviet peoples, 
who during the stress of war had been allowed to stray so far from the narrow 
path of Marxism-Leninism. …............................................................. 
5.  ...the Truman Doctrine...and the birth of the idea of Marshall Aid had given 
them a sense of urgency.  For, as the Kremlin was quick to appreciate, this latter 
idea if realised in practice, raised the possibility not only that the impending crisis 
of the capitalist world might be deferred, but that common action by the 
governments of the capitalist states might even lead to the long-term 
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stabilisation of the capitalist system. This no doubt accounts for the violence of 
the Soviet reaction to the European Recovery Programme. 454 
 
With Bevin by now fully signed up to the work of the Russia Committee it ploughed on 
with renewed vigour throughout the next few months which were dominated by the 
discussions on the format and production of various versions of a paper, entitled 
‘Summary of Indications Regarding Soviet Foreign Policy’, which had been 
commissioned by Bevin and designed to be regularly updated and circulated to all 
senior government Ministers including the Prime Minister.455 Somewhat bizarrely, this 
paper, over the period from April to September, went through no less than fifteen 
drafts because the Russia Committee was at pains to adopt a format of the summaries 
which would best suit the Foreign Secretary and they also needed to get the content 
right.  They debated, for example, whether the regular summaries should reflect a 
more detailed analysis of the Soviet press and radio.  All this took a lot of time but by 
version fourteen – dated 17 September – the Minister of State had at last pronounced 
himself fairly happy according to Jebb who reported that the Minister of State had 
said: “This is a reasonable paper and represents substantially my own thinking….We 
are now collecting stuff, but we must index it and have it available at every conference 
ready to pull out…Above all we must overcome our reluctance not to use a point more 
than once. If it is good we must learn to plug the theme”. 456 
 
The summer of 1948 saw the start of the Berlin Blockade457 which the Russia 
Committee discussed at length in their meetings on 24 June458   8 July 459 and 21 
July.460  They were told by Kirkpatrick on 24 June that currently there were sufficient 
food stocks in Berlin for 27 days and coal stocks for 40 days. The situation could only 
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be solved either by the Soviets relaxing their present restrictions or by bringing in food 
by air to Berlin.  Kirkpatrick outlined three possible courses:  to fly in sufficient 
foodstuffs for our troops and leave the people of Berlin to starve; to leave Berlin 
placing the onus on the Russians; or to tell the Russians they must be responsible for 
the feeding of Berlin. They concluded that the difficulties of keeping it going would 
increase over the winter months, particularly the transport of coal.   On 8 July the 
Cabinet discussed the progress of the Berlin Airlift with the Foreign Secretary reporting 
that the Governments of the United Kingdom, United States and France had now 
presented to the Soviet Government notes of protest against the Russian blockade of 
the western sectors of Berlin.  No reply had yet been received to these notes. 
Meanwhile, very satisfactory progress had been made with the arrangements for 
supplying Berlin by air.461 
 
From an organisational viewpoint the interesting period of the Russia Committee in 
1948 occurred at the tail end of the year when the membership and modus operandi 
of the Committee were subject to review at the highest level.  This was to be the first 
of two major reviews of the Committee during its twelve-year existence.  This first 
review began with a personal minute from Warner to Jebb dated 22 November462  in 
which Warner, at one point, lays claim to having set up the Russia Committee though 
later in the same paragraph he notes that Moley (ie Orme Sargent) had expressed the 
view that the Committee was needed.  In view of the importance of this minute it is 
reproduced more or less in full as follows: 
I have for some time wondered whether it is not a mistake for the Russia 
Committee to spend the bulk of its time looking through a long draft intelligence 
summary in great detail.  When the Committee was originally set up at my 
instance, the idea was that the political and economic Under-Secretaries should 
pool recent information regarding Russian doings affecting their various areas in 
order to get a collated picture and consider what action, political, economic or in 
the publicity sphere, should be taken as a result. I remember Moley saying that 
although he did not believe in a Joint Planning Committee for the whole work of 
the Office, he thought it would be valuable to have a Joint Planning Committee 
…for matters concerning the Russians…it made sense to try to assess their plans 
and make counter plans. 
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This started quite well, but afterwards failed because Oliver Harvey, who was 
Chairman and also ought to have spoken at each meeting on Germany and 
Western Europe, practically never turned up, and gradually other Under-
Secretaries dropped out too. 
 
I gather that during my absence a plan was instigated for reviving something of 
this kind by having a small sub-committee to consider specific problems thrown 
up by the Russians …but this will not work if the main Committee takes an hour 
or so considering the draft intelligence summary, as happened last time....….it 
would be much more valuable to revert to something like the original idea, 
making a great effort to get all the Under-Secretaries that matter to come or to 
send adequate substitutes if they cannot…….463 
 
In very smart order thereafter the proposed Sub-Committee of the Russia Committee 
was set up and the Terms of Reference were mapped out along with a set of 
objectives:   including to loosen the Soviet hold on the orbit countries and ultimately 
enable them to regain their independence; and to seize every opportunity of 
discrediting the Soviet regime or weaken its position.464   
 
The first meeting of the Sub-Committee took place on 14 December and began by re-
casting the terms of reference which had been set out by the main Committee on 25  
November.  Theywere as follows:  
Making the Soviet orbit so disaffected that in the event of war it would become 
a dangerous area requiring large armies of occupation, and not a source of 
useful manpower for Russia. 
Loosening the Soviet hold on the orbit countries, and ultimately enabling them 
to regain their independence. 
Seizing every opportunity of discrediting the Soviet regime or weakening its 
position within the frontiers of the Soviet Union. 
Frustrating the Soviet effort to build up the economic war potential of the 
Soviet Union and the satellites.465 
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These highly ambitious objectives, the sub-committee agreed, should attempt to be 
attained by “all means available short of war”.  They also decided that the mooted 
special planning organisation should remain an off-shoot of the Russia Committee 
from whom it should take its directives and to whom it should report;  that the 
Chairmanship should be a Foreign Office person of the rank of Under Secretary but 
with representatives from the MOD Chiefs of Staff, The Treasury, The BBC and the SIS.  
They should concentrate initially on Yugoslavia, Albania, the Soviet Zone of Germany 
and, possibly, China.  
 
However, all was not plain sailing with the Sub-Committee.  Clearly Jebb was having 
second thoughts about it and duly called an additional early meeting of the main 
Russia Committee466  to have a preliminary discussion on the report of the first Sub-
Committee which raised two problems.  First, whether the objectives as formulated 
should be recommended to the Foreign Secretary and, secondly, whether the planning 
organisation outlined by the Sub-Committee was the best means of attaining those 
objectives.  There was clearly, and understandably, concern over the objectives agreed 
at the 14 December meeting which were, one might even say absurdly, over 
ambitious.  Since Ministerial sanctioning would have been necessary for the work to go 
ahead, it would have been essential, if they were to be approved by Bevin, that each 
objective should be well articulated and the action to deliver it should be properly 
founded.  As to the second issue, there was general agreement to the proposal to 
create a small permanent Planning Section under the Foreign Office but with 
representatives from other government departments.  But there was unease as to 
whether it be appropriate for such an inter-departmental committee, even if under 
Foreign Office chairmanship, to be under the ambit/control of the Russia Committee 
and, if so, it seemed likely that the latter’s Terms of Reference would need recasting.  
After a lengthy discussion of the issues the Committee concluded that the Sub-
Committee should prepare:  a memorandum analysing the advantages of a policy of 
counter offensive against Soviet attacks; and a separate paper setting forth the views 
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of the Committee on the Planning Organisation which would be required if the 
counter-offensive policy were approved. 
 
The concerns felt by the Russia Committee about the Sub-Committee were well 
founded as was illustrated the following day when Orme Sargent called a meeting 
directly as a result of the meetings held on 24 November, 14 December and 16 
December concerning the proposals around the setting up of the Sub-Committee, its 
objectives and proposed planning machinery.467  He had summoned several of his 
most senior colleagues as well as the normal senior Russia Committee members468 and 
clearly wanted to take control of what was happening and to look at several questions. 
First, the need to consider the re-organisation of the Russia Committee itself, which 
perhaps he feared was in danger of over-reaching itself.  Secondly, the desirability of 
setting up another organisation for planning counter offensive policy. Thirdly, and 
somewhat oddly, to consider the question of what action should be taken to educate 
the Service departments in the methods and function of the Foreign Office. 
 
The meeting discussed whether the new Committee (which was meant to be a 
reconstructed Russia Committee) should be a purely Foreign Office body or should 
have, for example, a MOD Chiefs of Staff representative.  The thought was that, if it 
were decided to pursue a more offensive policy towards the Soviets, the Committee 
would need to draw on a wider pool.  Orme Sargent said that if Bevin were to agree to 
a more offensive policy, it might be necessary to set up an inter-departmental planning 
organisation, possibly an official Cabinet Committee, in co-operation with the Chiefs of 
Staff and others concerned.  He thought, however, that Bevin would not agree to an 
essentially foreign policy initiative being undertaken by, for example, the Defence 
Committee.  Summarising the discussion, Orme Sargent said that a Policy Committee 
would be useful and commissioned Jebb to prepare a paper containing Terms of 
Reference, taking account of renewed Terms of Reference of the Russia Committee.  
The sub-committee proposal was designed to deal with the criticisms levelled by 
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Warner and initially seemed like a good idea to Jebb but he, and Orme Sargent,  soon 
realised that the sub-committee’s proposed remit was too ambitious and impractical 
and the outcome was that the Russia Committee remained the central Soviet watching 
body for the time being and its membership was expanded to take in representatives 
from a wider pool from Whitehall and beyond.   
 
1948 had proved another eventful year for the Russia Committee with 27 meetings of 
the Main Committee but as the year drew to a close the Committee was under close 
scrutiny by the Permanent Under Secretary and with the prospect of imminent 
changes and with a question-mark over whether the work that was being done by the 
Committee might be more appropriately undertaken, by another body.  It was a time 
of uncertainty. 
 
Conclusion  
The end of 1948 saw the conclusion of the first phase of the Russia Committee’s work.  
Three years of solid commitment, at first weekly meetings, then fortnightly.  At first, 
no evidence to show that Ministers in general, or the Foreign Secretary in particular, 
were either aware of and/or committed to the existence of this body.  Then a period 
where Ministers were clearly aware of the Committee’s work but Ernest Bevin was 
careful not to publicly commit himself to agreement with the basic premise of the 
work of the Russia Committee, namely that action was needed to counter the hostile 
Soviet foreign policy.  By the end of 1947 there existed evidence of official acceptance 
of the situation.  So, the first phase of the Russia Committee’s work was one of shifting 
perceptions.  Merrick concludes that:  “During 1946 and 1947, as the east-west 
struggle surfaced, the Russia Committee had been at the very heart of the British 
appraisal of the Soviet threat” 469 Merrick also recognised the Russia Committee as 
having made a significant contribution towards convincing Bevin and Attlee, of the 
need carefully to monitor and do all it could to counter the propaganda of the Soviets.  
This assessment clearly has merit.  It is hard to conceive of a better placed group of 
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senior public servants with expertise in Soviet machinations, nor a better placed 
organisation to gather together the data needed to reach conclusions and on which to 
base their advice to Ministers.  Merrick’s work provided a valuable starting point for 
assessing the contributions of the Russia Committee but as it was restricted primarily 
to the years 1946 and to an extent 1947, whereas the work of the Committee had a 
long way to go beyond this period, it would have been impossible for him to make a 
comprehensive assessment of the affect of the Russia Committee’s work.  It continued 
in existence, still producing important policy papers, until the early 1950s.   However, 
as will be shown, its remit changed significantly as other Committees came into 
existence in later years.   
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Chapter 6  Phase II of Russia Committee work  1949  to  1952 
 
From 1949 through to mid-1952, here described as the middle phase of the Russia 
Committee‘s existence, it continued to meet regularly and to produce policy advice to 
Ministers.  But it has to be recognized that this period saw the diminishing of the 
position of the Committee in that it was no longer fulfilling a unique advisory role   
because this period saw the arrival on the scene of other official bodies covering some 
of the same ground.470  Nevertheless, it would not be accurate to write off this whole 
period as being an unimportant phase, for two main reasons.  First, it was during this 
period that the ‘Crystal Gazers’ - which are explained hereafter - came into their own 
and were the main regular output of the Committee;  and, secondly, it was a period 
which saw commissions from Bevin and Attlee for advice from the Committee on 
specific topics, requests they assuredly would not have made if they saw no value in 
the Committee’s advice.   
 
This almost four-year span saw many significant developments in the Cold War that 
occupied the statesmen in all the countries which it impacted. The development of 
atomic bomb by the Unites States was followed by that of the Soviet Union and, later – 
towards the end of 1952 – by Great Britain and ushered in one of the great challenges 
of Cold War statecraft, that of seeking to avoid another war, which would have 
catastrophic global consequences.  A key element of the strategy to avoid war was the 
need to make judgements on what your opponents were likely to do in a given set of 
circumstances.  To do that effectively what was needed was the gathering of up to 
date information which would be analysed and turned into advice to decision makers 
by those with expertise in the subjects in hand.  In a nutshell this is what the Foreign 
Office’s Russia Committee was all about.  It was not just relations with the Soviets that 
were difficult at this time. Relations between the United States and Great Britain were 
also under strain in the context of the development of nuclear weapons.  The British 
nuclear physicist Klaus Fuchs was found guilty in March 1950 for passing nuclear 
secrets to the Soviets, which contributed to the United States decision not to 
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collaborate further with Britain on nuclear matters.  The Communist Peoples’ 
Government of China, established in October 1949, also joined the nuclear race by the 
end of the 1950s.  1950 also saw the invasion of South Korea by North Korea which 
brought the United States and Great Britain, and the recently formed United Nations, 
into the conflict with China and, by association, as they were thought to have colluded 
with China, into further conflict with the Soviets.  These and many other international 
concerns, arising through the tensions between East and West, tested the political 
leaders of the states concerned.  For the leaders of the two Attlee administrations, and 
for Bevin in particular, these issues occupied a good deal of the time of this highly 
pressured person, neatly summed up in a House of Commons debate471 by him, as 
quoted by Bulloch:  “All the world is in trouble and I have to deal with all the troubles 
at once”.472  
Against the background of such troubled times, the Foreign Office in general, and the 
Russia Committee in particular, continued to gather information on the perceived 
threats posed by the Soviets and to provide the advice to Ministers which was 
reflected in the papers and other outputs from the Committee during this period.  The 
next Chapter will look at three of the themes on which the Russia Committee focused 
its attentions in these years - namely the development of atomic weapons; the 
growing concerns about Chinese Communism; and Titoism.  This chapter, however, 
continues to focus more on the actual development, and preoccupations, of the Russia 
Committee itself.   These included the changes to its structure and the regular 
engagement with Bevin and Attlee.  There are also glimpses from the Committee’s 
papers of the shifts in relations between the UK and the US over certain issues, for 
example over China.  These issues are examined as a means of shedding light on how 
the Russia Committee influenced foreign policy decisions during this period. 
Changes to the Russia Committee 
At the beginning, and again at the end, of the second phase of the Russia Committee’s 
existence it was subject to two reviews.  The first of these took place during December 
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1948/January 1949.  It resulted in the expansion in the membership of the Committee 
to include other Departments of State, a change which had by its nature to enhance 
the reach of the work of the Committee.  On 13 January 1949, Orme Sargent wrote to 
the Head of the Commonwealth Relations Office (CRO)473 and the Head of the Colonial 
Office (CO)474, with Bevin’s agreement, inviting them to send representatives to Russia 
Committee meetings.  In his minute, Orme Sargent says: 
You may be aware that there exists in the Foreign Office a Russia Committee 
with Terms of Reference as shown in the enclosed Annex to this letter.  This 
Committee meets once a fortnight under the Chairmanship of one of the Deputy 
Under-Secretaries, and is at present attended by senior officials of the Foreign 
Office and by representatives of the Chiefs of Staff and of the Overseas Service of 
the BBC.  It has occurred to us that you might find it useful to send a 
representative of your Department to the meetings of this Committee, and the 
Foreign Secretary has agreed to my inviting you to do so ….475 
 
Whilst Orme Sargent did not mention them specifically, the Russia Committee had 
also, long since, been keeping in close contact with the JIC by virtue of there being a JIC 
representative attending Russia Committee meetings and by the exchange of papers 
produced by both Committees.   This was a natural alliance in that the JIC was the 
central British official committee that liaised with all the intelligence agencies and with 
the Foreign Office whose Secretary of State was responsible for three of those key 
Agencies476 while its remit was to look at all intelligence issues relating to any area of 
the world,  it naturally had an interest in intelligence relating to Communist 
expansionism.   The CRO and the CO accepted the invitation to join the Committee.  
So, by the beginning of this second phase of its existence, the Russia Committee, while 
remaining a Foreign Office run and dominated body, included members from the 
Cabinet Office (JIC), the MOD (Chiefs of Staff), the CRO, and the CO.  Its main task 
remained: “To review at fortnightly intervals the development of all aspects of Soviet 
policy and propaganda and Soviet activities throughout the world, more particularly 
with reference to the Soviet campaign against this country......  to consider any 
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immediate action that might be required as a result of the Committee’s review, and to 
make recommendations accordingly”.477 
 
Under the Chairmanship of Gladwyn Jebb not only was the status of the Russia 
Committee enhanced in terms of its extended membership but also its workings 
became more crisply and more formally organised.   Meetings now began by 
considering and agreeing the minutes of the previous meeting – a normal, and formal, 
way of running any such committee, though not one reflected in the Minutes of earlier 
Russia Committee meetings.  Moreover, the meetings did not always follow the 
hitherto standard pattern whereby they considered papers on various topics within 
their sphere of interest.  Sometimes they were given over entirely to discussing one 
specific issue.  But the question remains whether the Committee, for all its changes 
and enhanced status, could be said to have influenced the decisions made by British 
Ministers on foreign policy towards the Soviets and, if so, how much influence they 
had.  Elsby makes a pertinent observation on this issue when he argues that: “The FO’s 
influence on foreign policy derives from its function of interpretation of incoming 
information germane to foreign policy and of giving advice to the Foreign 
Secretary”.478  If that observation holds true then it is difficult not to see the Russia 
Committee, for so long the unique body dedicated to gathering and interpreting 
information about Soviet activities, as having such influence and value.  Clearly the 
Committee itself believed it had a value, as the minutes of a special meeting in 
December 1949 record:  “Even if such a committee479 were not useful in itself, it could 
deprive the Chiefs of Staff of their argument that there was no body in the Foreign 
Office for considering and coordinating long-term policy”.480  
At the end of the end of the second phase of the Russia Committee’s existence, Jebb 
was succeeded as Chairman by the equally senior Pierson Dixon and just had Jebb had 
done before him, Dixon began his tenure by taking another close and critical look at 
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the organisation he had inherited and so began the second major overhaul of the 
Russia Committee.  As a result, at the end of February 1952, the Secretariat of the 
Committee produced a draft paper making proposals for re-organisation481 and these 
were put to Pierson Dixon, under a manuscript covering note: “If you agree that the 
Russia Ctee needs rejuvenating, I think that the attached paper by Mr. Bushell provides 
a very useful basis for discussion …”.482 Pierson Dixon responded saying:   “I have been 
feeling for some time that the Russia Committee needs a “new look”, & I asked Mr. 
Bushell to consider the matter.  His proposals are much to the point & I agree that they 
shd be circulated & considered at a small meeting as proposed by Mr.Harrison.  PD”.483 
The proposed meeting took place a fortnight later.  The suggestions were considered 
and agreed by the Committee members and the Permanent Under Secretary. 
However, nothing further happened on this front for a further six months when the 
Chairmanship changed again, this time from Pierson Dixon to Frank Roberts who wrote 
to William Strang, by then the PUS, on 9 December 1952, in the following terms: 
About six months ago Sir P Dixon obtained your approval to certain measures of 
re-organisation of the Russia Committee.  They have now been tested and the 
Committee agreed at its last meeting that the time had come to put them on 
formal record. 
2. I accordingly submit a draft office circular on the work of the Committee 
..…The main changes are in respect of meetings and membership, both of which 
have been cut down, and in the scope of the Committee’s work which now 
includes China.  You will notice that the definition of the scope of our monthly 
survey has been amended to cover this last point:  and, similarly, as a 
consequence, the terms of reference. 
3. We thought it right in present circumstances to omit the sentence on liaison 
with the Chiefs of Staff and JIC, from the new terms of reference, since this is 
now the work of the PUS Department484 in the first instancen…. 
 4. Although the title is no longer accurate, there was general agreement that it 
should not be changed. 
I should be grateful for your approval for the issue of the new circular.485  
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The text of the Office Circular486 sets out the revised terms of reference of the Russia  
Committee and changes of the frequency of meetings to monthly whereas they had  
originally been weekly and then fortnightly.  The circular makes clear that the main  
output of the Committee was to be its monthly reports to Ministers.487   It also  
states that the Russia Committee was to report to the PUS on any issues of importance  
and to work closely with the PUSC with whom they would share secretariats.  
 
The Russia Committee therefore began, and ended, the second phase of its existence, 
from 1949 to 1952, by undergoing re-organisations.  But they were different in scale 
and importance.  The earlier overhaul was driven by the need to improve 
administrative arrangements.  The second, more far reaching changes, were driven by 
two main factors.  The first was the changing international situation and, in particular, 
the emergence of China as a force to be reckoned with. The second was undoubtedly 
the fact that by 1952 other more senior vehicles existed to continue the work 
previously done by the Russia Committee, most notably the Permanent Under 
Secretary’s Department (PUSD) and this signaled the start of the diminishing of the 
Russia Committee’s importance. 
The Russia Committee ‘Crystal Gazers’ 
In March 1948 Ernest Bevin had told Orme Sargent that he was anxious to receive, 
from the Russia Committee,  reports giving fortnightly surveys of Communist activities 
in countries outside the Soviet Union including Communist activities in British overseas 
territories.488 These were entitled  ‘Summaries of Indications Regarding Soviet Foreign 
Policy’ but  subsequently became known colloquially  as ‘Crystal Gazers’.  For several 
months thereafter, as noted in Chapter 5, the format and content of the ‘Crystal 
Gazers’ went through numerous iterations before finally being agreed.   
 ‘Crystal Gazers’ became, in effect, the mainstay of the work of the Russia Committee 
throughout the whole of the second phase of the Committee’s existence.  Until 
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November 1948 they were only distributed within the UK and were always classified 
both “Top Secret” and “Personal”.   They were sent every fortnight to the Prime 
Minister, the Foreign Secretary, other senior Ministers and, no less, to His Majesty the 
King.  Eventually they were to stale in their impact as can often happen when 
something is produced regularly in a standard format.   Indeed, Jebb, when he became 
Chairman  criticized the length of the ‘general’ section of the summaries and 
suggesting that they should only include points of major interest and detail and should 
be included under the country concerned and that they should be: “… less of an 
intelligence summary and more of ‘an inspired guess’.489  
These constructive criticisms were aimed at improving the Crystal Gazers, there being 
no suggestion on Jebb’s part that they should cease all together or had outlived their 
usefulness.  Indeed, as they had originally been commissioned by Bevin it would not 
have been for Jebb to decide to abandon them.  Nearly a year later, and under a 
different Chairman, further criticism was leveled at the Crystal Gazers when Pierson 
Dixon described them as being: “too long.  It should be compressed more in the form 
of an intelligence summary, to bring out points of importance which were otherwise 
obscured by the somewhat conversational style”.490  
 
But the most fundamental formal change in the fortnightly ‘Crystal Gazers’ was to 
occur from January 1951 onwards, following the North Korean invasion of South Korea 
in June 1950, which resulted in the expansion of the coverage of the Russia Committee 
to include gathering information relating to Chinese Communism.  In January 1951,  
Pierson Dixon, wrote to His Majesty’s Ambassador to Singapore,491 explaining that he 
had recently taken over the Russia Committee chairmanship and that, at their 
fortnightly meetings, they approved the regular ‘Summary of Indications’ papers 
(colloquially known as the “Crystal Gazer”).492 He explained that these papers were 
sent out under very tight security arrangements to the King, the Prime Minister and 
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the Foreign Secretary and a very few other senior people.  He explained that until 
recently they had been concerned only with Soviet Policy but that, given recent events 
in the Far East, their papers had begun to focus also on China.  It had therefore been 
decided that in future the papers would be in two sections with a short summary 
covering both parts.   Pierson Dixon therefore proposed to include the Ambassador in 
the recipients list and to ask him to contribute/comment as necessary in relation to 
issues concerning the Far East, and to treat the papers with special care given their 
sensitivity and to make sure that his copies would be destroyed after three months.  
He agreed and consequently the first example of the new format of the ‘Summary of 
Indications/Crystal Gazer’ fortnightly papers was circulated on 23 January 1951.493   
Further Engagement of Ministers with the Russia Committee  
While the ‘Crystal Gazers’ were the Russia Committee’s main regular output for 
Ministers, there were plenty of other examples of commissions from Bevin or Attlee 
over this period.  One example was Ernest Bevin’s request that the Russia Committee 
be asked for: “a considered appreciation of the probable results of the creation by the 
Soviet Government of a Council for Economic Mutual Assistance with reference to the 
following:  whether the formation of the new body…likely to lead to the gradual 
disappearance of the Cominform...... whether the new step was likely to mean a 
genuine lessening of international tension or not?” 494  
The Russia Committee summarised and sent their advice to Bevin, their main 
conclusions being that there was no evidence that Cominform was about to disappear; 
that the main difference between the two bodies was that the new Council 
represented governments whereas the Cominform was an organisation of Communist 
Party representatives; and the creation of the new Council might lead the satellites to 
adopt a tougher attitude in their trade negotiations with the West. 
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In April 1949495 Attlee and Bevin commissioned the Russia Committee to produce a 
paper on Soviet industrial potential.  The paper in its draft form mostly concerned the 
Soviet economy and the estimated Soviet expenditure on armaments over which there 
was some dispute about the accuracy. It was largely agreed that the strength of the 
Soviet Union lay in its numerous front-line soldiers in Germany and was not dependent 
on basic economic factors. The figures in the paper showed that the Soviet standard of 
living was supporting an increasing productivity and also provided a higher food 
standard than West Germany.  The paper went in mid-May to both Attlee and Bevin  
who suggested that it should be circulated to Cabinet once any comments from the 
MOD had been sought and taken on board.  This must be seen as further evidence that 
Attlee and Bevin valued the advice of the Russia Committee.  The MOD, perhaps 
because they saw the aspect of the paper which dealt with armament expenditure as 
trespassing on their military policy interests, said that they wished to circulate a 
parallel paper giving the latest estimates of Russian armament production.  But this 
was deemed unnecessary since the original version had already been amended in 
accordance with comments from the JIC – conceivably because the JIC representative 
on the Russia Committee had already passed on MOD comments to the Committee 
secretariat.   The Committee agreed that the revised paper should be sent to Bevin 
under a covering minute making this clear. Another example, perhaps, of the tensions 
sometimes underlying the relationship between the MOD and the Foreign Office.  
 
In February 1950 Attlee’s government was returned to power following a General 
Election but the Labour Party’s overall majority was reduced to five.   From the Russia 
Committee point of view nothing much changed at this juncture and their regular 
meetings and their production of papers for Ministers continued as before.  In May 
1950 the Committee discussed a paper entitled “Western Measures to Contain Soviet 
Communism” by the Foreign Office’s Northern Department and which had been 
commissioned by Bevin. Jebb thought that the paper was:  “well written and contained 
useful material”496 but despite this praise he thought it “too long for busy Ministers to 
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have to read”.497 As he would have been well aware, there is always pressure on 
officials to keep papers for Ministers as brief as the information to be conveyed allows.  
There are always many calls upon the time of Ministers and Bevin, in particular, had a 
huge portfolio to manage.   In the event, a further, shorter, version was produced and 
discussed in July and was then sent to the Cabinet.498   
There were other commissions to the Russia Committee directly from Bevin but these 
few serve as examples of the fact that the Committee was taken seriously at the top 
most levels of the UK government as a resource for information and considered advice 
that would help Ministers to form their policy decisions on the areas under scrutiny.  
Once again it raises the question of the influence of the Committee on policy decisions 
and, as Bulloch points out: “Bevin had to rely on the information and the appreciation 
of that information supplied by the Foreign Office”.499  
The second phase of the Russia Committee’s existence was clearly one which was set 
against a good deal of change in the relations between the Western allies and the 
Communist world and, indeed, between the Soviet Communist world and that of the 
Soviet Satellites and of the Chinese and other Asian Communists.  Stalin had concerns 
in Europe, notably over the need to prevent the re-armament of Germany and the 
wish to nip in the bud the spread of Titoism both within Yugoslavia and outward to the 
other Satellites.  Stalin’s volatile personality would not have helped to reduce the 
tensions in the relations between the West and the Soviets but it did have its ups as 
well as its downs.  An example being in October 1951 when the Russia Committee 
discussed a paper by the Northern Department entitled “Possible Conciliatory moves 
by the Soviet Government”500 which outlined many, mostly fairly insignificant, 
indications of a softening of Soviet attitudes towards the West.  These included such 
things as the Soviets appointing more Western friendly Ambassadors to key Western 
postings; the showing of greater affability towards Western counterparts at official 
gatherings; and even the fact that they had permitted the outgoing British Ambassador 
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in Moscow,501 to have access to places he had hitherto been denied.  But these rather 
feeble ‘green shoots’ were short lived, and by November 1951 the Russia Committee 
was noting that there had been a swift return to the truculence formerly 
demonstrated by the Soviets. 
There were also ebbs and flows in the relationship between the UK and the US, though 
arguably of less far reaching consequences but, nevertheless the closeness of the 
alliance seemed diminished, with the US acting more independently over, for example, 
Korea. Throughout the period, though, the Russia Committee maintained its role of 
information gathering and the disseminating of information and advice to those at the 
heart of the British Government.   
One major change which occurred towards the end of the second phase of the Russia 
Committee’s life-span was the loss of the Foreign Office’s highly esteemed political 
supremo.  In March 1951 Ernest Bevin resigned when his ill health reached the point of 
his no longer being able to carry out his punishing work schedule.  This was swiftly 
followed, on 14 April 1951, by his death.  He had been, by any accounts, a towering 
figure as Foreign Secretary and a major player in both the post-war Attlee 
governments and in the war-time coalition government.  As Alexander Cadogan, in his 
diaries, said of Bevin: “He was the heavyweight of the Cabinet and will get his own way 
with them”.502  
Elsby  gives another example of how Bevin was fully master of his Foreign Policy brief 
and not having to worry about keeping in step with the wishes of No 10 when he 
quotes another senior diplomat, Oliver Harvey,  as saying: “…we hear nothing of No 10 
these days, none of those Ministers going back and forward…..We have a Foreign 
Secretary who is master in his own house”503 
The loss to the Foreign Office was felt not just because of Bevin’s stature as an 
outstanding statesman and Foreign Secretary but because, on a personal level, he was 
revered, even loved, throughout the Foreign Office as revealed by the circumstances of 
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his farewell party.  Bevin’s biographers, notably Bulloch and Williams, give accounts of 
the touching farewell party given to Bevin on his resignation as Foreign Secretary.  But 
perhaps the most intimate of the accounts was by Sir Roderick Barclay who was 
Bevin’s PPS at the time of his departure and who, therefore, unlike Bulloch or Williams, 
had both a Foreign Office official’s perspective and contemporary first-hand 
experience, when he wrote: “It had been agreed, in view of the affection and esteem 
in which he was held throughout the Foreign Service, that we should join together to 
give him a seventieth birthday present, and though the suggested contribution was (if I 
remember right) only two shillings 504we had no difficulty in collecting a considerable 
sum of money.” 505 
Nor was it just the UK diplomats who had placed such a high value on their Foreign 
Secretary.  On the world stage he was recognized as being a great statesman.  Truman, 
for example, credited Bevin with being the leading force behind the Marshall Plan and 
the setting up of NATO.506  
So, Ernest Bevin, who had worked himself into the ground and, perhaps against all 
likelihoods, had become one of the most respected, ever, Foreign Secretaries by his 
officials, relinquished the job - unwillingly but resignedly, as he knew his health would 
not permit him to carry on much longer.   To his chagrin, he was succeeded by Herbert 
Morrison whom Bevin much disliked and who, in the remaining six months of the 
Attlee government, did not cover himself in glory in the post.   Indeed, as Barclay said 
of his six months as Foreign Secretary:  “This relatively short period amply sufficed to 
show up his inadequacy for the job”.507  In his defence, before Morrison could settle 
into his new job he was required, in April 1951, as Deputy Prime Minister, to assume 
the government’s helm as Attlee went into hospital to have treatment for a duodenal 
ulcer, and he was: “faced with the biggest internal political crisis of this Labour 
government”508 namely, the controversial scheme to impose charges for the supply of 
false teeth and spectacles under the National Health Service and which resulted in the 
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resignation of Aneurin Bevan,  Harold Wilson and John Freeman.  Once the dust had 
settled on that crisis Morrison was able to concentrate more on his Foreign Secretary-
ship but one problem followed another in quick succession.  Perhaps the most notable 
of which was the spy scandal of Burgess and Maclean which “was a hammer blow to 
Morrison”.509  He, of course, cannot have been responsible for the circumstances that 
led to their defections but his handling of the situation, in common with his handling of 
other crises, was poor, and he faced criticism in the Press and in the House of 
Commons for these shortcomings.  Morrison became increasingly unhappy and 
disillusioned with his job.  He was irritated with his inability to produce a concrete 
solution to any of the problems on his desk.  At one point he told an American 
journalist:510  “Foreign Policy would be okay except for the bloody foreigners”.511 
Morrison’s unhappy tenure in the post lasted until the General Election in October 
1951 which returned Churchill to No 10 and found Anthony Eden back in the post of 
Foreign Secretary.  With Eden back in charge it might perhaps have been hoped that 
there would have been a revival in the stature of the Russia Committee but this was 
not to be.  In his memoirs, Lord Gladwyn512 said that: “Bevin took much interest in [the 
Russian Committee] but I believe that when Eden returned to the office in 1951 it 
rather faded out”. 513  
So, the second phase of the Russia Committee’s existence saw three quite different 
Foreign Secretaries but this considerable churn in political leaders was different from 
the situation with regard to the officials.  While the period also saw three different 
Chairman of the Russia Committee, all three were diplomats with long experience and 
deep expertise in the subject matter and they, and the other experts on the 
Committee, provided continuity and stability as the Russia Committee continued its 
work through the changes and upheavals.  
From the end of 1949 through to the end of 1952 the Russia Committee continued to 
operate on a consistent and regular basis, usually meeting on a fortnightly basis.  They 
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met a total of 24 times during 1949; a total of 27 times in 1950; in 1951 they met on 16 
occasions before the October General Election and a further 3 times from October 
through to the end of 1951; and they met on 11 times during 1952. Clearly then, by the 
end of 1952 there was a significant falling off in the frequency of the meetings and the 
Committee may, indeed, have started to ‘fade away’.  But for the time being – and for 
a further five years - it continued to exist.  And while there remains a question mark 
over the extent of the influence of the Committee’s work, what can be said is that this 
middle phase of its existence resulted in the production of more papers and regular 
reports that were seen by those in Government who made the policy decisions.  That 
may not be much of a claim to make for a such a high-level body which invested 
considerable time and resources into its work, and the claim might be to 
underestimate the Committee’s contribution.  It is neither possible to prove the extent 
of the Committee’s influence, nor to disprove it. 
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Chapter 7  Foreign Policy Highlights for the Attlee Administrations 
Previous chapters have focused on the detail of the Russia Committee’s work from 
1946 through to 1952 which largely coincided with the span of time of the two post-
war Attlee administrations and the period of Ernest Bevin’s tenure as Foreign 
Secretary.  This chapter aims to look in the wider context at a few of the issues of 
statecraft that dominated the work of the Attlee government government as the 
international scene was in a state of churn following the end of the War.  Many such  
foreign policy issues were discussed by the Russia Committee and the three selected 
are:  the development of the atomic bomb;  the  development of non-Soviet 
Communism in the Soviet Satellite country of Yugoslavia and the emergence of  
Titoism;  and  the changes in international relationships in the Far East brought about 
by the establishment of Mao Tse-Tung’s People’s Republic of China in 1949 followed 
by the Korean ‘war’ which began in 1950. 
Dictionary definitions of the term ‘Statecraft’514 vary marginally but are essentially 
variations of ‘the art of conducting state affairs’ and therefore are bound up with how 
a state is managed both internally and externally.  Externally, or intra-nationally, 
statecraft is about formulating and putting into effect foreign, military and security 
policy and: “…concerns the whole range of risks and opportunities which far-sighted 
statesmen must appreciate and evaluate in the conduct of his craft”. 515   
When Attlee became Prime Minister in July 1945 and immediately appointed Bevin 
Foreign Secretary they faced numerous issues domestically and internationally. Bevin’s 
primary focus was, naturally, on developing foreign policy across a considerable range 
of post-war international issues, though with his Trade Union and wartime coalition 
Minister of Supply experience he was also influential on domestic economic issues.    
Quite apart from the many domestic issues with which, as a senior member of the 
Cabinet, he was concerned (including housing, employment, food shortages) his own 
portfolio was formidable and included:  formulating policy on Britain’s response to the 
                                                     
514 The Oxford English dictionary definition, for example, is ‘The skillful management of state affairs’; 
Collins English dictionary definition is ‘The art of conducting public affairs’. 
515 Thatcher, Margaret.  Statecraft:  Strategies for a Changing World.  Published Harper Collins, 2003. 
Introduction, Page xix.  
157 
 
US development of the atom bomb;  maintaining British influence on the world stage;  
working with former allies on settling issues outstanding at the end of the war, issues 
on borders, on reparations, on Germany; on Palestine and the setting up of the State 
of Israel;  on responding to the calls from parts of the British Empire for independence.  
As the months and years went on the statecraft issues were constantly changing and 
shifting as relations with former allies altered; and not just as the Cold War began with 
the West harbouring suspicions towards the Soviet Union’s intentions but also over 
changing relations with the United States.  During these years foreign policy had to 
keep pace with the changing circumstances and while Bevin and his Foreign Office 
Ministerial team made decisions on foreign policy, they were advised on all the issues 
that demanded their attention by the numerous expert diplomats from within the 
Foreign Office and through the offices of such expert advisory bodies as the Russia 
Committee.   
Atomic Race 
Bulloch describes the “...issues around the atomic bomb as the most difficult for any 
government to handle”516 and this was one of the first issues confronting Attlee and 
Bevin at the start of the Labour administration.  Despite their close relationship with 
Churchill through their senior roles in the wartime coalition government, neither 
Attlee nor Bevin had been informed by Churchill of the ‘Tube Alloys’ project517 which 
must have come as quite a shock.  In his first speech to the House of Commons as 
Foreign Secretary, on 20 August 1945, Bevin spoke of the need to formulate policy on 
this issue when he said:  “War is not caused by the intervention of weapons.  It is 
policy that makes war...the intention to go to war....I am perfectly certain that the late 
Lord Rutherford had no idea at all...It is we in the form and control of our policy, who 
misdirect the results of scientific research”. 518 
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Formulation of British policy during the following six years of Attlee’s governments was 
largely in the hands of those half a dozen Ministers519 who formed the membership of 
the ad hoc Cabinet Committee known as General 75, but “Attlee and Bevin together 
played a greater role than any other Ministers in shaping British atomic policy”.520 
 
In May 1947 the Chiefs of Staff of the Ministry of Defence produced a major, and 
deeply gloomy, report on future defence policy spelling out what they saw as the 
serious threat from Soviet territorial and ideological expansionism and foresaw the 
inevitability and imminence of their acquiring nuclear weapons.  The report argued 
that the only means of preventing the Russians from using such weapons against the 
West was by: “...facing her with the threat of large scale damage from similar weapons 
if she should employ them....we believe that the knowledge that we possessed 
weapons of mass destruction and were prepared to use them would be a most 
effective deterrent to war itself”.521 
 
As Hennessy says:  “The nuclear factor was central throughout the Cold War”522  and 
was a high priority in the immediate aftermath as both the US and the Soviets 
continued to develop their capabilities.  He also says that: “the Cold War, like no 
conflict before or since, was soaked in the nuclear factor in a manner that everyone, 
expert or inexpert, could understand.  If it had come to it, and the nuclear taboo which 
had held since the atomic bomb fell on Nagasaki on 9 August 1945 was broken,  the 
world, or at least what was left of it if the East and West had unleashed their arsenals 
against each other, would have been transformed for ever”.523 
 
Attlee, like his predecessor Churchill, had a strong interest in the concept of nuclear 
deterrence and a firm belief that Britain needed to have its own nuclear capability for 
the purpose of such deterrence.  In August 1945, having been elected as Prime 
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Minister the previous month, Attlee wrote: “It is difficult for people to adjust their 
minds to an entirely new situation….Even the modern conception of war to which in 
my lifetime we have become accustomed is now completely out of date…it would 
appear that the provision of bomb-proof basements in factories and offices and the 
retention of ARP [Air Raid Precautions] and Fire Services is just futile waste…The 
answer to an atomic bomb on London is an atomic bomb on another great city”.524 
 
Bevin took the same view.  The British had been closely involved in the US 
development of their nuclear capability through the close participation of British 
scientists but this was brought to an abrupt end by the US Congress passing the 
McMahon Act in August 1946 which prohibited the transfer of classified atomic energy 
information to all foreign countries, including Britain.  For a country that had worked 
so closely with the US on this and all intelligence issues for a long time this was a blow 
to Britain and to her ‘special relationship’ with the US.  It was apparent by late 1946 
that “if the United Kingdom was eventually to develop and produce its own stockpile 
of nuclear weapons it would have to do so alone”.525  And it was the severing of co-
operation with her former close ally that acted as a catalyst for Britain to decide to 
develop its own deterrent.  She had the expertise through her knowledge of “the 
science of the bomb”526 but was not rich in resources or the industrial know-how of 
the US and so hard decisions had to be taken by the British Government as to whether 
to allocate scarce resources to such a costly venture.  Hennessy describes a Cabinet 
Committee discussion, in the Autumn of 1949, about whether to agree to fund the 
building of a £30 to £40 million gaseous diffusion plant for the production of uranium, 
where the ‘sparse minutes’ record, first, the line put forward by Dalton and Cripps:527 
“In discussion it was urged that we must consider seriously whether we could afford to 
divert from civilian consumption and the restoration of our balance of payments the 
economic resources required for a project of this scale.  Unless present trends were 
reversed we might find ourselves faced with an extremely serious economic and 
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financial situation in two to three years time.”528  and then the counter argument put 
up by Bevin, which won the day:  “.. we could not be left behind in a field that was of 
such revolutionary Importance from an industrial, no less than from a military point of 
view.  Our prestige in the world, as well as our chances of securing American co-
operation would both suffer if we did not exploit to the full a discovery in which we 
had played a leading part at the outset”. 529 
As Blackwell puts it:  “The possession or control of atomic weapons had become the 
sine qua non of great power status and real independence in the post war world”.530  
Bevin, According to Sir Michael Perrin, who had attended the GEN 75 meeting as a 
representative of the Ministry of Supply, Bevin - in response to a line taken by  Dalton 
and Cripps said: “No, Prime Minister, that won’t do at all.  We’ve got to have this.  I 
don’t mind for myself, but I don’t want any other Foreign Secretary of this country to 
be talked at, or to, by the Secretary of State in the United States as I just have in my 
discussions with Mr Byrnes. We’ve got to have this thing over here, whatever it costs.  
We’ve got to have the bloody Union Jack on top of it”.531 
 
So it was that by the time the Korean ‘War’ started in 1950, the United States had 
“been piling up nuclear weapons for over five years”532 and the Soviets had detonated 
their first atom bomb a year earlier.   Britain was lagging behind in terms of producing 
their own nuclear capability, but was catching up fast.  The policy decision to ‘go it 
alone’ in developing a British nuclear deterrent was one of the most far reaching policy 
decisions of the early Cold War and it was brought about largely as a result of the 
tensions and rivalries between the former Western and Eastern War time allies   
 
Given that the atomic race was such a dominating issue in the early Cold War and was 
a central plank in the opposing camps of the West and the Soviets, the Foreign Office’s 
Russia Committee might have been expected to be closely involved in advising 
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Ministers on the subject.  However, it was not a major preoccupation for the 
Committee.  That is not to say that they did not discuss the issue, and it certainly 
featured in their fortnightly ‘Crystal Gazers’ and there are examples of when they 
discussed papers on the subject produced by others.533  But, as Goodman534 makes 
clear, it was the Russia Committee’s closely connected fellow Whitehall Committee - 
the JIC - that was the main generator of such papers and of advice to Ministers on the 
subject.  As there had been a JIC representative as a Member of the Russia Committee 
since its inception this constituted a clear and important link between the two bodies.  
In a sense, the JIC was primarily a creature of the COS whereas the Russia Committee 
was the Foreign Office’s.  This is in no way surprising.  The Russia Committee was best 
placed to acquire information on policy issues behind foreign policy decisions whereas 
the information required about nuclear capabilities was of a more technical nature and 
related more to intelligence and to the Soviets military capabilities and was more 
within the MOD’s bailiwick.   
Titoism 
Marshall Josip Broz Tito had been in complete control of Yugoslavia since mid-1945, 
and largely so before that, and he was a formidable personality.535  As Lawrence 
Freedman puts it, having become President of Yugoslavia after leading his partisan 
forces as they “hounded the Germans out of his country” he “had no intention of being 
dictated to by Stalin”.536  Equally Stalin was wary of other Communist leaders who 
were independent from Soviet Communism.  Stalin had formed the Cominform, 
according to Deutscher:   “..in order to recentralise and rediscipline the Communist 
parties”537 in the satellite countries but no sooner had he  done so than the Yugoslav 
members of the new organisation, and Tito in particular, challenged his authority. 
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There had been no more “dogmatic and fanatical”538 supporter of Stalin than Tito in 
the years up to 1948 but: “…the years of armed revolutionary struggle in his own 
country had transformed the puppet into a man and leader.  Stalin sensed the change, 
and grew suspicious”.539    
The tensions between Stalin and Tito grew as the Soviets “set out to plan the economic 
development of their satellites to meet not only internal but also Soviet needs”. 540  
But Yugoslavia had no wish to concentrate on heavy industry, which the Soviets wished 
them to do, for fear of this having an adverse impact on the standard of living of 
Yugoslavs.  By June 1948 Stalin had had enough of Tito’s independent stance and 
Yugoslavia was expelled from Comintern. But despite the savage economic and 
military blockade Stalin imposed on Yugoslavia, Tito was not brought to heel and Stalin 
found himself to be unsuccessful against an opponent who was a fellow Communist 
leader.  And worse still for Stalin, Tito’s brand of independent Communism found 
favour with other European Communists.   Tito’s break with Russia in 1948 was, as 
George Kennan saw it: “the first overt breach in the monolithic unity of the Moscow-
dominated Communist bloc.  For long, it remained the only one”.541 
 
Against that background, by 1949 the Russia Committee were discussing radio reports 
of guerilla fighting in Yugoslavia and noting that, in general, there was no apparent 
abatement in the virulence of the Soviet campaign against Tito.  They noted a 
reference to an Observer report that the Soviets were planning a general withdrawal 
from the Balkans – though the Russia Committee saw no evidence to support this 
assertion - and they also noted that there was fresh evidence of Russian troop 
movements towards Yugoslavia, although the numbers were thought to be insufficient 
as yet to support large scale operations.542   
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There was a further interesting discussion on the state of play with Tito at the Russia 
Committee meeting at the end of September 1949 543 which concluded that the 
Soviets probably calculated that the Western Powers would not go to war for the sake 
of Yugoslavia;  that active intervention by the Red Army might very well  be needed to 
dislodge Tito;  that although the possibility of armed intervention was not excluded,  
the Soviets would probably wait until the Spring  to bring matters to a head.  The 
Russia Committee invited the Northern and Southern Departments of the Foreign 
Office to prepare, for Bevin, a joint paper on the probable developments of the 
Soviet/Yugoslav dispute.  In October 1949 the Committee discussed Yugoslavia’s 
economic position at greater length.544  In early November 1949 Sir Charles Peake,545 
HM’s Ambassador, Belgrade, attended the Russia Committee meeting546 and reported 
that he had seen Marshall Tito the previous week at the latter’s request.  The general 
tenor of their discussions had been that Tito believed that Yugoslavia had the situation 
regarding the Soviets and the Soviet Satellites in hand and that Stalin could only wait 
while Yugoslavia consolidated her independence.  Tito believed the people of 
Yugoslavia foresaw that a new system would arise in which the Satellites dropped 
away from the Soviets and grouped themselves around Yugoslavia as independent 
Communist states and would be able then to talk to the Soviets on equal terms.  
Ambassador Peake said that he thought that the Yugoslavs would continue to need 
economic help over the next 18 months to 2 years to encourage her.  He also noted 
that in the face of Tito’s independent stance the Soviets had engineered the 
appointment of a Russian - Marshall Rokossovsky –  to become head of the Polish 
armed forces, a move that they would surely have known would anger Poles greatly 
and it was thought that the appointment provided a ‘magnificent opportunity for Tito’ 
to emphasise the inevitability of Russian dominance over the Satellites.  The 
Committee saw this as evidence that the Soviets were disturbed by the state of feeling 
                                                     
543TNA: FO 371/77624/N8287/1052/38G. Meeting held on 27 September 1949. 
544TNA: FO 371/77624/N8287/1052/38G Meeting held on 25 October 1949. 
545 Rothwell. Chapter 7, Pages 392 and 393 gives an account of Sir Charles Peake’s arrival in Belgrade as 
HM Ambassador-Designate who had yet to present his credentials and was ordered  not to do so as the 
Yugoslavs had just shot down two US planes and their own Ambassador-Designate had declined on this 
basis not to present his own credentials and the Foreign Office wanted to show solidarity.  But Peake 
ignored orders and as a reward was given an informal meeting with Tito, which turned out to be one of 
many such meetings. 
546 TNA: FO 371/77624/N9737/1052/38G.  Minutes of Russia Committee Meeting held on 8 November 
1949 
164 
 
in Satellite countries and were taking steps to counteract it by obtaining more military 
control over them. 
There was further discussion about ‘Titoism’ at the Russia Committee’s end November 
meeting.547 Jebb referred to the prevailing tendency to treat all manifestations of 
Communism throughout the world as Soviet inspired and/or controlled, whereas 
Yugoslavia was evidence that Communism need not always be so and there were 
thought already to be signs of support for Titoism in Norway, France and, indeed, in 
the UK.  And he noted that Count Sforza548 had told Bevin that among Italian 
Communists there was a growing tendency towards ‘Titoism’.  The Soviets, on the 
other hand, according to Molotov, speaking at the time of Stalin’s birthday party in 
January 1950,549 thought that the downfall of Tito was not far off.  Jebb commissioned 
a paper on Anti Stalinist Communism and the paper, which was finalised in February 
1950, was a key one in drawing together the intelligence on the state of play with 
Titoism. The detailed paper was five pages long plus a six page Annex. The conclusions 
are set out in Part IV of the main paper as follow: “16.  (a)  Titoism and other 
manifestations of anti-Stalinist feeling in Communist parties are a potentially valuable 
force working against both international Communism and Russian imperialism. (b)  The 
value … is, however, qualified by the fact that in particular cases, eg China, Western 
Germany and Austria, it may broaden the Communist appeal and so present dangers 
of its own…c)  The appeal of Titoism depends essentially on the character of a “pure” 
Communist doctrine, independent of, and indeed theoretically hostile to, the capitalist 
West.  Any overt support we might give it would …play into the hands of Soviet 
propaganda. (d)  Subject to (b) and (c) above, we should exploit the differences 
between national and Kremlin-controlled Communism, in existing Communist parties. 
Our attitude must, however, be governed by the circumstances of each case…” 550   
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This paper provides a good example of the kind of information and analysis provided 
by the Russia Committee on a given subject, gleaned from experts in the field with 
first-hand experience and top-level access to people and events in relevant countries, 
through the Foreign Office’s network of Embassies and Consulates.     Jebb considered 
this paper important enough to send to the PUS, William Strang, and through him, to 
Bevin, and the cover note is worth quoting extensively: 
I submit a paper, prepared and approved by the Russia Committee, on the 
subject of Titoism and other manifestations of “National” or “anti-Stalinist” 
Communism.   
2. The paper is based on information supplied by certain of HM Missions abroad, 
who were asked to report whether Tito’s example had had any effect (a) on local 
Communist parties, or (b) non-Communist fellow-travelling opinion, and whether 
there was any evidence of attempts by the Yugoslav Government to form a 
Titoist International.  It also embodies information, supplied by the security 
authorities, on the effect of Titoism on the British Communist Party. 
It is proposed, if you agree, to circulate the paper to the Prime Minister and the 
other recipients in London of the “Summary of Indications regarding Soviet 
Foreign Policy”, and also to the chief posts on whose reports the memorandum is 
based (see attached list).551 
Jebb thought it essential that care be taken in distributing the Memorandum, to 
emphasise the need for careful handling given the secret nature of the material it 
contained.  Interestingly, despite this concern over secrecy, he wanted the UK’s 
Embassy in Washington to give a copy to the most suitable official in the State 
Department and enquire whether the Americans had prepared any similar study and if 
they had done so to ask whether they would share it with the UK.552  The cover note 
accompanying the Memorandum was signed by Jebb and initialed by William Strang 
and by Bevin, the latter adding a manuscript addendum saying:   “I agree”.553  Bevin 
then sent the paper on to Attlee saying:  
I send you herewith a copy of a memorandum prepared by the Russia Committee 
on the subject of Titoism and other manifestations of “National” or “anti-
Stalinist” Communism……………………………………………………………………………..   
3.If you have not time to read the whole paper you will, I think, be interested to 
glance at the first five pages, which contain a general survey and the conclusions. 
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4.Copies of the memorandum and of this minute are being sent to the Lord 
President, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the Minister of Defence and the 
Secretaries of State for Commonwealth Relations and the Colonies. 554 
 
That Attlee read the paper is proven by a copy of a Minute sent by his PPS to  Bevin 
which reads: “Foreign Secretary’s Minute, (PM (50)12) of 18 3 50 enclosing copy of a 
memorandum by the Russia Committee about Titoism and “anti-Stalinist” 
Communism.  The Prime Minister has seen and noted“.555 
In October 1950 Charles Peake556 again attended a Russia Committee meeting557 and 
was invited to update the Committee on his views of the current position in Yugoslavia 
and, in particular, he was asked how stable he regarded Tito’s regime to be. He said 
that he saw two main internal dangers for Yugoslavia.  The first was that since the end 
of July he had been aware of disagreements among high party leaders, some of whom 
gave the impression that they wanted to rejoin their spiritual home in Moscow and 
that Tito had told Brigadier Maclean that the Cominform was trying to sow disaffection 
not only in the party as a whole but also among the Marshall’s own collaborators.  The 
second internal danger, Peake said, was that Yugoslavia might emerge from the winter 
weakened by hunger and disease – especially tuberculosis – and the workers would 
lose the will to work.  The circumstances would then prevail for the Cominform to 
undermine the Tito regime.  Resultant strikes and unrest would enable the Russians to 
claim that Tito was no longer in control of the situation. 
 
But for all that, Tito remained in control and on 13 January 1953 he was elected 
President of the Federal Assembly of Yugoslavia just over six weeks before Stalin’s 
death at the beginning of March 1953.  Thereafter, Tito continued to enjoy a cordial 
relationship with the UK and the US.   Attlee  - no longer British Prime Minister but still 
Leader of the Labour Party - saw certain countries within the Communist bloc, notably 
Yugoslavia, as being “more biddable and capable of being peeled away from the Soviet 
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orbit”.558  He found that Tito had developed a “system very different from that of 
totalitarianism” and found the Yugoslavs “full of humour, with nothing of the austere 
nature of the Russians”.559   As such, Attlee was hopeful that  other Communist 
countries could follow suit, he having seen hopeful signs of dissent against 
Communism in Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Poland.  Although this may not have 
transpired in the way that Attlee had hoped, nevertheless, as far as Yugoslavia was 
concerned, Tito remained at the helm until he died in 1980 a few days before his 88th 
birthday and his legacy to Yugoslavia in maintaining its independence from Soviet 
domination endured.  
The Russia Committee advice to Ministers on Titoism, as outlined above, is perhaps 
one of the few tangible examples of a senior Minister, in this case the Foreign 
Secretary, finding the advice from the Russia Committee to be worthy of troubling a 
busy Prime Minister with reading.  Whether this can be seen as tangible evidence of 
the Russia Committee helping to form foreign policy towards Tito is uncertain but it 
could be argued that it was likely to have done so.  
China 
As Isaac Deutscher puts it, “While Stalin was fiercely hitting out at Titoism, a heresy far 
more potent and dangerous was rearing its head in Peking”.560  In May 1949, over 
twelve months before the Korean ‘war’ began, there was the emergence of an interest 
on the part of the Russia Committee in what was going on in China and the possible 
relationship between the Chinese Communists and the Soviets.  In May the Committee 
was given a talk561 by the UK’s Commissioner General in South East Asia, Mr Malcom 
Macdonald, and the essence of his address was that the future policy of a Communist 
Government of China was an important question as was the issue as to whether such a 
Government would be able to embark upon Foreign adventures, as well as coping with 
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the situation in China itself, or would need to undertake such adventures in order to 
divert attention from the Chinese situation.   
It appeared to Macdonald that the Soviets had very little direct association with events 
in South East Asia, where others were doing their work for them, but that there was 
reason to suppose that the Soviets were in touch with the Chinese Communists.  This 
surmise was supported by evidence in that, as Isaac Deutscher noted, in December 
1949, no sooner had the People’s Republic of China been proclaimed, than Stalin 
invited Mao to Moscow and “received him in the Kremlin with every honour and every 
sign of friendship and respect”.562 Macdonald described the Russian Embassy in 
Bangkok as a focus of trouble and he thought that Russian tactics were mainly to 
support dissident elements, such as the Chinese minorities, which had great economic 
power in South East Asian countries.    
At the end of December 1949, at their last meeting of the year, the Russia Committee 
had a further talk on the Far East, this time by HM’s Ambassador to China, Sir Ralph 
Stevenson, who was visiting London.  Addressing the Committee,563 Stevenson saw it 
as being accidental that the Communists had successfully completed a Chinese 
revolution begun 38 years previously.  There were, he thought, three main factions in 
the Chinese leadership:  those with exclusive devotion to Russia; those who believed in 
the need for reasonable relations with countries besides Russia; and those who had a 
hatred of all foreigners. Chou-en-Lai seemed to think that a clash between the first and 
second factions was unlikely; Mao-Tse-Tung appeared to float above all three factions.  
As to the hatred of foreigners, there was much xenophobia throughout China, largely 
undiscriminating, but there was a particular hatred of Russia in the north.  In general, 
Stevenson said, the new Chinese rulers were utterly ruthless and would rather let 
millions of Chinese die than yield to foreign pressure.  Asked whether the Chinese 
Communists were subservient to Moscow and whether the Soviets could, as she had in 
all other Satellite countries except Yugoslavia, gain control through the secret police, 
he said that most Chinese Communists were Marxists but not all were pro-Soviet.  The 
                                                     
562 Deutscher. Chapter 15, Page 582. 
563 TNA: FO 371/77624/1052/38G.  Minutes of Russia Committee Meeting held on 6 December 1949.   
169 
 
younger ones tended to look mainly to the Soviets though he doubted that any 
foreigner could establish a grip on China.  
In December 1949 the Russia Committee noted that information had been received – 
and would be included in the next ‘Crystal Gazer’ - to the effect that Mao Tse-tung had 
recently visited Moscow and there was concern that this could suggest a possible 
Soviet-Chinese Treaty and the Committee requested further information on this front 
be obtained by the Foreign Office Far Eastern Department so that Ministers could be 
kept up to date.  
The Russia Committee, therefore, by the end of 1949 was focusing more attention on 
China and the Far East than on Soviet issues, which prompted the Chairman, Gladwyn 
Jebb, to query whether this meant that the ‘Cold War’ was now centered on that area 
or whether it merely reflected exceptional diligence on the part of the Foreign Office 
Departments concerned.  It transpired that the contributions on the Far East had been 
deliberately increased at the request of the Committee at an earlier meeting, from 
which Jebb had been absent.564   
This focus on China as well as on Russia was to be reflected upon several times over 
the following two years as the situation in Korea would place Chinese Communism and 
the relationship between the Soviets and the Chinese higher up the agenda of the 
work of the Russia Committee.   
In January 1950 the Attlee government recognized the Chinese People’s Government 
(CPG) and it seemed keen at first to secure good relations and, perhaps of greater 
importance, good trading links with the CPG, no doubt partly to safeguard British 
interests in Hong Kong which were thought to be rendered vulnerable by the 
emergence of the new Chinese Communist government.  These early intentions to 
foster good relations were short lived.    
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The morning of Sunday 25 June 1950 saw the beginning of the Korean ‘war’,565  which 
was to overshadow Stalin’s last few years, when the surprise invasion of South Korea 
by North Korea took place.  The North was supported by China and, in the background, 
by the Soviet Union – many assuming that Mao and Stalin had planned it during their 
Moscow meetings.  But although the Soviets were thought to have had advance notice 
of the aggression, it seems unlikely that Stalin and Mao would have planned it together 
since the relationship between them was a delicate one.  Stalin mistrusted any non-
Soviet Communism but he “had learned from his mistake about Tito”.566 So while 
Stalin and Mao clearly managed to carve out an alliance it could not be regarded as a 
close working relationship. 
Whatever advanced notice the Soviets received, the Chinese aggression had certainly 
come as a surprise to the US and this led to criticism of the CIA in Congress.  According 
to Christopher Andrew: “Communist North Korea’s invasion of the South in the early 
hours of 25 June was as big an intelligence surprise as Pearl Harbour”. 567 Hennessy 
says that the failure to predict the invasion “cannot easily be explained away”568 but as 
Aldrich points out the apparent intelligence failure was more complicated than to 
warrant blanket disapproval.569   For one thing, Aldrich claims, the North Koreans were 
very good at signals security as they had been very well trained by the Russians and 
left little to be ‘picked up’ by the Western eavesdroppers, even assuming they had 
been sufficiently well equipped to pick up the signals. Christopher Andrew goes into 
some detail as to why the CIA station in Seoul was not well placed to have picked up 
the signs in the run up to the ‘war’.570  Whatever the reasons for the intelligence 
failure, the fact remains that the invasion by North Korea was a surprise, as was the 
speediness of the US response to the aggression. As Bennett says: “The swiftness of 
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the US response, securing within three days a UN Security Council Resolution to 
support South Korea and moving forces to the area, seems equally to have surprised 
the Soviet leader, Josef Stalin.” 571 
The UN Resolution would not have been so easy for the US to obtain had the Soviets 
not walked out of the UN a few months earlier and thereby forfeited their right of 
veto.  The South was, therefore, supported by the UN but, with the United States 
contributing 88% of the UN military and other resources, it was effectively the United 
States that supported South Korea.  It was, however, important to them that it should 
be seen to be a UN initiative and just as important for the maintenance, or even the 
repair, of the US/UK ‘special relationship’ that the British Government should support 
the US in this action.  The British government recognised the need to do so.  At the 
Cabinet meeting on 25 July 1950572 this was discussed and no-one argued against the 
decision to send British troops to Korea.  This resolve was strongly supported by Attlee 
and Bevin who, while unable to attend the Cabinet meeting as he was in hospital, 
nevertheless transmitted his views from his hospital bed.   
 
Against that political overview, where was the Russia Committee in all this?  It certainly 
discussed the Korean situation at its meeting on 4 July, the secretariat having 
circulated two interesting papers for discussion at that meeting.  The first, dated 1 July, 
was a paper by Northern Department, entitled “Soviet Union and Korea”.573  It stated 
that there could be little doubt that the Kremlin had prior knowledge of, and had given 
approval to, the military operations in Korea and that such an operation would be 
suitable for Soviet involvement for a number of reasons, among them:  Southern Korea 
was weak and a ‘vacuum’ area;  the US had withdrawn their troops from Southern 
Korea as it was seen as being strategically unimportant and untenable;  the Soviets 
were not required to commit troops, as such, and therefore need not actively be 
involved;  if the Northern Koreans were successful it would be a powerful blow at US 
and Western prestige in the Far East.  What was less clear was the timing of the 
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military operations.  The possible reasons included:  pragmatism in that the Northern 
Korean military forces had reached a point where they had overwhelming superiority 
in numbers and training and could well seem to the Soviets to be ripe to give a fillip to 
Communism in the Far East.  The paper concluded that Korea was a suitable terrain for 
a Soviet probe of Western defences and constituted a flagrant provocation of the US 
and the UN and a heightening of already existing world tensions.  The Soviets were 
also sure to make propaganda over UN/US retaliation as being evidence of Western 
military aggression. 
The second paper was a telegram from Sir David Kelly, HM’s Ambassador, Moscow, 
described as being  “of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised 
recipient and not passed on”.574  The list of those ‘authorised recipients’ was very high 
level, beginning with:  The King;  The Prime Minister; the PS Secretary of State – which 
was de-facto Mr Bevin; other FCO Ministers;  the Head of the Foreign Office, the PUS, 
William Strang;  and Pierson Dixon, the  Chairman of the Russia Committee. That he 
was included was not just an indication of his seniority and importance – he, after all, 
was close to Bevin as he had been his PPS before being promoted and knighted - but of 
the importance of the Russian Committee itself.   
As a document which illustrates the thinking of the Ambassador on the Soviet tactics 
and intentions over the Korean situation it is interesting.  David Kelly saw the main 
elements of the situation as follows:  he, too, thought that the attack was certainly 
launched with Soviet knowledge and, most certainly, at Soviet instigation.  The 
campaign began well and the Soviets probably hoped for a swift walk-over.  The UN 
Security Council had reacted with unexpected speed and the prompt reaction of the 
US had not been foreseen and from the Soviet press it seemed that the Soviets would 
be happy to exploit this as evidence of US aggression while not being in any hurry to 
commit themselves to the North Korean cause.  He concluded that the North Korean 
attack was intended to exploit a favourable local situation, not to provoke a general 
conflict. 
                                                     
574 TNA: FO 371/86756/NS1052/70. 
173 
 
An article in the British Observer Newspaper by journalist Frank Robertson 575 who had 
toured extensively in South East Asia, questioned the effectiveness of the UN action 
following the invasion of South Korea largely because, as he put it: “most articulate 
Asiatics are convinced that all Asia is going Communist’ and that ‘repugnant as this 
prospect is to many’ there exists a ‘certain unreasoning satisfaction that this will mean 
the end of the white man’s rule over the Asiatic peoples’.  He said that he had found 
‘unperturbed acceptance of the prospect of Communist rule among even the 
wealthiest class of Asiatics.  
The Russia Committee kept abreast of the developments in Korea and included the 
information they obtained in their fortnightly ‘Crystal Gazers’. The general feeling of 
the Committee was that there were two possible explanations for the Chinese 
intervention in Korea.  Either Russia had pushed China into intervention to keep US 
forces in Korea whilst maintaining the Soviet pose as peace champions; or the 
inspiration had come from the Chinese and was mainly based on fear of US intentions 
and their possible advances beyond Korea.   
In December 1950, and a month later, the Russia Committee again welcomed David 
Kelly, to their meetings to discuss a paper covering a JIC memorandum on the Chinese 
Communist threat in the Far East and South East Asia.  The JIC paper assumed that the 
Chinese would be likely to call a halt to their action in Korea if given an ultimatum as 
they would shrink from war.  The Committee chairman saw no evidence for this as he 
believed that China was not afraid of war with the US.  David Kelly’s view, however, 
was more nuanced.  He thought that Chinese intentions could only be discovered if an 
offer to open negotiations was made; she would not take such an initiative and she 
would, he thought, certainly try to destroy UN forces unless some such steps were 
taken soon. He thought it unwise to count on Sino Soviet differences.  The interests of 
the two governments ran largely in parallel and the Soviets would certainly be glad to 
see US forces bogged down in the Far East.576  The Russia Committee considered that, 
as far as the Sino-Soviet relationship was concerned, the Soviets must welcome the 
                                                     
575 Article dated July 15 1950 by Frank Robertson, Observer Correspondent, entitled ‘Asia Sees Victory 
for Communism:  Fatalism is Widespread.   
576TNA: FO 371/86761/NS1053/35 and FO 371/94842/NS1053/3G.  Minutes of Russia Committee 
Meetings on5 December 1950 and 3 January 1951. 
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prospect of China’s expulsion of Western influence from the Far East but the Soviets 
could not contemplate without anxiety the prospect of China fresh from a successful 
revolution, expanding her area of dominion.  Moreover, the Committee felt that 
Chinese actions in Korea showed that they had no fear of war with the US but that the 
Soviets would not want to go that far and thus might act as a restraining influence. 
As the ‘war’ in Korea waxed and waned the Russia Committee continued to keep 
abreast of, and to report to Ministers on, the latest developments.   By mid-1951 the 
Chinese had agreed a cease fire with the UN and at their 21 August meeting the  
Committee considered a paper 577 by the Secretariat on ‘Certain Reports on Soviet and 
Chinese Intentions’ which concluded that both attached great importance to Japanese 
re-armament and the fact that the Russians had probably counted on the over-running 
of Korea before turning attention to Japan but the UN’s success had compelled them 
to think again and the re-emergence of Japan was thought to be very disturbing to the 
Chinese and the Soviets. 
It is hardly surprising that the Korean ‘war’ occupied such a large degree of the Russia 
Committee’s energies, given that the Committee existed to monitor Communist 
expansionism but it gave rise to some head scratching on the part of the Committee.  
In the first place, it had been necessary to re-think the structure of the fortnightly 
“Crystal Gazers” into different sections on ‘Soviet’ and on ‘Chinese’ Communist 
activity.  And it led to consideration, in November 1952, as to whether the Committee 
should change its name from the Russia Committee to reflect the importance they now 
attached to Chinese Communist activity.  It was decided to retain the title. 
In his article in the Electronic Journal of International History,578 David Clayton 
analyses the economic impact of Britain’s foreign policy towards China in this period 
and argues that the primary driver in developing British foreign policy was not just the 
need to protect the British interests in Hong Kong which was such an important 
financial centre but also to foster prestige and influence in Asia.  The question arises 
again, then, as to whether, in their analysis of the changing situation in China, the 
                                                     
577 TNA: FO 371/94842/NS1053/35G.  Minutes of Russia Committee Meeting held on 21 August 1951.    
578 Clayton, David.  British Foreign Economic Policy Towards China 1949 to 1960.  Electronic Journal of 
International History.  ISSN 1471-1443, Article 6. 
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Russia Committee influenced British Ministers decisions regarding their foreign policy 
towards China.  Such may not be proven - or disproven – but it is indisputable that the 
Committee had access expert information on China which seems likely to have 
influenced their policy decisions.  
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Chapter 8   The End of the Russia Committee and the Growth of Parallel 
Foreign Affairs Advisory Bodies Within Government  
The period from 1953 through to 1957 saw the final, and probably least important, 
years of the Russia Committee. It was no longer the organisation which was of primary 
importance in terms of providing Ministers with information and advice on all aspects 
of Soviet and Chinese Communism.  Additional committees had been established 
whose purpose was, at least in part, to assess and monitor the Communist threat.  
Although the purpose, scope and, indeed, ownership, of such bodies differed from the 
Russia Committee they all had some overlap with the latter and several of them had 
co-existed for some time.  Some were clearly more senior, some were extended in 
scope beyond the Foreign Office, some focused more on intelligence and some had an 
interest in issues beyond Communism.  So, despite the fact that the Cold War at this 
period was at its height, the need for the Russia Committee diminished as other bodies 
came along that took its place.  
In addition, then, to the Russia Committee, by 1952  there existed the Joint Intelligence 
Committee (JIC), the Information Research Department (IRD);  the Permanent Under 
Secretary’s Committee (PUSC); the Official Committee on Communism (Home) (AC(H)); 
the Official Committee on Communism (Overseas) (AC(O)); and the Overseas Planning 
Committee (OPC).  The AC(H) and the AC(O) were both official Cabinet Committees.579 
The JIC, when it was first set up in 1936, was a military planning committee under the 
Committee of Imperial Defence (CID) which was the forerunner of the Cabinet 
Office580and it was a sub-committee of the Chiefs of Staff. It later moved to the 
Cabinet Office, in the 1950s, where it remains.  As its name suggests, it was, and is, 
essentially an intelligence gathering committee which straddles the various 
intelligence agencies as well as Departments including the Foreign Office and the 
Ministry of Defence.   
                                                     
579 Official Cabinet Committees being Cabinet Committees with membership of officials rather than 
ministers.  
 580 Seldon, Anthony.  The Cabinet Office 1916-2016.  Published Biteback Publishing, 2016.  Chapter 1, 
Pages 14 and 15. 
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According to Goodman the JIC: “was born out of the anxieties over the military rise of 
Nazi Germany; it reached maturity in dealing with the very different concerns of the 
Cold War and the threat of nuclear annihilation”. 581  
The JIC, which predated the Russia Committee, had some parallels with the latter.  
Both were Whitehall Committees with membership drawn from officials not 
politicians, both in essence were bureaucratic devices for gathering and disseminating 
information in their particular sphere of interest. For the JIC, this covered the whole 
panoply of intelligence.  For the Russia Committee it covered all matters relating to 
Communism, including intelligence.  The JIC’s remit in intelligence terms was therefore 
much wider than was ever that of the Russia Committee though the two were in close 
touch from through JIC attendance of Russia Committee meetings and circulation of 
papers.  Another important difference between the two Whitehall Committees was 
that the JIC, although situated within the Cabinet Office, was by its very nature a cross-
departmental body whereas, despite the Russia Committee allowing officials from 
other departments and agencies to attend their meetings and even to be co-opted as 
members, it was essentially a Committee under Foreign Office ownership and with the 
Foreign Office in the driving seat.  Such a distinction ought, perhaps, not to have much 
significance but there can be tensions between different Departments of State and 
one way of dealing with them is to ensure all participants have an equal status and 
voice as would be true for members of inter-departmental policy committees like the 
JIC.  
In January 1948 the Foreign Office’s Information Research Department (IRD), was set 
up following a proposal by Christopher Mayhew, then a junior Foreign Office Minister, 
to Bevin.  Its forerunner, according to Goodman, was the Cultural Relations 
Department of the Foreign Office, and when it became the IRD it was intended to 
work: “alongside…..the Russia Committee; a group…..charged with political warfare 
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Cambridge, on 18 January 2013. 
178 
 
activities that would ensure that JIC intelligence assessments were factored into policy 
advice”.582 
 
The IRD was designed to operate as a very secret Foreign Office Department, reporting 
to the PUS, and charged with collecting information on Communism and disseminating 
material in order to counter Communist propaganda worldwide.  It was, in effect, a 
propaganda committee, disseminating information to journalists and politicians who 
were sympathetic to the anti-Communist cause with, according to Maguire, initially an 
ostensibly foreign remit but this quickly extended into both foreign and domestic 
spheres such that: “IRD analysis of Soviet propaganda from 1948 consistently revealed 
its main target audiences to be trade unionists and labourers, in addition to students, 
left-wing socialists, and the armed forces”. 583  
 
IRD’s methods of operation were covert in that they were un-attributable and they 
dispersed their propaganda messages through what Maguire describes as “safe-private 
networks” but they were careful to ensure that their material was recognised to be 
truthful so as to maintain IRD’s reputation.  The Soviets would have been well aware of 
the existence and work of the IRD not least because Guy Burgess, who subsequently 
defected to Russia, worked in IRD for a short time in 1948. For many years a shadowy, 
secret, organisation, the IRD was disbanded in 1977 and its papers first began to be 
released at TNA in late 2012 and in 2013 and more are sure to follow.  
In early 1949 the Foreign Office’s Permanent Under-Secretary’s Committee (PUSC) was 
established.  Lomas584argues that the origins of this move stemmed from the tensions 
between the MOD’s Chiefs of Staff and Ministers and the Foreign Office officials and 
Ministers.  In March 1949 the Minister of Defence585 wrote to Attlee: “..informing him 
of the growing disquiet among the military at the apparent inadequacies of Britain’s 
                                                     
582 Goodman.  The Official History of the Joint Intelligence Committee Volume I  . Chapter 8, Page243.  
583 Maguire, Thomas J.  Counter-subversion in early Cold War Britain:  the Official Committee on 
Communism (Home), the IRD and ‘state-private networks.    
584 Lomas, Daniel W B.  Intelligence, Security and the Attlee Governments, 1945-51. An uneasy 
relationship?  Published Manchester University Press, 2017. Chapter 4, Page 128. 
585 A V Alexander, then Minister of Defence. 
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organisation for conducting the cold war”. 586  In effect, this was a strong criticism of 
the Russia Committee and was another symptom of the rivalry between MOD and the 
FO on this issue. Alexander recommended to Attlee that: “something should be done 
to stiffen the present Russia Committee”.587   
He also attached a paper by Sir John Slessor588 which argued that the existing 
machinery for fighting the Cold War needed to be expanded so that it was in closer 
touch with the Chiefs of Staff and should be a higher-level body.  He later wrote a note 
to Attlee in which he called for the setting up of a “Cold War Committee’.589  Attlee 
must have seen some value in this proposal as he sent a copy of the paper to Bevin 
indicating that a staff conference should be held.  But neither Bevin nor his top officials 
thought much of the idea and even the Cabinet Secretary, Norman Brook,590 had 
concerns, noting the many flaws in the arguments of the military and pithily saying 
that they: “had been misled by the term ‘Cold War’” and believed “it was their 
business, when in fact it is foreign policy and not their business at all”.591  Nevertheless 
a review followed by the Foreign Office who then introduced a change whereby the 
Russia Committee continued to exist but at the same time the PUSC, a higher level 
body, was also set up because, according to Foreign Office historians, it:  “had become 
apparent that the Russia Committee was the wrong body to consider ‘long-term and 
general questions of foreign policy’ arising from its collation of information about 
Communism from various sources, and to recommend counter-measures”.592 
So, the PUSC was to do the strategic thinking while the Russia Committee collected the 
data.  This, surely, has to be seen as a diminishing of the Committee’s status, despite 
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588 Sir John Cotesworth Slessor a senior commander in the Royal Air Force and at the time of the paper 
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their being allowed to continue to exist and being:  “entitled to recommend immediate 
counter-measures against communism”.593   
This begs the question as to what it was that the PUSC brought to the table that could 
not have been brought by the Russia Committee.  The   obvious difference was that the 
interests of the PUSC were wider than those of the Russia Committee which was only 
concerned with the threat of Communism.  There was another difference according to 
a current PUSD expert594 and that is that PUSC reflected the historical role of the 
Foreign Secretary as a point of liaison between the Foreign Office and the British secret 
intelligence apparatus.595  The intelligence organizations at the time operated under a 
security blanket and were not avowed until the 1990s.  And the Foreign Office was 
then, as it is now, the Department whose Secretary of State had responsibility for the 
SIS, the secrecy surrounding which even extended to the budget for paying for this 
organisation.   But for all its, what might be described as, greater glamour than the 
Russia Committee,  the PUSC was nothing more or less – as was the Russia Committee 
– than an administrative body that existed solely as a Foreign Office entity to provide 
information to those who were responsible for agreeing policy decisions, namely the 
elected Ministers.   
To add to the number of Communist ‘watching’ government committees, later in 1949 
it was decided to set up an inter-departmental official Cabinet Committee596 to keep 
the Communist threat under review – not just by monitoring what was happening 
abroad but also within the UK, and to make proposals for dealing with it.  The 
Committee was called the Anti-Communism – or “C.” Committee.  The fact that it was 
chaired by a senior Foreign Office official – the first Chairman being Gladwyn Jebb, the 
then Deputy Under Secretary of State (Political Affairs) who was also at the time the 
Chairman of the Russia Committee – is a further indication that the Foreign Office was 
seen as the lead department in dealing with policy issues relating to combating 
                                                     
593 TNA: FO 0/1/57 (also in JIC 165/57). 
594 Private information. 
595 Bennett, Gill. FCO Historians History Note.  From World War to Cold War:  Records of the Foreign 
Office Permanent Under-Secretary’s Department, 1939-51. 
596 Official Cabinet Committees are made up of senior officials from relevant government departments 
whose membership would keep their Ministers informed and such Committees will often, though not 
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Communism.  The Membership of C Committee was drawn from officials in the Foreign 
Office, the Cabinet Office, the Ministry of Defence, the Joint Intelligence Bureau (JIB), 
the Colonial Office, the Commonwealth Relations Office and the Secret Intelligence 
Service.  It is clear, therefore, given the similar membership, that there must have 
been cross-over between this Committee and the Russia Committee. The purpose of 
this new body was to: “stimulate and co-ordinate…all anti-Communist activities 
(including those related to information) overseas”.597  Lomas describes this body as 
having superseded the Russia Committee which, “while continuing to meet regularly, 
was restricted to reviewing and forecasting Soviet Policy”.598  From May to November 
1949 the new Committee was busy drawing up proposals for a more coordinated 
policy and: “machinery for action, offensive and defensive, against the Soviet and 
Communist menace in all spheres (political, military, economic, and social) at home 
and abroad”. 599 
This Committee was subsequently split into two: 600  The Official Committee on 
Communism (Home) (AC(H)) and the Official Committee on Communism (Overseas) 
(AC(O)).  These were highly influential bodies – not confined to ‘ownership’ by the 
Foreign Office. Not only did they, like the Russia Committee and other Foreign Office 
committees, include representatives from other central Whitehall Departments and 
the intelligence agencies and the military, but also, as they were official Cabinet 
Committees, this brought their influence into a different and wider sphere.  The 
inclusion on the membership of all of these ‘Soviet watching’ Committees of 
individuals representing the UK Intelligence services was significant not least because, 
according to the JIC, the intelligence agencies had firmly concluded as early as June 
1946 that the Soviet Union should be ‘the first charge on our intelligence resources’.601  
The AC(O) Committee was subsequently disbanded in 1956 but the AC(H) Committee 
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continued for another six years and was disbanded in 1962.  There was also a 
Ministerial Cabinet Committee mirroring the Official Committees 602 which existed 
from 1949 to 1951 but from the scarcity of its papers it met infrequently. 
In 1957 the Foreign Office was tasked with establishing the Overseas Planning 
Committee (OPC) whose membership was again drawn from across Whitehall, and 
included the military and the intelligence agencies.  Hennessy says that this initiative 
arose after the 1955 Geneva Conference “when it became plain that the Russians were 
about to indulge in competitive coexistence”.603  This was supported by a lower-level 
official body called the Political Intelligence Group, again with inter-departmental 
representation.  The terms of reference of the OPC required the Committee to attempt 
to forecast: “Communist and extreme nationalist subversive aims in any part of the 
world and to recommend counter-measures.” 604 
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The End of the Russia Committee 
There had been, as described in earlier chapters, several attempts over the years from 
1949 onwards to re-organise the Russia Committee to make it more effective.   
Perhaps the most far reaching was that of March 1952 when Pierson Dixon was about 
to relinquish the Chairmanship of the Committee.  He reported to William Strang, the 
then PUS: “I have for some time felt increasing doubts about the usefulness of the 
discussions in the Russia Committee and the papers produced by it…..I held a small 
meeting recently with senior members of the Committee to consider means of 
adapting the Committee’s work to present circumstances…Briefly, we recommend that 
there should be a smaller and more high-powered committee with meetings monthly 
instead of fortnightly….The “Crystal Gazer” has, I think you will agree, become a rather 
pedestrian and uninspired production, and, if the Committee is to fulfill its function as 
an interpreter of Soviet policy, we clearly need a more thoughtful document….”. On 
the same date William Strang added a manuscript note saying:  “I agree.  Let us try 
this”.605 
Even given William Strang’s immediate approval of the proposals they were not put 
into effect until the end of 1952 by which time Frank Roberts had become Chairman, 
but it is clear that the writing for the Russia Committee was on the wall.  Although it 
continued in existence until 1957, it was not the force it had been for the early Cold 
War years from 1946 through to 1952.  The Foreign Office had won its way in the early 
years by seizing the initiative to take control of the information gathering and 
disseminating of all foreign policy issues relating to Communism.  But it’s membership, 
terms of reference and outputs had been subject to change as other more senior far-
reaching government committees were set up.  
 It might be argued that, as a body, the most useful and potentially influential time for 
the Russia Committee had coincided with the two Attlee governments and, in 
particular, with the period up to the resignation of Bevin who had been Foreign 
Secretary from just before the Committee’s inception until March 1951.  
                                                     
605 TNA: FO 371/ZP12/2/G.  Minute dated 17 March 1952 to Sir William Strang (PUS) from Pierson Dixon   
184 
 
By the end of 1957 the Foreign Office was again reviewing the committee structure of 
its anti-communism bodies and, recognising that there was overlap between the OPC 
and the Russia Committee, consideration was then given to merging the two.606   The 
apparatus for combating the Communist threat was therefore turning full circle, 
following an active and productive decade in which the Foreign Office had managed to 
persuade the politicians of the importance of their work.  The Russia Committee was 
finally disbanded in 1957. 
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 Chapter 9  Conclusion - The Russia Committee in historical perspective  
 
This conclusion seeks to draw together the threads of the foregoing chapters and to try 
to place the Russia Committee in historical perspective.   It attempts to assess the 
Committee’s achievements in terms of influencing the British Government in forming 
its foreign policy decisions in the light of the perceived emerging threat of the spread 
of Soviet Communism in the early years of the Cold War.   
 
One of the motivations for researching the Russia Committee flowed from the desire 
to establish why the Foreign Office saw the need to set up the Russia Committee and 
this led to a need to examine the political landscape at the end of the Second World 
War and the way the sands were shifting in the relationships between the former 
three big war time allies.  The seeds were there by 1945, as illustrated in Chapter 2, 
and the officials who were expert Soviet watchers in the US and in Britain were 
becoming concerned that their political masters needed to be alerted to what was 
happening and to take action against it. Towards the end of the War, with Anthony 
Eden as Foreign Secretary, the British government were aware of the warning signs 
that the relationship with the Soviets might have some serious challenges ahead, for 
example with their demands to receive punitive reparations from Germany, to unpick 
agreements reached at Yalta and at Potsdam.  The views of Anthony Eden and his 
officials were closely aligned and he was well regarded – see, for example, his 
relationship with Pierson Dixon607 - and some key officials were already voicing 
concerns about Soviet expansionism.  The Stock Taking After VE Day Memorandum 
was commissioned by Anthony Eden before the General Election in October 1945608 
and it was this, together with the Long Telegrams of Kennan and Roberts 609  in early 
1946 that, several contemporary historians610  have asserted, prompted the setting up 
of the Russia Committee, by the newly promoted PUS of the Foreign Office, Orme 
Sargent.  As is clear from his ‘Stock Taking’ Memorandum, he had a thorough 
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608 See Thesis Chapter 2 
609 See Thesis Chapter 4. 
610 Richard Aldrich, Greening and Bennett have all expressed this view as shown in Thesis Chapter 3. 
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knowledge of what was happening in the Soviet Union born of many years diplomatic 
experience.  And while some thought him “too old for the post”611 he was the most 
senior diplomat in the Foreign Office and was well up to the job.  His knowledge and 
experience had convinced him of the need to gather as much information as possible 
about Soviet intentions so that the Foreign Office could optimize its ability to advise 
Ministers of what was happening. 
As noted in earlier chapters, it has been claimed that Bevin was, for some time after 
becoming Foreign Secretary, reluctant to be convinced of the need to take actions 
against the Soviets.  But this thesis takes the view that, shrewd man that he was, and 
on all fours with Eden over foreign policy as he was, Bevin was acting pragmatically 
with an eye on both the need to keep at bay his Labour party critics and the need to 
try to maintain working relations with his Soviet counterparts.  He may not have been 
prepared to go public with his concerns until after the abortive November 1949 
Foreign Ministers conference but that does not mean that he did not agree with his 
advisers.  Indeed, as has been shown, Bevin was his own man, ready to listen carefully 
and weigh up information before making decisions to which he tended to stick.  But 
that does not mean that he was not influenced by his Foreign Office advisers.  It is 
clear that Bevin shared many of their views.  He shared their aversion to Communism.  
He also shared their views on the wish for Britain to remain a world power as was 
evidenced, for example, by his arguments in Cabinet that Britain needed to develop its 
own nuclear capability, despite the cost of so doing to a Britain in a parlous economic 
position.  His core views were reflected in the attitudes of his Foreign Office officials 
and this is one reason why they were able to influence him because, in a sense, they 
were not struggling to persuade him into decisions but were pushing at an open door.    
Indeed, it is perhaps unlikely that he would have thought so highly of his Foreign Office 
advisers if he had been seriously at odds with them over their views about the threats 
posed by the Soviets.  
Research for the early chapters of this thesis, therefore, established why there was a 
real need to set up a body that was equipped to gather accurate information from 
                                                     
611 Richardson, Adam.  The Berlin Embassy, The Foreign Office and German Aims 1945-1949, Chapter 6,  
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experts in the field and experts in Whitehall in order to assess what the information 
meant in terms of likely actions by the Soviets and to advise Ministers accordingly.  The 
international situation in the years following the Second World War was a fluid and 
developing one.  No-one had a clear idea of what was going to happen.  In such a 
changing dynamic situation all that could be done was to make judgements, based on 
the best information available, as to the likely future turn of events.   
By far the most difficult aspect of the research for the thesis was to try to establish 
what the Russia Committee could be said to have uniquely contributed, which has not 
hitherto been explored and written about.  The starting point for this was to look 
afresh at what it was aiming to achieve.  The aims were formally set out in the 
Committee’s terms of reference which, though subject to some changes following the 
several reviews to which the Committee was subject, were to remain substantially 
unchanged during its life span, namely:  “To review …all aspects of soviet policy and 
propaganda and soviet activities throughout the world, more particularly with 
reference to the soviet campaign against this country….to consider what action is 
required as a result of the Committee’s review …….and to ensure that the necessary 
recommendations as to policy are made either by the departments of the office 
concerned or by the Committee to Sir Orme Sargent….”.612 
This central aim of the Committee was achieved as is shown by the vast number of 
reports, ‘Crystal Gazers’ and bespoke advice on specific subjects, provided to Ministers 
over the life span of the Committee.  Although the wording of the terms of reference is 
quite precise and clear it does not actually say what must clearly have been another 
central aim of any high level official committee of this kind, that is not just the 
collection of as much valuable information about Soviet intentions as possible from 
expert sources, but the use to which it is put.  The purpose of such information 
gathering must have been to enable the Foreign Office experts to analyse the 
information and to try to predict what positions/actions the Soviets were likely to take 
in any given set of circumstances and to advise Ministers so that the latter could make 
informed decisions on the way forward.  This is not an unimportant point.  It is central 
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to any understanding of the workings of the British civil and diplomatic services that 
they exist to serve their political masters.  As Bennett has said: “government policy is 
made by government ministers, not by officials…”.613   Officials, special advisers and 
others may have influence on the decisions of their Ministers and, indeed, may be 
failing in their duty if they do not, but the decisions are made by the Ministers who are 
publicly accountable for them.  
 
In addition to looking at whether the Russia Committee fulfilled the remit from its 
terms of reference this thesis also looked at what others perceived the purpose of the 
Committee to be.   For example, as outlined in Chapter 4, Richard Aldrich saw the 
setting up of the Committee as a move by the Foreign Office to take control of a key 
foreign policy issue by creating their own “coordinating centre” 614 rather than being a 
participant in a similar body controlled by the Cabinet Office or even the Chiefs of 
Staff.   This thought is echoed by Richardson who personalized this into:  “Sargent did 
not like other governmental bodies interfering in foreign policy.  For him this was the 
sole work of the Foreign Office and he endeavored for the office to have control”. 615 
 
Orme Sargent proved successful in putting the Foreign Office in control of foreign 
policy and, importantly, in gaining Bevin’s support.616 Aldrich also saw the retirement 
in early 1946 of the long-serving PUS at the Foreign Office, Alexander Cadogan, as 
offering a timely opportunity for the Foreign Office to introduce an organisation of the 
nature of the Russia Committee.  He believed that Cadogan had an aversion to 
‘planning’ but that his successor, Orme Sargent, who had a different mind-set, felt that 
it would be valuable to have a joint planning committee like the Russia Committee 
because he believed it to be: “imperative to get organized since the military were now 
the Foreign Office’s rivals for control of Britain’s Cold War”.617   
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One view as to the purpose of the Russia Committee, therefore, was to ensure that the 
Foreign Office was firmly in the driving seat of forming foreign policy.   Given the 
previously mentioned tensions between the Foreign Office and the MOD, this seems 
likely to be true.  Ulricke Thieme saw that another purpose of having such a 
Committee was to ensure “effective diplomacy”618 by being able to anticipate Soviet 
actions through being as knowledgeable as possible about what was going on through 
the collection of information from the experts. 
 
So, the reasons for setting up the Russia Committee and its aims could be said to 
include:  providing a much needed information gathering, coordinating and planning 
body which had ready access to the necessary expertise;  keeping Ministers up to date 
on developments;   using expertise to anaylyse the information gathered in order to 
form views on the actions likely to be taken by the Soviets;  and advising Ministers on 
what could and should be done as a result.  There was also a narrower, even parochial, 
reason which was around enabling the Foreign Office to regain the initiative and 
maintain its position as the primary mover in enabling the determination and driving 
forward of the formation British foreign policy.  The reasons for setting up the Russia 
Committee seem obvious enough but how successful it was in delivering those aims is 
a separate issue.  
 
Clearly the Russia Committee achieved its aim of gathering information from experts 
which they did on a regular basis over a period of twelve years, justifying Sir Ivone 
Kirkpatrick’s assertion that the:  “ Foreign Office was the first department of State to 
go in for information in a big way”.619   With the hundreds of papers, many of them 
very detailed, produced by and/or discussed by the Russia Committee members over 
its twelve years existence, it certainly gathered a vast amount of information and it 
took the information from experts in the subject, often from key players in relevant 
Embassies.  It succeeded, therefore, in delivering one of its main aims, to collect and 
disseminate information on Soviet Communist expansionism in a coordinated and 
                                                     
618 Thieme. Pages 84 to 88. 
619 Kirkpatrick. Chapter 10, Page201. 
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thorough way, rather than in a piecemeal fashion had this been left to individual 
Foreign Office departments. In so doing it also served to highlight and publicise the 
issues involved as there was one central body, which involved many of the Foreign 
Office departments and several other government departments and agencies and was 
able to take a broad look, from a senior influential level, at all aspects of the subject. 
 
It is also demonstrably true that the Russia Committee achieved its aim of keeping 
Ministers up to date on developments and providing advice to them as required.  
There are examples outlined in earlier chapters of Bevin or  Attlee seeking papers on 
specific issues but perhaps the most obvious proof of the Committee advising 
Ministers was the regular production and dissemination of the ‘Crystal Gazers’ which, 
as has been shown, were produced for a very illustrious set of recipients including the 
King, the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary.  Although these were changed in 
format and coverage as circumstances dictated, the ‘Crystal Gazers’ were a regular 
feature for several years.  They had to have been regarded as worth producing, not 
least because the recipients were individuals whose time should not be wasted on 
wading regularly through unnecessary information.  That these outputs from the 
Committee were influential seems highly probable but what cannot be measured is the 
extent of such influence. 
 
One claim for the Russia Committee, that it put the Foreign Office in the lead on Soviet 
watching, is perhaps more easily verified.  For a time, at least, the Committee was the 
lead body in coordinating policy advice on Soviet Communism  and, given that it 
included individuals from the JIC, the Chiefs of Staff, the Colonial Office and the 
Dominions Office, it was acting in the mode of an inter-departmental Committee while 
still being ‘owned’  by the Foreign Office.  As illustrated in Chapter 8, from early 1952 
the Russia Committee began to decline in importance   not just as a result of the 
setting up of the Foreign Office’s IRD and the PUSD but also by the other more senior 
official Cabinet committees that were to come into existence from 1951 onwards.   
Nevertheless, for a time the aim of putting the Foreign Office in the driving seat was 
accomplished. In some ways what is surprising about the whole Foreign Office/MOD 
tensions is why they existed at all since it seems self-evident that the Foreign Office 
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should lead on foreign affairs, which were at the core of the issues under consideration 
by the Russia Committee, while the MOD were clearly left to major on military issues. 
So what did the Russia Committee, for so long a virtually unknown Whitehall 
organization, achieve and what contribution did it make to the development of the 
foreign policy of containment of Soviet expansionism?  Undoubtedly the Committee 
was in a strong position, with the Foreign Office Embassies and Consuls placed all 
around the globe, to act as a rich information gathering body and it clearly did that.  
HM’s Ambassadors in key embassies were often able to have personal and influential 
dealings with the political leaders of the countries in which they were based – for 
example, Tito and Stalin, as has been shown, had personal dealings with senior British 
Ambassadors, who they clearly regarded as being of sufficient importance to warrant 
their personal attention. But did any of this contribute to the formation of foreign 
policy or even help to adjust the shaping of that policy?  This is very difficult to assess 
in the absence of specific claims by policy makers of the day that they had found the 
Committee’s output to be useful in their determination of policy decisions.  But with so 
many high-level diplomats being involved with the Committee it surely had to have 
had some impact.  Hardly a ringing endorsement of its importance, perhaps, but at 
least some recognition of its worth.  And it could be argued that the fact that 
politicians followed a considered path in their relations with the Soviets must have in 
part been on the advice and information they received from their officials including 
those on the Committee. 
As previously observed there are relatively few references to the Russia Committee in 
the papers, diaries and memoirs of those who were central players in the organization 
and still less in such secondary sources to illustrate what Bevin thought of the 
Committee.    One important exception is from the memoirs of Gladwyn Jebb in which 
he says:  
Towards the end of 1948 I presided over a body known as the ‘Russia 
Committee’.  This grew up quite naturally in order to coordinate policy in the 
light of that new phenomenon, the Cold War.  One of its functions was to make 
appreciations of what we believed the Soviet Government was up to and how 
and how far we ought to disregard, or alternatively pay attention, to their 
frequent dire threats.  The idea was that all the political Under-Secretaries – 
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and notably Frank Roberts – who had more to do with our Russian policy than 
anybody else – should meet every so often and discuss what I suppose would 
now be called ‘position papers’… and I believe the experience was an 
undoubted success….Later this body was taken over by the Permanent Under-
Secretary himself and became, in effect, a planning machine…..Bevin himself 
welcomed the committee and took much interest in it but I believe that when 
Eden returned to the office in 1951 (sic)620it rather faded out…..I believe the 
Russia Committee did fulfill a useful function. Certainly it conditioned our 
whole policy for ‘containing’ Soviet expansion during a very critical time. 621 
There are several strands from the Jebb quote that bear scrutiny.  First, it should be 
remembered that when Orme Sargent penned his ‘Stock Taking’ Memorandum and 
then sought comments on his paper from his colleagues, Jebb had submitted 
comments which Sargent characteristically had chosen not to reflect in the amended 
version.622  Since the Memorandum was one of the key pieces in the jigsaw leading up 
to Sargent’s setting up of the Russia Committee, this chain of events establishes Jebb 
as someone who was involved in the Committee from its earliest days until, as he 
claimed, “it rather faded out”623 on Eden’s return as Foreign Secretary in Winston 
Churchill’s Administration from 1952.  He was also Chairman of the Russia Committee 
from late 1948 through to 1951 and was specifically appointed by Sargent because the 
latter perceived the need for the Committee to be both better focused and to both 
include other organizations624 and maintain the seniority of its membership.  
Secondly, Jebb’s comments about the working together of the ‘Under-Secretaries’ is 
interesting as an insight into the relationships between the senior people in the 
Foreign Office.  Since the people he describes were not elected politicians but senior 
officials, it might be tempting to regard their “Great efforts… to arrive at a common 
‘official’ view’“625 as unimportant politically,  or even  irrelevant.  But this would be to 
misunderstand the influence of such individuals.  Ministers decide, and rightly, as they 
are generally drawn from a body of people elected by the public .626  But Ministers 
                                                     
620 In fact Anthony Eden did not return to the Foreign Office as Foreign Secretary until 1952 when the 
general election returned the Conservative party to power.  
621 Gladwyn.  Chapter 13, Pages 226-227. 
622 See Thesis Chapter 2. 
623 Gladwin. Chapter 13,  Pages 226-227. 
624 To include the Ministry of Defence representatives; the Colonial Office; on occasion the JIC; and the 
CRO. 
625Gladwyn.  Chapter 13, Pages 226-227.  
626 The exception being those appointed from the House of Lords. 
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decide on policy often on the basis of what Jebb called ‘position papers’  which will 
have been prepared for them by officials and which will have, in those times627 
provided Ministers with all that they needed to form their own views on the subject.   
It is inconceivable that such a body of very senior diplomats who were experts in their 
fields would not have had an influence on the thinking of the political masters whom 
they advised, and therefore on policy itself.  
Thirdly, Jebb’s observation that the Russia Committee faded out in 1951 when Eden 
returned as Foreign Secretary perhaps could imply – as the comment followed on from 
saying that Bevin ‘took much interest in it’ 628 - that Eden did not have regard for the 
work of the organization.  Indeed, Jebb says: “All Secretaries of State have their own 
ways of running things and there is no doubt that Eden’s knowledge of the techniques 
of diplomacy was superior to Bevin’s, so he may have found a ‘planning’ body …to be a 
hindrance rather than a help….Much depends on personalities and the essential thing, 
if possible, is to have a highly knowledgeable and practical Permanent Under Secretary 
working with an imaginative minister.  In such ideal circumstances there is probably no 
need of ‘planning’ as such. 629  This does not necessarily imply that Eden had no regard 
for the Committee but, if Jebb’s assessment has validity, rather that it was no longer 
needed as a planning body.  It must, however, still have had some value or it would not 
have continued to exist for a further six years, although it has to be acknowledged that 
its importance was diminished after the setting up, in 1951, of a government review of 
British information activities which resulted in the IRD of the Foreign Office taking a 
closer role, under the eye of the relatively newly established PUSC.  Indeed, this is 
confirmed in government papers, released at TNA in May 2013630 which included 
reference to the fact that the PUSC was established in 1949 when it became apparent 
                                                     
627 Before the advent of computers and, more importantly, e-mails, policy advice from senior civil 
servants to Ministers would have been presented in comprehensive written papers setting out all the 
pros and cons and weighting the options relating to a particular policy issue – ready for the Minister to 
see clearly the whole picture before taking a position (in the case of a matter for decision at Cabinet 
level) or a decision (on a departmental matter). The advent of e-mails and the increasing pressure on 
time has tended to lead to a more fragmented, piecemeal approach to policy advice. This matters less in 
the short-term as all the pieces of the jigsaw are reasonably readily available, but for future 
historians/researchers the piecing together of the evidence will be much more challenging.  
628 Gladwyn.  Chapter 13, Pages 226-227. 
629 Ibid. 
630 TNA: FO 1093/576-582.  Minutes of meetings of Permanent Under-Secretary’s Committee from 
1949-1950.  
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that the Russia Committee was the wrong body to consider “long-term and general 
questions of foreign policy”631 arising from the Committee’s collection of information 
from various sources about communist expansionism. 
Fourthly, and perhaps most tellingly in the context of this thesis, is Jebb’s  assertion 
that the Russia Committee “Certainly.. conditioned our whole policy for ‘containing’ 
Soviet expansion during a very critical time”.632   It might be said that as a key official 
intimately involved in the work of the Committee he might be thought to have been 
exaggerating their influence but nevertheless it is a very big claim from someone who 
was an expert on this field and should not be ignored.  
Another, somewhat, curious secondary reference to the Russia Committee is found in 
a book by Victor Rothwell where he accords the Committee, wrongly, the status of a 
Cabinet Committee.  He is describing the Cabinet’s decision on 14 May 1946 to provide 
aid to Germany on political and humanitarian grounds in part to try to avoid the 
danger of Germany falling completely under Russian influence, and he states that: 
“The final stamp of approval was given to Bevin’s policy by the Russia Committee of 
the Cabinet on 14 May”.633  Clearly, since the Committee was never part of the 
machinery of Cabinet,  this is a mistake on Rothwell’s part but given the date of the 
book, which pre-dates any release of information on the Russia Committee, it may be a 
result of a faulty memory – to which one must assume such personal accounts can be 
subject - that could not have been verified at the time.  It is perhaps useful if only 
through the recognition of the close link between Bevin and the advice of the 
Committee. 
Two other references to the Russia Committee in academic works are found in: the 
Official History of the JIC,634 and in The Hidden Hand,635 both of which are rooted 
firmly in the sphere of Intelligence gathering and both of which provide some 
indications that the product of the Committee was valued.   In his official history of the 
                                                     
631 TNA: FO 1093/583-88 
632 TNA: FO 1093/583-88 
633 Rothwell.  Chapter 6. Page 321. 
634 Goodman.  The Official History of the Joint Intelligence Committee, Volume I.  Chapter 8, Page 242. 
635 Aldrich, Richard.  The Hidden Hand:  Britain, America and Cold War Secret Intelligence.  Published 
John Murray, 2001.  Chapter 5, Pages 122 to 130 to 141. 
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Joint Intelligence Committee, Goodman describes the Russia Committee in 1948 as 
being the existing machinery in the Foreign Office for coordinating action against 
Soviet expansionism and notes that this Committee: “would ensure that JIC 
intelligence assessments were factored into policy advice”.636  This assessment is likely 
to be true since the JIC were represented at most Russia Committee meetings and JIC 
assessments/papers regularly featured in their discussions.  In the Hidden Hand, 
Aldrich, too, draws a close link between the JIC and the Russia Committee.  Referring 
back again to the foreign policy turf war, he says that:  “..the creation of the Russia 
Committee was also a symptom of the continuing Cold War within Whitehall.  During 
bitter arguments about future Soviet intentions, diplomats had used the JIC as a brake 
on the work of the military planners.  But diplomatic control over the JIC could not be 
guaranteed.  Creating the Russia Committee provided a key coordinating centre that 
was controlled by diplomats…This explains its strange remit, which included the work 
of high-level intelligence appreciation”. 637    
 This thesis claims to add to previous knowledge in one major respect and in several 
more marginal respects.  Firstly, the major respect.  The research for this thesis has 
involved a closer and more thorough examination of the output of the Russia 
Committee than any other previous academic work.  It has covered the whole of its 
twelve-year existence, although the thorough cataloguing of minutes and some papers 
concentrates on its first six years.    This in-depth, extensive, research was greatly 
facilitated by the Head of Histories in the Foreign Office638 who had encouraged the 
study and provided unprecedented access to his own collection of papers.   
 
More marginal claims to adding something new to existing knowledge include a closer 
look at some of the diplomats who were involved with the work of the Russia 
Committee and on their relationships with their political masters, notably Ernest Bevin.  
Another, perhaps even more marginal claim is, in some small way, to have thrown a 
little new light of the workings of Whitehall as seen from an insider’s point of view.    
                                                     
636 Goodman.  The Official History of the Joint Intelligence Committee Volume 1 . Page 243. 
637 Aldrich, Richard.  The Hidden Hand:  Britain, America and Cold War Secret Intelligence.  Published 
John Murray, 2001.  Chapter 5, Page 128. 
638 Professor Patrick Salmon, formerly of Newcastle University. 
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Clearly then the research benefitted from access to vast primary material in the form 
of official government archives.  However, one of the more difficult challenges in 
researching and writing this thesis has been the sparcity of secondary material on the 
work of the Russia Committee which, of itself, underlines the lack of verifiable 
evidence of the impact that the Committee had on policy formation.    Nor is there 
much of substance in the personal archives examined for this thesis and in the diaries 
and biographies of key players, though good use has been made of such material.  It 
remains the case, therefore, that there is little material available from studies of the 
subject by historians so that their interpretations of the contribution of this Committee 
to the understanding of the issues and the formation of policy, are largely non- 
existent.  
 So, what if anything can be said, that is evidence based, about the impact of the work 
of the Russia Committee on the thinking of those Ministers responsible for taking 
foreign policy decisions in relation to the Communist threat as perceived by the 
various administrations in the early Cold War years?    Surely any organization which 
exists for twelve years, and survives the changes wrought by three different 
governments during this period, and whose membership is drawn from the great and 
the good of the diplomatic corpus, had to have been seen to be useful and worth 
continuing.  Even if the Committee had been deemed no longer suitable as a force for 
containment by the mid-1950s, it was nevertheless at the earliest part of the Cold War 
the only information gathering body working in the field.  Moreover, the work it had 
been doing had, by definition, to have been considered worthwhile or it would not 
have been necessary for other similar bodies to have been set up.  The PUSC, the IRD, 
the AC(H) the AC(O) were all, in some sense, successors to the Russia Committee.  So, 
while circumstantial evidence may be all that exists to determine the importance of 
the Committee’s work, it cannot reasonably be dismissed. 
Much of the period covered by the thesis was dominated by the two Labour 
Administrations under Clement Attlee and, in particular the first one which lasted a full 
term and which was not hampered – as was the second Administration – by having a 
very weakened majority in the House of Commons.  The first Labour government is 
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commonly recognized as a ‘reforming’ government.  For most chroniclers of this time 
the achievements of the reforming government would relate to the domestic policy 
changes which were introduced, most notably the Welfare State.  The early Cold War 
years were arguably equally important for the achievements of the Labour 
government and, in particular of Attlee and Bevin working so closely on the 
international scene.   As Bennett has written: “As Foreign Secretary since 1945 he had 
not only dominated British policy but had been the major player in the development of 
Western security policy and institutions”. 639  He, it was, who was the driving force 
behind the Marshall Plan, the setting up of the United Nations, the setting up of the 
International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.  Bennett goes on to say that Bevin’s 
“workload and pressure were prodigious” and he was not someone to do things by 
halves.  Roderick Barclay, who became Bevin’s Private Secretary in March 1949 records 
that: “he was told by the Foreign Office, by Buckingham Palace, and by the Chief of the 
Imperial General Staff that his first duty was to keep the Foreign Secretary from 
working himself to death”. 640   Clearly, Barclay was not successful in preventing Bevin 
from doing just that.  
For virtually the whole of the most productive time of the Russia Committee’s 
existence Bevin was the Foreign Office’s political master and well aware from the very 
outset of the Committee’s work which he clearly valued. Once Bevin was no longer 
around, the Russia Committee declined in importance.  It is because of the centrality of 
Bevin and his cadre of top diplomats to the story of the Russia Committee, and the 
close regard that existed between them,   that this thesis argues that the Committee 
has to be seen as having influence, albeit unquantifiable and unverifiable, in the 
forming of Bevin’s foreign policy towards the Soviet Union from his early days as 
Foreign Secretary until his departure in 1951. 
To conclude, there is clear circumstantial evidence that the formation of foreign policy 
towards the Soviets in the early years of the Cold War would have been guided by the 
wealth of information assiduously collected and analysed by the Russia Committee and 
provided to Bevin and other Ministers. There is proof that their advice was seen by, 
                                                     
639 Bennett, Gill.  Six Moments of Crisis . Chapter 1, Page 17. 
640 Barclay. Page 30. 
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and read by, the great and the good. It seems inconceivable that such advice would 
not have constituted a significant element in the factors that influenced the policy 
makers.  As Bennett has said, the Russia Committee played a major part:  “in 
determining how to deal with the emerging circumstances and tensions from the end 
of the war”.641  Beyond that, it is not possible to identify previously unknown specific 
outcomes flowing directly from the work of the Committee. 
Returning to the epistemological discussions outlined in Chapters 1 and 7, historical 
fact, even assuming that such a concept has validity, is not what this thesis has been 
about.  Nor has it been about providing proof of consequences.  Rather it has been 
about forming conclusions of likely results on the basis of information available.  It is 
not possible, for example, to determine exactly when Bevin reached the view that the 
Soviets needed to be firmly countered.  Had he, as argued here, from very early on, 
had serious doubts about the West’s future relations with the Soviets?  Had he held 
back from publicly voicing his views until much later because it was necessary to avoid 
alienating the pro-Soviet backbench MPs in the Labour Party, as well as some of his 
Cabinet colleagues?  Or, had he started off with a genuine belief that the Soviets could 
be brought to agreement, for example on the future of Germany, but been persuaded 
out of that view by the eloquent arguments of his Foreign Office advisers?  Did he, in 
short, like Christopher Warner, have a change of heart?  The answer to these 
questions is that we simply cannot tell.   
The Russia Committee, so long a secret outside of Whitehall, was the first committee 
after the Second World War to examine Britain’s developing, and changing, 
relationship with the Soviets.  This was a new situation.  Nobody knew how things 
were going to develop, nor what would be required to meet the new challenges.  In its 
time the Russia Committee was a vital piece in the jigsaw of intelligence provision to 
the British government on Soviet Communist expansionism, and for a time was the 
only body collecting and analysing all aspects of Soviet activities.  It helped to 
determine how to deal with the emerging circumstances and tensions and inevitably 
                                                     
641 From an interview with Gill Bennett on 17 January 2018 
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influenced the decisions taken by Ministers. The inability to prove the extent of that 
influence does not negate the case for such influence to have occurred.  
So, finally, what did the Russia Committee actually contribute to the Foreign Office and 
the British government’s knowledge and view of Russia and what was unique about it?  
It contributed a huge amount.  The Committee, being a Foreign Office body, was 
uniquely well placed to be the first and the most comprehensive information collection 
agency on all that was newly occurring in Soviet foreign policy changes.  It enabled the 
Foreign Office, as Aldrich has said, 642 to create their own “co-ordinating centre” rather 
than just being a participant in an inter-departmental body.  It did not just gather 
important information from a wide base of expert contributors, it used its experts to 
analyse the date and prepare policy advice papers for Ministers.  As we know from 
Cabinet papers and from Bevin’s statements in Debates in the House of Commons the 
Russia Committee was influential in the decisions that Ministers made.  It was the first 
such body working in the area of Soviet watching at a time when politicians were 
facing new and swiftly changing circumstances.  As Jebb claimed, 643 and which does 
not seem to be too high a claim, it “conditioned our whole policy for ‘containing’ 
Soviet expansionism during a critical time”.    
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APPENDIX 1  Russia Committee Minutes and Key Papers 
 
List of, and summary of, Russia Committee Minutes and Key Papers From 1945 
(Before the Committee was set up in March 1946) through to 1952.  
 
11 July 1945 FO 371/50912.  Minute from Sir Orme Sargent to his then boss as PUS Sir Alexander 
Cadogan, reporting that the Secretary of State – then Anthony Eden – had 
commissioned him to write a ‘Stock Taking’ Memorandum on the general political 
situation at the end of the European War.  Also attached, as was Cadogan’s 
commendation of the Memo to Eden and Eden’s manuscript note saying that the 
Memo and Annexes were all valuable and that he wanted the PM and the Cabinet to 
see them. 
11 July 1945 FO 371/50912.  A copy of what Sargent described as his ‘hurried’ attempt at the Stock 
Taking Memo.  4 single spaced typed pages, 16 paragraphs.  The final paragraph sums 
up the contents of the Memo and reads as follows: 
(a) We must base our foreign policy on the principle of co-operation between the three 
World Powers.  In order to strengthen our position in this combination we ought to 
enrol France and the lesser Western European Powers and also the Dominions, as 
collaborators with us in this tripartite system. 
(b) We must not be afraid of having a policy independent of our two great partners and not 
submit to a line of action dictated to us by either Russia or the United Sates, just 
because of their superior power or because it is the line of least resistance, or because 
we despair of being able to maintain ourselves without United States support in 
Europe. 
(c) Our policy, in order not to be at the mercy of internal politics or popular fashion, must 
be in keeping with British fundamental traditions and must be based on principles 
which will appeal to the United States, to the Dominions and to the smaller countries of 
Europe, especially in the West.  It must be definitely anti- totalitarian, and for this 
purpose be opposed to totalitarianism of the Right (Fascism, & c.) as much as to the 
totalitarianism of the Left (Communism & c.).  In pursuance of the policy of “liberalism” 
we shall have to take risks, and even live beyond our political means at times.  We must 
not, for instance, hesitate to intervene diplomatically in the internal affairs of other 
countries if they are in danger of losing their liberal institutions or their political 
independence.  In the immediate future we must take the offensive in challenging 
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Communist penetration in as many of the Eastern countries of Europe as possible, and 
must be ready to counteract every attempt by the Soviet Government to communise or 
obtain political control over Germany, Italy, Greece or Turkey. 
(d) We must not desist from this course or be discouraged even if the United States give us 
no help and even if they adopt a policy of appeasement towards Russian domination, as 
well they may. 
(e) We must exert every effort to grapple with the economic crisis in Europe – not only in 
our own interests (a prosperous Europe is Great Britain’s best export market) but in 
order to use the material resources at our and America’s disposal as a makeweight 
throughout Europe against Communist propaganda, which the Soviet Government will 
use for their own ends wherever possible.  
21 Aug  1945 FO 371/50912.  Pierson Dixon manuscript note to Secretary of State, now Ernest Bevin, 
mentioning Orme Sargent’s ‘Stock Taking’ Memo “which you have already read” and 
asking Bevin if he wants it circulated to Cabinet.  EB’s almost indecipherable response 
apparently giving assent. 
c24 Sept 1945 FO 371/50912.  Stocktaking After VE Day (Revise) which takes in comments accepted 
by Orme Sargent (very few – mostly as originally drafted in July) and retains same date 
(11 July) though it is on file after a minute dated 24 September 1945. 
2 Oct 1945 FO 371/ N13101/9.  Minute from Pierson Dixon to C F A Warner entitled ‘Russian Aims 
and Tactics’ refers to a conversation between Bevin and Molotov on October 1st when 
the latter revealed the intensity of Russian jealousy of the UK’s strong position in the 
Mediterranean since France and Italy had ceased to be first-class powers and that 
there had been a singular bitterness in Molotov’s attitude at the Council of Foreign 
Ministers Conference in London, then in its final day. 
3 Oct 1945 FO 371/N13101/9.  Minute, from C F A Warner to Orme Sargent headed ‘Russian 
Behaviour at Council of Foreign Ministers’  and referring back to, and commenting on, 
Pierson Dixon’s 2 October observations and concluding that the Soviets were quite 
shocked at the failure of their tactics and at the coverage in the Press which had been 
a novel experience for them.  Warner thought that it was possible that they would go 
away and re-think their future tactics as a result. 
4 Oct 1945 FO 371/N13101/9.   Added Minute to end of  Warner’s 3 October note, from Orme 
Sargent to  Ernest Bevin saying that he agrees with Warner’s analysis and that he 
suspects that Molotov miscalculated the temper of the US and UK governments etc.  
The end of the Minute is initialled by Bevin as having seen/read it but with no 
additional comments. 
231 
 
12 Oct 1945 FO 371/N13452/18/38.  Minute/Telegram from Mr C F A Warner to Frank Roberts in 
the British Embassy in Moscow saying that he has received authorisation, as a special 
exception to the rule, almost certainly from Orme Sargent, to his sending Roberts 
copies of minutes about Russian behaviour at the Council of Foreign Ministers, and to 
seek his views. 
12 Nov 1945 FO 371/13432/18/38.  Response from Roberts saying the 12 October Telegram had 
only just reached him and he would be responding but that he had sent a letter on 12 
October putting London in the picture about speculations concerning Stalin’s health 
etc. He had also been critical about Russia eg on Persia (para 777) where Russia had 
put in troops in contravention of earlier agreements and Bevin was aware of this.  But 
he had chosen simply to say that he was sure that the Persian Government would take 
this up with the Soviets.  
22 Feb 1946 US Department of State Telegram 8963.  George Kennan to George Marshall.  Harry S 
Truman Administration File, ‘Elsey Papers’.   
4 March 1946 CAB 128 20 CM(46).  Ernest Bevin, under item 2 ‘Persia’ , informed the Cabinet that 
without prior notification to HMG and contrary to the provisions of Article 5 of the 
Anglo-Soviet Treaty of 1942 with Persia, the Soviet Government had publicly 
announced their intention to retain troops in parts of Persia after 2 March 1946. He 
informed the Cabinet of the terms of his note of protest to the Soviets pointing out 
that they were in breach of their Treaty obligations. 
8 March 1946 COS (46)69(0) Chiefs of Staff Committee paper ‘Russia’s Strategic Interests and 
Intentions.   
8 March 1946 CAB 80/100.   Sir Orme Sargent Top Secret Minute to the Secretary, Chiefs of Staff 
Committee, saying:   “The Foreign Secretary has received the report on Russia’s 
strategic interests and intentions which has been sent to him by the Chiefs of Staff.  
We wish to ask His Majesty’s Embassy in Moscow for their comments…I enclose copies 
of the telegrams which have been drafted….let me know as soon as possible whether 
the Chiefs of Staff have any comments on these drafts….I understand that the Chiefs of 
Staff considered that in no circumstances should the report itself be transmitted to 
Moscow.  But I presume that they will have no objection to a summary of the 
conclusions being telegraphed so that His Majesty’s Embassy may know against what 
background they are being asked to send their comments….in order to meet the 
requirements of secrecy the Embassy are being instructed to burn that telegram after 
perusal…”.  
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8 March 1946 JIC (46) 1 (O) (Limited Circulation) Final Revise Annex I to Annex IV.  
11 Mar 1946 CAB 195/4:  Taken from CM 23(46).  Discussion in Cabinet about Winston Churchill’s 
Iron Curtain Speech in Fulton, Missouri on 11 March 1946.  Extract from Cabinet 
Secretary Notebooks recording Cabinet Members views of the unauthorised speech of 
the leader of the opposition and Bevin saying that it was suggested in the US press that 
the UK Government had been consulted by WSC in advance but they had not. 
18 March 1946 FO371/N5574.  Report of a meeting in Orme Sargent’s room to brief Sir Maurice 
Peterson (His Majesty’s Ambassador to the Soviet Union from 1946 to 1949) to discuss 
Russian policy and British attitude towards it. Also present were CFA Warner, Mr 
Vivyan, Mr Kirkpatrick, Mr Hall-Patch and Mr Caccia – notably all of whom were 
subsequently involved in the RC. 
This meeting is of great significance re the setting up of the Russia Committee.  Orme 
Sargent – by then the Permanent Under Secretary at FCO, presided over a meeting 
which took a strategic overview of the position re the Soviet Union.  His first concern 
was that the Chiefs of Staff were not as yet persuaded to take an interest in the Soviet 
attitude to the Middle East but the Foreign Secretary saw this as being of ‘high 
importance’ and need to be looked into ‘most carefully’. It was felt that the Soviets 
were not just interested in Middle East oil and that the ‘probability was that their aim 
was not either economic or defensive or ideological, but all three combined’.  Secondly 
the meeting considered whether the Russians were playing from strength or from 
weakness.  If from weakness, they would be unlikely to resort to armed force.  If from 
strength, it would be more dangerous but the JIC paper (see above) had concluded 
that that the Russians would not be prepared to engage in a major war for the next 
five years. Either way, the Russians were dangerous.  Thirdly, the meeting looked at 
what might be done to counter the spread of Communism and Communist 
propaganda.  It was felt that it would be easy to counter propaganda ‘if the 
Government decided to attach Communist doctrines, but not otherwise’.  Orme 
Sargent suggested that a paper needed to be put up but it would need to clearly define 
the aim of our propaganda.  It was suggested, too, that the Dominions Office and the 
Colonial Office should be involved in discussions about how to counter Communist 
propaganda in the British Empire.  NB both were subsequently represented on the RC.  
2 April 1946  FO 371/N56885/N5169/38.  Minutes of 1st meeting on Soviet Policy Co-ordination 
Committee – later called the Russia Committee.   Mr Oliver Harvey (then Deputy 
Under-Secretary) in the Chair and the Secretary was Mr Robin Hankey. Mr Harvey who 
explained that the outcome of a recent meeting with Sir Orme Sargent was that: 
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“a general paper should be put up to the cabinet on policy towards the Soviet 
Union, which it was clear had returned to pure Marx-Leninism, was becoming 
dynamic and aggressive and had opened an offensive against Great Britain as 
the leader of social democracy in the world…Recommendations were to be 
made to the cabinet for a coordinated defence against this long term attack 
and possibly for the adoption of a defensive-offensive in reply…”  
The meeting then reviewed the situation in various parts of the world:  Far East; 
Middle East; Central and South East Europe; Scandinavia; Austria; and Germany; and 
International Organisations.  
 
2 April 1946 FO 371/56832 N6344/605/38.   Top Secret Memorandum entitled ‘The Soviet 
Campaign Against This Country and Our Response to It’ by C F A Warner, to be 
discussed at the RC Meeting 7 May 1946 – see below. 
The paper (which subsequently became known as ‘The Warner Memorandum” sets 
out in seven single spaced typed pages, 28 numbered paragraphs, the evidence of the 
Soviet campaign the future developments; and the ideas for the counter attack. It 
concludes: “28.  To sum up, the Soviet Government, both in their recent 
pronouncements and in their actions have made it clear that they have decided on an 
aggressive policy, based upon militant Communism and Russian chauvinism.  They have 
launched an offensive against social democracy and against this country……The Soviet 
Government makes coordinated use of military, economic, propaganda and political 
weapons and also of the Communist “religion”.  It is submitted therefore that we must 
at once organise and coordinate our defences against all these and that we should not 
stop short of a defensive-offensive policy.  If general approval is given to these 
propositions, further study should be given as a matter of urgency to the various 
suggestions outlined in this memorandum”. 
9 April 1946 Reference to a key paper (not yet found) by Sir William Strang to the Foreign Secretary 
entitled “Soviet Policy in Germany”.  
9 April 1946 FO 371/56885/ N5170/38.  Minutes of Russia Committee meeting.  Mr Oliver Harvey 
in the Chair.  Mr Warner was commissioned to draft terms of reference in consultation 
with Sir Nigel Ronald (which were duly published on 12 April as below). The Committee 
looked at Economic Questions and also reviewed the situation in the same counties as 
on 2 April but in addition, the Balkans. 
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12 April 1946 FO 371/56885/ N5170/38.    Terms of Reference for Committee:   
“To review weekly the development of all aspects of Soviet policy and propaganda and 
Soviet activities throughout the world,  more particularly with reference to the Soviet 
campaign against this country, to ensure a unified interpretation thereof  throughout 
the political and economic departments of the Foreign Office, to consider what action 
is required as a result of the Committee’s review with particular reference to the 
probable degree of support to be looked for from the United States of America and to 
a lesser degree, from France and others: and to ensure that the necessary 
recommendations as to policy are made either by the departments of the Office 
concerned or by the Committee to Sir Orme Sargent, as may be appropriate.  The 
Committee will maintain close contact with the J.I.C. with a view to coordinating 
intelligence and policy at every stage. 
A brief report of each meeting is to be submitted to Sir Orme Sargent.”  
16 April 1946 FO 371/ 56885/N5406.  Minutes of Russia Committtee. Mr Oliver Harvey in the chair. 
The meeting considered inter alia the strategic position of the British Commonwealth 
and the need, in the face of severe manpower restrictions in the armed forces, to try 
to get the Dominions to contribute manpower. A new committee had been set up by 
MOD to look at the manpower problems which would not be solved despite the plans 
for three years conscription.  The FCO was to be represented by Hall-Patch – a Russia 
Committee member so the latter would be kept in the loop on developments. 
17 April 1946 REF  ¨Paper entitled ‘Relations with the United States’ – NB just front page as the rest 
is Retained under Section 3.4 of the Public Records Acts(PRA).  
23 April 1946 FO/371/56885/N5407.  Minutes of Russia Committee.  Mr Oliver Harvey in the Chair.  
The meeting discussed inter alia the importance of securing reductions in Russian 
troops in central and south eastern Europe because of the knock-on effect on Britain’s 
manpower shortages.  The Minister was to raise this with the Americans at his 
forthcoming visit.  Much discussion on countering Communist infiltration into national 
and international organisations and agreement to put up proposals to Sir Orme 
Sargent on dealing with this.  Stock taking on the by now standard Agenda items 
including:  Far East; Middle East; Europe; Economic questions and transportation.  
Under Europe, two interesting points were made:  Sir N Ronald said that the growth of 
Communist influence in France was having a marked effect on the governments of 
Netherlands and Belgium who were becoming nervous of having close connections 
with France; and that Czechoslovakia was “falling more and more into the Soviet 
sphere”. The Russia Committee is casting its net wider than just FO as it becomes clear 
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that the issues under discussion draw in others from, for example, the Home Office, 
Chiefs of Staff, JIC, COI. 
25 April 1946 FO 371/ N5407/5169/G38.  Several memos, including hand written, RMA Hankey 
asked one of his team to find out from Sir Nigel Ronald what had led him to make the 
assertion about Czechoslovakia so that this could be included in the letter Hankey had 
been commissioned to write to the Ambassador in Prague. One of Ronald’s staff, Mr 
Warner, reported back in a handwritten almost unreadable memo as follows:  
“what Sir N Ronald had in mind was the Czechoslovakian Govt’s hesitation 
over joining E.C.O..  First we had Mr Magargu over here stating categorically 
that they would join, the we had enquiries by the Czech Ambassador that they 
would join, then he went back to Prague & there were interdepartmental 
difficulties, then we had enquiries by the Czech  Ambassador that made it look 
as though they were getting down to it;  finally there was Prague telegram 57 
saying to the effect that the Council of Ministers had decided to join, but 
procedure might take some little time.   
In the course of making up their minds the Czech Govt asked Mr (Pridley?) to 
visit Prague (he was at the time – successfully – converting the Poles in 
Warsaw) to explain E.C.O. to them.  They were then most unforthcoming & he 
left Prague in disquiet. 
Sir N Ronald thought all of this indicated a tug of war with the Russians going 
on in the background”. 
30 April 1946 FO 371/ 56885/N5490/5169/38.  Minutes of Russia Committee.  Mr R G Howe in the 
Chair.  The meeting noted the paper on the Soviet Campaign Against Great Britain and 
the response to it had been approved by the Prime Minister. (my underlining). The 
meeting focused, as well as on the by now usual topics, on Sir Orme Sargent’s wanting 
the committee:  
“to pay special attention to economic policy as well as political and to the co-
ordination of the two” 
The Committee is thus widening out its sphere of interest and involving yet more other 
state departments eg Treasury.  Concern reiterated about the Russia making 
propaganda use of Great Britain not having supplied wheat to France when asked:  
“the Russians had speeded up their campaign of vilification against us saying 
for instance that Russians had only given wheat because the Anglo-Saxons had 
failed to help France”. 
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1 May 1946 FO 371/N 5407/5169/38.  Letter (classified Secret) Lambert, FO to A E Welch, Board of 
Trade:  Report that Soviet government prevented British commercial representatives 
from going anywhere in Russia and that we needed to consider whether to adopt 
reciprocity by not letting the Soviets into our commercial areas eg rubber in Malaysia.  
FO seeking BoT advice on whether this would have serious commercial disadvantages 
in terms of further reciprocity. 
 See reply to Lambert in letter dated 22 May from Board of Trade’s John Lechie below 
 
3 May 1946 FO 371/ N 5407/5169/38.  C F A Warner provided Hall-Patch with a draft circular 
(which Orme Sargent had commissioned) and invited Hall-Patch to make any changes 
he thought fit and then to pass it on to Orme Sargent.   
4 May 1946 FO 371/ N 5407/5169/38.   Hall-Patch passes this on to Sir Orme Sargent on 4 May 
1946 commenting: 
“This circular covers the Russian aspect of the Committee’s work very well. 
It makes no mention of any more general activities. You may wish to add 
something to cover this, or it may be better to leave things as they are and see 
how the work of the Committee develops” 
 
6 May 1946 FO 371/ N5407/5169/38.   Sir Orme Sargent responds: in his recent minute: “I should 
like to be certain that this meets the points raised by Mr Coulson minute”. 
 
6 May 1946 FO 371/56885/N6092/5169/38.  Note for discussion at Tuesday’s Meeting. The Note is 
by J M Troutbeck (member of the Russia Committee) who had been asked by Brimelow 
for his views on Paragraph 2 of Warner’s paper on Soviet policy.  The Notes discuss the 
appalling economic state of Germany and the arrangements within the British Zone for 
political management and the representation of the various political parties and 
whether the Communist parties should be allowed to be represented.     
7 May 1946 CAB 195/4:  Taken from CM 43(46).  Extract from Cabinet Secretary Notebooks 
recording Cabinet Members views on Bevin’s proposed Policy Towards Germany. 
7 May 1946 FO 371/N56885/N6092/5169/38.  Minutes of Russia Committee.   Mr R G Howe in the 
Chair.  Mr Lambert, Secretary. The meeting was updated on the items discussed at the 
30 April meeting but notable both for discussing the Warner Memorandum and for a 
reference to recommending to the JIC that they prepare a paper on Russian strategy in 
the Middle East, showing the cross fertilisation of the work/interests of these two 
bodies. 
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10 May 1946 FO 371/N56885.   Note by Mr C F A Warner to Sir Orme Sargent giving a draft 
paragraph to be included in a Circular to FCO Heads of Department on the Russia 
Committee which the latter had already approved. 
13 May 1946 FO 371/56885.   Top Secret Circular from Sir Orme Sargent to Heads of Political and 
International Departments of the Foreign Office, headed “Committee on Policy 
Towards Russia.  Key document which refers to the Memorandum (immediately 
below) and a shorter version of it which has been circulated and it explains why, in 
paragraph 2, it was felt necessary to set up the Russia Committee. 
13 May 1946 FO 371/56885. Top Secret Circular to Heads of Political and Functional Departments 
entitled ‘The Soviet Campaign against this Country and our Response to it”.  Essentially 
this is the Warner memorandum as at 2 April 1946 above. 
14 May 1946 FO 371/56885/N6092/5169/38. Minute (classified Most Secret) to Sir Arthur Street by 
Sir Orme Sargent (no signature but looks like his writing) commenting on putting into 
effect the policy in regard to the Soviets as in the Memorandum (shortened version to 
PM dated 23 April) noting that FO is to begin an anti-Communist propaganda 
campaign. Also concludes that it is important in future to try to foresee Soviet attacks 
on this country.  Reference also to the “explosive nature” of the Memorandum.   
14 May 1946 FO 371/56885/N6523/5169/38.  Minutes of Russia Committee.  Mr R G Howe in the 
Chair.  Mr C T Candy Secretary. The meeting focused on three things:   that use should 
be made of the attitude of Roman catholic church to counter the Soviet Union 
campaign against the UK, as suggested by Lord Addison; Field-Marshall Montgomery’s 
notes on the situation in Germany; and Mr Robert’s minute on Montgomery notes.  
 (NB Victor Rothwell in Chapter 6 of his Britain and the Cold War quotes this paper ref 
as ‘FO 55587/5224 and says “The final stamp of approval was given to Bevin’s policy by 
the Russia Committee of the Cabinet o on 14 May”.  Very confused reference  
14 May 1946 FO 371/56885/N6478/5169/38.  The text of a draft letter from Sir Orme Sargent to 
Oliver Harvey of the British Delegation on Paris attending an international conference 
in Paris to agree a Treaty on, among other things, Reparations.  Sargent stresses the 
need for Ridsdale, a senior FO representative at the conference, to be charged with 
making known, particularly to the Italian press, the Russian attitude to the reparations 
- i.e. that it was the Russians alone who were insisting that Italy paid reparations and 
as a result were delaying the agreement of this aspect of the Treaty.  The notes 
attached to the draft letter include a note from Ridsdale on 24 May saying that 
“…The Russian attitude in regard to Italian reparations was brought out 
clearly and persistently whenever the opportunity presented itself in my press 
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conferences in Paris…I cannot tell to what extent the Italian correspondents 
dealt with the subject or how their dispatches were reproduced in Italy  I only 
know that the Russian demand for reparations and the resistance to it by 
ourselves and the Americans was well and truly stressed”. 
 
15 May 1946 FO 371/56885/N 6092/5169/38.  Memorandum (classified Secret) entitled ‘General 
Review of Intelligence Concerning Russian Military Activities in Europe and the Middle 
East’ under cover note from A E. Lambert, Secretary to Committee, which says that the 
paper is circulated to Russia Committee members:  NB The paper, dated 8 March 1946,  
was also found in COS (46)69(0), entitled  Chiefs of Staff Committee paper ‘Russia’s 
Strategic Interests and Intentions.  The paper outlines three studies being prepared on 
Russian activities: 
a) Russia’s Strategic Interests and Intentions – a Report prepared by the JIC (ref JIC 
(46)1(0)) – to be updated six-monthly to see it the conclusions needed amending. 
b) Fortnightly reports on Russian Troop Movements in South East Europe and on the 
Persian frontier.  Short reports to be produced keeping info updated. 
c) A paper in preparation on Russia’s Strategic Interests and Intentions in the Middle 
East- to be reviewed and updated monthly – possibly to include a section on India 
and Afghanistan. 
The Memorandum also records that the Russia Committee, in addition to ensuring that 
they had sight of the above three regular report updates, would also, “as sufficient 
material becomes available” prepare studies on: 
a. Russian activities in Western Europe; 
b. Russian activities in Austria and Hungary; 
c. Russian activities in Chinese Northern Provinces and in the use of Chinese 
communism to further Russian aims; 
d. The spread of communism throughout the world and the extent of its direction 
from Moscow including Russian use of Diplomatic Privileges and Missions for 
subversive purposes.  
 
15 May 1946 FO 371/56885/N 6092/5169/38.  Memorandum (classified Secret) by I A Kirkpatrick 
entitled ‘Anti-Communist Propaganda’.  A key document, it sets out the factors that 
need to be kept in mind for a scheme for anti-Communist propaganda in a paper 
circulated to the Russian Committee by the Secretary (A Lambert) for discussion at the 
Committee’s next meeting.  
 Summary of factors to be borne in mind setting up propose anti Communist 
propaganda: 
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1. Unlike Russians, UK cannot control domestic organs of publicity – 
dependent on goodwill of our publicists; 
2. Success of propaganda dependent upon engaging Ministers etc.; 
3. Propaganda must be backed up with policy and deeds; 
4. US support ‘invaluable’ and must be maintained; 
5. This is an education campaign and therefore long-term. 
Action at Home needed: 
1. Inform and obtain co-operation of Ministers and Home depts. 
2. Enlist cooperation of MOD Admiralty, War Office and Air Ministry 
3. Engage BBC Home Service via Governors 
4. Engage Chatham House to include suitable material in their publications 
5. Include suitable people in “our Intelligence Summary”    
6. Carefully and gradually influence Home Press and foreign correspondents  
Action Abroad: 
1. Keep Heads of Missions fully updated on purpose/scope of propaganda 
campaign 
2. Provide Missions with info on malpractices of Soviet Govt as opposed to 
Communist party 
3. Enlist support of BBC foreign services who are “much more amenable” 
than Home Service 
4. Request COI to carry suitable material in: London Press Service; feature 
articles which get into large number of foreign newspapers newsreel and 
documents 
5. Arrange for despatch of suitable political lecturers 
6. Prepare a bibliography and dispatch selected books and pamphlets to 
libraries 
7. Arrange visits of foreign TU leaders, politicians etc. to propagandise on 
return 
 
15 May 1946 FO 371/56885/N6274/5169/38. Manuscript Note by Thomas Brimelow stating: 
”Attaches draft circular to Heads of Departments, with a paragraph drawing attention 
to the necessity for foreseeing and preparing to meet in advance Russian moves. 
Further reference on the Note as follows: “See within Minute by Sir Orme Sargent of 
25/5 circulated to heads of Political & functional departments”. (NB no such circular 
attached) 
 
22 May 1946 FO 371/56885/N6847/5169/38.  Letter classified Secret from John Leckie of the Board 
of Trade to A E Lambert replying to the latter’s 1 May letter, basically arguing that to 
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comply with the Russia Committee Secretary’s request for reciprocity to the Soviets 
action of preventing British businessmen from travelling around Russia.  Interesting 
manuscript notes accompanying the letter and commenting on Leckie’s letter.  Thomas 
Brimelow, commenting on 27 May said: 
“Mr Leckie and ourselves are talking at cross purposes.  He has taken our view 
to be to secure increased facilities for ourselves in the USSR; whereas what we 
wanted was to exclude the Russians from S.E.Asia”.  
Lambert then commented that his letter to Leckie was possibly “badly worded” and 
there was a need to explain to the Board of Trade what the FO meant by reciprocity, 
viz:  1)  We have no illusions about getting facilities for our own people in Russia; 2) 
The Russians say they don’t believe in reciprocity; 3)  we propose to say ‘But we do.  
Ergo, if you don’t give us anything you won’t get anything from us.   
25 May 1946 FO 371/56885/N 6274/ 5165.  Top Secret Circular from Sir Orme Sargent to Heads of 
Political and Functional Departments entitled ‘Communist Activities in International 
Federations and Congresses. This Circular warns recipients that the Soviets were 
penetrating existing – and influencing the creation of - international federations of 
various kinds, for example the World Federation of Trade Unions for their own 
propaganda purposes so that such bodies “are made to serve the ends of Soviet 
propaganda and in particular for unscrupulous attacks against this country”.  The 
Circular offers advice on how to handle such issues and which departments of the FCO 
should be informed/asked to advise etc. 
28 May 1946 (Ref? None on paper but clearly from FO 371)   Minutes of Russia Committee.   Mr R G 
Howe in the Chair. Mr Gandy, Secretary. The Committee reviewed the events of the 
week; discussed several specific issues (eg sale of British aircraft engines; Tehran 
telegram etc.) and two substantive ones: 
• the draft circular to HM Representatives abroad regarding the Soviet 
campaign against the UK and response to it:  the draft had been submitted to 
Sir Orme Sargent who had returned it, asking whether it might not be better 
to send Mr Warner’s Memorandum to a select number of Heads of Missions 
rather than give it a wider circulation.  However, “The Committee took the 
view that it was important to inform all Heads of Missions that the policy 
recommended in Mr Warner’s Memorandum had received the P.M. approval 
and therefore formed the basis of HMG’s attitude towards the Soviet Union”.  
Key document   
• the circular to Heads of Departments on Communist activities in International 
Federations:  Mr Caccia, referring to para 3 of the Circular which dealt with 
consulting MI5, asked that such consultations should be done through him.   
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30 May 1946 FO 371/56885/N6847/5169/38 Letter (Secret) from Board of Trade’s ‘H……’ to 
Lambert FO, extending the debate about the free movement of British commercial 
visitors to Russia and to the Balkan countries, and taking a line more in keeping with 
FO views. 
31 May 1946 FO 371/56885/N 6847/5169/38 Letter from Lambert FO to J Leckie, Board of Trade, 
replying to his 22 May letter – see above – and starting off by saying that his 1 May 
letter had been unclear and that what was exercising the FOs Russia Committee was: 
“Apart from political objections to having Soviet representatives establish themselves 
in South East Asian territories under our control, we feel that there may be more 
purely economic arguments against encouraging any Russian penetration there and we 
wanted to have your views on this subject.  The easiest and most logical way of 
keeping them out of South East Asia is to make their entry conditional on reciprocal 
permission.”  
1 June 1946 (No Ref)  5 page memo from J S Steele, Office of the Commander-in-Chief, HQ, Allied 
Commission for Austria (British Element), classified Top Secret, to Sir Arthur Street, 
Head of the Control Office For Germany and Austria, based in Norfolk House, London 
SW1, setting out the former’s very detailed and considered views on the substance of 
the Memorandum produced by Warner, of the Russia Committee, and sent to Street 
by Sir Orme Sargent on 14 May 1946. Both Street and Steele regarded with concern 
and suspicion Soviet policy towards the Western Powers and in particular towards 
Austria which Steele saw the maintenance of Austria’s independence “as an essential 
factor in British foreign policy; for Austria is a salient into the territories that lie behind 
the so-called iron curtain, and the importance of an effective counter to Communism 
here accordingly goes far beyond the confines of Austrian domestic politics”.        
4 June 1946 FO371/56885/N7515/5169/38.  Minutes of Russia Committee.   Mr O C Harvey in the 
Chair.  Mr Gandy, Secretary.  In addition to updating themselves on developments 
since the previous meeting, two items of substance were discussed: 
1. Mr Warner’s Memorandum:  as in the previous meeting, it was noted that Sir 
Orme Sargent had ruled that the draft dispatch to representatives abroad should 
not be sent out but instead Mr Warner’s Memorandum should be sent under a 
suitable covering letter to “a restricted number of posts”.  The meeting discussed 
the terms of the covering letter to be drafted.  “It was agreed that in view of the 
Secretary of State’s refusal to approve the paper on propaganda (see 2 below) the 
covering letter should make it clear that while the analysis contained in Mr 
Warner’s paper had been accepted, its recommendations were still under 
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consideration and could not yet be acted upon.  Heads of Mission should however 
be invited to comment, to discuss its applications to their own posts and to advise 
on measures that might be taken to implement the policy.  The draft covering 
letter and suggestions as to who should receive the Memorandum and covering 
letter to be discussed at the next meeting. 
2. Mr Kirkpatrick’s Memorandum on Propaganda:  this had been submitted to the 
Secretary of State but it had not been approved.  He had requested that “instead 
of publicizing the misdeeds of the Communists, we should concentrate on 
extolling our own achievements.  In this connection he wanted the new Insurance 
and National Health Bills to be particularly stressed”.  
 
11 June 1946 FO 371/56885/N7816/5169/38.  Minutes of Russia Committee.   Mr O C Harvey in the 
Chair.  Mr C T Gandy Secretary.  The meeting included two main items:  
 1:  discussion about circulation of the Warner Memorandum (see 14 May Meeting 
Minutes above). The RC noted that on Sir Orme Sargent’s instructions the 
Memorandum had been redrafted to be sent under cover of a letter and would be 
addressed to a limited number of posts only.  Concerns were identified about the 
secure handling of the Memorandum.   
2:  the RC discussed the JIC paper (JIC (46) 38 (0)) as circulated to RC members, and its 
main conclusions on Russian Strategy in the Middle East, in particular in relation to 
Persian oil fields; and discussions on Russian attitudes to British interests in 
Afghanistan and India.    
12 June 1946 FO 371/56885/GN7959/5169/38.  Letter from John Leckie, Board of Trade, to Mr A E 
Lambert in response to the latter’s 31 May letter, and internal FO manuscript reactions 
to the letter from various FO staff through to August 17 as penultimate recipient had 
mislaid the correspondence.  Leckie argues that there are no economic arguments for 
preventing the admission of Soviet consular and commercial agents to British 
controlled areas of South East. The manuscript notes are interesting as an illustration 
of FO working methods.  
18 June 1946 FO 371/N8183/5169/38.  Minutes of Russia Committee.   Mr Hall-Patch in the Chair.  
Mr Gandy, Secretary. The meeting reviewed the main events of the past week, viz:   
1: Sir Orme Sargent had approved the dispatch of the Warner Memorandum to those 
posts suggested by the Committee provided adequate security could be ensured;  
2:  Soviet attitude towards existing combined purchasing agreements where there 
were signs that the Soviets were by-passing agreement machinery;   
243 
 
3:  financial and banking developments in Germany where Soviet actions in closing all 
banks and freezing assets in the Soviet zone were seriously undermining any hope of 
establishing a united Germany;    
4:  situation in Persia – the Minister of Fuel and Power would be in Tehran on 20 June 
and would discuss with the Ambassador the best way to protect Britain’s oil interests. 
5.  helping ‘our friends’ - in reference back to the Memorandum on Soviet policy, the 
RC discussed what economic, diplomatic and publicity action might be taken once 
Ministers had approved the recommendations in the Memorandum 
6.  application of policy outside FO purview – the RC noted the importance of drawing 
in other departments where the policy impacted their responsibilities.  
 
25 June 1946 FO 371/ 56885/N8376/5169/38.  Minutes of Russia Committee.   Mr Hall-Patch in the 
Chair.  Mr C T Gandy, Secretary.  The Committee followed up their discussions at their 
previous meeting:  on Persia the Committee decided that the US Service Departments, 
in addition to the State Department needed to be kept appraised of developments on 
Persia;  the Dominions needed to be kept updated on the Committee’s work and Hall-
Patch duly was to set up a ‘permanent liaison’ with the Dominions Office;  US pressing 
for the Bank of International Settlement to be wound up as discussed at Bretton 
Woods  – concern as this would adversely impact on Britain and France both financially 
and in loss of influence. 
 
25 June 1946 FO 371/56885/N8467/5169/387.   Top Secret Note to Sir Orme Sargent from Sir Arthur 
Street of Control Office for Germany and Austria entitled “The Soviet Campaign Against 
Great Britain in Germany”, comprises a 9 page note giving comments on a Top Secret 
FO Memorandum “about policy towards Russia” sent by Orme Sargent on 14 May 
1946.   
3 July 1946 FO 800/N8550/971/38.  Telegram to Secretary of State, Ernest Bevin, from 
Washington Embassy (Lord Inverchapel, Minister in Washington. on behalf of HM 
Ambassador Balfour, setting out in detail the deterioration in relations between the 
Soviet Union and the Western Powers and the growing conviction that it was 
‘becoming impossible to bridge the ideological gap between them’.  It reports on two 
recent published articles by John Foster Dulles the central thought of which was that 
the Soviet rulers do not consider that the security of their country can be guaranteed 
until it is possible to eradicate the non-Soviet type of society which dangerously divides 
the one world into incompatible halves.  
9 July 1946 FO 371/ 56885/N9162/5169/38.  Minutes of Russia Committee.   Mr R G Howe in the 
Chair.  Mr A D M Ross, Secretary. Otherwise, usual membership plus ‘Mr P Dean’ – 
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Patrick Dean later to become the Permanent Under Secretary of the FCO and to be the 
official sent by Eden in 1956 to Paris to discuss the Sevres Protocol.  The main item of 
interest was discussion on UK relations with Iraq following discussions between Sir 
Hugh Stonehewer Bird (HM Ambassador to Iraq) and the Iraqi Prime Minister who had 
posed two questions to Sir Hugh:  1.  If his government were to take severe repressive 
measures against Iraqi Communist parties how would, in the UK’s view, the Russians 
react?  The answer given was that Russia would increase the propaganda against the 
Iraqi government and against Iraq’s friendship with the UK but as to possibly more 
drastic steps, it was difficult to judge.  And, 2.  Would Iraq be able to count on GB 
support if the Iraqi’s were to take repressive measures, the answer being that GB 
would not go so far as to place armed forces at Iraq’s disposal but would provide every 
other support.  
15 July 1946 CAB 128 68 CM(46).  Ernest Bevin, under item 1 ‘Council of Foreign Ministers, gave the 
Cabinet an account of the proceedings at the recently concluded Council of Foreign 
Ministers in Paris.  He outlined the very intransigent line taken by Molotov on 
reparations and the latter had made many charges that Britain was not playing their 
part but had declined Bevin’s proposal for an enquiry and Bevin concluded that it 
would be well to bring publicity to bear on Russian activities in this matter.  Cabinet 
also discussed Persia in the light of a general strike in the Persian oil fields and he 
proposed emergency plans to evacuate British and Indian personnel to protect lives, 
and possibly to deploy British forces even though one of the consequences would be 
the probable consequences would be for Russian forces to be deployed in northern 
Persia. 
16 July 1946 FO 371/56885/N9543/5169/38.  Minutes of Russia Committee.   Mr R G Howe in the 
Chair. Mr C T Gandy Secretary.  The Committee concentrated on a report from Mr Hall-
Patch on the Conference of Foreign Ministers.  He said that the UK had been forced to 
give way to the Russians which he ascribed to the weakness of our bargaining position 
for which he identified two causes:  1 the US had been so anxious to get the Peace 
Conference off the ground that they had acceded to many of the demands of the 
Russians to include items and 2, and the main problem, UK had a small delegation of 
generalists whereas the Russians had arrived mob handed with specialists in all of the 
fields under discussion.  He reported that the Council had been unable to reach 
agreement on Germany where it was the US and GN wish for German Unity but it was 
concluded that such unity might be dearly bought at the expense of a nation-wide 
domination of Germany by Russia through the Communist party.  The projected talks 
would fail, and German unity be unachievable unless the Western powers and the 
Russians could agree on an exact interpretation of the Potsdam Agreement.  At the 
245 
 
moment the Russians were construing certain ambiguous passages in this document in 
a sense which did not coincide with our interpretation.  The Secretary of State had 
declared his intention of circulating in due course to the Foreign Ministers a document 
giving the British interpretation of the Potsdam decisions. 
16 July 1946 FO 371/56887/N9460/605/38.  Secret Minute to Secretary of State Ernest Bevin from 
Sir Maurice Peterson, HM Ambassador in Moscow, dated 16 July 1946.  Seven-page 
minute which records the Ambassadors views on Soviet foreign policy and, indeed, on 
the Soviet mindset.  He expresses surprise and pleasure that the Soviets unexpectedly, 
at the Second Conference of Foreign Ministers in Paris, had shown themselves willing 
to try to unlock the deadlock that had transpired at the end of the previous 
Conference. He discusses the need to improve communications – “There are no half-
tones in Russia and the foreign commentator must steer a middle course between the 
Scylla of flattery and the chaybidis of insult” – and to see whether some agreement 
could be reached on the Russian obsession over increasing “bases”. An important 
Minute because it is to Bevin and pulls no punches about the trickiness of the Soviets.  
26 July 1946 FO 371/N10141/5169/38.  Agenda for Russia Committee meeting to be held on 30 
July.  Two items: 
1. Weekly review of important events 
2. “The Prime Minster has drawn attention in a minute to a suggestion made by 
General Gardner that ‘as Russian tactics in Europe and Asia follow the same 
pattern, it would be useful if our representatives in the East could be given early 
notice of tactics followed in the West and vice versa, so that they would be 
forewarned’.  It is proposed to discuss the best means of carrying out this 
recommendation”. 
 
28 July 1946 FO 371/56885/N9929/5169/38. Covering minute from A E Lambert to members of 
the Russia Committee saying that the courses of action suggested in paragraphs 10 and 
11 of the attached memorandum were to be discussed by the Committee at the 
earliest opportunity, and to make recommendations. 
28 July 1946 FO 371/56885/N9929/5169/38.  Secret Memorandum, by Mr Montagu-Pollock 
entitled ‘ British Participation in an International Student Congress To Be Held in 
Prague in August. The paper outlines the issue of Communist infiltration into various 
student organisations and the alleged methods adopted by Communists to wield 
undue influence.  Paragraphs 10 and 11 summarised as follows: 
 Paragraph 10: the Congress was, inter alia, to “lay plans for the establishment of a 
World Student Federation to be affiliated with” the World Federation of Democratic 
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Youth, described as a Communist instrument. The Memorandum considered the 
circumstances that would be faced by any British delegation, members of which would 
be nominated by the NUS, and the pressure they would be under. 
Paragraph 11:    outlined three alternatives “open to us”  
(a) To discourage the delegation from going to the Congress on the grounds 
that they would find themselves the tools of the Communist propaganda 
machine. 
(b) Not to discourage them but to warn them what they are in for. 
(c) To take no action but to ensure that the proceedings of the Congress are 
reported in their true light. 
 
29 July 1946 FO 371/56886 and FO 371/N9930/5169/38. Minutes of a Meeting of the Russia 
Committee Sub-Committee on Publicity.  Sub-Committee, chaired by CFA Warner with 
Lambert, again, as Secretary, examined the questions raised by the Parliamentary 
Secretary to the Minister of State re making available to the Libraries of the House of 
Commons reviews of the Soviet Press and considered the advantages of giving wider 
circulation to such reports.  The best reviews for this purpose were those compiled by 
the British Embassy in Moscow viz a weekly review of Soviet daily press on 
international issues and a Monthly Review of the main omissions and the peculiarities 
in the presentation of world news by the Soviet Press. The sub-committee agreed to 
put to the next full Russia Committee meeting their recommendations that that: 
a. The idea of putting the material in the House of Commons library should be 
pursued with the Min of State’s office 
b. Before the additional material was circulated to a wider selection of public and 
some public bodies, the PM should be asked to communicate with the Press to the 
effect that the British Government would have no problem in their using the 
material.   
 
30 July 1946 FO 371/56885/N10141/5169/38.  Minutes of Russia Committee.   Mr Neville-Butler in 
the Chair.  Mr Gandy, Secretary. The substantive item (see Agenda dated 26 July 
above) was discussed and it was agreed that “it would be best to compile a monthly 
summary on Russian tactics as revealed in the “tour d’horizon” made each week by the 
Russia Committee and to pass this summary by telegram to His Majesty’s 
Representatives in Tokyo and Nankin and to Lord Kilearn, the first summary would be 
prepared at the end of August.  In addition, His Majesty’s Consul-General at Saigon 
should be instructed to inform us of any Russian moves in French Indo-China. The 
Russia Committee directed that the above should be embodied in a note for 
submission through Sir Orme Sargent to the Prime Minister”.  Evidence, therefore, that 
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the PM was aware of the Russia Committee ‘s existence.  The Committee also 
discussed the Student Congress to be held in Prague in August and concluded that the 
only action necessary was to tell the British Ambassador in Prague that we had 
withheld encouragement or support from the delegation and asking him to report fully 
on the proceedings. 
 
6 Aug 1946 FO 371/56886/N10437/5169/38.  Minutes of Russia Committee.  Mr R G Howe in the 
Chair.  Mr Gandy, Secretary.  Three Agenda items:  a. usual update from previous 
meeting; b.  the Paris Peace Conference discussed the future statute of the 
international territory of Trieste and the proposal by the Russians that it should come 
under Yugoslavian (and therefore Soviet) control rather than being independent.   
Publicity problems – it was agreed that in order to see that the publicity machine was 
working at full efficiency “in order that it might be able to meet the possibility of 
Ministers approving an all-out anti-Communist campaign”;  and  c. the fact that there 
was a shortage of newsprint in London which could hamper the efficiency of the 
publicity machine. 
13 Aug 1946 FO 371/56886/N10647/5169/38.  Minutes of Russia Committee.  Mr R G Howe in the 
Chair.  Mr Gandy, Secretary. One item, in addition to the usual update on issues of 
interest to the Committee, was item 4(a) reporting on the Devastated Areas Sub 
Commission and stated that the Russian and satellite representatives on the 
Commission were resisting any attempt to include the ex-enemy countries (the 
definition of which apparently excluded Austria) in the list of countries to be 
considered by the Commission.  The Russian representatives had, however, left it to 
the Poles to openly resist.  The Russia Committee felt that the Russians should be 
made to come out into the open with their views which should then be publicised in 
Italy and Austria. 
20 August 1946 FO 371/56886/N10901/5169/38.  Minutes of Russia Committee.   Mr R G Howe in the 
Chair.  Mr Gandy, Secretary.  The Committee returned to discussing the issue of the 
British Press being reluctant to report anything critical of Russia in case the British 
Government were thought to be against such reports (see 29 July Meeting Note) and 
reverted t the proposal from the end of July that a lead should be given to the Press 
indicating that HMG did not wish to deter the Press from reporting Russian activities 
that would be detrimental to GB.   
22 August 1946 FO 371/56886/N11231.  Note by Lambert to say that it was decided at the Russia 
Committee’s meeting on 30th July that the Committee’s Monthly Reports on 
Developments in Soviet Policy should be distributed to 25 named HM Missions abroad 
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and to the following other government departments:  India Office; Colonial Office; 
Burma Office; Dominions Office; and the Control Office.   
26 August 1946 FO 371/N10647.  Hand-written notes to Mr Gandy (a member of the Russian 
Committee) from Gordon Boyd who had explained in some detail the background to 
the machinations in the Sub Commissions meetings (see 13 August meeting above) and 
that the Russians were playing a low key role leaving things to the Poles and the Czechs 
who were the two countries east of the iron curtain hoping to benefit most from the 
Sub Commission’s recommendations.     
 
28 August 1946 FO 371/56886/N11284/5169/38.   Minutes of Russia Committee.   Mr C F A Warner in 
the Chair.  Mr Gandy, Secretary. The discussion turned again to questions of publicity 
and to the “increasing evidence to show that the Press…was still abstaining from the 
publication of items reflection (sic) unfavourably on Soviet policy”.  Evidently the 
Committee proposed to draft a minute for the Foreign Secretary to send to the Prime 
Minister to deal with this but decided that the draft should await discussions at the 
forthcoming Paris conference on the Balkan Treaties which might generate publicity.  
The Committee agreed, therefore, to put this on hold for discussion a fortnight hence. 
 
28 Aug 1946 FO 371/N10437.  Hand written notes on Minutes  
6 Sept 1946 FO 371/56886/N11516/5169/38.  Cypher to HM FCO Reps Overseas.  An update to 
Overseas Reps on the developments during August 1946 in each of the areas covered 
by Sir Orme Sargent’s Top-Secret Memorandum dated 21 June 1946. 
17 Sept 1946 FP 371/56886/N12335/5169/38.  Minutes of Russia Committee.   Mr Warner in the 
Chair.   Mr Gandy, Secretary.  Wide ranging discussion notable for illustrating the 
breadth of the RC’s interests and concerns in general and for two issues in particular:  
firstly, the Chairman, noting that: 
“our publicity in general was not keeping the public fully informed on two 
important aspects of the present situation, via. The extent and virulence of the 
Russian propaganda campaign against us over the last six months, and the 
reign of terror and oppression which was mounting in countries behind the 
iron curtain”. (ref para 9)  
The RC decided against asking the Secretary of State to ask the Prime Minister to 
intervene with the Press.  However, Warner told the meeting that he had been 
instructed by Sir Orme Sargent to prepare a minute for the SoS on these matters.  
Secondly, Warner said that Sir Orme Sargent had suggested that General Jacob of the 
MOD Chiefs of Staff, who was vitally interested in the subjects discussed but the RC, 
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should be invited to attend meetings.  Warner noted that the RC had decided “some 
time ago” to confine membership to the Foreign Office but given Orme Sargent’s 
suggestion the RC decided that General Jacob should be invited to attend “in his 
personal capacity”. 
24 Sept 1946 FO 371/56886/N12615/5169/38.  Minutes of Russia Committee.  Sir Oliver Harvey in 
Chair.  Mr Gandy, Secretary.  Normal range of subjects discussed notable for two 
items:  reference to Roberts’ dispatch of 4 September but which RC members had yet 
to see so discussion was deferred until next meeting:  and fact that future weekly 
meetings were to be re-timed to accommodate General Jacob’s attendance.  However, 
the RC felt that he should not receive RC papers routinely because of security but that 
this ‘decision’ would need to be cleared with Orme Sargent.  
25 Sept 1946 FO 371/56886/N12449/5169/38. Confidential Memorandum from Ernest Bevin in 
Paris to Cabinet colleagues reporting on a conversation he had had with US Secretary 
of State Byrnes about UK policy towards Russia.  Byrnes had called attention to the 
conduct of the Russians at the Paris Peace Conference and in the Security Council 
where they had attacked the US and the UK without notice and without reason despite 
the US having tried hard to bring about peace and amity with them. 
5 Oct 1946 FO 371/56886 /N12819/5169/38.  Confidential Cypher to heads of embassies in a 
range of countries giving a monthly update of developments in Soviet foreign policy 
affecting various areas of the world.   
9 Oct 1946 FO 371/56886/N12107.  Minutes of Russia Committee Meeting.  Sir Oliver Harvey in 
Chair.  Mr Gandy, Secretary.  Clearly a lengthy meeting and in addition to normal 
membership was attended by HM Ambassador in Moscow, Sir Maurice Peterson, and 
Mr Ashley Clark, from HM Embassy, Paris. Includes a lengthy discussion on the 
establishment of “Cominform” in Belgrade and Russia’s attitude thereto; a discussion 
on economic self-sufficiency in Eastern Europe; and a draft dispatch on Communist 
activities at Non- Governmental International Conferences, a subject that was to 
feature again and again in RC discussions. 
13 Oct 1946 FO 371/56886/N13901.   Cypher Tokyo to Foreign Office.  Records that the summaries 
provided in the Telegrams (see 5 October above) were extremely useful to them in 
Tokyo and that they hoped to continue to receive them. It goes on to describe how a 
series of strikes, accompanied by considerable violence had swept the American Zone 
in South Korea and there was evidence that this was Communist inspired.   
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14 Oct 1946 FO 371/56887/N85609.  And on FO 371/N15609/5169/38.  A draft directive, 
circulated by C T Gandy to RC members, entitled “Russia in the Middle East Publicity 
Directive” dated 11October and written by Mr I A Kirkpatrick. This makes the case that 
although Britain’s problems in the Middle East were not created by Russia, they were 
being “deliberately aggravated by a savage Soviet campaign anti-British propaganda” 
through the Soviet press and radio etc.  He argues that the British reply should be 
twofold:  to show to the Middle East that it is to Britain they should look for guidance 
and support; and to deal factually with the Russian campaign of misrepresentation.    
17 Oct 1946 FO 371/ N/3201/5169/GP.  Cypher Tokyo to Foreign Office.  Provided further update 
on strikes situation at request of the Prime Minister’s Special Representative in Japan.   
17 Oct 1946  FO 371/56886/N13583/5169/38.  Minutes of Russia Committee Meeting.  Mr Hall-
Patch in Chair.  Mr Gandy, Secretary.  General Sir Ian Jacob in attendance in personal 
capacity for first time.  In addition to the by now usual updates, the RC discussed Mr 
Kirkpatrick’s draft directive (see above) and agreed some changes to be made to the 
final version.  General Jacob expressed reservations as to whether the BBC, to whom 
the Directive would be sent, would be willing to compromise the independence with 
which the wider world viewed their broadcasts by engaging in resisting anti British 
propaganda by the Soviets. 
19 Oct 1946 FO 371/56887.  Note from Mr E A Radice to Mr R M A Hankey, covering his Note 
entitled ‘The Dependence of the USSR on Imports from the UK and USA’.  The note is 
interesting because it outlines the kinds of goods the Soviets needed for 
reconstruction after the devastations they suffered during the War.  It says that they 
are not short of raw materials but do need electrical equipment, mining and 
metallurgical plant, oil drilling and refining equipment etc. and it notes that the Soviets 
had assumed that such material would have been forthcoming from reparations from 
Germany and credits from the US, neither of which were likely to be forthcoming as 
the Soviets would have wanted.  The paper also alludes to the question of possibly 
prohibiting exports of certain types of security products or products that could be used 
to develop security products.  
24 Oct 1946 FO 371/56887/N13979.  Minutes of Russia Committee Meeting. N M Butler (later Sir 
Neville Butler) in the Chair.  Mr Gandy, Secretary.   In addition to the normal review of 
recent developments, the meeting discussed Mr Radice’s Note (see above) and 
decided to prepare a letter to the Chiefs of Staff asking them to take note of the RC 
views and to consider including in the ‘Security List’ equipment that could not 
specifically be described as having a military character but which would nevertheless 
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play a part in the process of rearmament;  and also discussed Mr Kirkpatrick’s Publicity 
Directive which had now been approved by the Secretary of State.   
24 Oct 1946 FO371/13583/5169/38.  Note to the Secretary of State, Ernest Bevin, from TIfor Rees 
of the British Delegation, Bolivia, entitled ‘Indications of Soviet Activity in Bolivia’ and 
outlining some relatively low level recent Communist activities in Bolivia, including the 
fact that the Minister of Labour in the Provisional Government had hung a portrait of 
Lenin in his office. 
24 Oct 1945 FO371/13583/5169/38.  Note by R M A Hankey to Sir Nigel Ronald giving detailed 
comments on the latter’s draft circular, about which Hankey was quite critical (see 
Memorandum and Circular below which puts Hankey’s comments into perspective). 
31 Oct 1946 FO371/56887.   Note by W I M Pollock also giving detailed comments on the Sir N 
Ronald’s draft circular. 
1 Nov 1946 FO 371/56887/14732.  Secret Cover Note by A E Lambert to members of the Russia 
Committee attaching Sir Nigel Ronald Memorandum and draft circular for discussion 
by the Committee. 
 The lengthy Memorandum -5 page single spaced, 14 paragraphs – is a think piece 
about the difficulties presented to the Western world by the spread of communism.  
The Circular attached to the Memorandum essentially asks overseas representatives to 
provide answers to six questions:  are there any signs that the interest of any 
important organised body or community, political, religious etc. are being threatened?  
From what quarters do such groups apprehend danger?  What tactics are being 
deployed for defence and how successfully?  Any special precautions against 
infiltration being taken?  Any groups receiving international directives?  Is any 
coalescing?  
 
6 Nov 1946 FO 371/N13576/5169/38.  Confidential Cypher to heads of embassies in a range of 
countries giving a further monthly update of developments in Soviet foreign policy 
affecting various areas of the world.   
7 Nov 1946 FO 371/56886/N14607/5169/38.  Minutes of Russia Committee Meeting. G H Howe in 
the Chair.   Mr Gandy, Secretary.  Committee decided in future to hold a general 
review fortnightly rather than weekly, unless particularly important material needed to 
be noted.  They then discussed the draft circular and memorandum to HM 
representatives abroad which had been prepared by Sir Nigel Ronald after discussion 
with the Minister of State.  It was generally felt that the draft was likely to be 
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interpreted too widely by representatives to elicit useful information and would cause 
representatives abroad a lot of unnecessary work. 
21 Nov 1946 FO 371/56887/N15456/5169/38.  And FO 371/56887. Minutes of Russia Committee 
Meeting.  G H Howe in the Chair.  Mr Lambert, Secretary.  The meeting began with a 
report by Sir Nigel Ronald on the current situation in France and Germany and Russia’s 
interests in both. In terms of the French elections, Sir Nigel Ronald described how 
although the proportion of Communists had remained fairly steady the centre was 
dividing up between the left and right and this was strengthening the Communist 
position in France which he described as having the strongest Communist party outside 
of Russia.  General Jacob asked how many people in France who voted Communist 
actually held Communist cards; Sir Nigel Ronald said he did not know but would look 
into it.   He concluded that the trends of events in France appeared likely to assist the 
Russians at many points and to make our task in limiting Russian encroachment in 
Europe more difficult.  There was an equally detailed discussion of the Soviet policy re 
Germany on which Sir Nigel Ronald thought the Soviets were undecided but Mr 
Warner thought that it was not so much that the Russians were undecided but that 
while running the Soviet zone of Germany under their exclusive control, they reaped 
the advantages of quadripartite control and might thereof over-do lip service to the 
principle of economic unity of Germany without having to carry out any of the 
obligations it involved – a similar principle governed their attitude to the UNO. 
26 Nov 1946 FO 371/66364/N2322/271/38.   Note from A E Lambert to Russia Committee members 
covering comments received on the ‘Warner’ Memorandum sent by Orme Sargent in 
June 1946 to overseas representatives.  Comments from Oslo, Helsinki, Stockholm and 
Copenhagen. 
28 Nov 1946 FO 371/N15458/5169/38.  Minutes of Russia Committee Meeting. N M Butler in the 
Chair.  Mr Lambert, Secretary. Sir Nigel Ronald gave another report to the Committee 
following up his report at the previous Meeting and, answering General Jacob’s 
previous question said that the Communists said that there were about one million 
Communist card holders and the numbers who had voted Communist in the election 
was between 5 and 6 million.  There then ensued a further lengthy discussion about 
both the situation in France vis a vis Communism and the Soviet policy in respect of 
Germany. 
4 Dec 1946 FO 371/ 56887/N15013/5196/38.  Cypher giving a report to overseas representatives 
on the concessions made by the Soviet delegates in the General Assembly and the 
Council of Foreign Ministers. 
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6 Dec 1946 FO 371/ N13576/5169/38.  Usual monthly cypher to overseas representatives giving 
an update on developments over Soviet foreign policy. 
10 Dec 1946 FO 371/56887/N15843/5169/38.  Note by Lambert to members of the Russia 
Committee attaching a paper ‘Anglo Soviet Relations’ prepared by HM Ambassador, 
Moscow, Sir Maurice Peterson, for discussion at the Committee’s next meeting.  He 
also circulated a note by R M Hankey which, basically, argued that Sir Maurice’s central 
theme of putting a list of conditions to the Soviets with the aim of improving relations, 
would be unlikely to produce the desired improvements. 
12 Dec 1946 FO 371/56887/N16004/5169/38.  Minutes of Russia Committee Meeting. R G Howe in 
the Chair.  Mr Gandy, Secretary. The Committee discussed HM Ambassador Sir 
Maurice Peterson’s memorandum on the Anglo-Soviet relations and agreed that it 
would be wrong to dismiss lightly any means of improving relations with Russia, not 
least because there would be virtue in trying so to do and it would enable the 
Secretary of State to assure his Labour party colleagues that he had done his best to 
improve Anglo-Soviet relations. On the other hand, any weakening of the firm line 
taken with the Soviets to date could cause problems.  Following a very full discussion it 
was concluded that the question of an approach to the Soviet Government as 
suggested in the Memorandum deserved the fullest consideration but the Committee 
did not feel able to advise the Secretary of State that any radical change of heart on 
the part of the Soviet Government would be likely to result.  It was agreed, therefore, 
that no approach should be made unless it could be represented as an answer to an 
initiative already taken by the Russians.  It was agreed that the Secretary of State 
should take with him to Moscow a paper setting out the lines of an approach to the 
Soviet Government, to be used if he thought it desirable.  
19 Dec 1946 FO 371/56887/N16244/5169/38.  Minutes of Russia Committee Meeting. R G Howe in 
the Chair.  Mr Gandy, Secretary. The meeting reviewed developments on HMG’s policy 
towards Greece and Turkey, Eastern Europe and the Middle East.  On Greece and 
Turkey it was noted that a decision on HMG’s future policy would not be taken before 
Christmas.  A paper was in preparation on HMG’s future attitude towards countries in 
Eastern Europe where there was a tension between maintaining the UK’s anti-
totalitarian principles on the one hand and seeking to improve Soviet relations by not 
resisting their expansionist policy towards, for example, Bulgaria, Poland and Romania.  
20 Dec 1946 FO 371/56887/N16336/5169/38.  Cover note by R G Howe to Russia Committee 
members seeking their comments on the attached Draft Memorandum entitled ‘Anglo-
Soviet Relations’ - same paper as above.  
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2 Jan 1947  CAB 195/5:  Taken from CM 1(47).  Extract from Cabinet Secretary Notebooks 
recording Ernest Bevin report to Cabinet, and Cabinet colleague’s responses, on latest 
state on Foreign Affairs including latest position on Peace Treaties discussions with 
Soviets and US. 
 
4 Jan 1947 FO 371/56887/ N16363/5169/38.  Monthly update cypher to overseas representatives 
which inter alia notes that Soviet policy had been more restrained in December 1946 
than for some time past which was thought to be due in part with the Soviets being 
satisfied with the outcome of the General Assembly.  Other than that the cipher 
updated the normal issues. 
 
9 Jan 1947 FO 371/66362/N613/271/38.  Minutes of Russia Committee Meeting.  Sir Oliver 
Harvey in the Chair.  Mr Gandy, Secretary.  The Meeting had two items to consider:  
first, the Chairman asked for views on the question raised in the recent memorandum 
on Communist activities as to whether the FCO should imitate the US State 
Department in appointing to UK Diplomatic Missions, specialist in Communism.  It was 
decided in discussion that this was not necessary as HM representatives were in 
general sufficiently aware or the need to report fully on Communist activities;  
secondly, the Committee discussed the revised draft of the minute on Anglo Soviet 
Relations circulated on 20 December and to consider whether the recommendations 
therein were sufficiently positive to put forward to the Secretary of State.  A decision 
on this was postponed until the following meeting when they would have in 
attendance HM Minister in Moscow, Mr Frank Roberts) and could take his views.   
16 Jan 1947 FO 371/   NO REF.  Minutes of Russia Committee Meeting.  Sir Oliver Harvey in the 
Chair.  Mr Gandy, Secretary.  Mr Frank Roberts (of Long Telegram) attended the 
meeting.  Sir Oliver drew attention to the apparent hardening of expert opinion in 
Whitehall in regard to the possibility of maintaining future peace with the Soviets and 
asked Mr Roberts to opine on whether this was justified. He described Soviet problems 
both internal and external.  Their internal problems were largely economic as the 5-
year plan was not going to schedule and the bad grain harvest in 1946 had led to food 
rationing bordering on starvation in the Ukraine; the people were becoming 
disillusioned.  Externally, the Soviets feared the closeness of the US and UK and, of 
course, the US atomic bomb.  A distinction was drawn between Molotov and his 
aggressiveness – which was perceived by many to be the ‘real’ stance of the Soviets 
and the sometimes more conciliatory comments by Stalin.  Interestingly, the 
Committee felt that the appearance of a more accommodating Soviet mood might be 
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designed to provide communication for the critics in the Labour Party who were 
pressing Ernest Bevin to make more concessions re the Russian attitude than he had 
previously been prepared to do.  
20 Feb 1947 CAB 129 (47) 68.  Memorandum to Cabinet by Secretary of State, Ernest Bevin, entitled 
‘Main Short-term Problems Confronting US in Moscow.  The paper concentrates on 
what would be likely to be the most crucial part of the discussions in the forthcoming 
March Moscow meeting, namely the short-term economic and political problems of 
Germany.  Bevin, speaking to Cabinet colleagues rather than to Labour Party critics, 
makes harsh assessments throughout the paper on the Soviet stance and their going 
back on Potsdam agreements.  He says that:  “It is most important ...that the 
responsibility for failure at Potsdam should be placed fairly and squarely on the 
shoulders of the Russians who are entirely responsible for the present state of affairs” 
(paragraph 11).   
26 Feb 1947 Warner circular letter on Communism outside of the Soviet Union.  Not yet found. 
27 Feb 1947 FO 371/66365/N3125/271/38.  Minutes of Russia Committee Meeting.  Mr Butler in 
the Chair. Mr Gandy, Secretary.  The Committee discussed Soviet propaganda against 
the UK; Revisions of Anglo-Soviet Treaty; developments in the previous two weeks; 
Communist parties in Italy and France; and the Far East.  On the first item, Mr Warner 
informed the Committee that the Soviet propaganda machine had now been turned 
against the internal policy of the UK Government and was attacking the leadership of 
the Labour Party.  Bevin had therefore decided that he would mention this in his next 
Foreign affairs speech and had duly included a passage in his next debate speech.  
Warner had also suggested to Bevin that he should confront Stalin and ask him 
whether such a policy of hostility could be reconciled with the Treaty of Alliance and 
Collaboration to which he was a signatory.  In addition, the Committee endorsed a 
suggestion by Mr Jebb (also present for the meeting) that he should prepare a dossier 
of Russian attacks on the UK in the United Nations, which Bevin might also wish to 
point out to Stalin. 
24 March 1947 FO 371/66439.  A collection of papers on lectures on Russia given by Thomas Brimelow 
(later Lord Brimelow) to the Joint Services Staff College in March, July and September 
1947 (and February 1948). 
10 April 1947 FO 371/66369/N6359/271/38.  Minutes of Russia Committee Meeting.  Mr R M 
Makins in the Chair.  Mr Gandy, Secretary. The meeting discussed Communist parties 
outside of Europe; The Anglo-Soviet Treaty; and the Russian internal economic 
situation. On the first of these topics the Committee agreed to redraft Warner’s 
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circular in the light of any comments received to his circular of 26 February and the 
final draft would then be sent for comments to HM Embassies in Moscow and 
Washington and then, afterwards, perhaps circulated to Ministers.  The Committee 
discussed the tactics for revising the Anglo-Soviet Treaty and the Committee agreed 
that Mr Warner should submit a minute to Sir Orme Sargent giving his observations 
and suggesting that the UK delegation in Moscow should have their attention drawn to 
several points that were giving rise to concern in the Russia Committee. On the Russian 
internal economic situation the Committee discussed and gave comments on a paper 
circulated by Mr Hankey and Mr Radice and agreed that once their comments had 
been taken on board the paper should be submitted to Sir Orme Sargent with a view to 
its being circulated for information to major posts abroad. 
24 April 1947 FO 371/66368/N4991/271/38.  Minutes of Russia Committee Meeting.  Mr I A 
Kirkpatrick in the Chair.  Mr Lambert, Secretary.  The Committee discussed the 
outcome of a meeting on 21 April between HM Ambassador in Moscow and M 
Vyshinsky on a revised version of the British draft Treaty which had been sent to the 
Soviet Government on 3 April.  No progress had been made at the meeting and no 
date fixed for a further meeting. It was felt that the Soviets would put blame on the UK 
for failure to achieve progress.  It was noted that the Daily Worker, in an article on 23 
April, had started attacking HM Government and, in particular, the Foreign Secretary.  
The Committee then went on to outline the lines which should be taken in response to 
a Russian propaganda campaign.  They concluded that two papers should be prepared 
for submission to the Secretary of State:  the first should comprise guidance to the 
British Press; the second should cover the more technical points arising out of the 
Treaty. 
29 April 1947 FO 371/66368/N5124/271/38. Minute by R M A Hankey to the Russia Committee 
which refers to an earlier discussion (see 9 January minutes) about whether to follow 
the US example of appointing staff in Embassies etc. abroad who were experts in 
Communism and the fact that it was felt that this policy did not amount to very much 
more than was already done within  UK overseas missions and that the Russia 
Committee itself, which transmitted to, and received information from, UK 
representatives abroad, was itself an important piece of machinery for coordinating 
the work of the political and publicity departments.  However, it was agreed that as an 
additional source of information, diplomats from abroad who were on leave in London 
or otherwise on duty should be encouraged to visit the Northern Department and 
report any information of relevance. Hankey expressed the view that such a request 
should properly come from Sir Orme Sargent as the PUS. 
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2 May 1947 CAB 195/4:  Taken from CM 43(47).  Extract from Cabinet Secretary Notebooks 
recording Bevin’s report to Cabinet on the Moscow meeting of Council of Foreign 
Ministers (which ended after six weeks on 25 April) which itemised all the areas of 
disagreement between the US and UK and the Soviets.    
8 May 1947 FO 371/66369/N6314/271/38.  Minutes of Russia Committee Meeting.  Sir Edmund 
Hall-Patch in the Chair.  Mr Gandy, Secretary.  The latter gave the Committee a report 
on the Moscow Conference. The UK delegation had arrived in Moscow ‘full of 
apprehension’.  The Secretary of State had refused to commit to partial solutions to 
the outstanding problems at the initial stages of the Conference and subsequently 
tabled a paper ‘Revised Potsdam’ which surprisingly the Russians had seemed to 
accept in large measure.  German reparations were, as always, the main stumbling 
block with the Russians seeking more than the US and UK were prepared to go along 
with.  The next Council of Foreign Ministers would be held in November when 
decisions on reparations would need to be made.  The Committee also referred back 
to the 28 April proposal and agreed that visiting Heads of Chancery etc. could be 
invited to attend Russia Committee meetings while in London. 
16 May 1947   FO 371/66368/N5124/271/38.  Note by A E Lambert to Heads of Chancery and His 
Majesty’s Missions Abroad, setting out the request discussed on 29 April above. 
22 May 1947 FO 371/66369/N6315/271/38.  Minutes of Russia Committee Meeting.  Sir Oliver 
Harvey in the Chair.  Mr Gandy, Secretary.  The Committee considered the responses 
from overseas representatives to Mr Warner’s 26 February on Communism outside of 
the Soviet Union.  Need missing 26 Feb paper to make sense of comments but 
Committee agreed that once the Memorandum had been amended to reflect their 
comments it should ‘go forward’.  The Committee also discussed inter alia the state of 
negotiations for a revised Anglo-Soviet Treaty.    M Vyshinski had had further 
discussions with HM Ambassador in Moscow with a measure of success in reaching 
some agreement on the terms of the revision, albeit with some difference in view 
about the revisions between Sir Orme Sargent and the Chiefs of Staff.  In connection 
with the Treaty, Izvestia had published an editorial with ‘a slashing attack’ on the 
Secretary of State’s recent speech in the House of Commons, claiming that his version 
of the negotiations for a revised Treaty did not correspond with the facts and that the 
UK version would worsen, not improve, the present Treaty. 
25 May 1947 FO 371/66369/N6315/271/38G.  Minute by Mr Ashton-Gwatkin, following the 
discussion on Communists outside of the Soviet Union, giving his further views (he had 
been at the 22 May RC meeting) basically arguing that Communists outside of the 
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Soviet Union were likely to become disillusioned as they witnessed how things were so 
much better in the US and even in the UK as compared with in Russia, and suggesting 
that the facts of Russia’s poverty and backwardness, so obvious to anyone visiting the 
country, should be given greater publicity. 
16 June 1947 FO 371/66369/N6315/271/38G.  Note by Thomas Brimelow commenting on Ashton-
Gwatkin’s note and that this had been discussed at a meeting on 9 June under Mr 
Jebb’s chairmanship and noting that Mr Troutbeck (who had also been present at RC 
Meeting on 22 May) had written: “Personally, I feel we should do better to put the 
whole proposition into cold storage for the moment” because it seemed doubtful that 
it was the right time to open propaganda campaign against the economic weaknesses 
of the USSR. 
17 July 1947 FO 371/66371/N8811/271/38.  Minutes of Russia Committee Meeting.  Mr I A 
Kirkpatrick in the Chair.  Mr Gandy, Secretary.  The Committee discussed:  the Marshall 
Offer; the next session of the General Assembly; the Japanese Peace Treaty; and 
circulation of the Committee’s minutes.  Discussion on the Marshall offer centered on 
the disruptive behaviour of the Russians at the recent Paris Conference where they 
had walked out at once and subsequently caused their satellites to leave the 
conference, and their reasons for so behaving.  Despite this behaviour the Secretary of 
State was of the view that European unity should not be despaired of until after the 
November conference of Foreign Ministers.  On the General Assembly, Mr Jebb 
reported that the US view was that the next session should see an all-out Anglo-
American campaign against Russia and satellite behaviour in Eastern Europe.   But this 
would not be compatible with the current idea of doing a deal with the Russians over 
the admission of new members so the Committee agreed that the US Embassy should 
be informed that their proposal could not be decided upon until nearer the time.  On 
circulation of the Committee’s minutes, Sir Orme Sargent had enquired whether they 
were sent to HM Embassy in Moscow.  They were not and the Committee agreed it 
was not necessary to do so. 
31 July 1947 FO 371/66371/N9345/271/38.  Minutes of Russia Committee Meeting.  Mr I A (Ivone) 
Kirkpatrick in the Chair.  Mr Gandy, Secretary.  The Meeting discussed:  publicity about 
USSR; Socialist parties in eastern Europe; Ex-Italian North Africa; troubles in Indonesia; 
and Anglo-Russian relations generally.  On publicity, the Committee considered a 
minute circulated by Mr Kirkpatrick setting out arguments for and against a more 
actively critical line in UK publicity about Russia in the light of the failure of the Trade 
talks and their attitude to the Marshall offer.  They agreed that it would not be politic 
to recommend any drastic changes to the policy until after the November Conference 
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and that a campaign of propaganda against Russia by the BBC at that time would serve 
to undermine the latter’s reputation for objectivity.  It would also be at odds with the 
situation with satellite countries which was impacted by the directive earlier in 1947 by 
the Secretary of State to HM representatives abroad to maintain correct relations with 
the satellites.  Moreover, obstructive Russian tactics were already showing signs of 
damaging Communist influence in the UK and clumsy Russian propaganda was serving 
our cause well in the US.  Therefore, the Committee agreed that no recommendations 
on publicity should be made to the Secretary of State at the present stage. On Anglo-
Russian relations generally, the Committee was informed that the revised Anglo-Soviet 
Treaty was in cold storage though if the Russians suggested a further meeting the UK 
would agree.  On Anglo-Soviet Trade Talks, the Soviet Government had decided to pay 
only 50% of the instalment due on 1 August.  
14 Aug 1947 FO 371/66371/N9549/271/38.  Minutes of Russia Committee Meeting.  Mr C F A 
Warner in the Chair. Mr Gandy, Secretary.  The Committee considered:  the general 
policy towards Russia; the Ratification of Treaties; the Marshall Plan; United States Aid 
Broadcasts to the USSR; the international situation:  and Commonwealth relations.  
With Sir Maurice Peterson (HM Ambassador in Moscow) present at the meeting, he 
described how the atmosphere in Moscow had changed for the worse recently and the 
breach between East and West now appeared to the Russians to be an accomplished 
fact, and one that the US also acknowledged.  The Secretary of State (who had to 
contend with the risk of a split in the Labour Party) continued to maintain that we 
should not sanction any policy of despair at being able to reach some agreement with 
the Russians until after the November Conference.  However, as the hope of a change 
of heart on the part of the Russians was so slight there was a need to make alternative 
plans.  On the Russian internal situation, Sir Maurice Peterson reported that the grain 
harvest had proved better than in 1946 though it had still not reached pre-war levels.  
He had seen few signs of the much-publicised mechanisation under the Five-Year Plan 
and thought that the oil production of the USSR was between 50 and 60% of pre-war 
levels.  Sir Maurice was asked what he thought liable to happen on Stalin’s death and 
said that although Molotov was the “heir to the throne” he lacked popular appeal and 
it might fall to some other member of the Politburo to fill the gap.   
28 Aug 1947 FO 371/66371/N10279/271/38.  Minutes of Russia Committee Meeting.  Mr C F A 
Warner in the Chair.  Mr Brimelow acting as Secretary.  The meeting discussed:  a 
review of current events; membership of Russia Committee; Mr Passant’s minute on 
the resemblance between the Soviet political system and the one-party system of the 
defeated Axis powers; EID paper on Soviet Trade agreements with the satellites.  On 
membership of the Committee, it was agreed that Mr Gee should be invited to future 
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meetings and that Mr Passant should become a member.  On Mr Passant’s paper, Mr 
Warner suggested that a paper should be drafted, not for publication, but as a basic 
brief for use in the Middle East and possibly for use elsewhere if Ministers at any time 
authorize anti-Communist and anti-Soviet publicity.  Once drafted the paper would be 
circulated to the Russia Committee for discussion at a future meeting.   
11 Sept 1947 FO 371/66372/N10896/271/38.  Minutes of Russia Committee Meeting.  Mr I A 
(Ivone) Kirkpatrick in the Chair and three guest attendees.  Mr Gandy, Secretary.  The 
Meeting discussed:  Germany; and Austria.  On Germany, the focus was on what the 
Russian attitude was likely to be at the forthcoming November Council of Foreign 
Ministers where it was feared that they would press for unreasonable concessions and, 
if and when unsuccessful, would blame the Western powers for non-achievement of 
German unity.  On Austria, Mr Dean reported that there had been no progress on the 
Austrian Peace Treaty because the Russians would only sign if they could acquire a 
large portion of German assets in Austria and he emphasised that it was important the  
UK agreed a common line on Austria with the US.  
26 Sept 1947 FO 371/66371/N11688/271/38.  Minutes of Russia Committee Meeting.  Mr C F A 
Warner in the Chair.  Mr Lambert, Secretary. Sir Maurice Peterson (HM Ambassador, 
Moscow) in attendance. The meeting discussed:  Russian participation in the Japanese 
peace settlement; and recent developments affecting Russian policy.  On Japan, the 
Committee noted that the Russians had rejected the US proposal for a preliminary 
conference on the Peace settlement with Japan.  It was debated whether one should 
press on without Russian participation and whether the UK should wait to see what 
the US decided or should tell them of the UK views; it was noted that the US 
Presidential elections also affected the US attitude and the timing. The Committee 
discussed the likelihood of the subject being raised at the November Conference and 
concluded that the Russians could well raise the subject.  It was concluded that it 
would be to the UK’s advantage to give the UK’s views to the US and the Japan 
Department would be asked to prepare a minute for submission.  The Committee also 
noted that when they had had time to examine the JIC’s report on Communism in 
South East Asia the question of improving liaison between the Foreign Office and the 
Colonial Office on matters concerning Communism in colonial territories should be re-
examined.  Finally, reference was made to a recommendation by the JIC that the 
number of Soviet officials stationed in the UK should be reduced but there were 
difficulties with such a proposal which the Committee would need to re-examine in 
consultation with the Security Departments. 
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8 Oct 1947 FO 371/66296/N13332/49/38.  Note by Mr Lambert to Russia Committee, entitled 
‘Communist tactics at International Congresses, covering a draft paper on Communist 
activities at non-governmental international conferences for discussion at the next 
meeting of the Committee.   
9 Oct 1947          FO 371/66372/N12137/271/38.  Minutes of Russia Committee Meeting.  Sir Oliver  
Harvey in the Chair.  Mr Gandy, Secretary.  The Committee discussed the  
establishment of ‘Cominform’(Communist Information Forum)  founded by Stalin in  
September 1947 to draw together the Communist satellite countries in Belgrade; 
economic self-sufficiently in Eastern Europe; and the draft dispatch on Communist  
activities at non-governmental international conferences.  A wide-ranging discussion  
took place on the significance of the Russian move to set up Cominform which had  
been the subject of a telegram (No 2212) from Frank Roberts.  It was felt that the  
Russians might believe that the present economic difficulties in Europe would increase  
and spread to the US and thus that the whole non-Communist world might be  
ready to plunge into economic chaos.  But, with the November Council of Foreign  
Ministers around the corner the tactic appeared to have finally caused Monsieur  
Bidault to lose patience with the Russians.  And in the UK the public’s attention had   
been drawn to the Russian campaign against the UK which had hitherto largely gone  
unnoticed.  The Committee discussed how to present this situation to the Secretary of  
State and it was decided that when Mr Roberts fuller analysis had reached London it  
should be correlated with the Committee’s discussions and a note prepared for  
circulation and, if necessary, an ad hoc meeting of the committee would be held, after  
which it would be submitted to the Secretary of State together with draft Intel to  
posts abroad for his approval.  The Committee then considered a paper drafted by Mr  
Radice on the prospect of Eastern Europe becoming economically independent of the  
West in the near future in which he concluded that this could happen by 1950 or 51.   
Finally, Mr Warner raised the subject of the draft circular on Communist activities  
at non-governmental international conferences saying that he was not satisfied with  
the draft which gave the impression of the Committee despairing of ever taking any 
 action in London to warn British delegates against Communist tactics at such  
conferences.  He suggested and the Committee agreed that other government  
departments should be asked to inform the Foreign Office before important  
conferences took place so that the FO could consider whether anything could be done  
against anticipated Communist tactics.  
 
23 Oct 1947 FO 371/66374/N13701/271/38. Minutes of Russia Committee Meeting.  Mr Kirkpatrick 
in the Chair.  Mr Gandy, Secretary.   The Committee continued their earlier discussion 
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on ‘Cominform’ and were informed that the Secretary of State had taken note of Mr 
Roberts’ preliminary analysis  but had ruled that no ‘Intel’ on the subject should be 
sent out, as had been suggested at the Committee’s last meeting because he wished to 
wait for further evidence of the effect on which the setting up of the ‘Cominform’ was 
going to have on Communist plans in Europe and would probably await the outcome 
of the November Conference.  Later in the meeting General Jacob said that while the 
Russians were coming more and more into the open with their attacks on the US and 
UK there was no sign of any official reaction in the UK and as a result our publicity 
organs were handicapped.  
 
5 Nov 1947 FO 371/66296/N13332/49/38.  Note by Mr Lambert to Mr Warner attaching a 
redrafted note on Communist manoeuvres at international non-governmental 
congresses, redrafted to pick up on the comments made by the Committee at their 9 
October meeting. An added manuscript note shows that Mr Warner was happy with 
the redraft.   
6 Nov 1947 FO 371/66373/N13180/271/38.  Minutes of Russia Committee Meeting.  Sir Oliver 
Harvey in the Chair.  Mr Gandy, Secretary. The Committee business included:  a paper 
on the ‘foundation of Stalinism’; economic relations with Eastern Europe; and political 
developments in Eastern Europe subsequent to the establishment of the ‘Cominform’.  
The paper on Stalinism was deferred for discussion at a meeting scheduled for 13 
November after which it was proposed to submit it to the Secretary of State.  The 
Committee considered Mr Radice’s paper as circulated on 20 October and agreed that 
it should be submitted to the Secretary of State under a short covering minute 
emphasizing that it contained a purely factual appreciation.   
7 Nov 1947 FO 371/66373/N12755/271/38.  Top Secret Memorandum by Mr A E Lambert, 
Secretary to the Russia Committee, Headed ‘Russia Committee - The Cominform’ as 
circulated to FO Heads of Department.  Interestingly it begins by saying that the 
Secretary of State is suspending judgment on the real significance of the Cominform 
until we can see whether it results in changes to Soviet policy and tactics.  However, 
the Russia Committee still decided to circulate to Heads of Department and to ask 
them to keep their eyes open for changes. 
8 Nov 1947 FO 371/66373/N12959/271/38.   Memorandum from Sir Maurice Peterson, HM 
Ambassador in Moscow, to Secretary of State, Ernest Bevin (received 13 November)  
providing, in advance of the November Council of Foreign Ministers meeting to be held 
in Paris in November,  a lengthy analysis of the course if Anglo-Soviet relations  since 
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the last meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers in Moscow in April 1947.  It is a 
pessimistic analysis from the man on the spot in Moscow.   
10 Nov 1947 FO 371/66373/N12755/271/38.  Top Secret Memorandum by Mr Warner to Heads of 
Mission and HM representatives abroad making the same point as Lambert above re 
Secretary of State’s stance and asking that representatives to draw to the Russia 
Committee’s attention anything which seems to constitute evidence in support of the 
theory of a new phase in Soviet attitudes and tactics as the Committee wishes to 
collect and collate such evidence for the Secretary of State.  
13 Nov 1947  FO 371/66373/N12959/271/38.    Memorandum from R M A Hankey to Mr Warner 
and also initialled by Sir Orme Sargent as having been read by him, describing and 
attaching Sir Maurice Peterson’s 8 November Memorandum and putting his own gloss 
on Peterson’s views.   
21 Nov 1947 FO 371/66297/N13619/49/38.  Covering minute from Mr Lambert to Sir Oliver Harvey 
attaching the first periodical summary for the Secretary of State on concrete evidence 
that the Declaration of the Cominform marks a new departure in Communist and 
Soviet policy.  The attached Top-Secret Memorandum pulls together comments 
received, to be passed on to Ernest Bevin, from Embassies in Austria; Hungary; 
Bulgaria; Czechoslovakia; Yugoslavia; Romania; France and Italy. 
22 Nov 1947 FO 371/66296/N13332/49/38.  Minute William Hayter to J A Drew, Cabinet Office, 
following up earlier discussions on the question of counteracting political manoeuvres 
of Communist delegations to international non-governmental congresses and the steps 
that might be taken to put British delegates on their guard.  The remedy would be to 
get hold of such British delegates in advance and warn them but this could be 
misinterpreted and resented as infringement of freedom and he spelt out how this 
might be done but said that they required some machinery for centralizing the 
information the Foreign Office received and asked whether the Working Party on 
which he, Hayter, represented the Foreign Office – and therefore a Cabinet Office 
Working Party – might be willing to circulate the paper to the Government 
Departments most likely to be concerned.   
5 Nov 1947 CAB 128/10/90 (47)2.  Cabinet Minutes where the Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin, 
spoke to colleagues about his lack of optimism about the fifth Council of Foreign 
Ministers Conference that was to open in London later that day.  The minutes record 
Bevin as saying: 
“There were no indications that the Soviet Government would be more 
accommodating than they had been at the last meeting in Moscow.  Indeed, 
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their action in establishing the Cominform, in strengthening their political 
control in the satellite countries of Eastern Europe and in fomenting industrial 
troubles in many parts of Western Europe seemed to suggest that they had no 
present desire to reach agreement with the Western powers for the peaceful 
settlement of Europe.  There was, therefore, little ground for hoping that the 
Council of Foreign Ministers would be able to make much progress towards 
agreement on the main issue still outstanding in connection with the Peace 
Treaties for Germany and Austria.  The Foreign Secretary said that, if the 
proceedings at this meeting confirmed his fears, he would have to ask the 
Cabinet to consider a fresh approach to the main problems of our foreign 
policy”.  (Item 2)   
This underlines that although Bevin was being cautious with the suggestions coming 
from his FO team, and was careful in the House not to antagonize his pro-Russia 
Labour colleagues, he clearly had not only reached a pessimistic view of Soviet tactics 
but was prepared to go on record – albeit in the controlled environment of the Cabinet 
- to express these views.   
  
4 Dec 1947 FO 371/66375/N14304/271/38. Minutes of Russia Committee Meeting.  Mr C F A 
Warner in the Chair.  Mr Pridham, Secretary.  The Committee discussed inter alia the 
draft memorandum on Cominform; the Council of Foreign Ministers; and US attitude 
towards Russian policy.  The terms of the draft memorandum relating to Cominform 
were agreed subject to certain amendments and it was agreed that it should go 
forward not just to the Secretary of State but also the Minister of State and the 
Parliamentary Under-Secretary but not be circulated to posts abroad or given further 
distribution in London.  On Council of Foreign Ministers Conference then taking place 
in London, the Committee suggested that it was important to foresee what the UK 
publicity should be in the event of a breakdown (which did occur) and General Jacob 
drew attention to the fact that Ministerial speeches were an essential preliminary to 
any propaganda operation and that the Secretary of State should be advised to make a 
statement either at the Conference or immediately following it to give maximum effect 
to the publicity and Mr Warner agreed to discuss this matter with Sir Orme Sargent.   
18 Dec 1947 FO 371/66375/N14892/271/38. Minutes of Russia Committee Meeting.  Mr I A 
Kirkpatrick in the Chair. Mr Pridham, Secretary.  The Committee agreed, subject to 
some amendment, that the draft periodical summary seen at the previous meeting 
should go forward.  The Committee went on to discuss Mr Gladwyn Jebb’s draft 
Memorandum on the future of the United Nations and the Soviet’s attitude to the UN 
and the whole question of security that the UN could provide to its members.   
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5 Jan 1948 CAB 129/23 CP (48)5.  Memorandum to Cabinet by Ernest Bevin entitled ‘Policy in 
Germany’ (circulated to Cabinet on 6 January). This paper sets out the situation 
resulting from the breakdown of the Conference of Foreign Ministers, explaining that it 
was not unexpected, though Bevin had, before the Conference, not abandoned hope 
that the issues around trying to reach agreement on German policy would be resolved.  
He now felt that the UK and Western powers had to consider urgently but soberly 
what their future policy in Germany should be in response to Russia’s intransigence.  
4 Jan 1948 CAB 129/23 CP (48)6.  Memorandum to Cabinet by Ernest Bevin entitled ‘The First Aim 
of British Foreign Policy’ (circulated to Cabinet 5 January). When discussed by Cabinet 
on 8 January (see below), the Cabinet endorsed the policy outlined in CP(48)6 but felt 
that too much emphasis should not be laid on its anti-Soviet aspect.  In reply Bevin was 
reported as saying:  ‘it would be impossible for him to give an effective lead without 
being critical of Soviet policy, but it was his intention to concentrate mainly on the 
positive and constructive side of his proposals’. 
5 Jan 1948 CAB 129/23 CP (48)7.  Memorandum to Cabinet by Ernest Bevin entitled ‘Review of 
Soviet Policy’ (circulated to Cabinet 6 January). This paper is partly based upon Sir 
Maurice Peterson’s 8 November Memorandum to Bevin.   The Cabinet ‘took note’ of 
the contents of this Memorandum. 
7 Jan 1948 FO 371/***************.  Minutes of Russia Committee Meeting.    NB Minutes 
missing 
8 Jan 1948 CAB 128/12 CM (48)2.  Minutes of Cabinet Meeting.  Very important paper from 
Russia Committee viewpoint.  Under Item 5, Ernest Bevin referred to the above 
Memoranda that Cabinet had before them and the Minutes record his saying:   
‘…although the recent Soviet attempts to stir up trouble in France and Italy 
had largely failed, some closer form of union should be created in Western 
Europe in order to resist the increasing penetration of Soviet influence.  It 
would have been premature to take action in this direction before the recent 
meeting of the Council of Foreign Minister, but the breakdown of that 
conference …had opened the way for an attempt to secure a greater measure 
of co-operation among the countries of Western Europe’.  
Significantly, in Russia Committee terms, Bevin was also reported as saying:  
‘The most effective method of countering Soviet propaganda was to provide 
specific information refuting the misrepresentations made by the Soviet 
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Government.  The Prime Minister’s recent broadcast illustrated how this could 
be combined with encouragement of Socialist principles’. 
‘It might be desirable to establish some form of inter-departmental 
organisation, including the Board of Trade, the Colonial Office, and the 
Commonwealth Relations Office, to work out the basic principles of co-
operations and advise on the lined which propaganda should follow’. 
15 Jan 1948 FO 371/71687/N765/765/38.  Minutes of Russia Committee Meeting.  Mr Gladwyn 
Jebb in the Chair.  Mr Lambert, Secretary. The meeting began with Mr Gladwyn Jebb 
informing the Russia Committee that Sir Orme Sargent had asked him to assume 
Chairmanship o the Committee in succession to Sir Oliver Harvey.  The business then 
concentrated on the approvals given by Cabinet on 8th January.  Key document in 
relation to Cabinet decisions (see previous entry). 
16 Jan 1948   FO 371/71687/N765/765/38.  Minute from Gladwyn Jebb to Orme Sargent in which 
he says that ‘to his astonishment’ when chairing the meeting he discovered that, with 
the exception of Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick,  the Russia Committee members – all of whom 
of course were very senior diplomats, had not seen the papers as circulated to the 
Cabinet  and therefore “it was really not possible for [the Russia Committee] to 
function very intelligently”. He therefore proposed some special circulation rules to 
circumvent the stringent rules governing Cabinet papers circulation from preventing 
the efficient working of the Russia Committee.  Orme Sargent then sent to minute to 
Mr Roberts (Ernest Bevin’s Principal Private Secretary) for the Secretary of State to see.  
Key document 
22 Jan 1948 Hansard.  HC Debate Vol 446 cc383-517.  Significant Hansard Extract.  Bevin reported 
to Parliament following the breakdown of the December meeting of the Council of 
Foreign Ministers.  This marked the official recognition on Bevin’s part that relations 
between Western Powers and the Soviet Union had seriously broken down and that 
actions, as had long been suggested by his Russia Committee Foreign Office officials, 
had to be recommended to his Cabinet colleagues and, now, in Parliament.  His speech 
was a lengthy one where he painstakingly described the changes in relations since 
Potsdam onwards – after which, he said, ‘things had begun to go wrong’ -  and gave 
examples of what he described as the ‘war of nerves and pressure upon weaker 
neighbours’ exercised by the Soviets since the war.  He said that Mr Marshall’s 
proposals for a European Recovery Programme, which he saw as an opportunity for 
really trying to get Europe on its feet - had been the catalyst for further deterioration 
in relations between the West and the Soviets who could not accept the concept of the 
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unity of Europe.  He re-iterated that Molitov had threatened both the UK and France if 
we went on with the European Recovery Programme and it was soon after that the 
Soviets established the Cominform, the objective of which was to prevent the 
Programme from succeeding.  Against that background, which was not encouraging, 
the planning for the November London Council of Foreign Ministers went ahead.  
Bevin went on:  ‘The flood of abuse against ourselves and the world by M Vyshinski in 
New York was calculated  to raise tempers…we still went on trying to get the 
conference on a proper basis as I reported to the House before the Recess.  Every day 
when there was a proposal discussed and an effort made to reach a practical 
conclusion we had to waste a whole day listening to abuse of the Western Powers.  ….I 
ask each one here to try to imagine what it is like to sit there hour after hour and to 
have thrown at one almost every invective of which one can think and not answer 
back…..Now we have to face a new situation…..the free nations of Western Europe 
must now draw closely together’. 
 On Germany, Bevin stated: ‘We stand for a united Germany, not a dismembered or 
divided Germany.  We have been in favour of a centralised German Government but 
not an over-centralised German Government which in our view could be a danger to 
peace.  In this, I believe the Americans, the French and ourselves, despite slight 
differences between us, can reconcile our views.  On the other hand, the Soviet 
Government are pressing for an over-centralised Government which we know could be 
used in the same way to develop a one-party dictatorship as has been done in the 
Eastern European countries, and we cannot agree to it’.  
 On how to meet the change in Soviet policy, Bevin said: “Despite all the artificial 
barriers set up, and the propaganda blared out, which no doubt will increase after this 
Debate, we shall pursue a course which will seek to unite Europe.  If the present division 
of Europe continues, it will be by the act and the will of the Soviet Government….. 
However, we shall not be diverted, by threats, propaganda or fifth column methods…”     
  29 Jan 1948 FO 371/71687/N1372/765/38.  Minutes of Russia Committee Meeting. Sir Edmund 
Hall-Patch in the Chair.  Mr Lambert, Secretary.  The Committee business included 
discussion of a paper on recent developments connected with Cominform and agreed 
amendments so that the paper could be submitted to Ernest Bevin.  The Committee 
then discussed a recent speech by Winston Churchill; a conversation Mr Warner had 
had about the probable effects of the death of Stalin should it occur  and the recent 
Cabinet Conclusions on foreign affairs – now that they had seen the papers.  Key 
document. 
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7 Feb 1948 FO 371/*********.  Minutes of Russia Committee Meeting.  NB Minutes missing. 
19 Feb 1948 FO 371/71687/N8166/765/38.  Minutes of Russia Committee Meeting.  Mr Gladwyn 
Jebb in the Chair.  Mr Lambert, Secretary.  The Committee business included:  a 
discussion on the World Federation of Trade Unions and the TUC’s attendance at a 
proposed meeting; Cominform Survey; Chinese Communists; Anti Communist 
Propaganda; and Churchill’s view on Anglo Soviet Relations.   
26 Feb 1948 FO 371/71670/N2433/9.  Memorandum from Vernon Bartlett to W Ridsdale.  Very 
interesting Memo on a conversation between Vernon Bartlett, then a British Member 
of Parliament, and the former Czechoslovakian Ambassador, Slavik.  The latter, whose 
judgement Bartlett felt to be excellent, spoke of the Soviets not, as was commonly 
thought, being alarmed by the prospect of another war for several reasons:  the few 
British and US troops left in Europe could be overrun quickly;  there was no force to 
prevent the very rapid and complete occupation of Western Europe including Britain;  
once Britain was occupied the US would be reluctant to interfere.   
28 Feb 1948   FO 371/71670/N2433/9.  Note by William Hayter to Mr Roberts (of British Long 
Telegram but who was by then Private Secretary to Ernest Bevin) saying that Roberts 
had asked for his views on the Vernon Bartlett Memo (as above).  He said that he, the 
JIC and the FO ‘have always taken the view that the Russians would not be prepared to 
face the outbreak of a major war with any confidence before about 1956 of 1957’ and 
that he was not shaken in his view by the Bartlett Memo.  Roberts then adds a 
manuscript note to Ernest Bevin saying that he might like to see the attached Memo.   
4 Mar 1948 FO 371/71687/N2915/765/38.  Minutes of Russia Committee Meeting.  Mr Gladwyn 
Jebb in the Chair.  Mr Lambert, Secretary. The Committee business included:  the 
proposed Treaty, Belgium, Holland and Luxembourg; the Cabinet paper on China; and 
the Czech crisis and the situation in Italy. 
18 Mar 1948 FO 371/71687/N3866/9. Minutes of Russia Committee Meeting.  Mr Makins in the 
Chair.  Miss Rolleston, Secretary.  The Committee was informed that the Cabinet paper 
on China which had been prepared in accordance with the recommendation of the 
Russia Committee would not now be circulated to the Cabinet by the Secretary of 
State.  On Sir Orme Sargent’s instruction it was being recast in the form of a 
memorandum which was to be distributed to Cabinet.  Christopher Warner asked for 
the Committee members’ help in ensuring that matters requiring publicity should be 
drawn to the attention of the recently formed Information Research Department 
which was relying on the Russia Committee to provide information to them while the 
organisation was still engaged in being set up.  
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24 Mar 1948 FO 371/71687/N3866/9.  Memo from Mr Lambert to Mr Hankey, referring back to the 
Minutes of the Russia Committee meeting on 18 March. 
30 Mar 1948 FO 371/71677/N3820.  Memo from Orme Sargent to Sir T Lloyd, Colonial Office, saying 
that the Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin, is anxious to have periodical (fortnightly) 
surveys of Communist activities in countries outside the Soviet Union, and asking Sir T 
Lloyd to supply the Northern Department of the FO (i.e. the Department that runs the 
Russia Committee) with information about Communist activities in British overseas 
territories.  Thus, what was to become colloquially known as the “Crystal Gazer” came 
into being and until November 1948 was only distributed within the UK, always 
classified both “Top Secret” and “Personal”. 
31 Mar 1948 FO 371/71677/N3820.  Papers relating to a lengthy (17 page) paper by Mr W Barker, 
Head of the Russian Secretariat at the British Embassy in Moscow, entitled “The 
Practice of Stalinism” and a cover note from Sir Maurice Peterson (HM Ambassador in 
Moscow) to Ernest Bevin dated 24 March 1948 in which he says: 
“2.  What emerges from the study with incontrovertible clarity is that Soviet 
policy has always been, still is, directed towards the ultimate goal of bringing 
about world revolution…..During this desperate struggle for survival….when the 
peril was especially great, the Soviet leaders were compelled to jettison, at least 
temporarily, many of the fundamental principles of Leninism both at home and in 
their relations with that part of the capitalistic world with which they were 
compelled to make common cause…………………………….. 
3.  The years 1946 and 1947 saw, in pursuance of this policy, the development of 
a ponderous propaganda campaign for the reconditioning of the Soviet peoples, 
who during the stress of war had been allowed to stray so far from the narrow 
path of Marxism-Leninism. …. 
5.  It is possible that the Soviet leaders would have been prepared to rely mainly on 
the normal development and exploitation of the crisis, had not firstly the Truman 
Doctrine as applied to Greece and Turkey, and, secondly, the birth of the idea of 
Marshall Aid’ given them a sense of urgency.  For, as the Kremlin was quick to 
appreciate, this latter idea if realised in practice, raised the possibility not only that 
the impending crisis of the capitalist world might be deferred, but that common 
action by the governments of the capitalist states might even lead to the long term 
stabilisation of the capitalist system This no doubt accounts for the violence of the 
Soviet reaction to the European Recovery Programme”.  
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1 April 1948 FO 371/71687/N8167/765/38.  Minutes of Russia Committee Meeting.  Sir Ivone 
Kirkpatrick in the Chair.  Mr Rob, Secretary.  The main item of discussion was whether 
there was a need for a more formal means of exchanging information regarding the 
Soviet Union with the US State Department.  Close, but informal, contact existed 
between US and UK Embassies in Moscow and between, for example, Mr Warner and 
his opposite number in the State Department and these contacts and resultant 
information sharing was satisfactory.   
 
1 April 1948 FO 371/71670/N4057/9.  Minute from Geoffrey Harrison, British Embassy, Moscow, to 
R M A Hankey of the Northern Department of the Foreign Office about a report being 
produced by the ‘US Embassy in Moscow on ‘Soviet Intentions’.  The gist of the report 
was that the belief on the part of the US was that the Soviets would do everything 
‘short of war’ to achieve their objectives.   
 
15 April1948 FO 371/71687/N8168/765/38.   Minutes of Russia Committee Meeting.  Mr Jebb in 
the Chair.  Mr Lambert, Secretary.  The Committee business included consideration of 
a draft Summary of Indications regarding Soviet foreign policy which were to be 
circulated to Ministers though consideration of the format of the summaries which 
would best suit the Foreign Secretary had yet to be determined.  It was suggested that 
the Committee should consider undertaking more detailed analysis of the Soviet press 
and radio.  The Committee also considered Mr Harrison’s 1 April minute (see above).   
29 April 1948 FO 371/71687/N8169/765/38.  Minutes of Russia Committee Meeting.  Mr Jebb in the 
Chair.  Mr Mackenzie, Secretary. The Committee business included:  further 
consideration of the Summary of Indications regarding Soviet foreign policy and the 
Committee approved the draft and noted that the Foreign Secretary had now agreed 
that these summaries were in future to be seen by the Prime Minister, Chancellor of 
the Exchequer, Minister of Defence and Lord President. 
3 May 1948 FO 371/71650/N5404/31/38.  Minute from R M A Hankey to Mr Crosthwaite (then 
Head of FCO Western Department) entitled ‘The Communist Campaign:  The Next 
Phase’ setting out his ideas and seeking Crosthwaite’s comments with a view to having 
a joint memorandum agreed between them for discussion at the Russia Committee’s 
meeting on 13 May.  
13 May 1948 FO 371/71687/8169/765/38.  Minutes of Russia Committee Meeting.  Mr Jebb in the 
Chair.  Mr Rob, Secretary.  Mr Harrison, from the British Embassy, Moscow, in 
attendance to discuss a further draft (Number 5) of the Summary of Indications 
regarding Soviet foreign policy.  Mr Harrison also reported that the Soviets had taken 
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the action of publishing recent correspondence between Molotov and General Bedel 
Smith of the US which the Soviets had calculated, correctly, would place them in a 
good light by laying claim to their having made peaceful proposals which had been 
rejected by the Imperialists in the US.    
27 May 1948 FO 371/71687/N8170/765/38.  Minutes of Russia Committee Meeting.  Mr Jebb in the 
Chair.  Mr Mackenzie, Secretary.  Mr Dixon (now HM Ambassador, Prague, formerly 
PPS to the Foreign Secretary) in attendance.  The Committee discussed a further draft 
(Number 6) of the Summary of Indications regarding Soviet foreign policy and decided 
to add to it something on developments in Palestine and the role played by Christian 
churches in resisting communism in Eastern Europe.  They also decided that the 
Molotov/Bedel Smith correspondence should be printed and circulated in the Foreign 
Office and to posts abroad.  Finally, the Committee discussed a draft memorandum on 
the Economic situation in Russia and its effect on Soviet foreign policy - which was an 
update of a paper produced a year earlier with annexes provided by EID and the JIB.  It 
was decided to recast the memorandum in the light of the Committee’s discussions 
and be reconsidered at a later meeting.   
10 June 1948 FO 371/71687/N7350/765/38.  Minutes of Russia Committee Meeting.  Mr Jebb in the 
Chair.  Mr Mackenzie, Secretary.  The Committee discussed a further draft (Number 7) 
of the Summary of Indications regarding Soviet foreign policy and spent the remainder 
of the meeting discussing the relative merits of using various terms to describe 
‘Communism’, totalitarianism’, ‘Stalinism’, ‘Soviet government’, ‘the Politburo’ etc.   
24 June 1948 FO 371/71687/N8171/765/38.  Minutes of Russia Committee Meeting.  Mr Jebb in the 
Chair. Mr Mackenzie, Secretary. The meeting began with Mr Jebb reporting an opinion 
expressed by Winston Churchill that there would be war before August.  The 
Committee agreed that despite the crisis over Germany, they would not endorse this 
opinion.  Then, in addition to their discussing further draft (Number 8) of the Summary 
of Indications regarding Soviet foreign policy, Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick then told the 
Committee that at present there were sufficient food-stocks in Berlin for 27 days and 
coal stocks for 40 days. The Committee business included:   the situation could only be 
solved either by the Soviets relaxing their present restrictions or by bringing in food by 
air to Berlin.  Sir Ivone outlined three possible courses: 
1. To fly in sufficient foodstuffs for our troops and leave the people of Berlin to 
starve; 
2. To leave Berlin; placing the onus on the Russians;  
3. To tell the Russians they must be responsible for the feeding of Berlin.  
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Date? FO 371/70272 Future of Russia Committee and relations between the Foreign Office 
and the Chiefs of Staff, Code 50, file 7836 
8 July 1948 FO 371/71687/N8172/765/38.   Minutes of Russia Committee Meeting.  Mr Jebb in 
the Chair.  Mr Rob, Secretary. Sir Charles Peake, HM Ambassador, Belgrade, in 
attendance. The Committee discussed the Berlin air lift and concluded that the 
difficulties of keeping it going would increase over the winter months, particularly the 
transport of coal.   
8 July 1948 CAB 128/12 CM (48)48.  Minutes of Cabinet Meeting.  Item 3:  Germany.  The Foreign 
Secretary said that the Governments of the United Kingdom, United States and France 
had now presented to the Soviet Government notes of protest against the Russian 
blockade of the Western sectors of Berlin.  No reply had yet been received to these 
notes…Meanwhile, very satisfactory progress had been made with the arrangements 
for supplying Berlin by air. 
Item 4:  Eastern Europe.  The Foreign Secretary gave the Cabinet a short appreciation 
of the situation in Eastern Europe.  It was impossible to forecast what policy the Soviet 
Government would eventually pursue towards Yugoslavia.  Meanwhile there was no 
weakening of the support for Marshal Tito in Yugoslavia.  It would be convenient if we 
could take advantage of this confused state of affairs in the Balkans to clear up the 
situation in Greece.  
 
21 July 1948 FO 371/71687/N8559/765/38.  Minutes of Russia Committee Meeting.  Mr Jebb in the 
Chair.  Secretary, Mr Mackenzie.  Sir Maurice Peterson, HM Ambassador, Moscow, in 
attendance.  The Committee business was again dominated by the Berlin situation with  
Sir Maurice suggesting actions against the Soviets, including:   breaking off of trade 
negotiations; more visits of warships to the Baltic and the Black sea; a blockade of 
Russian Pacific ports;  securing the departure of Franco and the entry of Spain into the 
UN;  economic sanctions; and refusal to give transit visas to all unofficial Soviet 
Cominform travellers.  Mr Glebb raised the question of how the Soviets would be likely 
to retaliate in the face of such actions.   
19 Aug 1948 FO 371/71651/N9471/31/38.  Minutes of Russia Committee Meeting. Mr Jebb in the 
chair. Mr Lambert back as Secretary. The Committee discussed a further draft 
Summary of Indications Regarding Soviet Foreign Policy which was approved for 
submission.  They then went on to discuss two substantive items.  First, the Foreign 
Secretary had asked the Committee to produce, in response to a request to the 
Foreign Secretary from the Minister of Defence, an appreciation by the Foreign Office 
of the most likely Russian moves in the near future at points other than in Austria.  In 
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discussion, the Committee agreed that a Memorandum responding to this request 
should be drafted by Northern Department to include the following main points:   
1. The situation in the Western Zones of Germany remains of overriding 
importance.   
2. While the Russians using methods of political warfare or exploiting local 
discontent, are in a position to make trouble at any point, and while the 
situation in the Far East is developing favourably for the Russians without 
their direct intervention, the area in which the most dangerous threat may be 
expected is the Middle East. 
3. The possibilities of the Russians being able to stir up serious trouble for us in 
the Middle East are such that we ought to be prepared to meet it by every 
means at our disposal including the stocking up of our bases at such points as 
Amman and Habaniyah. 
4. The most urgent need is for the reinforcement of our security and intelligence 
services all over the world in order to forestall trouble and enable us to 
dispose our forces accordingly.   
Secondly, the Committee was informed that a Survey of the Strength of Communism in 
Various Countries outside the USSR for which Sir Orme Sargent had called in March 
was now ready.  Mr Jebb explained that this was intended as a work of reference and 
suggested that it should be circulated in the Foreign Office and to HM Missions abroad 
and kept up to date periodically.   
 
19 Aug 1948 FO 371/71651/N9471/31/38.  Minute from Gladwyn Jebb to Sir Orme Sargent 
covering a Memorandum of 21 July by Research Department entitled ‘Survey of 
Communism in Countries Outside the Soviet Orbit’. Cover note reminds Orme Sargent 
that he had asked the Russia Committee in March to prepare a Survey of the Strength 
of Communism in various countries outside the USSR.  Gladwyn Jebb apologised for 
the length of delay in producing the Memo which was due to shortage of staff and said 
that the draft had been produced by the Research Department and it was proposed to 
update it at stated periods.   
24 Aug 1948 FO 371/71651/N9471/31/38.  Orme Sargent note in manuscript at end of 19 August 
Minute above, saying: “ The S/S said that he liked this paper & that he wished the 
Research Dept & those who prepared it to be thanked.  He thinks, however, that the 
paper speaks for itself & that the introduction which tends to draw broad conclusions 
and express opinions should be suppressed.  He would therefore like the paper to be 
circulated to the Cabinet minus the introduction and with a short covering note 
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explaining what the paper is & adding that it will be brought up to date as and when 
further information becomes available”.  
2 Sept 1948 FO 371/71687/N8559/765/38.   Minutes of Russia Committee Meeting.  Mr Bateman 
in the Chair.  Mr Rob, the Secretary.  The Committee considered a further draft 
Summary of Indications Regarding Soviet Foreign Policy (No 13).  The Committee 
agreed the draft subject to a few more amendments.   
16 Sept 1948 FO 371/71687/N10232/765/38.  Minutes of Russia Committee Meeting.  Mr Gladwyn 
Jebb back in the Chair.  Mr Robb, Secretary.  Sir Donald Gainer, HM Ambassador, 
Warsaw and Mr Sterndale Bennett, now Minister at Sofia) were also in attendance. 
The Committee considered a further draft Summary of Indications Regarding Soviet 
Foreign Policy (No 14).  The Committee agreed the draft subject to a few more 
amendments.   
16/17 Sept 1948 FO 371/ 71630/N10454/1/38. Minute from Gladwyn Jebb to Minister of State and 
from Mr F A Warner to Mr Mason and Mr F B A Rundall reporting the Minister of 
State’s views on the paper as follows:  “This is a reasonable paper and represents 
substantially my own thinking….We are now collecting stuff, but we must index it and 
have it available at every conference ready to pullout…Above all we must overcome our 
reluctance not to use a point more than once. If it is good we must learn to plug the 
theme”.  
20 Sept 1948 FO 371/ 71630/N10454/1/38. Minute by Mr Rundall giving notice that a meeting 
had been arranged for 22 September to discuss with Information Research 
Department (which had been set up in January 1948) the general question of Russian 
tactics at United Nations meetings and the possibility of combating them. 
24 Sept 1948 FO 371/ 71630/N10454/1/38. Note of the meeting on 22 September which had 
been attended by representatives from the following Foreign Office Departments:  
IRD; Northern Dept; United Nations Political Dept; Economic Relations Dept; European 
Recovery Dept. The meeting discussed strategy and tactics in relation to future UN 
meetings.  On strategy, they decided that as soon as the agenda was promulgated for a 
UN meeting those at this meeting should meet to consider the line they thought the 
Russians would take on agenda items;  their suggestions for British delegates to reply;  
an agreed memorandum embodying their conclusions would then be submitted for 
approval to the Russia Committee;  IRD, with assistance of Northern Dept, would 
prepare notes for delegates on the basis of the memorandum as approved by the 
Russia Committee.  On tactics, this would largely depend on the leader of the British 
delegation; it would be useful if leaders could be supplied with a handbook of material 
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for refuting stock Soviet lines of argument and propaganda on given subjects.  NB 
shows how IRD and Russia Committee were working closely together. 
30 Sept 1948 FO 371/71687/N10730/765/38.  Minutes of Russia Committee Meeting.  Mr Jebb in 
the Chair.  Mr Rob, Secretary.  Sir Maurice Peterson (HM Ambassador, Moscow) and 
Sir Ralph Stevenson (HM Ambassador in Nanking) both in attendance.  The Committee 
considered a further draft Summary of Indications Regarding Soviet Foreign Policy (No 
15).  The Committee agreed the draft subject to a few more amendments.  In addition, 
Mr Jebb gave the Committee a review of the course of the General Debate in the UN 
Assembly.  The Berlin dispute had been referred to the Security Council by the Three 
Western Powers as a threat to peace under the UN Charter.  If the Soviets exercised 
their veto in the Security Council the intention was to refer the matter to the UN 
Assembly. 
14 Oct 1948 FO 371/71687/N11144/765/38.  Minutes of Russia Committee Meeting.  Mr Jebb in 
the Chair. Mr Mackenzie, Secretary.  The Rt Hon Malcolm Macdonald, HM 
Commissioner General for South East Asia in attendance.   The Committee business 
included a lengthy and detailed report by Mr Macdonald the situation in Malaya; a 
paper by the Joint Intelligence Bureau on Soviet purchases of rubber, from, primarily, 
Malaya and Ceylon; and a review on a recent meeting of the United Nations in Paris. 
28 Oct 1948 FO 371/71687/N11882/765/38.  Minutes of Russia Committee Meeting.  Mr Jebb in 
the Chair.  Mr Mackenzie, Secretary.  The meeting was interesting because they 
discussed a letter from Herbert Morrison, Lord President of the Council, to The Foreign 
Secretary, Ernest Bevin, on Anglo Soviet relations which contained views with which 
the Russia Committee disagreed.  Herbert Morrison had expressed the view that “war 
was unlikely between now and next May but that the likelihood would increase 
between May and September 1949”, and drew the conclusion that the UK should use 
the intervening months to put more pressure on the Soviets.  The Committee, 
however, thought that there was no basis for Mr Morrison’s conclusion and agreed 
that they should minute Mr Bevin to this effect.  Another interesting aspect of this 
meeting was when the Committee discussed Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick’s paper on anti-
Communist propaganda where the latter (who was in attendance) pointed out: 
‘..that we were in danger of using the term “cold war” in a wrong sense.  It 
was a term invented to describe the Soviet Government’s policy of trying to 
get the better of the Western Powers by every means short of military action.  
We had now come to apply the term to what was, in fact, merely propaganda.  
Our “cold war” rested on a policy calculated to frustrate Russian designs’. 
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Sir Ivone emphasised that it was important that policy on anti-Communist propaganda 
was established first before deciding on the ancillary support of propaganda to be 
used. He said that the political aspects of the policy were being provided for but that 
economic aspects needed to be addressed i.e. it needed to be decided whether it was 
in the UK’s interest to conclude trade agreements within the Soviet orbit, commenting 
that such agreements should not be concluded unless the UK was satisfied that it was 
in its interest to do so, and not enter upon them under the illusion that it would earn 
political goodwill.  Nor did he think that the UK should fall into the habit of ‘nagging at 
the Russian’ but should deliver our case with the utmost vigour and then let it have 
time to take effect.  Continual reiteration of the UK viewpoint, he felt, was merely 
wearying to ourselves and to the public.  General Jacob added that it was more 
important, in his view, to emphasis the advantage of living under a democratic regime 
than to try to explode the “myth” of the Soviet Union.     
11 Nov 1948 FO 371/71687/N12279/765/38.  Minutes of Russia Committee Meeting.  Mr Jebb in 
the Chair.  Mr Mackenzie, Secretary.  The Committee business included discussion of a 
draft letter on propaganda towards the Soviets which the Committee initially proposed 
that the Foreign Secretary send to certain ministerial colleagues as a suggestion for the 
broad lines on which they should base themselves when making public speeches.  They 
concluded, however, that the draft should be recast in the form of a memorandum 
and, once cleared with Christopher Warner, should be given to the Foreign Secretary 
with the suggestion, if he agreed, that he talk to the Prime Minister about it, with a 
view to the PM bringing it to the attention of his Ministers – presumably because this 
would hold greater authority.  
22 Nov 1948 FO 371/71687/N12649.  Personal minute from Christopher Warner to Gladwyn Jebb.  
Key document.   This minute is interesting for what it says about the Russia 
Committee, its membership and ways of working.  In the first paragraph, Warner, at 
one point, lays claim to having set up the Russia Committee though later in the same 
paragraph he notes, in effect, the view held by Moley (i.e. Orme Sargent - Warner’s 
boss) that the Committee was needed.  The minute is so important that what Warner 
says to Glebb, should be reproduced more or less in full as follows: 
“I have for some time wondered whether it is not a mistake for the Russia 
Committee to spend the bulk of its time looking through a long draft 
intelligence summary in great detail.  When the Committee was originally set 
up at my instance, the idea was that the political and economic Under-
Secretaries should pool recent information regarding Russian doings affecting 
their various areas in order to get a collated picture and consider what action, 
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political, economic or in the publicity sphere, should be taken as a result. I 
remember Moley saying that although he did not believe in a Joint Planning 
Committee for the whole work of the Office, he thought it would be valuable 
to have a Joint Planning Committee …for matters concerning the Russians…it 
made sense to try to assess their plans and make counter plans. 
This started quite well, but afterwards failed because Oliver Harvey, who was 
Chairman and also ought to have spoken at each meeting on Germany and 
Western Europe, practically never turned up and gradually other Under-
Secretaries dropped out too. 
I gather that during my absence a plan was instigated for reviving something 
of this kind by having a small sub-committee to consider specific problems 
thrown up by the Russians …but this will not work if the main work of the 
Committee takes an hour or so considering the draft intelligence summary, as 
happened last time. 
….it would be much more valuable to revert to something like the original 
idea, making a great effort to get all the Under-Secretaries that matter to 
come or to send adequate substitutes if they cannot……”. 
24 Nov 1948 FO 371/71687/N13016/765/38.  Terms of Reference for “Cold War” Sub-Committee of 
the Russia Committee.  These TORs said ‘Given the following objectives: 
(a) Loosening the Soviet hold on the orbit countries and ultimately enabling 
them to regain their independence; 
(b) Pending the attainment of this…long term promoting civil discontent, 
internal confusion and possibly strife in the satellite countries so that they 
will be a source of…weakness to Russia and a drain on her resources of 
manpower and trained personnel……. 
(c) Seizing every opportunity of discrediting the Soviet regime or weakening 
its position. 
Should there now be a planning staff to consider means whereby these objectives can 
best be achieved by methods other than the present ones; and, if so, how should it be 
constituted and what should it plan? 
 
25 Nov 1948 FO 371/71687/N13016/765/38.  Minutes of Russia Committee Meeting.  Mr Jebb in 
the Chair.  Mr Mackenzie, Secretary.  The Committee business included:  discussion of 
a paper by Mr Hankey on “British policy towards the Soviet orbit in Europe”.  This was 
an extraordinary discussion.  Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick put forward a suggestion that as the 
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UK was financially strapped it “..would be best to start any kind of offensive operation 
in a small area “  and suggested Albania.  He asked “..whether it would not be possible 
to start a civil war behind the Iron Curtain and by careful assistance to produce a state 
of affairs that the Russians had produced in Greece”?  He suggested making use of the 
forces of opposition/resistance within Albania and adopting SOE type tactics.  Others 
on the Committee, Frank Roberts among them, pointed out the dangers in so doing 
and the need to march in step with the Americans.  Lord Tedder (Marshall of the Royal 
Air Force) who attended for discussion of this item, stressed the importance of setting 
up a planning staff to examine the various means available and said he was sceptical of 
the value of SOE type operations unless followed up by military action.  He also said 
that he thought “we should aim at winning the cold war (by which he meant the 
overthrow of the Soviet regime) in five years time”.  Mr Jebb stressed the importance 
of having a Cabinet decision on the proposal to indulge in anything like SOE operations 
as well as on the setting up of the proposed organisation to plan these actions.  Mr 
Jebb summed up by suggesting that a sub-committee be set up to examine this 
question and report back to the full Russia Committee.  He read out the terms of 
reference for the Sub-Committee, prepared earlier (see above) which the Russia 
Committee agreed. 
10 Dec 1948 FO 371/71687/N13469/765/38.  Minutes of Russia Committee Meeting.  Mr Bateman 
in the Chair.  Mr Mackenzie, Secretary.  The Committee business included discussion of 
further drafts of various papers seen in earlier drafts by the Committee.   
14 Dec 1948 FO 371/71632A/N13467/9.  Report of the first meeting Sub-Committee set up to 
examine the problem of planning in relation to policy towards the Soviet Union and 
the Soviet orbit.  Key document.  Following the meeting on 24 November the Sub-
Committee agreed to recast their Terms of Reference as follows: 
(a) Making the Soviet orbit so disaffected that in the event of war it would become a 
dangerous area requiring large armies of occupation, and not a source of useful 
manpower for Russia. 
(b) Loosening the Soviet hold on the orbit countries, and ultimately enabling them to 
regain their independence. 
(c) Seizing every opportunity of discrediting the Soviet regime or weakening its 
position within the frontiers of the Soviet Union. 
(d) Frustrating the Soviet effort to build up the economic war potential of the Soviet 
Union and the satellites.  
The Sub-Committee agreed that they should seek to attain the above objectives by “all 
means available short of war” and that the mooted special planning organisation 
should remain an off-shoot of the Russia Committee from whom it should take its 
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directives and to whom it should report;  that the Chairmanship should be a Foreign 
Office person of the rank of Under Secretary but with representatives from the MOD 
Chiefs of Staff, The Treasury, The BBC and C’s organisation (i.e. The Secret Intelligence 
Service/ Box 850).  They should concentrate initially on Yugoslavia, Albania, the Soviet 
Zone of Germany and, possibly, China.  
 
16 Dec 1948 FO 371/71687/N13677/765/38.  Minutes of Russia Committee Meeting.  Mr Jebb in 
the Chair. Mr Mackenzie, Secretary.  Key document.  The Committee had met for an 
additional meeting (now meeting fortnightly and it was only one week since the 
previous meeting) to have a preliminary discussion on the report of the first Sub-
Committee  (see above) which raised two problems:  (i)  whether the objectives as 
formulated should be recommended to the Foreign Secretary;  and (2) if so, whether 
the planning organisation outlined by the Sub-Committee was the best means of 
attaining those objectives.  There was clearly some concern re the first problem that 
the objectives agreed at the 14 December meeting were over ambitious and that since 
Ministerial sanctioning was necessary if the work were to go ahead, it would be 
important that a case for each objective and an indication of what action could be 
taken to achieve them, should be properly worked out because analogous suggestions 
had been considered by the Foreign Secretary at various times and not been approved.  
As to the second issue, there was general agreement to the proposal to create a small 
permanent Planning Section under the Foreign Office but with representatives from 
other government departments, but would it be appropriate for such an inter-
departmental committee, even if under Foreign Office chairmanship, to be under the 
ambit/control of the Russia Committee and, if so, the latter’s Terms of Reference 
would need recasting.     After a lengthy discussion of the issues the Committee 
concluded that the Sub-Committee should prepare: 
(1) A memorandum analysing the advantages of a policy of counter offensive 
against Soviet attacks. 
(2)  A separate paper setting forth the views of the Committee on the Planning 
Organisation which would be required if the policy discussed in (1) were 
approved. 
 
17 Dec 1948 FO 371/77623/N1052. Note of a meeting held in Sir Orme Sargent’s room.  Key 
document.  Other attendees:  Sir William Strang; Sir N Charles; Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick; Mr 
Makins; Mr Jebb; Mr Bateman; Mr Warner; Mr Dening; Mr Caccia; Mr Wright; Mr 
Hayter; Mr Roberts; and Mr Hankey.    Sir Orme Sargent had clearly called this meeting 
directly as a result of the meetings held on 24 November, 14 December and 16 
December concerning the proposals around the setting up of the Sub-Committee, its 
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objectives and proposed planning machinery.  He clearly wanted to take control of 
what was happening and said that there were several questions to be discussed: 
(a) The re-organisation of the Russia Committee; 
(b) The desirability of setting up an organisation for planning; 
(c) The question of what action should be taken to educate the service departments 
in the methods and function of the Foreign Office. 
The meeting discussed whether the new Committee (by which was meant a 
reconstructed Russia Committee) should be a purely Foreign Office body or should 
have, for example, a MOD Chiefs of Staff representative and the thought was that if it 
were decided to pursue a more offensive policy towards Russia and the Soviet orbit, as 
implied by the Sub-Committee meeting proposals, it might be necessary for ultimate 
decisions to be taken by a Cabinet Committee.  Sir Orme Sargent said that if the 
Secretary of State were to agree to a more offensive policy, it might be necessary to 
set up an inter-departmental planning organisation in co-operation with the Chiefs of 
Staff and others concerned.  He thought the Secretary of State would not agree to an 
offensive policy undertaking the encouragement of subversive documents and such 
other activities that would require the involvement in parallel of the PWC and SOE and 
still less would he allow the Defence Committee to run foreign policy.  
Summarizing the discussion, Sir Orme Sargent said that a Policy Committee would be 
useful and commissioned Mr Jebb to prepare a paper containing Terms of Reference, 
taking account of the Terms of Reference of the Russia Committee.  
23 Dec 1948  FO 371/**********.  Minutes of Russia Committee Meeting.  NB  Minutes missing. 
13 Jan 1949 FO371/N1793/1052/38G.  Minute from Sir Orme Sargent to Sir P Leisching of the 
Commonwealth Relations Office and to Sir Thomas Lloyd of the Colonial Office inviting 
them to send representatives to Russia Committee meetings.  In this Top-Secret 
minute Sir Orme Sargent says: 
 “You may be aware that there exists in the Foreign Office a Russia Committee with 
Terms of Reference as shown in the enclosed Annex to this letter.  This Committee 
meets once a fortnight under the Chairmanship of one of the Deputy Under-Secretaries, 
and is at present attended by senior officials of the Foreign Office and by 
representatives of the Chiefs of Staff and of the Overseas Service of the BBC.  It has 
occurred to us that you might find it useful to send a representative of your 
Department to the meetings of this Committee, and the Foreign Secretary has agreed 
to my inviting you to do so.  One of the functions of the Committee is to produce a 
fortnightly summary of probable Soviet intention.  This summary, which contains Top 
Secret material, is sent to a few selected Ministers.  If your Secretary of State would like 
to receive a copy we should be glad to supply him with one.  I should be grateful if you 
would let me know if you wish to send a representative to these meetings, and if so, 
who he would be.  The Committee deal with much Top-Secret information and we 
therefore hope that your representative would be fairly senior.  The FO members of the 
Committee are of Under-Secretary or Counsellor rank.” 
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The Terms of Reference of the Russia Committee were appended to Sir Orme Sargent’s 
minute but in a manuscript note on the registry copy of the minute Hankey has written 
“Get enclosure from Mr Hayter.  It must be the new terms of reference”. (NB this was 
triple underlined).  The new terms of reference as appended were as follows, with the 
changes from the original TORs of 12 April 1946 shown in red: 
“To review at fortnightly intervals the development of all aspects of Soviet policy and 
propaganda and Soviet activities throughout the world,  more particularly with 
reference to the Soviet campaign against this country;  to ensure a unified 
interpretation thereof  throughout the political and economic departments of the 
Foreign Office;  to consider any immediate action that might be  required as a result of 
the Committee’s review, and to make recommendations accordingly.   The Committee 
will maintain close contact with the Chiefs of Staff and  J.I.C. with a view to 
coordinating intelligence and estimates of Soviet intentions  at every stage”. 
 
 These TORs are shortened considerably with two main omissions:  the first is excision 
of the words “.. particular reference to the probable degree of support to be looked for 
from the United States of America and to a lesser degree, from France and others: and 
to ensure that the necessary recommendations as to policy are made either by the 
departments of the Office concerned or by the Committee to Sir Orme Sargent, as may 
be appropriate”;  and removal of the words “and policy” from the final sentence.  
 
18 Jan 1949 FO371/N643/1052/38G.  Letter from to Sir P Leisching of the Commonwealth 
Relations Office to Sir Orme Sargent accepting the latter’s proposal to send a 
representative of the CRO to the Russia Committee and asking for a copy of the 
fortnightly Russia Committee summary for his Secretary of State. 
21 Jan 1949 FO 371/N847/1052/38G.   Minutes of Russia Committee Meeting.  Mr Jebb in the 
Chair. Mr Mackenzie, Secretary.  As the first meeting of 1949 and after the end year 
proposed enhancements of the Russia Committee membership, the numbers 
attending increased and there was an MOD representative (Admiral Lord Fraser) and a 
Colonial Office representative (G F Seel) as well as Sterndale Bennett and the Minister 
designate in Bucharest).  The meeting considered three papers, notably a further draft 
summary of indications regarding Soviet Foreign Policy.  
3 Feb 1949 FO 371/N1388/1052.  Minutes of Russia Committee Meeting.  Mr Jebb in the Chair.  
Mr Barnes, Secretary.  The Committee business included discussion of three draft 
papers (RC/9/49; RC 12/49; and RC/15/49) but was of particular interest for two other 
reasons.  First, for the discussion following an enquiry by Bevin “about the newly 
created Council for Economic Mutual Assistance in Eastern Europe;  and secondly, as 
an indication that the Russia Committee, now under Gladwyn Jebb’s Chairmanship and 
with extended membership now including the MOD, CRO and the CO, was ramping up 
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its status and was proceeding in a crisper more business like fashion.  The latter is an 
impression and cannot be proved but the minutes are set out more crisply and 
formally than in the past (NB from next meeting they considered the minutes of the 
previous meeting – a normal and formal way of running a Committee) and the 
membership had certainly expanded in number and status (eg two Major General’s 
from MOD) and the Committee was being asked for their views by the Secretary of 
State and by the Permanent Under Secretary.  As to Bevin’s request, he had asked the 
Russia Committee: 
 “for a considered appreciation of the probable results of the creation by the Soviet 
Government of a Council for Economic Mutual Assistance with reference to the 
following: 
(a) Was the formation of the new body…likely to lead to the gradual 
disappearance of the Cominform? 
(b) Were we likely to receive feelers from Eastern Europe in regard to closer trade 
relations? 
(c) Would the new step mean a genuine lessening of international tension or 
not?” 
The Russia Committee discussed these points and agreed that they would have their 
views summarised and sent to Bevin, their main conclusions being:  on (a) that there 
was no evidence that Cominform was about to disappear and that the main difference 
between the two bodies was that the new Council represented governments whereas 
the Cominform was an organisation of Communist Party representatives; on (b) that 
the general conclusion was that the creation of the new Council might lead the 
satellites to adopt a tougher attitude in their trade negotiations with the West;  on (c) 
no definite conclusions could yet be drawn from the Russians attitude to the wheat 
negotiations. 
 
15 Feb 1949 FO 371/N1727/1052.  Minutes of Russia Committee Meeting.  Sir Gladwyn Jebb in the 
Chair (NB first time he is so described).  Mr Barnes as Secretary.  The main business of 
the Committee was consideration of a further draft of the Summary of Indications 
regarding Soviet Foreign Policy (RC/20/49) and the Chairman was quite critical over the 
length of the ‘general’ section of the paper and suggested this section should only 
include points of major interest and detail should be included under the country 
concerned – a further evidence of the Chairman making changes to the way the Russia 
Committee worked.   
1 March 1949 FO 371/N2190/1052.  Minutes of Russia Committee Meeting.  Sir Gladwyn Jebb in the 
Chair.  Mr Barnes as Secretary.  The main business of the meeting was to discuss a 
telegram, dated 18 January 1949, from HM Ambassador in Moscow about the future 
trend of Soviet policy in which he implied that the Soviet Union might wish to wage 
war if it felt that there was a strong case for so doing.  Mr Hayter noted that this view 
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was not generally accepted by the Foreign Office and argued that the Soviets could 
achieve their ‘aggressive imperialism’ by other means.  Sir John Edelsten (NB Vice 
Admiral) disagreed, adding that it was the view of the Chiefs of Staff that we should be 
doing something to disrupt the course the Soviet build-up of military potential.  The 
Chairman summing up, noted that the US interpretation of the Soviet situation largely 
coincided with the Ambassador’s view.  “Russia had no particular need to accelerate a 
war and she still had the vast area of Asia and all the potentialities of Communist fifth 
columns in all the countries of the world to exploit”.  He also said that it could do no 
harm, and possibly some good, to encourage defection of Soviet scientists in order to 
sabotage the Soviet atom bomb development.  The Committee recommended that the 
telegram be circulated to recipients of the summary of indications with a brief covering 
minute setting forth the views if the Committee. 
15 March 1949 FO 371/77623/N2694/1052/38.  Minutes of Russia Committee Meeting.  Mr Bateman 
in the Chair.  Mr Harrison, Secretary. The Committee business included:  a paper by the 
Foreign Office Research Department on the prospects of a Communist opposition to 
Moscow in Germany; a minute on recent reports of Russian troop movements in 
South-East Europe; and a further draft Summary of Indications regarding Soviet foreign 
policy.  The latter dominated the meeting and these, by now fortnightly, Summaries – 
this was Summary of Indications of Soviet Foreign Policy No. 26 (Ref RC/41/49) – are 
circulated to a select number of Ministers, including the Foreign Secretary and other 
Foreign Office Ministers and the Prime Minister.  This particular Summary included 
references to:  Molotov’s translation of Soviet foreign policy; Voznesensky’s (described 
by Radice as a competent economist-statistician) having been sacked as Deputy Prime 
Minister and from the Politburo and being replaced by his own deputy and the 
Committee agreed that this information needed to be included in the Summary of 
Indications. 
23 March 1949 FO 371/77616.  Strang to Bevin.  NB unable to locate this paper. 
12 April 1949 FO 371/N3583/1052/38G.  Minutes of Russia Committee Meeting. Mr Hayter in the 
Chair.  Mr Barnes, as Secretary.  The Committee business included:  a paper by Mr 
Radice of Soviet industrial potential; and a further draft summary of indications 
regarding Soviet foreign policy. Mr Radice’s paper had been commissioned by Mr 
Bevin and the Prime Minister and largely concerned the Soviet economy and the 
estimated Soviet expenditure on armaments over which there was some dispute about 
the accuracy. It was largely agreed that the present strength of the Soviet Union lay in 
its numerous front-line soldiers in Germany and was not dependent on basic economic 
factors.  The figures in the paper showed that the Soviet standard of living was 
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supporting an increasing productivity and also provided a higher food standard than 
West Germany.  It was agreed that the paper needed to be refined and considered 
again by the Russia Committee before being submitted to the PM and Foreign 
Secretary under cover of a minute by the Committee. The Committee then looked at 
the latest ‘Summary of Indications’ paper and agreed it could be circulated.   
26 April 1949 FO 371/N3817/1052/38G.  Minutes of Russia Committee Meeting. Sir Gladwyn Jebb in 
the Chair.  Mr Barnes, Secretary. The Committee business included:  a copy of a 
dispatch by HM Ambassador, Moscow on possible effect on Soviet policy of recent 
changes in Soviet hierarchy; a minute by Information Research Department (IRD) on 
British participation in the Paris Peace Conference; a further draft ‘Indications’ paper. 
Of main interest was the latest ‘Indications’ paper which drew attention to the 
announcement in Tass regarding a possible lifting of the Berlin blockade and a meeting 
of the Council of Foreign Ministers which the Soviets had stated could be a means of 
ending the deadlock.  The Summary was also to include a reference to the defection of 
the former editor of the newspaper “British Ally” in Moscow.   Sir Anthony Rumbold 
was then invited to give the Committee his impressions of Czechoslovakia.  He gave an 
overall impression of how things were in the country, noting that although the great 
majority of the people hated the Communist regime there was no chance of a 
revolution or of any effective resistance and the Communists had complete control.  
The standard of living had been steadily going down. 
10 May 1949 FO 371/N4342/1052/38G.  Minutes of Russia Committee Meeting.  Sir Gladwyn Jebb 
in the Chair.  Mr Barnes, Secretary. The Committee business comprised 4 items:  a 
paper on ‘Peace Offensive, Tactical Deviation or Change of Policy?’; a memorandum 
concerning the replacement of Molotov by Vishinsky;  a revision of Mr Radice’s ‘Soviet 
Industrial Potential Paper first discussed at the 12 April meeting;  a further ‘Summary 
of Indications’ paper.  On Molotov’s move, the Russia Committee took a different view 
from that of HM Ambassador, Moscow, who had implied heavily that Molotov had 
been sacked whereas the Russia Committee members, in discussion, felt that there 
was no evidence to support this.  Mr Radice introduced his revised ‘Soviet Industrial 
Policy’ paper which had been commissioned by the Prime Minister and the Foreign 
Secretary, both of whom had seen the original version and had agreed, subject to any 
comments by the Minister of Defence, it should be circulated to the Cabinet.  The 
Ministry of Defence now wished to circulate a parallel paper giving the latest estimates 
of Russian armament production.  However, the original version had already been 
amended in accordance with Joint Intelligence Board and MOD comments, so the 
Russia Committee agreed that the revised paper should be sent to the Foreign 
Secretary under a covering minute making this clear.  As to the ‘Summary of 
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Indications’, new items to be included:  the fact that the Soviet Peace Initiative (see 
previous Minutes) regarding the possible lifting of the Berlin blockade appeared to 
date from Molotov’s move;  the ‘radio war’ and whether the Soviets were concerned 
to try to disturb the US and British propaganda broadcasts;  whether there was 
substance in HM Ambassador’s assertion that the Soviets were diverting their efforts 
from the West to Asia – the Russia Committee did not feel that the evidence as yet 
supported that view.   
24 May 1949 FO 371/N4901/1052/38.  Minutes of Russia Committee Meeting.  Sir Gladwyn Jebb in 
the Chair.  Mr Barnes, Secretary.  The Committee was joined by Mr Malcolm 
Macdonald, Commissioner-General in South East Asia and the main business of the 
meeting was given over to his address to the Russia Committee, the essence of which 
was as follows:   the future policy of a Communist Government of China was an 
important question and whether such a Government would be able to embark upon 
foreign adventures, as well as coping with the situation in China itself, or would need 
to undertake such adventures in order to divert attention from the Chinese 
situation…..  It appeared that Russia had very little direct association with events in 
South East Asia, where others were doing their work for them, but there was reason to 
suppose that Russia was in touch with the Chinese Communists.  The Russian Embassy 
in Bangkok seemed to be a focus of trouble…..  Russian tactics were mainly to support 
dissident elements, such as the Chinese minorities, which had great economic power in 
South East Asian countries, the extreme left-wing elements, as in Indo-China, and the 
Siamese Navy who hoped misguidedly to use the Communists to help them gain power 
in Siam.  The future depended on the course of both Communist policy and of 
nationalism in South East Asia.  Nationalist movements could be influenced by the 
Western attitude to them, particularly if some of them could be enlisted in opposition 
to Communism….. The influence of the Indian Government had been consistently 
against Communism and the latter’s decision to stay in the Commonwealth might be 
compared with that of the policy which had culminated in the Atlantic Pact in the 
West.  There was, at present, a struggle between Communist China and democratic 
India for the leadership of Asia.   
8 June 1949 FO 371/N5326/1052/38G.  Minutes of Russia Committee Meeting.  Sir Gladwyn Jebb 
in the Chair.  Mr Barnes, Secretary.  The Committee business included a paper by 
Economic Intelligence Department on the possible emergence of a rouble area 
(RC/81/49; N5328/1111/38G) and a further draft ‘Summary of Indications’ (RC/82/49; 
Final – N5177/1023/38G). New items for the latter included a discussion about the 
Soviet concern that the Berlin blockade was adversely affecting trade/economy of the 
East and that the Soviets might wish to restore trade between the sectors to avoid 
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comparisons between the standard of living in the two sectors because of the possible 
effect on satellite countries, particularly Poland and Czechoslovakia.  There was a 
reference to the defection of the head of the British Council in Warsaw. 
21 June1949 FO 371/N5675/1052/38G.  Minutes of Russia Committee Meeting.  Sir Gladwyn Jebb 
in the Chair.  Mr Barns, Secretary. The Committee business included:  a statement by 
the Chairman on the resistance to the Russians in Lithuania (no detail of the statement 
is recorded in the minutes);  Sir Stafford Cripps’,  the Chancellor of the Exchequer, 
comments on two Russia Committee papers (RC/77/49 “Peace Offensive”;  and 
RC/86/49 ‘Tactical Deviation or change of Long-Term Policy)  a further draft of the 
‘Summary if Indications’.  On the ‘Peace Offensive’ paper, the Chairman noted that 
Bevin thought Cripps’ comments ‘apposite and shrewd’ and thought that they should 
redraft the paper in the light of his comments and should discuss the redraft at their 
next meeting.  Mr Berthoud also raised the question as to whether policy towards the 
Soviet Union and satellites should be modified following the Council of Foreign 
Ministers.  The Chairman said that only the delegation to the Council would be able to 
speak with authority but there was no apparent reason in principle to change the 
existing policy. 
5 July 1949 FO 371/N6143/1052/38G.  Minutes of Russia Committee Meeting.  Sir Gladwyn Jebb 
in the Chair.  Mr Barnes, Secretary.  The Committee had four items of business:  a 
paper by EID (RC/92/49:  N6144/1121/38G) on the reported Russian withdrawal from 
the Soviet/Satellite joint companies;  a minute by the German Political Department on 
the effects on East-West trade of the recent Council of Foreign Ministers (RC/94/49:  
N6145/1155/38G);  a Statement by Mr Hankey on the ‘Krajina v Tass’ case; and a 
further draft ‘Summary of Indications’.     
19 July 1949 FO 371/N6594/1052/309.  Minutes of Russia Committee Meeting.  Mr Hayter in the 
Chair.  Mr Barnes, Secretary.  The Committee business comprised three items:  a 
further draft of ‘Summary of Indications’; an extract from a report written after the 
defection of the former Chief of the Czechoslovak Military Mission in Berlin; a minute 
by German Political Department on the Soviet-inspired “National Front” in Germany.   
9 Aug 1949 FO 371/77624/N7277/1052/38G.  Minutes of Russia Committee Meeting.  Mr 
Bateman in the Chair.  Mr Barnes, Secretary.  The Committee business comprised:   a 
record prepared by Northern Department of the interrogation of M Heidrich, former 
Secretary-General of the Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs;  a JIC review of 
developments in the Soviet Zone of Germany in the last three months;  a paper by 
Northern Department on ‘Deportations in the Soviet Union’;  and a further ‘Summary 
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of Indications’ draft.  On the JIC paper the Russia Committee noted the War Office 
view that it was too soon to assume any substantial Russian demobilisation in 
Germany at present and that no further information was likely until the end of 
Autumn;  they also noted that the Air Ministry did not think that the increase in the 
size of runways was very significant – more likely to do with some technical 
development in Soviet aircraft.   
30 Aug 1949 FO 371/77624/N7883/1052/38G.  Minutes of Russia Committee Meeting.  Sir Gladwyn 
Jebb in the Chair.  Mr Hadow, Secretary. The Committee had four items of business:  
comments from Sir David Kelly on EID’s rouble paper; papers by Northern Department 
of Foreign Office on Soviet Gold Dealings and on Soviet Policy in the Far East; a further 
draft ‘Summary of Indications’.     
8, 10, 12 Sept FO 371/77624//N7883/1052/38G.  Exchange of correspondence between CRO and Mr 
Hadow where the former disputed the wording in the previous Russia Committee 
Minutes of something said by the CRO representative.   
13 Sept 1949 FO 371/77624/N8287/1052/38G.  Minutes of Russia Committee Meeting.  Mr Hayter 
in the Chair.  Mr Barnes, Secretary. The Committee had two items of business:  a 
further ‘Summary of Indications’ paper; and a paper by the Economic Intelligence 
Department of the Foreign Office (EID) on ‘Soviet Use of the Price Mechanism’.  Re the 
former, interesting items included:  Moscow radio having reported guerrilla fighting in 
Yugoslavia – and in general there being no apparent abatement in the virulence of the 
Soviet campaign against Tito; reference to an Observer report that the Soviets were 
planning a general withdrawal from the Balkans – the Russia Committee saw no 
evidence to support this assertion;  and fresh evidence of Russian troop movements 
towards Yugoslavia but in insufficient numbers as yet to support large scale 
operations.   
27 Sept 1949 FO 371/77624//8665/1052/38G.  Minutes of Russia Committee Meeting.  Mr Hayter 
in the Chair.  Mr Barnes, Secretary.  The Committee business comprised four items:  a 
further ‘Summary of Indications’; revised Northern Department paper on ‘Soviet Policy 
in the Far East’; correspondence about Russian intentions with regard to Yugoslavia; 
and a paper by IRD on ‘The Communist Peace Offensive’.  The ‘Summary’ included 
reference to a Tass communiqué about an atomic explosion on Russia which appeared 
to show that Soviet warlike preparations were further advanced than had been 
expected – RC/123/49; a report from the International Bank said that the Yugoslav 
balance of payments position over the next four months would be “unbelievably 
serious”.  Interesting discussion on state of play with Tito which concluded that the 
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Russians probably calculated that the Western Powers would not go to war for the 
sake of Yugoslavia;  that active intervention by the Red Army might very well be 
needed to dislodge Tito;  that although armed intervention was not excluded,  the 
Russians would probably wait until the Spring to bring matters to a head.  The Russia 
Committee invited the Northern and Southern Departments of the Foreign Office to 
prepare a joint paper on the probable developments of the Soviet/Yugoslav dispute for 
the Secretary of State.   
11 Oct 1949 FO 371/77624/N8944/1052/38G.  Minutes of Russia Committee Meeting.  Mr Hayter 
in the Chair.  Mr Barnes, Secretary.  The Committee business included four items:  a 
further ‘summary of Indications’ paper; an IRD paper on Communism in Africa; a 
minute by Southern Department on the probable development of the Soviet/Yugoslav 
dispute; an IRD paper on ‘The USSR and the Satellites:  Organisation, Distribution of 
Power and Channels of Command’.  Of these perhaps the most interesting was the 
Southern Department’s minute which the Russia Committee agreed accurately 
represented its view on the situation and agreed that copies should be sent to HM 
Embassies in Washington, Moscow and Belgrade and that Washington should be 
authorised to show it to the US State Department and that the Russia Committee 
Chairman would also show it to the JIC – ref N8931/1023/38G.   
25 Oct 1949 FO 371/77624/N9313/1052/38G.  Minutes of Russia Committee Meeting. Sir Gladwyn 
Jebb in the Chair.  Mr Barnes, Secretary.  The Committee had three items of business:  
an EID paper on Yugoslavia’s Economic Position – RC/137/49; an IRD paper on 
Communism in Egypt; and a further ‘Summary of Indications’.  On Yugoslavia things 
had improved and the US was now likely to provide additional $11million credits 
against a net Yugoslav deficit of $12million therefore meeting Yugoslavia’s short-term 
requirements for raw materials. New issues for the ‘Summary’ included the fact that 
Russia had not made as many concessions as expected to the new Eastern German 
Government and had retained means of control over it; the election of Yugoslavia to 
the Security Council was seen as being unlikely to affect Soviet Policy towards 
Yugoslavia. 
8 Nov 1949 FO 371/77624/N9737/1052/38G.  Minutes of Russia Committee Meeting.  Mr Hayter 
in the Chair.  Mr Barnes, Secretary.   HM Ambassador, Belgrade, Sir Charles Peake, 
attended the meeting. The four items of Committee business were:   a statement by Sir 
Charles Peake; a further ‘Summary of Indications’; a dispatch from the High 
Commissioner, New Delhi, about Communism in India;  and an IRD paper on ‘Trends of 
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Communist Propaganda, 18 October – 4 November’.644 Sir Charles reported having 
seen Marshall Tito the previous week at the latter’s request.  The general tenor was 
that Yugoslavia had the situation regarding Russia and the Satellites in hand and Stalin 
could only wait while Yugoslavia consolidated her independence.  Yugoslavia also 
believed that a new system would arise in which the Satellites dropped away from 
Russia and grouped themselves around Yugoslavia as independent Communist states 
and would be able then to talk to Russia on equal terms.  The Yugoslavs thought that 
Stalin could not prevent this development except by use of force.  Tito said that he 
would use all necessary means of self-defence and was less sanguine than some fellow 
Yugoslavs that such force would not be forthcoming.  He expected trouble on the 
frontiers.  The Yugoslavs needed economic help over the next 18 months to 2 years to 
encourage her. 
Re the ‘Summary’, it included an interesting issue relating to Poland and the 
appointment by the Russians of Marshall Rokossovsky as head of the Polish armed 
forces which would annoy Poles greatly and that the appointment provided a 
‘magnificent opportunity for Tito’ to emphasise the inevitability of Russian dominance 
over the Satellites.  The Russia Committee saw this as some indication that the 
Russians were disturbed by the state of feeling in Satellite countries and were taking 
steps to counteract it by obtaining more military control over the Satellites. 
22 Nov 1949 FO 371/77624/N10086/1052/38G.  Minutes of Russia Committee Meeting.  Sir 
Gladwyn Jebb back in the Chair.  The Russia Committee saw a different approach at 
this meeting.  There were no papers as such (except for the ‘Summary of Indications’).  
The first item was a discussion as to whether in future the fortnightly ‘Summaries’ 
should be less of an intelligence summary and more of ‘an inspired guess’.  They clearly 
needed a re-look and the Russia Committee agreed to consider the future format at 
their next meeting.   Secondly, they had an interesting discussion about ‘Titoism’.  Sir 
Gladwyn Jebb referred to the prevailing tendency to treat all manifestations of 
Communism throughout the world as Soviet inspired, but Yugoslavia was evidence that 
Communism need not always be Soviet controlled.  The Russia Committee considered 
the rumoured setting up of a Titoist Communist International organisation but it was 
too early for them to have gleaned information on this, though there were thought to 
already be signs of support for Titoism in Norway, France and, indeed, the UK.  The 
Committee invited Mr Harrison to arrange for a paper to be prepared on 
‘manifestations of Titoism in national Communist parties. 
                                                     
644 FO9 371/87650 – I949 box.   
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6 Dec 1949 FO 371/77624/1052/38G.  Minutes of Russia Committee Meeting.  Sir Gladwyn Jebb in 
the Chair.  Mr Barnes, Secretary.  Sir Ralph Stevenson, HM Ambassador, China, and Sir 
Edmund Hall-Patch, UK Delegate to OEEC, Paris, were both exceptionally in 
attendance.  There were two items on the agenda – again no papers other than the 
latest ‘Summary of Indications’.  Sir Ralph addressed the Committee with reference to 
the passages in the ‘Summary’ relating to the Far East.  He said it was only accidental 
that the Communists had successfully completed a Chinese revolution begun 38 years 
ago.  There were three main factions/ tendencies in the Chinese leadership:  exclusive 
devotion to Russia; belief in the need for reasonable relations with countries besides 
Russia; hatred of all foreigners.  Chou-en-Lai seemed to think a clash between first and 
second to be likely; Mao-Tse-Tung appeared to float above all three factions.  There 
was much xenophobia throughout Chin, largely indiscriminating, but particular hatred 
of Russia in the north.  In general, he said, the new Chinese rulers were utterly ruthless 
and would rather let millions of Chinese die than yield to foreign pressure.  Asked 
whether the Chinese Communists were subservient to Moscow and whether Russia 
could, as she had in all other Satellite countries except Yugoslavia, gain control through 
the secret police, Sir Ralph said that most Chinese Communists were Marxists but not 
all were pro-Russian.  The younger ones tended to look mainly to Russia though he 
doubted that any foreigner could establish a grip on China through the secret police 
and he thought it very unlikely that Russia could order a purge of China.   
17 Dec 1949 FO 371/77623/N171/1052/38G.  Report of a Special Meeting on the Functions and Re-
organisation of the Russia Committee.  Meeting held in Sir Orme Sargent’s Room.  This 
was a very important meeting attended by the ‘top brass’ of the Foreign Office and 
chaired by the PUS himself.  Its purpose was to discuss three issues:  the question of 
whether to re-organise the Russia Committee; the desirability of setting up an 
organisation for planning; and what action should be taken to educate the Service 
Departments in the methods and function of the Foreign Office.   In attendance, 
alongside Sir Orme Sargent, were:  Sir William Strang; Sir Noel Charles, Sir Ivone 
Kirkpatrick and key regular Foreign Office members of the Russia Committee, including 
the current Chairman, Sir Gladwyn Glebb, and the sometime former Chairman 
Christopher Warner.   Such stellar attendees – all of whom were Foreign Office and 
excluding all the non-Foreign Office regular Russia Committee attendees - were a clear 
indication of the then current importance of the Russia Committee and the need to 
revisit whether it remained fit for purpose and whether, and if so what, any changes 
were needed.   
Sir Gladwyn Jebb began the discussion by saying that at present the Russia Committee 
were considering two questions:  whether a more offensive policy should be pursued 
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towards Russia and the Soviet orbit; and, if such a policy were to be pursued, what 
organisation would be required.  Added to these considerations were the somewhat 
separate questions as to whether the Russia Committee should be re-organised and, if 
so how, its functions and whether planning staff would be needed.  Sir Gladwyn 
believed that the Russia Committee could usefully be transformed into a Committee of 
Under-Secretaries under the Chairmanship of the PUS, the Head of the Office, and 
might consider major policy (not the day to day work of the office) once a week, with 
the PUS setting the agenda.  There should, he said, be a dedicated team of 2 or 3 
people to form the Secretariat and to prepare papers, as commissioned by the PUS, to 
go to the Secretary of State.   He said that: “Even is such a committee were not useful 
in itself, it could deprive the Chiefs of Staff of their argument that there was nobody in 
the Foreign Office for considering and co-ordinating long-term policy”.645  
Following discussion, Sir Orme Sargent agreed that such a Policy Committee would be 
useful and requested Sir Gladwyn to prepare a paper containing its terms of reference 
taking account of the terms of reference and functions and composition of the Russia 
Committee.  He should also work out the terms of reference for the Secretariat in 
cooperation with Mr Hayter.  It was also agreed that the regular fortnightly 
‘Summaries of Indications regarding Soviet Policy’ should be continued and Sir 
Gladwyn would consider ‘what would be the best system’ and that its preparation 
should remain the work of the Russia Committee and not the new Policy Committee.  
The meeting also considered what more could be done to educate the Service 
Departments regarding the organisation and function of the Foreign Office and 
concluded that it would be valuable if the Head of the Office (Orme Sargent) could 
meet with the Chiefs of Staff from time to time. 
20 Dec 1949 FO 371/77624/N10886/1052/38G.  Minutes of Russia Committee Meeting. Sir 
Gladwyn Jebb in the Chair. Mr Hadow, Secretary.  The final Russia Committee meeting 
of the year had just two items under discussion:  a further draft ‘Summary of 
Indications’; and the question of diplomatic relations with Bulgaria.    The meeting 
began with a discussion on whether the cold war had lulled and concluded that there 
was at least no acceleration in tempo at present.  Among the items to be included in 
the next ‘Summary of Indications’ was the fact that Mao Tse-tung had visited Moscow 
and whether this suggested a possible Soviet-Chinese treaty and the Chairman 
directed the Secretariat to consult the Foreign Office’s Far Eastern Department on this.  
As to relations with Bulgaria, the Americans were minded to break off diplomatic 
relations with Bulgaria should they declare the American Minister persona non grata.  
                                                     
645 FO 371/77623/N171/1052/38G.  Report, dated 17 December 1949,  of a Special Meeting on the 
Functions and Re-organisation of the Russia Committee.  Page 2, Paragraph 5. 
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The Foreign Office, however, felt it important to retain representation behind the iron 
curtain in order to have some source of information about developments there.  It was 
agreed that the Russians did not want to squeeze the missions of the Western powers 
out of Satellite countries completely, rather wishing to emasculate and depreciate 
them but still be able to preserve the myth of Satellite independence.  The Foreign 
Office view was that even if our missions were reduced to two or three people they 
would still be of value as listening posts.  
9 Jan 1950 FO 371/86761/NS1053/1.  Minutes of Russia Committee Meeting. Sir Gladwyn Jebb in 
the Chair. Mr Barnes, Secretary.  Four items for discussion:  a dispatch from HM 
Ambassador, Moscow; a Memorandum by the Russian Committee Sub-Committee on 
‘Anti-Stalinist Communism’;  a memorandum by Northern Department on ‘The British 
Press on Stalin’s Birthday; and a further draft ‘Summary of Indications’.   Of interest 
from the latter was a reference to the fact that the US State Department attached 
great importance to Molotov’s remark at the Stalin birthday celebrations that the 
downfall of Tito was not far off. 
24 Jan 1950 FO 371/86761/NS1053/4.  Minutes of Russia Committee Meeting. Sir Gladwyn Jebb in 
the Chair. Mr Barnes, Secretary.  Two items for discussion:  a further draft ‘Summary of 
Indications’; and a paper by the Information Research Department on ‘Trends of 
Communist Propaganda in 1949 – an Interpretive Analysis’ (Ref RC/10/50).  On the 
latter paper, the Russia Committee agreed that the draft paper should be circulated to 
all Foreign Office Departments for comments and then, after any amendments, should 
be circulated widely.  The Chairman then noted that at the next meeting of the Russia 
Committee the paper on ‘Anti-Stalinist Communism, previously circulated as RC/5/50, 
would be discussed. 
7 Feb 1950 FO 371/86761/NS1053/5.  Minutes of Russia Committee Meeting. Sir Gladwyn Jebb in 
the Chair. Mr Barnes, Secretary.  Three items for discussion:  the draft ‘Anti-Stalinist 
Communism’ paper as previously noted; a paper on the use of the term ‘Cold War’; 
and a further draft ‘Summary of Indications’ paper. On the first item, Sir Gladwyn 
noted that Count Sforza had told Bevin that among Italian Communists there was a 
growing tendency towards ‘Titoism’.  The Russia Committee agreed that the paper 
should be amended in the light of their discussions and a further draft considered at 
their next meeting.   They then discussed whether the term ‘Cold War’ should be 
replaced with another term as there had been criticism of the Permanent Under 
Secretary’s Committee (PUSC) using the term in a recent paper.  After some discussion 
the Chairman put forward, for discussion at the next meeting, the following as an 
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alternative:  “A struggle against Stalinist Communism on a world-wide scale not 
involving a world war”.   
11 Feb 1950 FO 371/86751/NS1052/13.  Top Secret paper by the Russia Committee entitled “Anti-
Stalinist Communism (Second Revise).  See final paper as 18 February below. 
14 Feb 1950 FO 371/86761/NS1053/1.  Minutes of Russia Committee Meeting. Sir Gladwyn Jebb in 
the Chair.  Mr Moss, Secretary. Three items for discussion:  Text of remarks by Acheson 
on 8 February; the redrafted paper on ‘Anti Stalinist Communism’:  and the possible 
change in the use of the term ‘Cold War’.  As to Acheson’s remarks as reported in the 
Times, he had put forward the idea that the Cold War should be called off on the 
grounds that the US saw no chance of reaching agreement with the Soviets. The 
redrafted second paper was discussed and it was agreed, subject to approval by the 
Foreign Secretary, it be sent to HM representatives abroad and to the US State 
Department.  Interesting point, within the discussion, was that Sir David Kelly was 
reported as assessing the effectiveness of the UK’s propaganda against the Soviets as 
94% ineffective!  As to the revised terminology suggested by Sir Gladwyn for the ‘Cold 
War’ the Russia Committee agreed his suggested definition.  An example of the Russia 
Committee taking themselves perhaps a bit too seriously. 
18 Feb 1950 FO 371/86751/NS1052/19.  Top Secret paper by the Russia Committee entitled “Anti-
Stalinist Communism (Final).  Key paper.  Five pages long plus a six-page Annex. 
Conclusions are set out in Part IV of the main paper as follow:  
 “16.  (a)  Titoism and other manifestations of anti-Stalinist feeling in Communist parties 
are a potentially valuable force working against both international Communism and 
Russian imperialism. 
        (b)  The value of this force to us is, however, qualified by the fact that in particular 
cases, eg China, Western Germany and Austria, it may broaden the Communist appeal 
and so present dangers of its own.  We should regard the estrangement of national 
Communist parties from Moscow not as an end in itself, but as a step towards the 
disruption of Communism in all its forms. 
       (c)  The appeal of Titoism depends essentially on the character of a “pure” 
Communist doctrine, independent of, and indeed theoretically hostile to, the capitalist 
West.  Any overt support we might give it would prejudice this appeal and play into the 
hands of Soviet propaganda. 
        (d)  Subject to (b) and (c) above, we should exploit the differences between national 
and Kremlin-controlled Communism, in existing Communist parties.  Our attitude must, 
however, be governed by the circumstances of each case;  eg while we may feed such 
movements in France and Italy (where Titoist propaganda is likely to split the 
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Communists than to attract fresh recruits to them), we should deprecate the spread of 
National Communism in countries where the Communist threat is not strong or which, 
like China, may develop a powerful international appeal even after severance from 
Moscow”. 
 
21 Feb 1950 FO 371/86761/NS1053/1.  Minutes of Russia Committee Meeting.  Sir Gladwyn Jebb in 
the Chair.  Mr Moss, Secretary.  Two items for discussion: the Minutes of the 14 Feb 
Russia Committee meeting; and a further draft ‘Summary of Indications’ paper.  On the 
first item, the Russia Committee instructed the Secretariat to ask Sir David Kelly to 
clarify his comments on the effectiveness of propaganda as there was some thought 
that he had been referring only to the BBC broadcasts to Russia.   
 
23 Feb 1950 FO 371/86751/NS1052/19.  Top Secret Minute from Sir Gladwyn Jebb to Sir William 
Strang and to Ernest Bevin which was a cover note to the Russia Committee paper at 
18 February entry above.  Important paper worth quoting extensively: 
“I submit a paper, prepared and approved by the Russia Committee, on the subject of 
Titoism and other manifestations of “National” or “anti-Stalinist” Communism.   
2. The paper is based on information supplied by certain of HM Missions abroad, who 
were asked to report whether Tito’s example had had any effect (a) on local 
Communist parties, or (b) non-Communist fellow-travelling opinion, and whether there 
was any evidence of attempts by the Yugoslav Government to form a Titoist 
International.  It also embodies information, supplied by the security authorities, on the 
effect of Titoism on the British Communist Party. 
3. It is proposed, if you agree, to circulate the paper to the Prime Minister and the 
other 
recipients in London of the “Summary of Indications regarding Soviet Foreign Policy”, 
and also to the chief posts on whose reports the memorandum is based (see attached 
list)646, with a suitable covering dispatch emphasizing the secret nature of the 
memorandum.  At the same time, we would ask our Embassy in Washington to give a 
copy to the most suitable official in the State Department and enquire whether the 
Americans had prepared any similar study which they would care to convey to us. 
The Minute was signed by Galdwyn Jebb and initialed by William Strang and Ernest 
Bevin the latter saying “I agree”.  
                                                     
646 The distribution list comprised the top 3433 senior posts abroad plus the UK High Commissioners in 
Delhi, Canberra, Karachi and Ottawa, and the UK Delegation to the United Nations in New York. 
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7 March 1950 FO 371/86761/NS1053/9.   Minute from Sir Gladwyn Jebb to Major General K W D 
Strong, member of the Joint Intelligence Bureau (JIB) agreeing to the latter’s request to 
become a member of the Russia Committee. 
7 March 1950 FO 371/86761/NS1053/10.  Minutes of Russia Committee Meeting.  Sir Gladwyn Jebb 
in the Chair.  Mr Moss, Secretary.  Four items for discussion:   a paper on ‘Sovietisation 
and Purges in Eastern Europe’; a paper on ‘Communism in Latin America’; a paper on 
the ‘Exchange Rate of the Rouble’; and a further draft ‘Summary of Indications’.  The 
Committee agreed to ask the IRD to amend the second of the papers in the light of the 
recorded Russia Committee discussions and they would then consider the redraft at 
their next meeting.   
18 March 1950 FO 371/86751/NS1052/19.Top-Secret Minute from Ernest Bevin to the Prime Minister 
which reads: 
 I send you herewith a copy of a memorandum prepared by the Russia 
Committee on the subject of Titoism and other manifestations of “National” or “anti-
Stalinist” Communism.   
2.The paper is based on information supplied by certain of HM Missions abroad, who 
were asked to report whether Tito’s example had had any effect:- 
 (a) on local Communist parties, or 
 (b) non-Communist fellow-travelling opinion, and whether there was any evidence of 
attempts by the Yugoslav Government to form a Titoist International.  It also embodies 
information, supplied by the security authorities, on the effect of Titoism on the British 
Communist Party. 
3.If you have not time to read the whole paper you will, I think, be interested to glance 
at the first five pages, which contain a general survey and the conclusions. 
4.Copies of the memorandum and of this minute are being sent to the Lord President, 
the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the Minister of Defence and the Secretaries of State 
for Commonwealth Relations and the Colonies.  
 
 21 March 1950 FO 371/86761/NS1053/1.  Minutes of Russia Committee Meeting.  Sir Gladwyn Jebb in 
the Chair.  Mr Moss, Secretary.  Three items for discussion:   a paper on the 
‘Strengthening of Soviet Political Control in Eastern Europe:  Interpretation of the 
‘Purges’’; the text of an address to the University of California by Acheson; and a 
further draft ‘Summary of Indications’.  Acheson’s speech, in conjunction with his 
pronouncements discussed at the Russia Committee’s 14 Feb meeting, was thought to 
be an important reflection of US policy which was to refute the moves to high level 
meetings between leaders and to adopt the Kennan policy of ‘firm but patient 
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containment’ in building up resistance to Russian expansion. In the ‘Summary’ there is 
reference to Molotov having been a tired man when he ceased to be Foreign Minister 
and was succeeded by Vyshinsky who was thought to be ‘only a puppet’ and that the 
Russians extremely successful handling of the Chinese situation was largely down to 
Stalin’s personal interest. 
23 March 1950 FO 371/86751/NS1052/19.  Copy of Minute by the Prime Minister to Ernest Bevin 
which reads: “Foreign Secretary’s Minute, (PM (50)12) of 18 3 50 enclosing copy of a 
memorandum by the Russia Committee about Titoism and “anti-Stalinist” 
Communism.  The Prime Minister has seen and noted“. 
4 April 1950 FO 371/86761/NS1053/10.  Minutes of Russia Committee Meeting.  Sir Gladwyn Jebb 
in the Chair.  Mr Barnes, Secretary.  Three items for discussion:   a revised paper on 
‘Communism in Latin America’; ‘East-West Trading Policy’; and a further draft 
‘Summary of Indications’.  The first paper had been revised as agreed by a special 
meeting of the Russia Committee Sub-Committee under Mr Warner’s chairmanship 
and also reflected the comments on it from H M Ambassador at Caracas and other 
Heads of Missions and would be discussed at the next Russia Committee meeting to 
which the Treasury and Board of Trade would be invited to send representatives.  In 
discussions on the latest ‘Summary’ the Chairman noted that it contained much more 
on the Far East and South East Asia than on any other part of the world and asked 
whether this meant that the ‘Cold War’ had now been transferred to that area or 
whether it merely reflected exceptional diligence on the part of the Foreign Office 
Departments concerned.  It transpired that the contributions on the Far East had been 
deliberately increased at the request of the Russia Committee at an earlier meeting 
but that it was true that the ‘Cold War’ was at present much more active in the Far 
East than elsewhere. The ‘Summary’ also noted that the JIC was studying the 
implications of a recent report that Russian aircraft had been seen in China. 
19 April 1950 FO 371/86761/NS1053/14.  Minutes of Russia Committee Meeting.   Mr Bateman in 
the Chair.  Mr Moss, Secretary.  Four items for discussion:   a revised paper on East 
West Trading Policy;  a paper by the Northern Department on ‘Relations between the 
Western Powers and the Soviet Union’ consisting of:  a draft brief for talks between Mr 
Bevin and Mr Acheson  and a memorandum summarizing and commenting on  certain 
United States views regarding Soviet intentions (which was not gone into in detail); a 
further draft ‘Summary of Indications’ paper;  and a paper by Northern Department on 
‘Foreign Policy through the looking glass’ – discussion of which was put on hold until 
the next meeting of the Russia Committee three weeks hence.   
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9 May 1950 FO 371/86761/NS1053/17.  Minutes of Russia Committee Meeting.  Mr Bateman in 
the Chair.  Mr Moss, Secretary.  Two items for discussion:  the ‘Foreign Policy through 
the Looking Glass’ paper deferred from the previous meeting; and a further draft 
‘Summary of Indications’ paper.  The purpose of the ‘Looking Glass’ paper by Northern 
Department was to look at themselves (i.e. the Foreign Office) as others might ‘see us’.  
The paper assumed that the main motive of Russian foreign policy was defence against 
capitalist encirclement.  Another important motive, however, was the Leninist thesis 
that until capitalism and imperialism were annihilated, socialism could not be safe.  In 
discussion it was felt that if Soviet foreign policy was motivated purely by ideological 
considerations, there was no hope for the future but it was assumed that there existed 
a realist element in the Soviet make-up which led the Russians to respect situations of 
strength of the Western Powers.   The thought was that a characteristic of the 
Communist State, as of the Nazi State, was the feeling that it was not secure unless it 
was expanding all the time. 
23 May 1950 FO 371/86761/NS1053/18.  Minutes of Russia Committee Meeting.  Sir Gladwyn Jebb 
back in the Chair.  Mr Moss, Secretary.  Four items for discussion:  Moscow dispatches 
on East-West trade; a further draft ‘Summary of Indications’;  a revised version of 
‘Foreign Policy Through the Looking Glass’;  and  a paper by Northern Department on 
‘Western Measures to Contain Soviet Communism’.  Sir Gladwyn introduced Sir 
Pierson Dixon who was to take over a Chairman.  After further discussion of the 
‘Looking Glass ‘ paper the Russia Committee agreed as the next step to send it to HM 
Embassy, Moscow, for comment.  As to the ‘Western Measures’ paper by Northern 
Department, which had been commissioned by Mr Bevin, Sir Gladwyn said that it was 
well written and contained useful material but was too long for busy Ministers to have 
to read so suggested that Mr Bevin should be asked what he wanted to be done with it 
and then possibly have it re-cast. 
  6 June  1950 FO 371/86762/NS1053/9.  Minutes of Russia Committee Meeting.  Sir Pierson Dixon in 
the Chair.  Mr Moss, Secretary.  Four items for discussion:  a revised version of the 
‘Western Measures’ paper; a minute by Southern Department; a minute on East-West 
trade; and a further draft ‘Summary of Indications’ paper.  The Chairman suggested 
recommending to Mr Bevin that a re-cast ‘Western Measures’ paper be circulated to 
Cabinet, though the Russia Committee would seek changes/contributions to a redraft 
first. 
20 June 1950 FO 371/86761/NS1053/20.  Minutes of Russia Committee Meeting.  Sir Pierson Dixon 
in the Chair.  Mr Moss, Secretary.  Three items for discussion:  a draft paper for 
submission to Cabinet on East-West Trade; a survey of Communism in Africa; a further 
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draft ‘Summary of Indications’. The East-West Trade paper was likely to be circulated 
to Cabinet within a week so the Russia Committee’s views were needed, particularly 
on the political section of the paper and the conclusions and on the sense in which the 
Foreign Office representative should be briefed for the Cabinet meeting. They 
therefore had a lengthy discussion and agreed changes to be included in Ministerial 
briefing.  The Committee also agreed to ask African Department and the Research 
Department to redraft and re-circulate the ‘African’ paper.   
1 July 1950 FO371/86756/NS1052/68.  Minute by the Russia Committee Secretariat (Messrs 
Barnes and Moss) for discussion at 4 July meeting, entitled: ‘Soviet Union and Korea’.  
Important paper. 
3 July 1950 FO371/86756/NS1052/70.  Copy of a telegram circulated by the Russia Committee 
Secretariat (Messrs Barnes and Moss) for discussion at 4 July meeting, giving HM 
Ambassador, Moscow (Sir David Kelly) views on Korea situation. Important paper   
4 July 1950 FO 371/86761/NS1053/21.  Minutes of Russia Committee Meeting.  Sir Pierson Dixon 
in the Chair.  Mr Moss, Secretary.  Four items for discussion:   a draft note by the JIC on 
the likelihood of further Russian aggressive moves following the action in Korea; a 
revised paper on ‘Communism in Africa’; a revised paper on ‘Western Measures to 
counter Soviet Expansion’; and a further draft ‘Summary of Indications’.  The Russia 
Committee agreed that the revised Africa paper was improved and should be widely 
circulated immediately; As to the ‘Western Measures’ paper, Sir Pierson said that in 
view of the recent events in Korea the paper was largely out of date and an updated 
version would be needed as soon as possible. 
15 July 1950 FO 371/86758/NS1052/81.  Annex A.  Article dated July 15 by Frank Robertson, 
Observer Correspondent, entitled ‘Asia Sees Victory for Communism:  Fatalism is 
Widespread.  In this article Frank Robertson, having toured extensively in South East 
Asia questioned the effectiveness of the UN action following the invasion of South 
Korea largely because, as he put it, ‘most articulate Asiatics are convinced that all Asia 
is going Communist’ and that ‘repugnant as this prospect is to many’ there exists a 
‘certain unreasoning satisfaction that this will mean the end of the white man’s rule 
over the Asiatic peoples’.  He said that he had found ‘unperturbed acceptance of the 
prospect of Communist rule among even the wealthiest class of Asiatics.  
15July 1950 FO 371/86757/NS1052/74.  Minute dated 13 July by Mr F R H Murray, circulated to 
the Russia Committee by the Secretariat, on ‘indications of possible Soviet action 
derived from current Soviet Propaganda’.  Mr Murray noted that the Foreign Office 
now had a ‘whole time expert devoted to studying…all sources and channels available’.  
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It stated, inter alia that: the Soviet propaganda continued to build against US 
aggression and intervention in Asia; and that the Chinese pledged ‘resolute support’ to 
the peoples of Korea, Japan, Vietnam and the Philippines in their struggle against the 
US. 
18 July 1950 FO 371/86761/NS1053.  Minutes of Russia Committee Meeting.  Mr Reilly in the Chair.  
Mr Barnes, Secretary.  Four items for discussion:  a revised ‘Western Measures’ paper; 
papers about Communist interrogation methods; a minute of current Soviet 
Propaganda; and a further draft ‘Summary of Indications’.  After further discussion on 
the latest ‘Western Measures’ paper it was agreed that a final, further shortened, 
version should be prepared for approval by Sir Pierson and Sir William Strang and 
submitted to Mr Bevin.  Discussion of the second paper was deferred until the next 
meeting as it was of particular interest to Sir Pierson who would then be back;   
1 August 1950 FO 371/86761/NS1053/17.  Minutes of Russia Committee Meeting.   Sir A Noble in the 
Chair.  Mr Moss, Secretary.  Four items for discussion: ‘Communist interrogation’ 
paper; ‘Survey of Communism in countries outside Soviet orbit’; a further draft 
‘Summary of Indications’ paper; and statement on East-West trade.  A ‘technical 
annex’ to the first paper, which IRD had been commissioned to produce, was not ready 
so discussion was postponed;  it was agreed that the factual survey paper need be 
produced annually – Sir Pierson Dixon’s suggestion  and the Russia Committee agreed 
to study the latest survey for discussion at the next meeting. 
4 August 1950 FO 371/86757/NS1052/78.   Summary of Indications Regarding Soviet Foreign Policy 
No 60.  Included here as an example of one of the fortnightly “Crystal Gazers”.  Divided 
into 5 parts:  I General; II Europe; III Middle East; IV South and South East Asia; and V 
The Far East.  On China and Korea, part V, the Note states that “We have no firm 
evidence of any further recent extension of Soviet penetration of China or of any 
increase, since the aggression in Korea, of Soviet military or technical assistance to 
China.  Close coordination of Sino-Soviet policy, however, appears to continue and 
finds expression in Chou En Lai’s Note to the Security Council challenging the validity of 
their resolution on Korea.  This Note parallels the Soviet line on the same question”.  
10 August 1950 FO 371/86758/NS1052/81.  Cover Note to an Observer article on the Korean situation 
circulated for information to the Russia Committee – see July 15 entry above. 
15 August 1950 FO 371/86761/NS1053.  Minutes of Russia Committee Meeting.  Sir Pierson Dixon in 
the Chair.  Mr Barnes, Secretary.  Four items for discussion:   ‘Communist 
interrogation’ redrafted paper; ‘Survey of Communism in Countries Outside Soviet 
Orbit;  a paper on the situation in Korea;  a further draft ‘Summary of Indications’ 
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paper.  On the first paper, after discussion it was agreed that a non-official short book, 
by a lawyer, might be the way forward, and invited the IRD to consider this and who 
might write it.  Approval would first be required from Mr Bevin.  The ‘survey’, it was 
agreed, should now be produced annually.   As to the latest ‘Summary’ the Chairman 
(Sir Pierson Dixon) said that it: “was too long.  It should be compressed more in the 
form of an intelligence summary, to bring out points of importance which were 
otherwise obscured by the somewhat conversational style” (Ref Page 4, paragraph IV, 
1).   
 
29 August 1950 FO 371/86761/NS1053.  Minutes of Russia Committee Meeting.  Mr Reilly in the Chair.  
Mr Dawbarn, Secretary.  Just one items for discussion – a further draft ‘Summary of 
Indications’ paper. 
 
12 Sept 1950 FO 371/86761/NS1053.  Minutes of Russia Committee Meeting.  Mr Reilly in the Chair.  
Mr Moss, Secretary.  Again, just one item on the agenda for discussion, again the latest 
draft ‘Summary of Indications’. 
 
26 Sept 1950 FO 371/86761/NS1053.  Minutes of Russia Committee Meeting.  Mr Reilly in the Chair.  
Mr Dawbarn, Secretary.  Again, just one item on the agenda for discussion, again the 
latest draft ‘Summary of Indications’. 
 
10 Oct 1950 FO 371/86761/NS1053.  Minutes of Russia Committee Meeting.  Sir Pierson Dixon in 
the Chair.  Messrs Barnes and Dawbarn, Secretariat.  Yet again just one item on the 
agenda for discussion, the latest draft ‘Summary of Indications’. 
 
24 Oct 1950 FO 371/86761/NS1053.  Minutes of Russia Committee Meeting.  Sir Pierson Dixon in 
the Chair.  Messrs Barnes and Dawbarn, Secretariat.  Two items on the agenda:  a 
discussion with Sir Charles Peake, HM Ambassador, Belgrade, who was attending the 
meeting:  and a further draft ‘Summary of Indications’.  The Ambassador was asked 
how stable he regarded Tito’s regime to be.  He saw two main internal dangers for 
Yugoslavia.  The first was that since the end of July he had been aware of 
disagreements among high party leaders, some of whom gave the impression that they 
wanted to rejoin their spiritual home in Moscow and that Tito had told Brigadier 
Maclean that the Cominform was trying to sow disaffection not only in the party as a 
whole but in the Marshall’s own collaborators as well.  The second internal danger, he 
said, was that Yugoslavia might emerge from the winter weakened by hunger and 
disease – especially tuberculosis – and the workers would lose the will to work.  The 
soil would then be ready for the Cominform to undermine the Tito regime.  Resultant 
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strikes and unrest would enable the Russians to claim that Tito was no longer in 
control of the situation.   
 
7 Nov 1950 FO 371/86761/NS1053/17.  Minutes of Russia Committee Meeting.   Sir A Noble in the 
Chair.  Messrs Barnes and Dawbarn, Secretariat.   Just one item on the agenda for 
discussion, the latest draft ‘Summary of Indications’.  Two new major developments 
were to be included in the ‘Summary’:  Russian proposals for a Council of Foreign 
Ministers; and General MacArthur’s communiqué about Chinese intervention in Korea.  
On Korea, the Chairman said that there were two possible explanations of the Chinese 
intervention in Korea:  either Russia had pushed China into intervention to keep US 
forces in Korea whilst maintaining the Soviet pose as peace champions;  or the 
inspiration came from the Chinese and was mainly based on fear of US intentions and 
their possible advances beyond Korea.  As to how far China planned to go, the Russia 
Committee considered whether it was a limited operation to scare off the US and 
deter them from undertaking a winter campaign in Korea or whether the Chinese 
contemplated a major effort to push the UN forces back to the 38° Parallel or even 
right out of Korea. They concluded that, despite the obvious dangers of the situation, it 
seemed unlikely that the Chinese were deliberately seeking to provoke a major war.   
 
21 Nov 1950 FO 371/86761/NS1053/33.  Minutes of Russia Committee Meeting.  Sir Pierson Dixon 
in the Chair.  Messrs Barnes and Dawbarn, Secretariat.  Two items on the agenda: a 
draft brief by the Northern Department on Russian Strategic Intentions and the Threat 
to Peace; and a further draft ‘Summary of Intentions paper. The latter was interesting 
because it was now to be in a new form:  a summary in front and two separate parts 
concerning Russia and Chinese policy respectively. 
5 Dec 1950 FO 371/86761/NS1053/35.  Minutes of Russia Committee Meeting.  Sir Pierson Dixon 
in the Chair.  Mr Dawbarn, Secretariat.  Sir David Kelly, HM Ambassador, Moscow, was 
in attendance.  Two items on the agenda:  a paper covering a JIC paper on the Chinese 
Communist threat in the Far East and South East Asia; a further fortnightly ‘Review’ 
(formerly referred to as ‘Summary of Indications’ but now in new format).  On the JIC 
paper, the Chairman took issue with the JIC’s assumption that the Chinese action in 
Korea would be likely to call a halt if given an ultimatum as they would shrink from 
war.  He saw no evidence for this as he believed that China was not afraid of war with 
the US.  Sir David Kelly said that Chinese intentions could only be discovered if an offer 
to open negotiations was made; she would not take such an initiative and she would, 
he thought, certainly try to destroy UN forces unless some such steps were taken soon. 
He thought it unwise to count on Sino Soviet differences.  The interests of the two 
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governments ran parallel and the Soviets would certainly be glad to see US forces 
bogged down in the Far East. The Russia Committee invited the Far Eastern 
Department to re-write the paper in the light of their discussions.  
19 Dec 1950 FO 371/86762/NS1053/36.  Minutes of Russia Committee Meeting.   Sir A Noble in the 
Chair.  Mr Barnes, Secretariat.   Just one item on the agenda for discussion, the latest 
draft fortnightly ‘review’.  There was discussion as to whether it was thought that 
Russia would leave the UN and it was thought that if she did she was unlikely to do so 
until after the forthcoming Council of Foreign Ministers but even then might be very 
hesitant to leave an organisation that might one day be of use to her. 
2 Jan 1951 FO 371/94819:  NS 1021/10.  Note by the new Chairman of the Russia Committee, Sir 
Pierson Dixon, to Sir John Sterndale Bennett, HM Ambassador, Singapore. Important 
document.  Sir Pearson explained to Sir John that he had recently taken over the Russia 
Committee chairmanship from Sir Gladwyn and explained that at their fortnightly 
meetings they approved the regular ‘Summary of Indications’ papers (colloquially now 
known as the “Crystal Gazer”) which went to the King, the Prime Minister and the 
Foreign Secretary and a very few other senior people, always under a tight security 
classification.  He went on to explain that until recently, from the start of the Crystal 
Gazers, they had been concerned with Soviet Policy but given recent events in the Far 
East they papers had begun to focus also on China.  It had therefore been decided that 
in future the papers would be in two parts with a short summary covering both parts.  
He was therefore proposing to include Sterndale Bennet in the recipients list and to 
ask him to contribute/comment as necessary in relation to issues concerning the Far 
East, and to treat the papers with special care given their sensitivity and to destroy his 
copies after three months. 
 
2 Jan 1951 FO 371/94842:  NS 1053/2.  Note by Russia Committee Secretariat to members 
enclosing a draft Telegram to go to Washington to be discussed at the special meeting 
of the Russia Committee on 3 January, after which a redraft would be prepared. 
3 Jan 1951 FO 371/94842/NS1053/3G.  Minutes of Russia Committee Meeting.  Sir Pierson Dixon 
in the Chair.  Mr Dawbarn, Secretariat.  Sir David Kelly, HM Ambassador, Moscow, was 
in attendance.  The one item on the agenda was the draft telegram as above.  The 
draft telegram was intended for the use of HM Ambassador, Washington in his 
preliminary discussion with US and French representatives about tactics for the 
proposed Four Power discussion with the Soviet Union.  The proposed talks were 
wanted by the Soviets to discuss the question of German re-armament to which they 
were totally opposed and the Russia Committee discussed the likely outcome of the 
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Soviets failing to prevent this. The Committee then considered the Sino Soviet 
relationship:  that the Soviets must welcome the prospect of China’s expulsion of 
Western influence from the Far East but the Soviets could not contemplate without 
anxiety the prospect of China fresh from a successful revolution, expanding her area of 
dominion.  Moreover, the Committee felt that Chinese actions in Korea showed that 
they had no fear of war with the US but that the Soviets who would not want to go 
that far might act as a restraining influence. 
  9 Jan 1951 FO 371/94842/NS1053/4G.  Minutes of Russia Committee Meeting.  Sir Pierson Dixon 
in the Chair.  Messrs Barnes and Dawbarn, Secretariat.  The one item on the agenda 
was a further draft ‘Summary of Indications’ / Crystal Gazer paper. One interesting 
point was reference to an article in the Observer of there being anti-Soviet discontent 
in Czechoslovakia though it was unclear whether there was hard evidence for this.  
  16 Jan 1951 FO 371/94842/NS1053/5G.  Minutes of Russia Committee Meeting.  Sir Pierson Dixon 
in the Chair.  Messrs Barnes and Dawbarn, Secretariat.  The one item on the agenda 
was draft JIC paper entitled “Likelihood of War” (JIC (50) 111) on which the Russia 
Committee were invited to comment before it was considered at the JIC meeting on 18 
January.  The Committee agreed points on German re-armament and the likelihood of 
this leading the Soviets to go to war to amend the JIC paper. 
23 Jan 1951 FO 371/94820:  NS 1021/11.  The first example of the new format of the ‘Summary of 
Indications/Crystal Gazer fortnightly papers.  The one page Summary has six 
paragraphs and makes notes on:  the Soviets wish for four power talks;  German re-
armament violation of agreements;   further signs of increased Soviet military 
preparedness and activity in Eastern Germany;  the French having forced the Viet Minh 
to temporarily break off their new offensive in Tongking;  and Chou En-lai’s rejection of 
the UN’s cease fire proposals for Korea.  The subsequent two sections went into much 
greater detail on these issues. 
3 Feb 1951 FO 371/94820/ NS1021/12.  Paper entitled ‘Possible Soviet Reactions to the 
Rearmament of Western Germany’.  
6 Feb 1951 FO 371/94842/NS1053/12G.  Minutes of Russia Committee Meeting.  Sir Pierson Dixon 
in the Chair.  Messrs Barnes and Dawbarn, Secretariat.  The one item on the agenda 
was a further draft of the ‘Summary of Indications’. 
20 Feb 1951 FO 371/94842/NS1053/14G.  Minutes of Russia Committee Meeting.  Sir Pierson Dixon 
in the Chair.  Messrs Barnes and Dawbarn, Secretariat.  The one item on the agenda 
was a further draft of the ‘Summary of Indications’.  It noted that Stalin had given an 
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interview to Pravda which was partly directed to home consumption but with an 
element of consumption abroad and concerned primarily the subject of Soviet re-
armament. 
6 March 1951 FO 371/94842/NS1053/16G.  Minutes of Russia Committee Meeting.  Sir Pierson Dixon 
in the Chair.  Messrs Barnes and Dawbarn, Secretariat.  The one item on the agenda 
was a further draft of the ‘Summary of Indications’ which was concerned with the 
proposed agenda for the forthcoming meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the Four 
powers and the possibility that the Soviets might be prepared to expand the agenda 
from solely concentrating on German re-armament. 
9 March 1951 NB Ernest Bevin resigns as Foreign Secretary 
 20 March 1951 FO 371/94842/NS1053/17G.  Minutes of Russia Committee Meeting.  Sir Pierson Dixon 
in the Chair.  Messrs Barnes and Dawbarn, Secretariat.  There were two items for 
discussion:  a letter from HM Ambassador, Moscow, enclosing a ‘Kremlin 
Memorandum’ together with a covering note by Northern Department; and a further 
draft ‘Summary of Indications’.   
14 April 1951 Ernest Bevin dies 
3 April 1951 FO 371/94842/NS1053/20G.  Minutes of Russia Committee Meeting.  Sir Pierson Dixon 
in the Chair.  Messrs Barnes and Dawbarn, Secretariat.  The one item on the agenda 
was a further draft of the ‘Summary of Indications’.  This referred, inter alia, to the fact 
that the Chinese remained convinced that they could drive the UN out of Korea and 
were in no mood for negotiation.  The Chairman also noted that the new Foreign 
Secretary (Herbert Morrison) had asked that papers submitted by the Russia 
Committee should in future be kept as short as possible – a possible early indication 
that he valued the Russia Committee less than his predecessor?)  
17 April 1951 FO 371/94842/NS1053/22G.  Minutes of Russia Committee Meeting.  Sir Pierson Dixon 
in the Chair.  Messrs Barnes and Dawbarn, Secretariat.  The one item on the agenda 
was a further draft of the ‘Summary of Indications’.  On the forthcoming Four Power 
talks, it had become clear that the Soviets now wanted to expand the subjects covered 
to include Western re-armament and not just German re-armament.   
  1 May 1951 FO 371/94842/NS1053/23G.  Minutes of Russia Committee Meeting.  Sir Pierson Dixon 
in the Chair.  Messrs Barnes and Dawbarn, Secretariat.  There was only one item on the 
agenda which was a further draft of the ‘Summary of Indications’ which noted the 
305 
 
Shrill tone of Mr Gromyko and speculated that the Soviets were now less interested in 
the Four Power talks for which they had hitherto long been pressing. 
  16 May 1951 FO 371/94842/NS1053/26G.  Minutes of Russia Committee Meeting.  Sir Pierson Dixon 
in the Chair.  Messrs Barnes and Dawbarn, Secretariat.  There were two items to 
discuss:  a draft pamphlet on re-armament prepared by the IRD; and a further draft of 
the ‘Summary of Indications’.  The draft pamphlet had been prepared by Mr Peck who 
was congratulated for producing an excellent and coherent account and was an 
attempt to meet the wishes of the Foreign Secretary and the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer to clarify the issues involved in the Defence Programme and to provide 
background for Ministers’ speeches. It was agreed, however, that while the possibility 
existed that the Four Power talks would still go ahead, the pamphlet should not yet be 
issued.  
     29 May 1951 FO 371/94842/NS1053/27G.  Minutes of Russia Committee Meeting.  Sir Pierson Dixon 
in the Chair.  Messrs Barnes and Dawbarn, Secretariat.  There was only one item on the 
agenda which was a further draft of the ‘Summary of Indications’ which noted that the 
Four Power talks were now further threatened as the French had taken fright at 
Gromyko’s insistence on the inclusion of an item on the Atlantic Pact.   
   12 June  1951 FO 371/94842/NS1053/28G.  Minutes of Russia Committee Meeting.  Sir Pierson Dixon 
in the Chair.  Messrs Barnes and Dawbarn, Secretariat.  There was only one item on the 
agenda which was a further draft of the new format ‘Summary of Indications’.  With 
the French General Elections due on 17 June the French were pressing for the Four 
Power Talks, which had just begun, As to Korea, the Chinese had withdrawn from 
Chorwen and Kumhwa but it was not clear why. 
26 June  1951 FO 371/94842/NS1053/30G.  Minutes of Russia Committee Meeting.  Sir Pierson Dixon 
in the Chair.  Messrs Barnes and Dawbarn, Secretariat.  There were two item on the 
agenda:   a paper by IRD on “The Stability of the Soviet Regime and its effects on Soviet 
Relations with the non-Communist World”; and a further draft ‘Summary of 
Indications’.  The record of the discussion of the first paper was excluded from the 
minutes and put in a limited circulation paper (Ref RC 55/51).  The Four Power Talks in 
Paris had been suspended as the Soviets had failed to get their way over its terms. 
10 July 1951 FO 371/94842/NS1053/31G.  Minutes of Russia Committee Meeting.  Sir Pierson Dixon 
in the Chair.  Messrs Barnes and Dawbarn, Secretariat.  There was only one item on the 
agenda which was a further draft of the new format ‘Summary of Indications’. On 
Korea there was a cease fire which the Chinese might insist on relating strictly to the 
38th parallel. 
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24 July 1951 FO 371/94842/NS1053/32G.  Minutes of Russia Committee Meeting.  Mr Mason in the 
Chair.  Messrs Barnes and Buzzard, Secretariat.  There was only one item on the 
agenda which was a further draft of the new format ‘Summary of Indications’ and the 
most important item for this version was said to be the publication of a new Soviet 
English-speaking periodical “News” but it was too soon to say how far the line of the 
publication would be put across to the domestic Russian readers. 
8 August 1951 FO 371/94842/NS1053/33G.  Minutes of Russia Committee Meeting.  Mr Mason in the 
Chair.  Messrs Barnes and Dawbarn, Secretariat.  The only item under discussion was a 
further draft of the new format ‘Summary of Indications’ which was fairly low key.  It 
included a reference to the “News” periodical but only to say that it was possible, 
given a reversion to ‘normal Soviet style’ that it was being sold outside Moscow. 
21 August 1951 FO 371/94842/NS1053/35G.  Minutes of Russia Committee Meeting.  Sir Pierson Dixon 
in the Chair.  Mr Dawbarn, Secretariat.  There were two items on the agenda:   a paper 
by the Secretariat on ‘Certain Reports on Soviet and Chinese Intentions’; and a further 
draft ‘Summary of Indications’.   On the first paper, there was a very full discussion on 
the relationship between the Chinese and the Soviets over the Far East concluding that 
both attached great importance to Japanese re-armament and the fact that the 
Russians had probably counted on the over running of Korea before turning attention 
to Japan but the UN’s success had compelled them to think again and the re-
emergence of Japan was thought to be very disturbing to the Chinese and the Soviets. 
4 Sept 1951 FO 371/94842/NS1053/36G.  Minutes of Russia Committee Meeting.  Mr Mason in the 
Chair.  Messrs Barnes and Dawbarn, Secretariat.  The agenda for the meeting noted 
that there would be only one item under discussion i.e. a further draft of the new 
format ‘Summary of Indications’ but the actual minutes are missing.  
18 Sept 1951 FO 371/94842/NS1053/38G.  Minutes of Russia Committee Meeting.  Mr Mason in the 
Chair.  Messrs Barnes and Dawbarn, Secretariat.  There were two items for discussion:   
a further draft of the new format ‘Summary of Indications’; and a paper by Mutual Aid 
Department on ‘East/West Trade.  On the latter, the Chairman explained that the 
paper had been commissioned following a suggestion that Western controls of 
East/West trade might be doing serious damage to the Russian economy, hence the 
latter’s proposal for an International Economic Conference.  It seemed that the 
Russians feared that Western Powers might be seriously considering adopting a policy 
of economic warfare but the UK could not afford such a policy and had made it clear 
that the existing controls represented the limit to which they intended to go.   
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2 October 1951 FO 371/94842/NS1053/40G.  Minutes of Russia Committee Meeting.  Sir Pierson Dixon 
in the Chair.  Messrs Barnes and Dawbarn, Secretariat.  There were three items on the 
agenda:   a further draft ‘Summary of Indications’; Anglo-American appreciation of 
world Communism; and pointers to modifications of Soviet policy.  On the latter there 
was concern that the US State Department looked at Russia and China as one 
indivisible ideological bloc moving entirely in step and that they had a wrong idea too 
about the distinction between subversive Communism and the use of force by Russia.  
The Committee agreed that it would be useful to discuss this whole issue with the UK’s 
US Embassy.  On the final discussion point, the Chairman noted that the Foreign 
Secretary thought it would be useful if the Foreign Office prepared :  a list of moves 
such as sending Ambassadors of Maisky’s type  (i.e. a pro-British ex diplomat)  which 
could be interpreted as showing a Russian change of practice;  and an indication of the 
reaction which the Western Powers should adopt to such moves.    
15 Oct 1951  FO 371/94845/NS1053/42.  Final version of the paper by Northern Department 
‘Possible Conciliatory moves by the Soviet Government’.  The paper postulated that 
the conciliatory moves the Soviet Government might make could include:  the 
appointment of some Western minded personalities as Ambassadors in London, 
Washington or as UN rep (eg Maisky);  articles in ‘News’ expressing more conciliatory 
attitudes towards the West;  greater affability on the part of officials at events;  
allowance to visit usually non accessible places (eg as recently granted to Sir David 
Kelly); release of British subjects held in the Soviet Union;  the release of the remaining 
Soviet wives;  economic helpfulness eg over timber and wheat;  exchanges of more 
students between UK and the Soviet Union; disbandment of Cominform – though this 
would be academic as the control over non-Russian Communist parties would remain 
fully intact). These and other such moves, the paper said, could reflect a policy change 
but could equally simply be to weaken Western resistance in the interests of the peace 
campaign.  The paper went on in a similarly sceptical fashion for several pages.  
16 Oct 1951 FO 371/94842/NS1053/41G.  Minutes of Russia Committee Meeting.  Mr Mason in the 
Chair.  Messrs Barnes and Dawbarn, Secretariat.  There were two items for discussion:  
a further draft ‘Summary of Indications’; and a paper by Northern Department on 
“Possible Conciliatory Moves by the Soviet Government”.  As to the latter, one of the 
tests of Soviet policy and the main cause of Soviet tension at the Four Power talks was 
the level of Soviet armaments and one indication of a genuine conciliatory move would 
be a reduction in their armaments.  The Russia Committee agreed certain changes to 
be made to the paper and, once Northern Department had made the changes the 
Chairman of the Russia Committee would submit the paper under a cover note to the 
PUS, Sir William Strang.  
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16 Oct 1951 FO 371/ 94845/NS1053/43.  Copy of Sir David Kelly’s final despatch on relinquishing 
his post as HM Ambassador at Moscow, after two and a quarter years in the post.  The 
dispatch concentrated on what seemed to him to be the most important 
considerations to be taken into account in the UK’s dealings with the Soviet 
Government.  He said that an outstanding fact about Soviet foreign policy is its 
impersonality:  the chain of responsibility is so tightly controlled that even the highest 
official who has dealings with foreigners has no more initiative than a ventriloquists 
dummy and the personal factor is  negligible;  the group at the top are obsessed by a 
doctrinaire interpretation of world events based on its fundamental assumption of the 
existence of two antagonistic camps which can only be brought to an end by the 
decline and fall of one of them.  He was concerned that the West needed to continue 
to do all that was necessary to maintain the balance of power as this, he felt, 
prevented all out hostilities.  He felt it important too that the violent and abusive 
language adopted by the Soviets should not be reciprocated.  And he saw the chief 
danger, as he left office, in the problem of maintaining the balance both with our own 
public opinion (which the Soviets in their autocratic state did not need to worry about) 
and above all with the American government. 
26 Oct 1951 FO 371/94845/NS1053/45G.  Agenda for Russia Committee Meeting to be held on 30 
October. A manuscript note on the Agenda circulated by the Secretariat notes that the 
meeting was subsequently cancelled. Perhaps due to the imminent General Election. 
NB 26/10/51 General Election.  Conservatives returned with 17 overall majority. Churchill back as PM 
13 Nov1951 FO 371/94842/NS1053/46G.  Minutes of Russia Committee Meeting.  Mr Mason in the 
Chair.  Messrs Barnes and Dawbarn, Secretariat.  There was one item under discussion 
i.e. a further draft of the new format ‘Summary of Indications’.  It noted that there had 
been a swift return to the truculence formerly demonstrated by the Soviets after 
recent apparent conciliatory changes.  This was not necessarily a surprise or change of 
policy but the normal response from the likes of Vyshinski to any attempts, such as 
Acheson’s speech, to wrest initiative from the US.  It was also noted that there was no 
evidence to support any conclusion of a Sino-Soviet rift. 
27 Nov 1951 FO 371/94845/NS1053/47.  Minutes of Russia Committee Meeting.  Mr Mason in the 
Chair.  Messrs Barnes and Dawbarn, Secretariat.  The agenda for the meeting noted 
that there would be only one item under discussion i.e. a further draft of the new 
format ‘Summary of Indications’.  The Chairman noted that over the previous fortnight 
the Russian tactics had been mainly defensive except that they were adopting a more 
positive line in the Middle East.  On Korea there was difficulty in determining the real 
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reasons behind the Chinese attitude towards an armistice i.e. whether there was a 
genuine desire for peace or the need to obtain a breathing space.  
18 Dec 1951 FO 371/94845/NS1053/48.  Minutes of Russia Committee Meeting.  Sir Pierson Dixon 
in the Chair.  Messrs Bushell and Dawbarn, Secretariat.  The agenda for the meeting 
noted that the only item under discussion would be a further draft ‘Summary of 
Indications’.  No particularly new or significant inclusions worth noting.  
8 Jan 1952 FO 371/100840/NS1052/1/9.  Minutes of Russia Committee Meeting.  Sir Pierson 
Dixon in the Chair.  Messrs Bushell and Dawbarn, Secretariat.  The agenda for the 
meeting noted that the only item under discussion would be a further draft ‘Summary 
of Indications’.  Re talks on re-armament the Russians had realised that the Armistice 
Talks were unlikely to reach a successful conclusion.  They had therefore decided to 
shift their ground and to work for an Armistice by other means, which incidentally had 
subsidiary advantages from the Russian point of view, for example by providing a 
better propaganda platform, chances to slow down the Western defence effort and so 
on.    
29 Feb 1952 FO 371/125005/ZP12/1.   Note by JCW Bushell, of the Russia Committee Secretariat, 
to Mr Harrison, covering a few ideas he had had on the re-organisation of the Russia 
Committee that if Mr Harrison agreed could be put to the Chairman Sir Pierson Dixon. 
1 March 1952 FO 371/125005/ZP12/1.   Manuscript minute from Mr Harrison to Sir Pierson Dixon 
covering the draft by Mr Bushell and saying:  “If you agree that the Russia Ctee needs 
rejuvenating, I think that the attached paper by Mr Bushell provides a very useful basis 
for discussion …” . 
1 March 1952 FO 371/125005/ZP12/1.   Manuscript note by Sir Pierson Dixon to Mr Harrison saying:  
“I have been feeling for some time that the Russia Committee needs a “new look”, & I 
asked Mr Bushell to consider the matter.  His proposals are much to the point & I agree 
that they shd be circulated & considered at a small meeting as proposed by Mr 
Harrison.  PD”. 
29 Feb 1952 FO 371/125005/ZP12/1.   Draft Memorandum by JCW Bushell, of the Russia 
Committee Secretariat, to Committee members saying that some weeks ago he 
suggested to Sir Pierson Dixon, Russia Committee Chairman, that he submit some 
proposals for the re-organisation of the Committee. This note sets out the case and is 
essentially as below at 9 Dec entry. 
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1 Mar 1952 FO 371/125005/ZP12/1.   Manuscript note by Sir Pierson Dixon attached to this is 
note. 
13 Mar 1952 FO 371/125005/ZP12/2/G.   Record of a meeting held in Sir Pierson Dixon’s room to 
discuss the re-organisation of the Russia Committee and which agreed the terms of the 
minute to Sir William Strang from Sir Pierson Dixon.  NB in essence the draft is the 
same as that finally sent to Sir William Strang by Sir Frank Roberts on 9 December after 
he had succeeded Sir Pierson Dixon as Russia Committee Chairman – see below. 
17 Mar 1952 FO 371/ZP12/2/G.  Minute to Sir William Strang (PUS) from Pierson Dixon  saying:  “I 
have for some time felt increasing doubts about the usefulness of the discussions in 
the Russia Committee and the papers produced by it…..I held a small meeting recently 
with senior members of the Committee to consider means of adapting the 
Committee’s work to present circumstances…Briefly, we recommend that there should 
be a smaller and more high-powered committee with meetings monthly instead of 
fortnightly….The “Crystal Gazer” has, I think you will agree, become a rather 
pedestrian and uninspired production, and, if the Committee is to fulfil its function as 
an interpreter of Soviet policy, we clearly need a more thoughtful document….”  On 
the same date Sir William Strang added a manuscript note saying:  “I agree.  Let us try 
this”. 
25 Mar 1952 FO 371/NS1052/12 and 13.  Cover note by Russia Committee Secretariat (12) to 
Chairman (Sir Pierson Dixon) Note Headed ‘Russia Committee’ and setting out changes 
to the “membership and procedure of” of the Committee with effect from 1 April.   As 
Pierson Dixon, the then Chairman of the Russia Committee, said at the end of March 
1952647, the Committee “was originally set up in 1947 after the Moscow Conference 
had put an end to our hopes of genuine cooperation by the Russians.  The terms of 
reference of the Committee were devised with the general aim of creating a body 
whose discussions would draw the attention of Ministers and others to the realities of 
the situation.  He reported that it had therefore been agreed to:  reduce the 
membership; reduce the meetings from fortnightly to monthly; and to abolish the 
“Crystal Gazer” and replace it with a shorter more general document.  Although Dixon 
was a pains to emphasise the positives of doing this (i.e. saying that the new structure 
should result in a more high-powered Committee), it is difficult not to see this as a 
recognition of the reduction in the importance of the Committee and, in a reference at 
the end of the paper to the PUS Committee, to place it clearly in a subordinate position 
to the latter body when Dixon says: “ Where suitable the Committee may recommend 
                                                     
647 FO 371/NS1052/13.  Paper dated 24 March 1952 from Sir Pierson Dixon, Chairman of the Russia 
Committee, to all members of the Committee, Paragraph 2. 
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that papers which they have considered shall be brought to the notice of the P.U.S. 
Committee”.648   
3 April 1952 FO 371/NS1052/14.  Circular by Russia Committee Secretariat to all recipients of 
Russia Committee documents.  ‘This is the last paper in the present series.  In future 
the Russia Committee will meet on the first Tuesday of each month, starting on 
Tuesday, the 6th May.  The results of its discussions will be summarised in slightly 
different form, but it is not intended to alter the distribution of final documents…’ 
13 Nov 1952 FO 371/125005/ZP12/4.  Minute from Russia Committee Secretariat to members on 
the Re-organisation of the Russia Committee and Consideration of the title and terms 
of reference and attaching a draft Office Circular.  On the title, it was noted that to 
date it had been agreed that despite the importance of China and Chinese Communist 
activity in the RC’s discussions the original title of  ”The Russia Committee” should be 
maintained.  It was also noted that Mr Frank Roberts, then a Deputy Under- Secretary 
and former member of the Committee, had now taken over the Chairmanship of the 
Committee from Sir Pierson Dixon.  As a further indication of the relative greater 
importance now of the PUS Department, the Note stated:  It will be seen that in the 
previous terms of reference the following sentence appeared:-  “The Committee will 
maintain close contact with the Chiefs of Staff and JIC with a view to co-ordinating 
intelligence and estimates of Soviet intentions at every stage.”  It is proposed to omit 
this sentence from the new terms of reference since it would be seen that effective 
liaison in this sense is now maintained through PUS Department in the first instance”. 
2 Dec 1952 FO 371/………………   Minutes of Meeting of Russia Committee.  NB Minutes missing.             
3 Dec 1952 FO 371/125005/ZP12/4.  Manuscript minute by Russia Committee Secretariat noting 
that the draft circular referred to under 13 November entry above has been “approved 
by the Committee at its meeting on 2 December, subject to certain amendments.  
Approval by Sir W Strang will now be required”. 
9 Dec 1952 FO 371/125005/ZP12/5.   Minute from Sir Frank Roberts to the PUS, Sir William Strang 
entitled “Russia Committee” about proposed changes to the Russia Committee, as 
follows: 
       “About six months ago Sir P Dixon obtained your approval to certain measures of 
reorganisation of the Russia Committee.  They have now been tested and the 
Committee agreed at its last meeting that the time had come to put them on formal 
record.  
                                                     
648 FO 371/NS1052/13.  Paper dated 24 March 1952 from Sir Pierson Dixon, Chairman of the Russia 
Committee, to all members of the Committee, Paragraph 9. 
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2. I accordingly submit a draft office circular on the work of the Committee, which 
might be issued in substitution of the relevant section of the previous circular on 1949 
on this subject…The main changes are in respect of meetings and membership, both of 
which have been cut down, and in the scope of the Committee’s work which now 
includes China.  You will notice that the definition of the scope of our monthly survey 
has been amended to cover this last point:  and, similarly, as a consequence, the terms 
of reference. 
We thought it right in present circumstances to omit the sentence on liaison with the 
Chiefs of Staff and JIC, from the new terms of reference, since this is now the work of 
the PUS Department in the first instance.  The PUS Department was, of course, created 
after the date of Sir O Sargent’s circular. 
Although the title is no longer accurate, there was general agreement that it should not 
be change. 
I should be grateful for your approval for the issue of the new circular”. 
 
22 Dec 1952 FO 371/125005/ZP12/5.   Copy of text of Office Circular No 18.  Text as follows: 
 
“RUSSIA COMMITTEE 
The description of the work of the Russia Committee and Terms of Reference, given in 
Office Circular No 3 of 17 January, 1949, should now be revised as follows:- 
The Russia Committee will meet on the first Tuesday of every month under the 
Chairmanship of the Deputy Under-Secretary responsible or of the Under-Secretary in 
charge of Northern Department.  The Secretariat will be identical with the Secretariat 
of the Permanent Under Secretary’s Committee.  The Committee may be attended by 
any member of the Permanent Under Secretary’s Committee who wishes to come, but 
its regular membership will be: 
Parliamentary Under-Secretary. 
Assistant Under-Secretaries in charge of Economic Departments, China and Korea        
Department, Eastern Department, Information Departments, Northern Department 
and Permanent Under-Secretary’s Department.  
Heads of Central, China and Korea, Information Research, Northern and South East 
Asia Departments, Overseas Planning Section, China and Soviet Sections of Research 
Department. 
Representatives of the Cabinet Office, Colonial Office, Commonwealth Relations 
Office, Ministry of Defence, Joint Intelligence Bureau and British Broadcasting 
Corporation. 
Other members may be added on a permanent or temporary basis at the discretion of 
the Chairman. 
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The Chairman will report to the Permanent Under-Secretary if any item arises in 
discussion which in his opinion might be referred to the Permanent Under-Secretary’s 
Committee. 
The Russia Committee will prepare each month a survey of the trends of policy and 
propaganda of the Soviet bloc and China, and of Communist activities generally.  The 
general paragraphs of this survey will be drafted by Northern Department and 
circulated to Central China and Korea, Information Research and Permanent Under-
Secretary’s Departments and to the Labour Adviser, who will suggest any necessary 
amendments and add special paragraphs on the subjects for which they are 
responsible.  The Secretariat will prepare the draft paper for the Committee from 
these contributions and will be responsible for the minutes and the secretarial work of 
the Committee generally.  A. STRANG   
 
ANNEX 
Terms of Reference 
To review each month the trends of policy and propaganda of the Soviet bloc and 
China, and Communist activities throughout the world, more particular with reference 
to Communist intentions towards this country;  to ensure the unified interpretation 
thereof throughout the Foreign Office;  to consider any immediate action needed as a 
result of the Committee’s review, and to make recommendations accordingly.  The 
Committee will also undertake or initiate studies of any particular aspect of 
Communist policy as the Chairman may think necessary”. 
NB The Russia Committee continued in existence after 1952 with papers 
listed until 1958 and a few with related titles beyond that time – some of 
which are listed but not summarised below 
FO 371/125258:  ZP2/1:   Russia Committee brief for Commonwealth Prime Ministers Meeting held January 31 to 
February 8, 1954, entitled “Where Does Moscow Stand?” 
FO 371/125260:  NS ZP2/26.  Minutes and papers of Russia Committee from August 1955 to January 1956. 
FO 371/122788   NS1022/10.  Papers relating to the distribution of Russia Committee papers. 
FO 371/128994:  NS1022/16.  Papers discussing the Dissolution of the Russia Committee.  Various papers dating 
from August through to   December 1957 
FO 371/129026:  NS1054.  Minutes of Russia Committee Meeting 5 February 1957. 
FO 371/125259:  NSZP2/15.  Minutes and papers from 1955. 
FO 371/143417:  NS1023/2.  Note dated December 1958 giving change of name of recipients – interesting because 
it says the IRD copy should go to…i.e. links Russia Committee with IRD) 
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APPENDIX 2 RUSSIA COMMITTEE MEMBERS AND OTHER KEY OFFICIALS   
 
John Sterndale Bennett 
John Sterndale Bennett joined the Diplomatic Service in 1920 following a distinguished 
military career for which he was decorated with a Military Cross in the First World 
War.  His Diplomatic career saw him serving in many countries and he ended his career 
as H M Ambassador to Cyprus.   In May 1947 Sterndale Bennett  was the British 
Minister in Sofia, Bulgaria,  and Keith Jeffery tells how Tony Brooks – an SIS officer and 
former SOE operator – was sent to Sofia as head of station stationed in the Sofia 
Embassy to undertake undercover work but that Sterndale Bennett disapproved and 
kept Brooks so occupied with non SIS type work that he was able to make no progress.  
In October 1947 Sterndale Bennett ordered Brooks to cease SIS activity altogether.  
But in May 1948 the Foreign Office confirmed Bevin’s wish was to see that “every 
effort was to be made to penetrate the Iron Curtain” and that “pressure would now be 
brought to bear” on Sterndale Bennett to lift his ban on SIS activity.  649  
Thomas Brimelow  
Thomas Brimelow – known as Tommy to his friends – was the product of a Grammar 
School education.  From early on he demonstrated a combination of hard work and 
high intellect which was to mark his whole career.  He excelled at both Mathematics 
and Greek and won a scholarship to Oriel College, Oxford, where he gained a first in 
Modern Languages in 1936.  He then joined the Diplomatic Service, gaining entry 
through the Consular Section.  He began his career as a probationary Vice Consul to 
Danzig;  then  a spell in New York and then in June 1942 went as third secretary and 
vice-consul in Moscow where he remained for the rest of the War.  He began to 
acquire that personal experience of the workings of the Soviet state which was to 
make him, throughout most of the cold war, the acknowledged authority on the 
interpretation of Soviet policy and the formulation of the British response.    
                                                     
649 Jeffery Keith.  MI6  The History of the Secret Intelligence Service 1909-1949.  Published Clays Limited, 
2010. Page 671-6 
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Brimelow was the best Russian speaker in the British Embassy in Moscow  during  the 
Second World War and it was as a young man that he was despatched to cope, face to 
face,  with Stalin, who, having imbibed his vodka, was in the habit of summoning the 
Embassy late at night or in the early hours to convey his views to Churchill and the 
British Government. 650  Later, Brimelow served as Ambassador to Poland from 1966 to 
1969 and rose to become Permanent Under Secretary at FCO from 1973 to 1975.   His 
command of the Russian language and his understanding both of the Russian character 
and of the Soviet system were legendary. Some saw him as the toughest of the cold 
warriors. Tough he was and having, as he said, “been brought up under Stalin”651 he 
had no illusions. But his policy was essentially that of George Kennan, namely: “Stand 
up to them, but not aggressively and let the hand of time do its work”. 652  Unyielding 
in his hatred of the Soviet system, he still worked for better relations and opposed any 
policy designed to promote instability within the Soviet empire. Brimelow’s papers are 
held at the Churchill Archives Centre ant Churchill College, Cambridge. 
Harold Anthony Caccia   
Harold Caccia was born in India and was educated at Eton and Trinity College, Oxford 
where he was a popular all-rounder and gained a rugby blue and second-class honours 
in philosophy, politics, and economics in 1927. In 1928 he won a Laming travelling 
fellowship from Queen's College, Oxford.   He entered Diplomatic service in 1929 and 
became APS to Anthony Eden from 1936 to 1939 and was then transferred to Athens 
until 1941.  From 1956 to 61 he was HM Ambassador to the USA.  In 1962 he became 
Permanent Under-Secretary of State and Head of the Diplomatic Service until his 
retirement in 1965.653  In this post he is credited with having helped to repair the UK’s  
‘special relationship’ with the US  which had been damaged by the Suez Crisis. 
In appearance Caccia was short, stocky, and bald with a fair complexion. He was 
forthright in speech and energetic in action, and he retained throughout his life a 
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cheerful and light-hearted, almost boyish, manner, which concealed a serious and 
thoughtful disposition. He was a good administrator and universally popular.   He 
ended as he had begun, as a great all-rounder.  Caccia was happy in his family life and 
he and his wife were a devoted couple. They had two daughters and one son. But his 
latter years were saddened by the untimely death of his son, David, in 1983.654 
 
Alexander George Montagu Cadogan  
Alexander Cadogan was the son of one Earl who had served in Salisbury’s Cabinet and 
been Viceroy of Ireland, and the grandson of another Earl.  He was Permanent Under 
Secretary of the Foreign Office from January 1938 to February 1946 - a longer term 
than normal in this highest position of the Diplomatic Service.655   
 
Early in 1936 the Foreign Secretary invited Cadogan to return from China in order to 
become the senior Deputy Under-Secretary in the Foreign Office. Cadogan accepted, 
taking up his post in October 1936.  He was universally regarded as the perfect 
embodiment of the senior civil servant. He was highly intelligent, unflappable and said 
to have sound judgement. In January 1938 he became the Permanent Under-
Secretary.  
 
By the time the Second World War broke out in 1939 Cadogan, having received the 
GCMG insignia in January 1939.  He had good relationships with Halifax and with Eden 
and Churchill.  He was not known for being deferential.  At a critical moment in 
Moscow in August 1942, following an acerbic encounter between Churchill and Stalin, 
he told the Prime Minister flatly and repeatedly and with some effect that his attitude 
to the draft Soviet communiqué was wrong. “I had never”, observed Churchill's doctor, 
who was present at this encounter, “seen anyone talk to the P.M. like this”.656  
 
                                                     
654 Oxford Dictionary of Bibliography entry. 
655 Bullock, Alan.   Ernest Bevin Foreign Secretary. Published Norton 1983.  Chapter 2, page 73. 
656 Moran, Lord.  Winston Churchill: the Struggle for Survival, 1966, 78. 
317 
 
From July 1945 Cadogan was appointed the first United Kingdom Permanent 
Representative at the headquarters of the United Nations (UN) in New York, though he 
would have preferred the Washington embassy. He left the Foreign Office in February 
1946. 
 
There is an interesting story in the memoirs of Ivone Kirckpatrick about Cadogan’s 
involvement in the Rudolph Hess episode in May 1941. Hess, flew to Scotland and met 
with the Duke of Hamilton who doubted his claim to be Reich Minister Hess but 
nevertheless told the Prime Minister and Winston Churchill then asked Anthony Eden, 
the Foreign Secretary, to look into it.  They needed to establish that Hess was who he 
claimed to be but he had neglected to bring proof of his identity.  Eden asked Cadogan 
if he knew of anyone who could actually vouch for Hess being who he claimed to be 
and Cadogan discovered that Ivone Kirkpatrick knew Hess well and so was duly 
despatched to Scotland to verify his identity – which he did. 657  
Cadogan was described as being “the punctilious and precise diplomat”, within three 
days of Bevin’s arrival as Foreign Secretary the latter was calling him “Alec”.658 Their 
relationship was a close one as is evidenced when, following Bevin’s death in April 
1951, he wrote to Mrs Bevin saying:  
 
“Having been privileged to work for Mr Bevin, I was able to appreciate all his 
great qualities of heart and mind.  He was a great leader who inspired 
admiration and respect in all those with whom he came in contact and the 
country has suffered a blow through his loss.”659  
 
Patrick Dean 
Patrick Dean was a lawyer and a diplomatist.  He was born on 16 March 1909 in Berlin, 
the only son and elder child of Henry Roy Dean, Professor of Pathology and later 
Master of Trinity Hall, Cambridge, and his wife, Irene.  Patrick Dean was educated at 
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Rugby School and Gonville and Caius College, Cambridge, where he was a classical 
scholar, gaining first-class honours in part one of the Classics tripos and in both parts of 
the Law tripos. He was elected a Fellow of Clare College in 1932 and then in 1935, 
having been called to the bar by Lincoln's Inn the previous year, practised as a barrister 
until 1939.   On the outbreak of the Second World War, he became assistant legal 
adviser in the Foreign Office and served throughout the war in that capacity, later 
being responsible for much of the legal preparation required for the War Crimes 
Tribunal at Nuremberg. In 1945 he accepted appointment as an established member of 
the foreign service with the rank of Counsellor, and in 1946 he was made Head of the 
German political department of the Foreign Office, an appointment he held until 1950 
during an important period of post-war reconstruction. It was during that time that he 
had dealings with the Russia Committee.  He was appointed CMG in 1947.  
In 1950 Patrick Dean became Minister in the Rome embassy before returning to 
London as senior civilian instructor at the Imperial Defence College. He then became 
Assistant Under-Secretary in the Foreign Office responsible for relations with the 
Chiefs of Staff and the intelligence services. He also became chairman of the Joint 
Intelligence Committee for over six years. In the early years of NATO and with no sign 
of softening in the attitude of Stalinist Russia, defence aspects of Foreign Office work 
had become of the greatest importance.  
Patrick Dean's incisive mind and intellectual grasp enabled him to perform the work 
with widely acknowledged authority, and in the course of his long tenure he was 
promoted again to be Deputy Under-Secretary in 1956 at the early age of forty-seven. 
It was because of his position at the centre of Foreign Office policy making that he 
became involved, albeit involuntarily, in a highly contentious episode at a late stage of 
the Suez affair in 1956. The Prime Minister, Anthony Eden, had decided to collaborate 
with a secret French-Israeli plan to attack Egypt and had also attempted to ensure that 
no word of this should become known beyond a very narrow circle. Thus Dean had no 
knowledge of the plan discussed by the Prime Minister with his French counterparts at 
Chequers on 14 October 1956 and in Paris on 16 October. He first learned of it when 
he was told by the Prime Minister on 24 October to go to Paris in order to continue 
discussions with the French and Israeli Ministers begun at Sèvres two days earlier by 
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the Foreign Secretary, Selwyn Lloyd. The only instruction given to Dean and his co-
emissary, Donald Logan (Lloyd's APS) was to make sure that it was understood that 
British forces would not move unless there was a clear military threat to the canal. The 
French recorded the discussion in an accurate memorandum which Dean signed ad 
referendum. To his dismay, however, when he showed this to Eden on his return that 
evening, Eden was furious and ordered his return to Paris the following day to ensure 
that all copies of the record were destroyed—a request that was refused after Dean 
and Logan had been incarcerated for some hours in a reception room at the Quai 
d'Orsay while awaiting  the French decision. Dean naturally felt a sense of humiliation 
over this episode, but in fact he had done his best to carry out the Prime Minister's 
instructions. He had had no part in the policy of using force and some years later 
privately expressed the view that this had been a strange aberration on the part of 
Eden whom he otherwise much admired. 
 
Dean was made KCMG in 1957 and spent several more years in the Foreign Office 
before being appointed in September 1960 to be the successor to Sir Pierson Dixon as 
UK Permanent Representative at the United Nations (UKREP). Following his time in 
New York, Dean had hoped to be appointed Permanent Under-Secretary in succession 
to Sir Harold Caccia. But the newly elected Labour government of 1964 decided that 
his involvement, however innocent, in the Sevres affair was a fatal bar, and with some 
reluctance they offered him instead the Washington embassy.  
Pierson Dixon 
Pierson Dixon – in practice always known as Bob - was Bevin’s – and before him, 
Eden’s, Principal Private Secretary at the end of the War.  His forenames reflected a 
long-standing family tradition.  Before entering the Diplomatic Service he was a Fellow 
of Pembroke College, Cambridge, where he read classics and gained a double first.  In 
the Foreword to his published diaries Lord Butler says of him: 
One of Dixon’s greatest services was as Private Secretary to Ernest Bevin.  It 
was remarkable that a man like Bevin who read papers and wrote with such 
difficulty, should have been able to handle the immense amounts of Foreign 
Office material, and be able to be absolutely at peace and ease with his official 
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advisers.  It was largely Dixon’s work to bring out the greatness in the man.  At 
the same time Dixon was able to conduct a bipartisan foreign policy through his 
friendship with Eden. 660 
As Bevin’s Principal Private Secretary, Pierson Dixon accompanied him to Potsdam.   
His personal papers, held by his son, were made available to Michael Blackwell in 
writing his book “Clinging to Grandeur” , published in 1993, his son Piers Dixon having 
published the first version of his own book drawn largely from his Father’s diaries, in 
1968,  “Double Diploma”. 
Bob Dixon was Bevin’s first PPS as Foreign Secretary and his third PPS, Roderick 
Barclay, described him as follows: 
Bob had been a great success during his two years as Private Secretary to Eden 
and had been just as highly esteemed by Ernie Bevin.  He had all the 
qualifications for this particular post, and indeed he was in every way an 
outstanding person, combining great charm of manner with exceptional 
intellectual gifts. He was just the man to help induct Mr Bevin at the Foreign 
Office, and he did a great deal to smooth the way for him during his early days 
there. 
Bob Dixon remained with Mr Bevin for more than two years before being 
appointed Ambassador at Prague.  The rest of his diplomatic career was equally 
distinguished and he ended up as Ambassador in Paris.  It was a tragedy that he 
died suddenly so soon after his retirement. 661 
 
In 1929 Dixon passed the Foreign Office examination comfortably, emerging second 
out of a distinguished intake which included Harold Caccia and was appointed a third 
secretary in October 1929. Postings in Spain (1932–6), Turkey (1936–8), and Italy 
(1938–40) followed in close succession, providing him with a solid grounding in the 
workings of the diplomatic corps. His spell in the Italian capital also allowed him to 
observe at first hand British efforts to appease Mussolini. He was, meanwhile, 
promoted second secretary in October 1934 and first secretary in December 1939. It 
was not until the outbreak of the Second World War, however, that his career really 
took off. His wartime years were mainly spent in close proximity to Anthony Eden. In 
1941 he accompanied the Foreign Secretary on a lengthy mission to the Middle East 
and the Balkans, and two years later, in November 1943, he was appointed Eden's PPS, 
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with the rank of counsellor. In this capacity he was present at many of the crucial allied 
encounters in the course of which both the shape of wartime strategy and the post-
war settlement were determined. At the Yalta summit in February 1945 he was 
responsible for co-ordinating the work of the British delegation and was deeply 
involved in the frantic attempts to draft a satisfactory communiqué before Roosevelt's 
earlier than expected departure. 
 
Midway through the Potsdam conference the general election result in 1945 prompted 
a change in the British government. Labour's victory, however, had no professional 
impact on Dixon, since he was immediately appointed principal private secretary to 
Ernest Bevin, Eden's successor. His position at the heart of British foreign policy making 
thus remained secure. Indeed, in many ways the spell as Bevin's right-hand man must 
rank as the most impressive of Dixon's career. The Foreign Secretary's schedule was 
arduous, dominated by the increasingly fraught conferences of foreign ministers at 
which the wartime allies struggled to contain their growing mistrust of each other and 
to reconcile their highly divergent priorities for the post-war world. Against this 
gloomy backdrop Dixon had not merely to act as companion, counsellor, speech-
writer, and administrator for Bevin, but also to join the foreign secretary in the late-
night singsongs which marked the end of at least some of the foreign ministers' 
meetings. He was appointed CMG in 1945 and CB in 1948. 
 
In January 1948 Dixon received his first ambassadorial posting, to Prague. He was 
appointed KCMG in January 1950, and in June of that year returned to London as 
Deputy Under-Secretary of State, with responsibility first for political and then for 
economic affairs. He also served as UK representative on the Brussels Treaty 
Permanent Commission, with the personal rank of Ambassador, until November 1952.  
Pierson Dixon’s personal papers are held at Birmingham University.    
 
 Edmund Leo Hall-Patch 
Edmund Hall Patch was a delicate child and was sent to a religious house in the  
south of France. Both these experiences—France and a Roman Catholic education— 
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strongly influenced his life. In France he became bilingual and he always felt quite as  
much at ease in France and in Europe as he did in England, while the only home he  
ever owned and to which, but for financial and legal difficulties, he would later in life  
have emigrated was in the south of France.  Wherever in the world he worked he was  
always close to the Catholic hierarchy.  After a spell at school in England, Hall-Patch  
returned at sixteen to Paris to train as a professional musician but soon decided he  
was not good enough. By 1914 he was studying French at the Sorbonne; he joined up,  
was commissioned in the Royal Artillery, won the Croix de Guerre with palms, was  
gassed, medically downgraded, and ended the war as a captain and railway transport  
officer near Paris.   In 1935 he was invited to join the Treasury as an Assistant  
Secretary, and from June 1936 became financial adviser to the British embassy. In 1938  
he was appointed CMG and in 1940 became the government's financial commissioner  
throughout the Far East.  In 1941 he returned to the Treasury to keep an eye on the  
Far East and be involved in negotiations, on such matters as lend-lease, with the  
United States. In 1944 he was promoted to Under-Secretary and transferred to the  
Foreign Office to direct and lay enduring foundations for its growing economic work. In  
1946 he was promoted to Deputy Secretary and in the following year knighted. 
 
As the principal economic adviser to Ernest Bevin he played a central and demanding  
role in the British response to the Marshall plan. In 1948 he was promoted again—this  
time to become Ambassador and leader of the British delegation to the nascent  
Organisation for European Economic Co-operation, based in Paris, and of which he  
Chaired the Executive Committee.  The OEEC worked in tandem with the  
ECA to devise annual recovery plans, allocate American aid under the Marshall Plan.  
 
Edmund Hall Patch was considered one of the most notable of the many equally  
impressive figures who stood in for government Ministers at the head of their national  
delegations.662  Over his four years as Chairman of the OEEC Executive  
Committee, he worked hard and travelled prodigiously, and was popular with his  
colleagues—American and European—and seen by them, and perhaps by himself, as  
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the champion of closer British ties with Europe. In 1951 he was appointed GCMG.  
 
Hall-Patch never felt quite at home in Whitehall and this diminished his  
influence and effectiveness. He tended to see himself as an outsider looking into the 
establishment, impelled by an austere conscience to warn his more sheltered and 
unwary colleagues against facile optimism or complacency. Bevin valued him and was 
amused by his Cassandra role. ‘Morning 'all-Patch’, he would say as he saw Hall-Patch 
lowering ominously in the corridor ‘and what's the snags to-day?’ When he had heard, 
he felt forearmed against the worst.  Hall-Patch’s  most lasting achievements were the 
pioneering and strengthening of the economic side of the Foreign Office and the 
handling of all the European developments arising from the Marshall plan.  
 
Robin M A Hankey 
Robin Hankey was the son of Maurice Hankey who was Cabinet Secretary until 1938.  
In the last three years of the war was moved from Cairo to Teheran as First Secretary 
and Head of Chancery.  In March 1942, was recalled home to become Deputy Head of 
the Eastern Department of the Foreign Office. In 1945/46 he was the chargé d’affairs 
in Warsaw.663  He then returned to the Foreign Office in London and from 1946 to 
1948 was Head of the Foreign Office’s Northern Department.  Between 1960 and 1965 
he was British Representative to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development. 
 
Oliver Charles Harvey  
Oliver Charles Harvey was the son of a Baronet landowner in Norfolk.  He was 
educated at Malvern College and at Trinity College, Cambridge, where he obtained a 
first in part one of the Historical Tripos in 1914. He served throughout the war in the 
Norfolk regiment, in France, Egypt, and Palestine, and was mentioned in dispatches. 
After the war Harvey began his career in the diplomatic service. He served as second 
secretary in Rome from 1922 to 1925, and as first secretary in Athens from 1929 to 
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1931, then as Head of chancery in Paris, where he remained for five years and was a 
discriminating student of all things French. His path thereafter was an alternation 
between Paris and London,664  
 
Oliver Harvey served for two spells as Principal Private Secretary to Anthony Eden, 
from 1936 to1938 and again from 1941 to 1943.  This, in itself was a significant 
achievement as Eden was known at the time to be a difficult man to serve under. Lord 
Brimelow described Harvey as:  “A good Private Secretary;  rather pompous;  also 
rather non-committal in his dealings with people”.665   
 
Harvey served Eden with a devotion to which his posthumously published diary bears 
eloquent witness. ‘Eden gave me his confidence most fully and I endeavoured to 
return it in the same spirit, loyally and to the best of my ability’. The diary is especially 
illuminating on his beloved ‘AE’, and, by way of baleful counterpoint, on the 
ungovernable Winston Churchill: “Really the PM is a lunatic: he gets in such a state of 
excitement that the wildest schemes seem reasonable. I hope to goodness we can 
defeat this one. AE believes the Cabinet and finally the King will restrain him, but the 
Cabinet are a poor lot for stopping anything”.666  
 
In 1946 he became Deputy Under-Secretary (political) at the Foreign Office, where he  
worked closely with Ernest Bevin, whom he much admired.   Bevin, too, clearly had 
great faith in Oliver Harvey and on several occasions commissioned him to brief his  
senior Foreign Office officials who were engaged in pursuing sensitive missions.   For  
example, August 1946, Harvey, in a briefing note to Patrick Dean, then Head of the  
Foreign Office German Department, who had been sent to Berlin for discussions on the  
future of the Western German Zone post Potsdam, conveyed Bevin’s views thus:  “Mr  
Dean will realize that it is the policy of the Secretary of State to use our  
control of the Ruhr not against France or the USA but against the Soviets solely  
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to secure the lifting of the Iron Curtain. …(Russia) hopes to get into the Ruhr  
while keeping us out of the Eastern zone.  But if we are firm and allow  
absolutely no infiltration she must in the end give way and open the Eastern  
zone to us”.667     
 
By June 1948 Oliver Harvey had become HM Ambassador in Paris in succession to Duff  
Cooper.  Speaking of his diaries668 he said that its whole value, if it has a value, lies in 
its ‘hotness’, in the immediate impression and atmosphere. I am the first to recognise  
how many of the first reactions and impressions and judgements were proved wrong  
and would be admitted wrong by myself now, but that is not the point. This is how we  
saw things at the time. … The more light that can be shed on the circumstances in  
which impressions were formed, decisions and actions taken, the better. 
 
 
Gladwyn Jebb 
Gladwyn Jebb was distinguished from other diplomats of his generation not only by his 
particular contribution to post-war international reconstruction, but by his transition 
after retirement to an active and eminent position in British politics. After what he 
described as a shaky diplomatic start in Persia,669  Jebb became a distinguished 
diplomat.   
 
In 1929, Hugh Dalton, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State in the new Labour 
government, appointed Jebb as his Private Secretary and later, when Dalton left 
government, he secured Jebb  a Foreign Office posting to Rome.  From Italy he 
observed and reported with guarded sympathy on Mussolini's corporative state and 
even though he despised fascism he tended to support the line of Italian appeasement 
taken by Sir Robert Vansittart, then Permanent Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office.  
At the age of 38, Jebb became Private Secretary to the PUS, briefly Vansittart, and then 
Sir Alexander Cadogan, and thereafter remained at the heart of foreign affairs. 
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In the summer of 1945 Gladwyn Jebb was chosen to be the Executive Secretary at the 
Preparatory Commission of the United Nations then based in London, and he guided 
that embryo body through its founding stages, as Acting Secretary-General, until the 
appointment of the first Secretary-General, Trygve Lie, in 1946.   
The arrival at the Foreign Office in 1945 of Ernest Bevin, with whom Jebb struck a 
chord,  had boosted an already buoyant career. A stickleback among piranha, the 
Foreign Secretary, tired and ailing, was mesmerised by his new and (almost without 
exception) Etonian team. "You know, Gladwyn," Bevin once confided, "I don't mind the 
upper class . . . what I frankly can't abide is the middle class."  Gladwyn Jebb was 
deputy to Ernest Bevin at the meeting of Foreign Ministers in negotiations in 1946, by 
when he had been promoted to Assistant Under-Secretary of State, and was Foreign 
Office Adviser to the 1947 and 1948 British delegations to the United Nations. 670 
During the post-war years Jebb's high standing was indicated by his chairmanship at 
the end of 1948 of the Foreign Office's Russia Committee. Even so, as a Deputy Under-
Secretary from 1949, he was disappointed not to get the Permanent Under- Secretary-
ship, and the Paris Embassy in 1954 was a qualified compensation for a man whose 
natural social diffidence could easily be mistaken for coldness. His retirement came, 
therefore, with only muted regret and he threw himself into promoting the European 
cause which he had long supported. Raised to the Lords he first, from a sense of 
obligation, sat on the cross benches; then with the defeat of the government, joined 
the Liberal Party and continued the campaign from there. 
 Ivone Augustine Kirkpatrick  
Ivone Kirkpatrick reached the position of Head of the Foreign Office in 1956 when he  
succeeded Lord Strang.  Before WWII he was Head of Chancery at HM Embassy in  
Berlin leaving there on 15 December 1938.  He was from a family of high military and 
Diplomatic achievement and rank – father a colonel in India, mother the daughter of a  
General and governor of Gibraltar). A Roman Catholic, Kirkpatrick was educated at  
Downside School from 1907 to 1914. On the outbreak of the First World War he  
                                                     
670 Taken from the Obituary of Gladwyn Jebb in The Independent dated 25 October 1996. 
327 
 
volunteered for active service and was commissioned in November 1914 in the Royal  
Inniskilling Fusiliers. Severely wounded in action against the Turks in August 1915, he  
was accepted by Balliol College, Oxford, but chose to resume his war service  
early in 1916 when he was employed in propaganda and intelligence activities.  
 
Kirkpatrick was said to have had an incisive mind, and to be a quick thinker. He  
was promoted second secretary in December 1920 and first secretary in October 1928.  
During the 1930s his postings gave Kirkpatrick first-hand experience of dealing with the  
emerging European dictatorships: three years in Rome, from 1930 to 1933, were  
followed by a transfer to Berlin in August 1933 as head of Chancery, where he  
remained until December 1938. These years proved the most formative part of his  
career, imbuing him with a deep loathing for totalitarian dictatorships of both the Nazi  
and Communist variants. Remembered by his friend and contemporary Gladwyn Jebb  
 as a ‘very brave and forthright man’ who was unafraid of ‘speaking his mind to his  
own superiors’.  
 
During the Second World War Kirkpatrick was once again employed in the propaganda  
And information work which he had so relished twenty-five years earlier. Appointed  
director of the foreign division of the Ministry of Information in April 1940, he became 
controller of the European services of the BBC in October 1941. Here he made a major  
contribution which included the task of interviewing Hitler's deputy, Rudolf Hess,  
following Hess's flight to Scotland in May 1941. In September 1944 Kirkpatrick was  
appointed to organize elements of the Allied Control Commission for Germany, and  
following the end of the war he served at supreme allied headquarters as British  
political adviser to General Eisenhower until that organisation's disbandment. By the  
time he returned to the Foreign Office he had become convinced not only that the  
USSR was aggressively expansionist, but that Britain's post-war difficulties overseas  
were being ‘deliberately aggravated by a savage Soviet campaign of anti-British  
propaganda’ and that Britain should respond accordingly. 
  
Appointed assistant under-secretary responsible for information work in August 1945,  
Kirkpatrick was instrumental in the creation of the information policy machinery which  
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served the Foreign Office during the cold war. Promoted deputy under-secretary in  
April 1948, he oversaw policy administration for western Europe and then in February  
1949 became permanent under-secretary overseeing the German section of the  
Foreign Office, the former ‘Control Office for Germany and Austria’. Both postings  
brought him into close contact with Ernest Bevin, for whom he had the greatest 
respect and affection. 
 
Between June 1950 and November 1953 Kirkpatrick was British high commissioner in  
Germany and, as one of the three joint sovereigns of western Germany, carried  
immense responsibility particularly with respect to the negotiation of the Bonn  
conventions during 1951–2, which terminated the occupation regime and (in parallel)  
prepared the way for the rearmament of West Germany.  
 
Kirkpatrick returned to London in November 1953 to succeed Sir William Strang as  
PUS in the Foreign Office.  
 
Robert Hamilton ("R.H.") Bruce Lockhart 
Journalist, author, secret agent, British diplomat, Lockhart was born in Anstruther, Fife. 
He attended Fettes College in Edinburgh.  He joined the British Foreign Service and was 
posted to Moscow as Vice-Consul and was Acting British Consul-General in Moscow 
when the first Russian Revolution broke out in early 1917, but left shortly before the 
Bolshevik Revolution of October that year. He soon returned to Russia at the behest of 
Prime Minister Lloyd George and Lord Milner as the United Kingdom's first envoy to 
the Bolsheviks (Russia) in January 1918. 
 During the Second World War, Lockhart became director-general of the Political 
Warfare Executive, co-ordinating all British propaganda against the Axis powers. He 
was also for a time the British liaison officer to the Czechoslovak government-in-exile. 
After the war, he resumed his writing career, becoming a long-term editor of the 
Evening Standard's Londoner's Diary, as well as lecturing and broadcasting. Sir Robert 
Hamilton Bruce Lockhart, died in 1970 at the age of 82.  
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Frank Kenyon Roberts  
Frank Roberts was educated in Bedales School (1917–20) and then Rugby School 
(1921–6). At both schools, although diminutive in stature, he excelled in games as well 
as in academic work. At Rugby his headmaster regarded him as an outstanding all-
rounder and he finished his school career by winning a scholarship to Trinity College, 
Cambridge from where he graduated in 1930 with first-class honours in both parts of 
The History tripos.  After spending the customary periods of study with academic 
families in France and Germany in order to improve his languages he took the Foreign 
Office examination in 1930.  From the first he was recognised as being exceptionally 
able, and he quickly made his mark. In November 1937 Roberts and his wife returned 
to London, where he was to serve in the Foreign Office until the last months of the 
Second World War. Still a very junior official,  Roberts was nevertheless in the thick of 
affairs as a member of the central department, dealing with European questions 
during the succession of crises just before the outbreak of war. Indeed, he acquired 
the reputation of always being on hand in the middle of the action.  For example, he 
was the official who took over to the House of Commons the telegram that enabled Mr 
Chamberlain to announce with high drama the invitation to meet Hitler at Munich in 
1938. In March 1939 he was dealing with Polish affairs when Chamberlain made his 
abrupt change of policy and gave a guarantee to Poland after Hitler's annexation of 
Czechoslovakia. Later on in the year he accompanied Strang to Moscow for the 
negotiations that attempted unsuccessfully to enlist Russian help in stemming German 
plans for further aggressive acts. He was present in the Secretary of State's room at the 
Foreign Office on 3 September 1939 when the ultimatum ran out and Britain therefore 
came to be at war with Germany. He was the British joint secretary of the Anglo-
French war council in 1939–40. In December 1941, after Hitler's invasion of Russia, he 
was one of the small group accompanying Eden to Moscow. Later in the war he was 
largely responsible for negotiating the Azores agreement with Portugal, providing for 
the allied use of this important naval base. He was then involved in much of the 
planning for a post-war settlement that went on in the Foreign Office in 1943 and 
1944, and he was present at the Yalta conference in 1945. 
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Promoted acting counsellor, Roberts was transferred to Moscow in January 1945. The 
next three years, 1945–7, were to be perhaps the most important period of the middle 
years of his career, as it was from Moscow that—as chargé d'affaires in close 
consultation with the United States ambassador, George Kennan—he sent back to 
London his ‘Long Telegram’. The policy of containment advocated therein was shortly 
adopted and successfully carried out once it became clear that the Soviet Union was 
not willing to remain in collaboration with its wartime allies in managing the post-war 
settlement. It was when in Moscow that Roberts (who had been appointed CMG in 
1946) was spotted by Ernest Bevin and invited to become his private secretary at the 
end of 1947. In this capacity he entered once more into the centre of government 
affairs at home. He was used by Bevin as his right-hand man in discussions with the 
Russians and the Americans over the Berlin airlift in 1947 and 1948, and he proved a 
reliable and skilful negotiator. But the normal duties of a private secretary were not 
really suited to one of such an active turn of mind and, although at the time reluctant 
to leave Bevin's side, Roberts's next experience, as number two in the high commission 
in India from April 1949 to August 1951, after which he returned to London to be the 
deputy under-secretary responsible for European affairs. By this time Eden had 
returned as Foreign Secretary and Roberts, as his principal adviser on Europe, dealt 
with the whole complex of problems involved in re-establishing a sovereign state in 
West Germany and in bringing Germany into the Atlantic Alliance as a major partner of 
the Western powers.  
Brimelow’s reaction when asked about Frank Roberts was (with a gleam in his eye) “Ce 
petit phenomene”.  “I have never seen anyone with such a capacity for getting through 
work; always cheerful; bright as a button; clear-minded.  A smiling, quizzical realist 
content to make the best of the world as he found it. A superlative operator”. 671 
 
 
                                                     
671 Notes on two conversations with Lord Brimelow 20-21 April 1982.  Michael Burd.  Lord Brimelow’s 
papers, Churchill Archive Centre. 
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Harold Orme Garton Sargent   
Harold Orme Sargent was the only child of Harry Garton Sargent, a gentleman of 
independent means, and his wife, Henrietta Sarah Finnis Stud Mackinnon, whose sister 
married the fifteenth duke of Somerset. He had an unhappy childhood, both parents 
being elderly, strict, and possessive. ‘Moley’, as he was known from childhood, was 
educated at Radley College, and then spent some time in Switzerland preparing for the 
diplomatic service, which he entered in March 1906. He passed on examination in 
public law in May 1908, was promoted third secretary in October 1911, and served as 
secretary to the British delegates at the international sanitary conference in Paris, from 
November to December 1911. 
 
During the early stages of the First World War, Sargent worked in the department of 
the Foreign Office dealing with the blockade, which gave him a good grounding in 
commercial and economic affairs. In October 1917 he was promoted second secretary 
and transferred to Bern; he was promoted first secretary in April 1919. In July that year 
he was seconded to the British delegation to the peace conference at Versailles. 
Following the signature of the treaty of Versailles and the disbandment of the British 
delegation in December 1919, he remained in Paris to work with the conference of 
ambassadors, which continued to meet to discuss the problems of European security 
and reconstruction. He returned to London in November 1925. Thereafter he refused 
to attend conferences or to go abroad for any purpose.  It was thought that he 
suffered from claustrophobia in ships and aircraft.  Intelligent, informed, and 
passionate about defending British interests, he was nevertheless reserved and 
somewhat aloof with little time for social life.   In October 1926 Sargent was promoted 
counsellor and put in charge of the Foreign Office's central department, which covered 
Italy, Austria, Hungary, Yugoslavia, and the Balkans. In August 1933 he was promoted 
assistant under-secretary, with additional responsibility for relations with Germany, 
France, and Poland. Apart from official minutes, he never wrote about his time in the 
Foreign Office.  
 
There is evidence that as early as the beginning of 1930 Sargent was anxious lest 
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Germany adopt a forward foreign policy, and welcomed internal wrangles in Germany 
that could limit this. On 13 November 1934 he wrote to Winston Churchill arguing 
against Churchill's view that Hitler was plotting a war of aggression in the immediate 
future. Sargent's analysis was that Hitler hoped to achieve his purpose by playing off 
one power against the other, and isolating each power in turn, rather than by force. 
Although Britain was probably the last power on Hitler's agenda, its turn would come. 
At this stage, however, Sargent's opposition to ‘appeasement’ was by no means clear-
cut. In June 1935 he blamed the French for refusing to make a bargain with the 
Germans when it had been possible in April 1934; and in a memorandum of 21 
November 1935 he and Ralph Wigram of the central department set out the case for 
coming to terms with Germany. They argued that Britain had a choice of three policies: 
it could do nothing; it could encircle Germany; or it could come to terms with 
Germany. Despite the immense obstacles involved, they concluded that an agreement 
was desirable and hinted that concessions over the Rhineland as well as in the colonial 
sphere could pave the way for an overall settlement. This was one of the classic 
statements of appeasement, and, in effect, outlined the policy later followed by Neville 
Chamberlain when he was Prime Minister. Nevertheless, Sargent found himself 
increasingly opposed to this policy, especially after Hitler's re-militarisation of the 
Rhineland in 1936. Later, however, he regarded the Munich agreement, and the 
enthusiastic reception accorded Chamberlain on his return, as a disgrace;.  He is 
alleged to have remarked that it might have been thought that Britain had won a great 
victory rather than betrayed a small country. Perhaps because of his now well-known 
opposition to appeasement, it was only with difficulty that Sir Alexander Cadogan was 
able to secure Sargent's promotion to the post of deputy under-secretary of state in 
September 1939. 
 
Following the outbreak of the Second World War, Sargent was increasingly concerned 
at the prospect of the Soviet Union dominating a devastated post-war Europe. In 
November 1940 he advanced ideas about taking over the anti-Comintern pact and so 
attracting Italy, Japan, and Spain to the allied cause. Even after Hitler's attack on 
Russia, he was determined to limit the power of the Soviet Union: when considering 
post-war planning in 1942–3 he favoured an Anglo-French alliance in the west, and 
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two large confederations in middle Europe which could maintain a balance of power 
and control a united Germany. As the Soviet Union established puppet governments in 
eastern Europe, Sargent became increasingly alarmed and was responsible for drafting 
Churchill's telegrams to President Truman urging the Americans to make a stand over 
this.  
 
Sir John Wheeler-Bennet described Sargent, whom he knew well, as “ a survivor of a 
past age, almost an anachronism.  In appearance, tradition, conventions, standards 
and values, he was essentially Edwardian with all the elegance and elan of that 
period”. 672   Lord Brimelow said of OGS:  “’Moley’ was an absolute model of a civil 
servant: quiet, orderly, calm;  meticulous; thoughtful;  fair-minded and expeditious.  
He could get through an extraordinary amount of work, but never appeared 
ruffled”.  673   
William Strang 
William Strang674 was the son of an Essex farmer.  He was educated at Palmer's School,  
Grays, Essex, and at University College, London, from where he graduated with an  
honours degree in English language and literature in 1912. While there he won the  
Quain essay prize, and with the proceeds spent a year at the Sorbonne (University of  
Paris). On the eve of the First World War he joined the University of London Officers'  
Training Corps, and he served throughout the war.  Following demobilisation Strang  
considered an academic career, and accepted a post as English at the University of  
Hong Kong. However, he decided to enter the competition for the diplomatic service.  
He was successful, joined the service in September 1919, and a week later was posted  
to Belgrade as third secretary. Promoted second secretary in December 1920, he acted  
as chargé d'affaires in the summer of 1921 and again in spring 1922. Strang returned  
to the Foreign Office in September 1922, and for the next eight years served in the  
northern department, dealing primarily with Soviet affairs. He was attached to the  
                                                     
672Blackwell. Chapter 5, Page 55. 
673 Notes on two conversations with Lord Brimelow 20-21 April 1982.  Michael Burd.  Lord Brimelow’s 
papers, Churchill Archive Centre. 
674 Details drawn from the Oxford Dictionary of Biography 
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secretariat of the Anglo-Soviet conference in 1924, and was promoted first secretary in  
November 1925. In July 1930 he was appointed acting counsellor in Moscow, where he  
remained until October 1933, being promoted full counsellor and appointed CMG in  
1932. On his return to London, Strang was made head first of the League of Nations  
section (1933–7) and then of the central department, dealing with German affairs  
(1937–9). He accompanied Neville Chamberlain to his ill-fated meetings with Hitler at  
Berchtesgaden, Godesberg, and Munich. While increasingly sceptical of the policies  
that have come to be known as appeasement, he nevertheless worked loyally for  
Chamberlain, and the Foreign Secretary Viscount Halifax, when Sir Alexander Cadogan  
was the PUS.  In 1939, after the failure of Chamberlain's Munich agreement, Hitler  
invaded Czechoslovakia and then turned his attention to Poland. Strang was sent to  
Moscow from June to August 1939 to try, with French diplomats, to negotiate a  
tripartite alliance with Stalin to try to stop the further expansion of the Nazi  
attempt failed.  Hitler instead signed the Nazi–Soviet pact, in which Poland was to be  
partitioned and the Baltic States annexed by the Soviet Union.  
 
The war marked the second distinct phase of Strang's career. Promoted assistant  
under-secretary of state in September 1939, for four years he oversaw relations with  
occupied Europe, and in particular with the governments-in-exile in London. He  
admired the Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, and the Foreign Secretary, Anthony  
Eden, who were now both at the height of their prestige. He accompanied Eden to the  
Moscow conference in 1943, which laid the foundation for the United Nations  
Organisation and the European Advisory Commission (EAC). He was appointed British  
representative on the EAC with the personal rank of ambassador in November 1943,  
was knighted (KCMG) the same month.  
 
The post-war period saw the third phase of Strang's career as a senior diplomat. Peace  
brought with it immense problems of economic and political reconstruction, urgent  
decisions on the correct future policy for Britain. Despite the creation of the United  
Nations Organisation, meaningful co-operation with the Soviet Union seemed  
increasingly unlikely. The cold war system, shaped by Marshall aid, the Berlin blockade,  
the founding of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), and the creation of a  
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democratic West Germany, characterised the first post-war decade. For Britain  
intergovernmental co-operation to create European economic institutions (the  
Organisation for European Economic Co-operation: OEEC), political and security  
institutions (the Brussels treaty, the Council of Europe), and the building of an  
American-led Western community (especially through NATO) were the hallmarks of  
British policy. 
 
Between the defeat of Germany and early 1949 Strang was concerned with the  
reconstruction of the British-occupied zone in Germany, first as political adviser to 
Marshal Montgomery, commander-in-chief of the British army of occupation, and then  
(from November 1947) as joint PUS in the Foreign Office, in charge of the German  
section. In February 1949 he was appointed PUS of the Foreign Office and as such  was  
in charge of the Foreign Office during the Korean War (1950–53), at the time of the  
Colombo plan (1950), the defection of Guy Burgess and Donald Maclean (1951), and  
the changeover of power in the Soviet Union after the death of Stalin (1953).  
 
Lord Brimelow said of Strang that he was an:  “absolutely top flight civil servant;  clear;  
bright; meticulous.  Everyone had the highest respect for him.  He was also in Russia  
before the war and had no illusions about the Russians at all.  675 
 
Arthur William Street  
676Arthur Street was born on the Isle of Wight, the son of a licensed victualler, and was 
educated at the county school, Sandown. At the age of fifteen he went to London to 
start in the civil service as a boy clerk. Street was determined to improve his position 
by further study at King's College, London, and by 1914 he had become an established 
second division clerk at the Board of Agriculture and Fisheries. 
 
During the First World War Street served with the Inns of Court regiment, the 
Hampshire regiment, and the machine-gun corps. He fought on various fronts—mainly 
                                                     
675 Notes on two conversations with Lord Brimelow 20-21 April 1982.  Michael Burd.  Lord Brimelow’s 
papers, Churchill Archive Centre. 
676 Details drawn from Oxford Dictionary of Bibliography. 
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in the Middle East—was wounded, mentioned in dispatches, awarded the Military 
Cross, and attained the rank of major. On his return to his old department in 1919, 
Street became PS to Lord Lee of Fareham, who was so impressed with Street's ability 
that he took him with him to the Admiralty when he became First Lord in February 
1921. In 1922 Street returned to the Ministry of Agriculture as a principal. Throughout 
the thirties Street moved up rapidly in the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, serving 
as second secretary in 1936–8. He was fast gaining a reputation in Whitehall and 
beyond as a leading civil servant, who combined an intense devotion to duty with an 
ability to formulate proposals on which Ministers could make decisions on policy. 
Though much of his career was concerned with extending the sphere of administrative 
control in British life, Street was a strong individualist who believed that adversity 
could be overcome by hard work and organisation. He repudiated the ‘feather-bed’ as 
an economic symbol for the age and expressed the view that although those who 
needed help should be given it, the best form of help was to show people how they 
could do without it.  
In 1938 Street was transferred to the Air Ministry, becoming PUS and a member of the 
Air Council in 1939. A war was imminent which for the first time in history would be 
extensively fought in the air. The air marshals who formed the Air Council believed 
passionately in the importance of the Royal Air Force and they considered it Street's 
function to find the resources they deemed necessary for expansion and as a 
newcomer he had to work doubly hard to master the unfamiliar facts of a rapidly 
expanding department.  He took to his task carefully,  concerned not to overplay his 
hand, and in consequence spoke little on the Air Council. When he did intervene, 
though, it was with real authority. By intensive hard work and with his remarkable 
ability for working with other people, he convinced his fellow members of the Air 
Council that he had the interests of the Royal Air Force as much at heart as anyone. 
The air marshals found in Street an adviser and a friend to whom they could bring their 
problems with the full confidence that they would obtain guidance and inspiration. 
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John (Jack) Monro Troutbeck 
677Troutbeck, after attending Westminster School, entered Christ Church, Oxford, as a 
scholar in 1913, but his studies were interrupted by military service (1914–19) in 
Queen Victoria's Rifles and the County of London regiment. He was aide-de-camp to 
his uncle, General Sir Charles Monro, in France, at Gallipoli, and in India. Appointed 
OBE shortly after demobilisation, he returned to Oxford and completed the war-
shortened course in modern history, taking his BA in 1922 and MA in 1929. In 
November 1920 he joined the Foreign Office as a third secretary in the central 
department, which supervised relations with central Europe from Germany to Greece.  
Troutbeck had seven years' experience of foreign affairs by the time of his first 
overseas posting, in September 1927, as second secretary at Constantinople. From 
December 1931 he spent a year at the College of Imperial Defence before serving 
under Sir William Seeds as first secretary in Rio de Janeiro. Returning to the Foreign 
Office at the close of 1934, Troutbeck then worked in the American department until 
sent to the Prague legation in October 1937, again as first secretary. He assisted Basil 
Newton, the Minister, in conveying to the Czechs just how little support they could 
expect from Great Britain with regard to the Sudetenland. After the Munich agreement 
he remained in the country as chargé d'affaires until May 1939, witnessing its 
disintegration and the German invasion. This made him quick to condemn thereafter 
any policy that might be construed as appeasement. He became a CMG in January 
1939 and was promoted to acting counsellor in October that year. 
 
Apart from three months in summer 1940, Troutbeck spent the first four years of the 
Second World War on secondment from the Foreign Office to the Ministry of Economic 
Warfare, where he headed a department after attaining the grade of acting principal 
assistant secretary in January 1942. His emergence as a significant figure in foreign 
policy making dated from October 1943, when he became the adviser on Germany, co-
ordinating planning for the occupation and peace settlement. This in turn led to his 
appointment as head of the German department of the Foreign Office in spring 1945 
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and as an assistant under-secretary in June 1946. Hence Troutbeck was much involved 
in the complex evolution of British thinking on the German question from Draconian 
early schemes to reduce the birth-rate to later programmes for economic regeneration 
in the western occupied zones. Though inclined to think that Nazism sprang from deep 
within German culture, he argued from 1945 that a harsh peace would aid Soviet plans 
for a Communist take-over in Germany. 
 
Troutbeck impressed Ernest Bevin, who chose him to succeed Arnold Overton as head 
of the British Middle East office, located in Cairo, in November 1947. The original 
purpose of the office, set up in 1945, was to organize economic assistance for lands 
within the British sphere of influence (on the supposition that material progress would 
neutralize political unrest). However, the British simply could not afford to finance 
major development schemes. Essential to stability, in his view, was a settlement of the 
Palestine problem, so he concentrated on analysing intelligence and advising on 
regional strategy.  
Christopher F A Warner 
Assistant Under Secretary in the FCO in mid-1940s – reference to him in Blackwell, 
Page 149.678  Head of Northern Department 1941-6 in succession to Collier.679   He 
later became His Majesty’s Ambassador in Brussels.680 
 
According to Lord Brimelow, Warner was a:  “Winchester man;  a real intellectual;  
unmarried.  He used to spend his spare time reading detective novels to spot faults in 
construction.  He said it helped him spot errors in the drafting of minutes.  He was a 
perfectionist; but he didn’t get there the first time.  When you went to speak to him he 
would speak at great length and his thoughts would evolve as he spoke.  You had to do 
                                                     
678 Blackwell Chapter 5 Page 149. 
679 Ross, Graham.  The Foreign Office and the Kremlin:  British Documents on Anglo-Soviet Relations 
1941-45.  Page 284. 
680Dilks, David. The Diaries of Sir Alex Cadogan 1938-1945.  Published Cassell & Company, 1971.  
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things for him three times.  The amount of redrafting was exasperating.  But he was 
the kindest of men”. 681   
Geoffrey  Masterman Wilson 
Geoffrey Wilson was educated at Manchester Grammar School and then at Oriel 
College Oxford where he was a Classical Exhibitioner.  He was a staunch Quaker and a 
close friend of Stafford Cripps. In the Foreign Office’s Russia Department in the War he 
was one of only two people who had actually been to Russia.  One of his duties was to 
translate Stalin’s letters to Winston Churchill.  He was a member of the British 
delegation to Yalta where he sat directly behind Churchill to take minutes of the 
plenary sessions and to empty his ashtray of cigar butts. 
Asked by Michael Burd whether Victor Rothschild was right to describe Wilson as “a 
tireless apologist  for Soviet Russia”, Lord Brimelow said that he thought not, and Burd 
agreed that the archives seemed to bear this out and that  Wilson did his ‘utmost to 
see the Soviet side of things  but by 1945 he had become fairly disillusioned’.  Lord 
Brimelow replied: “Geoffrey was a Quaker and a pacifist.  He had had political 
ambitions at one time; was a protégé of Sir Stafford Cripps; went to Moscow for a 
time.  A lawyer by training; and a very good brain.  Quakers are generally inclined to 
see the best in others.  Geoffrey gave the Russians the benefit of the doubt whenever 
there was any doubt”.682    
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APPENDIX  3  COLD WAR CHRONOLOGY 
 
10 May 1940 Churchill becomes Prime Minister 
7 December 1941 Japan attacks Pearl Harbour and US enters War 
6 June 1944 D Day landings 
9 October 1944  Moscow conference with Stalin, Molotov, Churchill and 
Eden i.e. leaders and Foreign affairs chiefs to discuss 
Eastern Europe after the war 
6-11 February 1945  The Yalta Conference  
12 April 1945 President Roosevelt dies.  Vice President Truman 
becomes President 
7 May 1945   Germany surrenders 
8 May 1945   Victory in Europe (VE) Day 
12 May 1945 In a telegram to Truman, Churchill uses the term ‘Iron 
Curtain’  first time 
18 May 1945 Churchill writes to Attlee seeking agreement to preserve 
the Coalition until the end of the war with Japan.  Attlee 
and Bevin favourably disposed but could not get 
agreement from labour colleagues 
21 May 1945 Attlee telephones Churchill from Labour Party 
conference to say reply to PM’s proposal was negative 
23 May 1945 Churchill to the Palace to offer his resignation to the King  
26 June 1945 United Nations Charter signed by 50 nations 
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1 July 1945 Churchill gives the US the UK’s approval to drop atomic 
bomb on Japan 
11 July 1945 Orme Sargent’s first draft “Stock Taking after VE Day” 
commissioned by Eden 
15 July 1945 The Potsdam conference began.  Stalin, Churchill, 
Truman and Attlee.  
16 July 1945  US detonates/tests its first atomic bomb in New Mexico 
25 July 1945 Potsdam conference adjourned- Churchill, Eden and 
Attlee – return to UK for election 
26 July 1945 Potsdam Declaration called for unconditional surrender 
of Japan 
27 July 1945 General Election.  Labour party wins with 47.8% votes 
and 393 seats on the Commons - overall majority 146 
seats.  Clement Attlee Prime Minister. 
 5pm Attlee tells Bevin he wants him as Foreign Secretary, 
not, as expected, as Chancellor of Exchequer. 
9pm Bevin, who was to accompany Atlee to Potsdam to 
resume the Conference, called at FCO for an hour’s 
briefing on the Conference with Pierson Dixon and Oliver 
Harvey.  
28 July 1945 FCO spend day “seeing one S of S out and another in”.  
Bevin advised by his PPS of the existence of the atom 
bomb. Then flight (Bevin’s first) from Northolt to Berlin 
(Gatow).  Meeting of Big Three resumed at 10.30pm. 
29 July 1945 Potsdam continues but no meeting of Big Three as Stalin 
unwell. 
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30 July 1945 Stalin still unwell so meeting of Foreign Secretaries took 
place instead.   
31 July 1945 Stalin recovered and meeting of Big Three resumed. 
1 August 1945 Final day of Potsdam conference.   
2 August 1945   Attlee and Bevin returned from Potsdam  
6 August 1945 The first atomic (uranium) bomb was dropped on 
Hiroshima 
9 August 1945   Atomic (plutonium) bomb dropped on Nagasaki 
14 August 1945  Japanese surrender ends Second World War 
15 August 1945  Victory in Japan (VJ) Day 
2 September 1945  British media censorship officially ended 
11 September 1945 
  to 2 October   First ‘Big Three’ Foreign Ministers conference in London 
 
16-26 December 1945 Foreign Ministers conference in Moscow but fails to 
achieve agreement 
9 February 1946 Stalin’s Election speech 
22 February 1946 George Kennan’s ‘Long Telegram’ 
5 March 1946 Churchill’s Iron Curtain Speech at Fulton (without first 
clearing it with Attlee!). 
14 March 1946 Frank Roberts Telegram Section 1 in response to 
Kennan’s 
17 March 1946 Frank Roberts Telegram Section 2 in response to 
Kennan’s 
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18 March 1946 Frank Roberts Telegram Section 3 in response to 
Kennan’s 
9 April 1946    First meeting of FCO Russia Committee 
25 April-15 May 46 Second Conference of four powers – first session (US, 
Soviets, Britain and France) 
Mid-June 1946 Second conference resumed 
29 July-14 October 1946   Peace conference in Paris 
1 August 1946 Truman signs McMahon Act establishes the US Atomic 
Energy Commission  
27 September 1946 Noviko Telegram, commissioned by Molotov and 
reflecting his personal views, which picks up on the 
points in the Kennan Telegram. 
4 November to  
12 December 1946 Third conference of foreign Ministers.  Molotov refuses to 
accept proposals on Germany and Austria 
 
12 March 1947 President Truman, in a speech to Congress, sets out 
Doctrine which encapsulates the US’s Cold War policy in 
Europe and beyond  
10 March to 25 April 1947 Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers 
5 June 1947  The European Recovery Plan (Marshall Plan) announced 
by General George Marshall, US Secretary of State. 
27 June-1 July 1947 Foreign Ministers conference in Paris.  Molotov rejects 
the supranational organisation to implement the 
Marshall Plan 
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22-23 Sept 1947 Cominform (Communist Information Forum) founded by 
Stalin to draw together the Communist satellites.   
25 November-  
16 Dec 1947 Council of Foreign Ministers meets in London but ends in 
acrimony  
 
January 1948 Foreign Office establishes the Information Research 
Department (IRD) 
19 February 1948 Czechoslovakia taken over by Communists 
2 April 1948 US Congress approves plans for Marshall Aid 
14 May 1948 State of Israel created 
24 June 1948 Soviets blockade Berlin heralding the 1948-49 Berlin 
Crisis.  Roads+trains  
26 to 29 June 1948 Western Allies respond by organising the Berlin Airlift to 
carry in supplies for the West Berliners.   
25 January 1949  Comecon (Council of Mutuel Economic Assistance) set up 
by Molotov to co-ordinate satellite economic policies  
6 March 1949 Roderick Barclay appointed PPS to Ernest Bevin 
4 April 1949 North Atlantic Treaty Organisation  established in 
Washington 
4 May 1949 Agreement to end Berlin Blockade with effect from 12 
May. 
11 May 1949 Soviets lift the Berlin blockade   
28 June 1949 Yugoslavia expelled from Cominform 
29 August 1949  Soviet Union explodes its first atomic bomb 
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1 October 1949 Permanent Under-Secretary’s Committee (PUSC) 
established in Foreign Office 
October 1949   The Communist People’s Republic of China established 
December 1949 December 1949 Official Committee on Communism 
(Overseas) (AC(O)) established. 
31 January 1950 Truman announces that US will manufacture H bomb  
3 February 1950 Klaus Fuchs (British nuclear physicist) charged with 
passing nuclear secrets to Soviets 
23 February 1950 General election.  Labour returned with majority reduced 
to 5. 
1 March 1950 Klaus Fuchs found guilty and imprisoned 14 years 
25 June 1950 The Korean War begins 
9 March 1951  Ernest Bevin resigns as Foreign Secretary due to ill health 
and Herbert Morrison takes over 
14 April 1951 Ernest Bevin dies at 70 years of age 
26 October 1951 General Election.  Conservatives returned with overall 
majority of 17.  Churchill back in No 10 as Prime Minister 
28 October 1951 Eden returns to FCO as Foreign Secretary 
21 November 1951 Churchill briefed on Atlee govt work on atom bomb 
1951 Official Committee on Communism (Home) (AC(H)) 
established.  
18 February 1952  Churchill says UK will test an atom bomb later in the year 
3 October 1952 Britain detonates its first atomic device 
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4 June 1952 Churchill briefed on the damage Russians atom bomb 
could inflict on UK 
1 November 1952 US detonates the first Hydrogen bomb  
13 January 1953 Josip Broz Tito elected President of the Federal Assembly 
of Yugoslavia 
January 1953 Eisenhower inaugurated as President of the United 
States 
3 January 1953  Churchill sails to Washington for talks with Eisenhower  
5 March 1953 Stalin dies.  Khrushchev takes over 
June 1953 Soviets suppress uprising in East Germany (GDR) 
August 1953  Soviets detonate their first Hydrogen bomb 
5 April 1955 Churchill resigns 
5 April 1955 Eden succeeds Churchill as Prime Minister 
